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1.   Introduction 
 
1.1 From job security to employment security 
 
Welfare and social security systems aim to respond to labour market 
imperfections and provide income security in the event of unemployment or 
disability. After World War II, welfare states in Europe expanded and covered a 
wider range of social risks (Gerven, 2008). For many years job security was the 
ultimate goal, which implied that employees had the security of being employed 
in their current job for a long time. In 1994, the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) used the term ‘employment security’ in one of their documents. The ILO 
reported that “Employment security means that workers have protection 
against arbitrary and short-notice dismissal from employment, as well as having 
long-term contracts of employment and having employment relations that 
avoid casualisation” (Dasgupta, 2001). But, in fact, this definition refers to job 
security rather than employment security. In the recent literature various 
definitions of employment security exist, but the common feature of these 
definitions is that employment security focuses on the security to be employed 
in a suitable job, not necessarily in the same job with the same employer. In 
section 1.3.1 the concept of employment security will be further elaborated.  
 
Currently, the perception is that, in the last decades, work patterns have 
changed and employees (have to) change jobs more frequently. Companies 
change their organisation in response to globalisation and increasing 
competition which require new skills and competencies. Not all employees fit 
into the new structure of the organisation and are forced to find another job. 
Lifetime employment has had its time. In management literature, the ‘new’ 
employee relationship was introduced and is seen as an ongoing shift ‘from 
lifetime employment’ to the “boundaryless” career (Muffels, 2008; K. Stone, 
2006). Moreover, in the academic debate, and also in the policy making 
discourse, proposals were raised to replace traditional unemployment insurance 
(UI) schemes with employment insurance (EI) schemes, geared towards the 
prevention of unemployment and a smooth transition to a new job (Bovenberg 
& Wilthagen, 2009; Schmid, 2008). Schmid states in his recent book that ‘(..) the 
increasing variety of employment risks requires a move from unemployment 
insurance centred on income security for jobless people to a system of 
employment insurance centred on job-to-job security (Schmid, 2008). The shift 
from lifetime employment to lifetime employability is also emphasized in a 
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2011.1 Smooth transitions from job-to-job are necessary in a globalizing and 
profoundly changing economy and require rapid responses from national 
governments, companies and workers. Redundancy and restructuring processes 
take place in order to compete with (foreign) companies and to fulfil the needs 
of the market. The perception is that the management of companies should be 
free to adapt their businesses as the market develops. However, the European 
Commission (EC) attaches value to the social consequences of restructuring. The 
EC’s point of departure is that greater protection should be afforded to 
employees in the event of collective redundancies. Differences in the Member 
States concerning law and legislation can have an effect on the functioning of 
the common market. The EC’s aim is to take into account the need for balanced 
economic and social development within the European community. Therefore, 
the EC has formulated directives which counterbalance management’s freedom 
concerning restructuring and redundancy processes (Kempen, Patmore, Ryley, 
& Steinau-Steinrück, 2008). The first EC Directive dates from 1975 (Directive 
75/129), as a response to the oil crisis of 1973, which led to many closures and 
restructuring of companies. The underlying principle of the Directive is that 
these economic dismissals are a collective issue, to be dealt with through 
collective information and consultation rights. Article 2(1) states: ‘Where an 
employer is contemplating collective redundancy, he shall begin consultations 
with the worker representatives in good time with a view to reaching an 
agreement’. Specifically, the employer is required to consider alternatives to 
dismissal. The consultation required ‘shall, at least, cover ways and means of 
avoiding collective redundancy or reducing the number of workers affected, and 
of mitigating the consequences.’   
 
Employment protection legislation, which provides employees with job security, 
is still, without doubt, an important feature which influences employment 
security systems. Today, all OECD countries have laws to protect employees 
against arbitrary dismissal. According to Allard, the reason for the introduction 
of these laws is that employees should be protected against the bigger 
corporations and against the uncertainty of changing labour market situations 
(Allard, 2005). Employment protection rules include, for instance, procedural 
requirements, notice and severance pay requirements, and prevailing standards 
and penalties for unfair dismissals. The employment protection of employees 
varies across countries and can influence the extent to which job mobility occurs. 
It can be hypothesized that, in countries with strict employment protection 
legislation (EPL), the dismissal costs are high, which ultimately will result in 

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avoiding dismissals. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) investigated a large amount of theoretical literature that 
looks at the impact of firing restrictions on labour flows. Strict employment 
protection should reduce worker flows, because companies will reduce both job 
creation and destruction. However, the effect on average employment levels is 
ambiguous (OECD, 2010b). Moreover, if the use of temporary contracts is less 
regulated, while strict employment regulations are maintained for open-ended 
contracts, employers will substitute temporary for permanent employees owing 
to lower costs involved with the termination of the employment relationship at 
the end of a temporary contract. The OECD tried to shed some light on the 
question as to whether strong firing restrictions influence the probability for 
displaced workers to find another job. Although the OECD had to work with 
incomplete data, they cautiously conclude that in a normal economic situation, 
not in a crisis, those workers who are declared to be redundant as a result of 
reducing the employment protection rules for regular workers, but who would 
not have been displaced without the reform, are likely to find another job within 
a relatively short period of time (OECD, 2010b). However, the OECD notes that 
this does not imply that employment protection reforms would not increase the 
number of displaced workers that experience short unemployment spells after 
they have been given notice. Those workers, who would have not been 
dismissed in the absence of amendments towards a more flexible employment 
protection legislation, might find a new job very quickly, but they will 
nonetheless suffer from an income loss during the possible unemployment spell, 
and in the new job associated with involuntary mobility (OECD, 2010b). 
 
With the enlargement of the European Union with new Member States, a fresh 
Directive was published in 1992 (Directive 92/56) and consolidated in 1998 
(Directive 98/59) (Kempen et al., 2008). A requirement in the Directive is that 
employee representatives must be informed about the dismissals. The written 
notification should include the reasons for the dismissal, the number and 
categories of workers to be made redundant, the number and categories of the 
normally employed, the period during which redundancy is to be effected, the 
selection criterion for those workers to be made redundant, and the method 
used to calculate compensation. The consultation procedure aims firstly at 
avoiding redundancy or reducing the number of employees affected and, 
secondly, at mitigating consequences and introducing social measures (Kempen 
et al., 2008). 
 
In 2002, the European Union adopted the Lisbon Agenda. In this strategy the EU 
set itself the goal “to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-
based economy in the world, capable of sustainable growth with more and 
better jobs and greater social cohesion”. The EC states that “in order to achieve 
the Lisbon objectives new forms of flexibility and security are needed, for 
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In 2002, the European Union adopted the Lisbon Agenda. In this strategy the EU 
set itself the goal “to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-
based economy in the world, capable of sustainable growth with more and 
better jobs and greater social cohesion”. The EC states that “in order to achieve 
the Lisbon objectives new forms of flexibility and security are needed, for 
individuals, companies as well as for Member States and the European Union” 
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(European Commission, 2007, p.8). As of 2006, flexicurity appeared on the 
European policy agenda and was heavily discussed both in the policy and 
academic arena (Bekker, 2011). Flexicurity is a conjunction of flexibility and 
security and has the double goal of simultaneously enhancing labour market 
flexibility and labour market security both for companies and employees 
(Wilthagen, 2004). In July 2006, the EC appointed a number of academic experts 
from several Member States to be part of the flexicurity expert group. In view of 
the differences in countries’ practices, the EU did not believe in a ‘one-size-fits-
all’ approach. The main objective of this expert group was to advise the EC on 
preconditions for flexicurity, various starting positions and flexicurity pathways 
(Bekker, 2011). In June 2007, the Communication “Towards Common Principles 
of Flexicurity: more and better jobs through flexibility and security” came out. In 
this document the EC formulated a set of pathways on flexicurity, taking into 
account the preceding work of the European Expert Group on Flexicurity. In the 
foreword, Commissioner Špidla states that rather than job security, flexicurity 
focuses on ‘employment security’. Employment security means staying in 
employment, within the same enterprise or into a new enterprise. The 
philosophy behind flexicurity is that workers are more prepared to make moves 
from one job into another if there is a good safety net (European Commssion, 
2007, p.7). In this Communication the following four policy components of 
flexicurity were addressed: flexible and reliable contractual arrangements, 
comprehensive lifelong learning (LLL), effective active labour market policies 
(ALMP) and modern social security systems. Furthermore, the EC formulated 
eight common principles of flexicurity which should help Member States to 
develop their own flexicurity strategy which fully takes into account their own 
challenges, opportunities and circumstances. The proposed principles are 
presented in table 1.1. Common principle five, which states that “Sufficient 
flexibility in recruitment and dismissal must be accompanied by secure 




Table 1.1: Common principles of flexicurity 
Common principles 
1 Flexicurity involves flexible and reliable contractual arrangements (from the 
perspective of the employer and the employee, of insiders and outsiders); 
comprehensive lifelong learning strategies; effective active 
labour market policies; and modern social security systems. Its objective is to 
reinforce the implementation of the Growth and Jobs Strategy, create more 
and better jobs, and strengthen the European social models, by providing 
new forms of flexibility and security to increase adaptability, employment 
and social cohesion. 
2 Flexicurity implies a balance between rights and responsibilities for 
employers, workers, jobseekers and public authorities. 
3 Flexicurity should be adapted to the specific circumstances, labour markets 
and industrial relations of the Member States. Flexicurity is not about one 
single labour market model or a single policy strategy. 
4 Flexicurity should reduce the divide between insiders and outsiders on the 
labour market. Current insiders need support to be prepared for and 
protected during job-to-job transitions. Current outsiders including those out 
of work, where women, the young and migrants are over-represented, need 
easy entry points to work and stepping-stones to enable progress into stable 
contractual arrangements. 
5 Internal (within the enterprise) as well as external (from one enterprise to 
another) flexicurity should be promoted. Sufficient flexibility in recruitment 
and dismissal must be accompanied by secure transitions from job-to-job. 
Upward mobility needs to be facilitated, as well as between unemployment 
or 
inactivity and work. High-quality workplaces with capable leadership, good 
organisation of work, and continuous upgrading of skills are part of the 
objectives of flexicurity. Social protection needs to support, not inhibit, 
mobility. 
6 Flexicurity should support gender equality by promoting equal access to 
quality employment for women and men, and by offering possibilities to 
reconcile work and family life as well as providing equal opportunities to 
migrants, young, disabled and older workers. 
7 Flexicurity requires a climate of trust and dialogue between public authorities 
and social partners, where all are prepared to take responsibility for change, 
and produce balanced policy packages. 
8 Flexicurity policies have budgetary costs and should be pursued also with a 
view to contribute to sound and financially sustainable budgetary policies. 
They should also aim at a fair distribution of costs and benefits, especially 
between businesses, individuals and public budgets, with particular attention 
to the specific situation of SMEs. At the same time, effective flexicurity 
policies can contribute to such an overall objective. 
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to the specific situation of SMEs. At the same time, effective flexicurity 
policies can contribute to such an overall objective. 
Source: (European Commission, 2007) 
INTRODUCTION 
18 
In June 2010, the Lisbon strategy was replaced by the EU2020 agenda: A 
strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. The Lisbon strategy 
evaluation document by the European Commission states that “Overall, the 
Lisbon Strategy has had a positive impact on the EU even though its main 
targets (i.e. 70% employment rate, and 3% of GDP spent on R&D) will not be 
reached. The EU employment rate reached 66% in 2008 (from 62% in 2000) 
before the employment rate dropped back again as a result of the crisis” 
(European Commission, 2010a, p.3). Between the launch of the Lisbon agenda 
and the introduction of the EU2020 agenda, the economic and employment 
situation changed drastically. In 2002, the unemployment rates in Europe were 
relatively low, the economy was growing, and shortages of labour occurred in 
several sectors in the following years. The turmoil of the global financial crisis of 
2008, was a turning point, since which the economy has declined, unemploy-
ment has risen in all European countries and governments are forced to make 
cut backs. Implementing flexicurity principles and enabling people to acquire 
new skills to adapt to new conditions and potential career shifts, are at the top of 
the EU2020 agenda. High levels of employment, productivity and social 
cohesion should be reached by 2020. As previously explained, flexicurity, i.e., 
combining flexibility with employment security and reducing labour market 
segmentation, was already at the core of the Lisbon strategy (Commission of 
the European Communities, 2007) and it will remain so in the current times of 
crisis and after 2011 (European Commission, 2010). As mentioned earlier, 
employment security differs from job security. But what is employment 
security? How can employment security be provided and organized within a 
dynamic labour market and economy? In the next section I will present the 
research problem leading to the research questions of this thesis. Subsequently, 
several relevant theories, definitions, and the analytical framework will be 
fleshed out (section 1.3). The research design, including the methodological 
considerations behind the selection of countries, and the method of data 
collection, is further discussed in section 1.4. This introductory chapter concludes 
with an outline of this thesis (1.5). 
 
1.2 Research questions 
 
Sufficient flexibility regarding hiring and firing should go hand in hand with 
securing transitions from job-to-job. In the Netherlands, and in other countries, 
there is a growing awareness that a job for life cannot be guaranteed any longer 
in a globalizing world. Both in the academic and policy discourse, attention is 
paid to employment security rather than, or in addition to, job security. From a 
social point of view it is important to know what employment security is and 
how employment security can be implemented. This research is about 
employment security systems in Europe, with a specific focus on forced job-to-
job transitions, i.e. workers who have to make a transition to another job, 
because they will lose their current job for economic reasons. Different job-to-
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job systems and arrangements for redundant employees in four European 
countries will be analysed in-depth throughout this study and, in a second stage, 
compared with the Dutch system or arrangements. A similar in-depth inter-
national comparison has never been conducted before.  
The exploration, description and explanation of the ‘status quo’ of employment 
security systems in four European countries and a comparison with the Dutch 
practice are the main purposes of this dissertation. The comparison is relevant in 
relationship to the lessons the Netherlands can learn from these foreign 
developments and experiences.  
 
The main research question of this thesis is: 
 
What kind of systems or arrangements can be distinguished in European countries 
in order to enhance employment security for redundant employees, how can 
differences and similarities between those systems be explained and what lessons 
can possibly be learned from a Dutch policy perspective? 
 
The main research question requires the following operational research 
questions: 
1. Are there systematic ‘job-to-job’ systems or arrangements in Europe? And, if 
so, what are the key characteristics of these systems?  
2. Are these systems successful in practice? What are the relevant  preconditions 
for the ‘job-to-job’ arrangements to be successful? 
 
In order to answer the main and the operational research questions an empirical 
study has been carried out. In the following section, the concept of employment 
security systems and the theoretical framework of policy learning will be further 
elaborated (section 1.3). Definitions of these concepts are necessary in order to 
provide clarity as to their meaning within the framework of this study.  
 
1.3 Theory, definitions and analytical model 
 
In this section operational definitions and the focus of this research will be 
further specified. First, the term ‘employment security’ will be operationalized 
(section 1.3.1). Subsequently, several relevant theories leading to a definition 
and an analytical framework of employment security systems are discussed 
(section 1.3.2). This section concludes with a theoretical discussion and an 
analytical framework of lesson drawing, policy learning and policy transfer 
(1.3.3). 
 
1.3.1 Employment security  
What is meant by ‘employment security’ in this study? Over the last years, in the 
literature, various kinds of employment security definitions have been used. 
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job systems and arrangements for redundant employees in four European 
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The exploration, description and explanation of the ‘status quo’ of employment 
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practice are the main purposes of this dissertation. The comparison is relevant in 
relationship to the lessons the Netherlands can learn from these foreign 
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and an analytical framework of employment security systems are discussed 
(section 1.3.2). This section concludes with a theoretical discussion and an 
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1.3.1 Employment security  
What is meant by ‘employment security’ in this study? Over the last years, in the 
literature, various kinds of employment security definitions have been used. 
Wilthagen and Tros combined the dimensions of flexicurity and security in a 
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flexicurity matrix in order to analyse, identify, and indicate developments within 
both flexibility and security. Wilthagen and Tros argue that “the matrix can serve 
as a heuristic tool to empirically trace flexicurity policies as specific trade-offs or 
at least interconnections between certain types of flexibility and certain types of 
security” (Wilthagen & Tros, 2004). In this matrix security is divided into four 
types (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions, 2008): 
1. job security: this concerns the expectation of a high job tenure in relation to a 
specific job; 
2. employment security refers to the degree of certainty of a worker to remain at 
work, even if the worker does not necessarily choose the same employer; 
3. income security relates to the protection of income in the case of such 
occurrences as illness, unemployment or maternity, which can involve a 
break in paid work; 
4. combination security is the possibility for workers to combine paid work with 
their private life and social responsibilities, such as family duties or 
recreational activities. 
 
This flexicurity matrix is portrayed in figure 1.1.  
 












flexibility (hiring and 
firing) 




    
Functional flexibility 
(employability) 
    
Labour cost/wage 
flexibility 
    
Source: (Wilthagen and Tros, 2004) 
 
Thus, in this perspective employment security is linked to four forms of flexibility 
commonly distinguished in the literature, i.e., external numerical flexibility, 
internal numerical flexibility, functional flexibility, and labour cost or wage 
flexibility. In this thesis, the main focus is on employment security relating to 





Evers et al., make a distinction between three types of unemployment 
prevention. The first type is ‘primary prevention’ which implies prevention of 
unemployment before a real threat occurs. The best prevention is a healthy 
business, so that the employer does not have to restructure. ‘Secondary 
prevention’ refers to a real threat of redundancy (five-to-twelve scenario). At this 
stage measures are taken to avoid forced dismissals. In the event of ‘tertiary 
prevention’ redundant employees have been dismissed and become 
unemployed. In this phase the preventative measures are geared to avoid long-
term unemployment (Evers, Wilthagen, & Borghouts, 2004). The secondary 
prevention phase can be subdivided into two categories: the phase of threat of 
redundancy and the period in which employees are under notice. The former 
refers to the stage where the employer has not yet filed for dismissals and the 
measures taken are geared to avoid forced dismissals. In the latter, when forced 
dismissals are inevitable, the employer starts the dismissal procedure. In this 
stage the employees are under notice, but not yet unemployed. Figure 1.2 
presents a further elaboration of the several phases in unemployment 
prevention.  
 
Figure 1.2: Different phases in unemployment prevention 
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Active re-integration measures and support 
 
This study explicitly focuses on the curative measures geared to direct job-to-job 
transitions (phase 3 in figure 1.2), while the other forms can be considered as 
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Active re-integration measures and support 
 
This study explicitly focuses on the curative measures geared to direct job-to-job 
transitions (phase 3 in figure 1.2), while the other forms can be considered as 
preventative measures. However, it should be emphasized that the preventative 
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measures and curative measures are interdependent. For instance, investments 
in education and training in order to achieve more functional flexibility in the 
company will subsequently also contribute to a smoother transition from job-to-
job in the event of redundancy.  
 
Wilthagen and Tros were not the first scholars to use the term ‘employment 
security’. In the late nineties of the last century, the term generally referred to 
the insecurity and protection against unfair or unjustified dismissals. As 
mentioned in the previous section, the ILO used the term ‘employment security’ 
in 1994, stating that employment security implies that employees have 
protection against arbitrary and short-notice dismissal, as well as having long-
term contracts of employment (Dasgupta, 2001). In the ILO definition, 
employment security covers only one category of the labour market, i.e. the 
workers, and Dasgupta argued that this definition becomes problematic when a 
large part of the workforce is self-employed. Another narrow definition of 
employment security that covers only ‘the insiders’ – those workers already 
having a job - comes from the European Foundation for the Improvement of 
Living and Working conditions, that states: “Employment security takes into 
account the degree of certainty of a worker to remain at work, even if the worker 
does not necessarily choose the same employer” (European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2008). Another definition in 
analogy to Wilthagen (2004) is the definition used by Muffels and Luijkx. They 
formulate employment security as to retain secure employment over time but 
not necessarily in the same job with the same employer (Muffels & Luijkx, 2008). 
In its definition of employment security the European Commission puts the 
emphasis on training for people in order to develop their skills. “Security means 
‘employment security’- to provide people with the training they need to keep 
their skills up-to-date and to develop their talents as well as providing them with 
adequate unemployment benefits if they were to lose their job for a period of 
time” (European Commission, 2007). According to the EC flexicurity aims at 
ensuring that EU citizens can enjoy a high level of employment security and 
gives the following example: “the possibility to easily find a job at every stage of 
active life and have a good prospect for career development in a quickly 
changing economic environment” (European Commission, 2007).  
The Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) defines employment 
security as follows2 (WRR, 2007): “Employment security means that individuals 
have the confidence, based on their experience, that if necessary they will be 
able to continue their employment career, either in another job with their 
current employer or in another job with another employer. Furthermore, 

2  In their communication the WRR translates the Dutch word for employment security 
(werkzekerheid) as ‘job-security’. 
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employment security means that people currently (temporarily) outside the 
labour force can have the confidence of being able to enter or return to the 
labour market.” The WRR employment security definition covers not only 
people who already participate in the labour market, but also people who are 
(temporarily) outside the labour market. Thus, employment security differs from 
job security. Hence, the definition of employment security could best be 
described as:  
 
The possibility for the unemployed or inactive persons to make the transition from 
unemployment to employment (reintegration/activation) and the possibility for 
workers to remain employed not necessarily in the same job with the same 
employer (job-to-job transitions) (Borghouts, 2010)  
 
From a research point of view it is important to understand that the above 
mentioned definition of employment security distinguishes two target groups: 
persons employed (insiders) and the unemployed (outsiders). In this dissertation 
the focus is on the second part of the above described employment security 
definition: the job-to-job transitions. Specifically, the focus will be on involuntary 
job-to-job transitions for those employees whose jobs are at risk. The transition 
from inactivity to employment falls outside the scope of this thesis. Lifelong 
learning and the development of skills by training are key methods or conditions 
to achieve employment security and will be addressed in the following chapters, 
but they are not components of the employment security definition as such in 
this thesis. In addition to a description of job-to-job policies, this thesis deals 
with the explanation of employment security systems in which several actors 
play a crucial role. 
 
1.3.2 Employment security systems  
Now that employment security has been defined and delimited to redundant 
employees, in this section what is meant by an employment security system is 
discussed. In the broadest conception, the term ‘system’ is defined as “a set of 
objects together with relationships between the objects and between their 
attributes” (Hall & Fagen, 1956). This definition is still very general, so Hall and 
Fagen elaborated the terms objects, relationship and attributes. In their opinion, 
objects are the parts or components of the system, attributes are properties of 
the components and relationships are those that “tie the system together”. In 
systems theory, the term ‘system’ connotes a complex of interacting 
components, together with the relationships among them, that permit the 
identification of a boundary-maintaining entity or process (Laszlo & Krippner, 
1998). To put it briefly, a system is a collection of parts that interact with each 
other to function as a whole. There are different kinds of systems: mechanical 
systems, ecological systems, human systems. For example, the human body is 
made up of different organs which interact with each other. Systems are 
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learning and the development of skills by training are key methods or conditions 
to achieve employment security and will be addressed in the following chapters, 
but they are not components of the employment security definition as such in 
this thesis. In addition to a description of job-to-job policies, this thesis deals 
with the explanation of employment security systems in which several actors 
play a crucial role. 
 
1.3.2 Employment security systems  
Now that employment security has been defined and delimited to redundant 
employees, in this section what is meant by an employment security system is 
discussed. In the broadest conception, the term ‘system’ is defined as “a set of 
objects together with relationships between the objects and between their 
attributes” (Hall & Fagen, 1956). This definition is still very general, so Hall and 
Fagen elaborated the terms objects, relationship and attributes. In their opinion, 
objects are the parts or components of the system, attributes are properties of 
the components and relationships are those that “tie the system together”. In 
systems theory, the term ‘system’ connotes a complex of interacting 
components, together with the relationships among them, that permit the 
identification of a boundary-maintaining entity or process (Laszlo & Krippner, 
1998). To put it briefly, a system is a collection of parts that interact with each 
other to function as a whole. There are different kinds of systems: mechanical 
systems, ecological systems, human systems. For example, the human body is 
made up of different organs which interact with each other. Systems are 
situated in an environment. In literature the term ‘environment’ is defined as ‘the 
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set of all objects a change in whose attributes affect the system and also those 
objects whose attributes are changed by the behaviour of the system’ (Hall & 
Fagen, 1956). The environment of a system contains three levels of purpose, 
according to Ackoff (1981 in (Laszlo & Krippner, 1998)): “the purpose of the 
system, of its parts, and of the system of which it is a part, the suprasystem”. In 
order to completely specify the environment of a specific system we need to 
know all the factors that affect or are affected by the system. This problem is, 
according to Hall and Fagen (Hall & Fagen, 1956), in general as difficult as the 
complete specification of the system itself. The definition of the environment 
raises the question as to when an object belongs to a system and when it 
belongs to the environment. A given system can also be further subdivided into 
subsystems, and every system has its own purpose. Objects can belong to one 
system, but can also be considered as part of the environment of another 
subsystem. 
 
This thesis deals with employment security systems, i.e. the interaction between 
several actors within a certain institutional and environmental context leading to 
job-to-job policies or arrangements for redundant employees. In other words, 
this dissertation goes beyond a description of the developed job-to-job policies 
and arrangements. In the 1970s, Gilbert and Specht distinguished three 
analytical perspectives in their analysis regarding social welfare policy: process, 
product and performance. They argued that the set of policy choices (product) 
evolves from interactions and relationships among various political, govern-
mental and other organized collectivities (process). The performance refers to 
the description and evaluation of the programmatic outcomes of policy choices. 
Moreover, Gilbert and Specht emphasized that these perspectives are in reality 
“overlapping and interrelated” (Gilbert & Specht, 1974). Thus, processes in which 
actors interact play an important role in the development and analysis of job-to-
job arrangements. Therefore, actors form a part of the employment security 
system. Following on Gilbert and Specht, the actor-centered institutionalism 
theory developed by Mayntz and Scharpf provides a theoretical framework in 
which they connect the actor and the institutional perspective in relation to 
policy research. This analytical framework on policy research can be considered 
as a conceptual lens through which employment security systems can be 
studied. Mayntz and Scharpf argue that an analysis of structures without 
reference to actors is as handicapped as an analysis of actors’ behaviour without 
reference to structures (Lieshout, 2008). As Scharpf emphasizes, the behaviour 
and action of primary actors is the proximate cause of policy developments and 
policy changes. This implies that policies and systems are to be considered in 
relation to the primary actors involved (Scharpf, 1997).  
 
Derived from work by Gilbert and Specht, Scharpf and Mayntz, and Thompson 
et al., figure 1.3 presents the analytical model for describing and explaining 
employment security systems in different countries. This analytical model starts 
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from the assumption that several factors influence the emergence of job-to-job 
policies. It includes the interaction between several actors within a certain 
institutional and environmental context. These interactions can lead to job-to-
job policies or arrangements for redundant employees. This analytical model will 
be used in this thesis and further clarified in the remaining part of this section. 
 
Figure 1.3: Analytical model for describing and explaining employment security 
systems 
 
Derived and adapted from Scharpf (1997), Gilbert & Specht (1974), and Thomson et 
al. (1991) 
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own self - interest; but they are not assumed to be perfectly rational. Many 
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organisation (Scharpf, 1997). This study focuses on composite actors such as 
trade unions, employers associations, Public Employment Services and the 
state, rather than on individuals acting on their own account. The strategies, i.e., 
the courses of action of different composed actors, are often interdependent: 
the outcomes of a particular strategy chosen by an actor will simultaneously 
depend upon the choices of other actors (Scharpf, 1997). Each actor has its own 
capabilities, i.e., action resources that allow an actor to influence an outcome in 
certain respects and to a certain degree. For example: personal qualities and 
competencies, physical resources, technological capability and privileged access 
to information.  
 
The orientations are the characteristic perceptions and preferences of a 
particular actor. Since no single actor in an employment security system can 
determine the outcome unilaterally, the actor constellation is important. Actor-
centered institutionalism assumes the interaction among policy actors. Scharpf 
emphasizes the distinction between non-cooperative and cooperative actor 
constellations. The latter refers to the possibility of coming to an agreement 
among the actors before they choose their strategy. In a non-cooperative 
constellation each actor must select his strategy before knowing the strategy 
choice of the other (simultaneous game), or one player must choose first, and 
the next actor will proceed in the knowledge of that choice (Scharpf, 1997). In 
reality, both non-cooperative games of pure conflict (one side gains what the 
other will lose) and of pure coordination (all actors maximize their own payoffs 
by agreeing on concerted strategies) are rare, while so-called mixed-motive 
games (preferences of the players are partly harmonious and partly in conflict) 
are more common. In 1950, Flood and Dresher presented a simple ‘non-
cooperative’ game. This game became known as the ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’, was 
based on a scenario presented by Albert Tucker, and is nowadays the most 
famous mixed-motive game (Clements & Stephens, 1995). The two players can 
choose between two moves, either ‘cooperate’ or ‘defect’. The idea is that each 
player gains when both cooperate, but if only one of them cooperates, the other 
one, who defects, will gain more. If both defect, both lose (or gain very little) but 
not as much as the ‘cheated’ cooperator whose cooperation is not returned. The 
‘Prisoners dilemma’ is exemplified by two suspects arrested by the police. The 
police separate the suspects because of insufficient evidence for a conviction 
and visit each of them offering the same deal: a reduced sentence for confessing 
unilaterally. Cooperating means here not-confessing. If one testifies for the 
prosecution against the other (defects) and the other did not say anything 
(cooperates), the defector goes free and the silent suspect receives the full 10 
year sentence. If both cooperate and say anything to the police, both prisoners 
are punished by only six months in jail for a minor charge. If each betrays the 
other, each receives a 5 year sentence. Jointly, they would be best off by both 
not confessing, which means that each suspect would choose to go for the 
cooperation strategy. However, at the individual level, regardless of what the 
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other suspect does, they would be better off by defecting, which here means 
confession.  
 
As Scharpf puts it, actor constellations are meant to represent what we know 
about the set of actors that are actually involved in particular policy interactions. 
This involves their strategies, the outcomes associated with strategy 
combinations, and their preferences. This constellation of actors is rather static, 
while the actual interactions of these actors can vary to a large extent (Scharpf, 
1997). Scharpf distinguishes four basic modes of interaction: ‘unilateral action’, 
‘negotiated agreements’, ‘majority vote’, and ‘hierarchical determination’. The 
first was the assumed mode of interaction in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The 
suspects could not consult each other and had to act on their own. The 
‘unilateral action’ changes into ‘negotiated agreements’ when communication 
between the actors is allowed. Decisions can also be reached by ‘majority vote’. 
Under the majority role the objections of a dissenting minority can be overruled 
(Scharpf, 1997). ‘Hierarchical authority’ creates a capacity to override the 
preferences of other actors (Scharpf, 1997).  
 
Job-to-job policies or activities thus evolve from the actor constellation in 
relationship with their modes of interaction. Coordination is needed to achieve 
efficient job-to-job policies and activities. Without coordination actors might 
have different and potentially conflicting objectives which could lead to 
inefficiency or the absence of job-to-job policies. According to Thompson et al., 
“Coordination implies the bringing into a relationship otherwise disparate 
activities or events. Tasks and efforts can be made compatible by coordinating 
them. Bottlenecks and disjunctures can be eliminated, so coordination is usually 
discussed under a sign of efficiency. By coordinating a set of items something 
can be achieved which otherwise would not be. It is the positive performative 
consequence of coordination that makes it such an attractive social practice and 
objective” (Thompson, Frances, Levačić, & Mitchell, 1991).  
 
In their work Thompson et al. distinguish three models of coordination 
mechanisms: the market, hierarchies and networks. In the first approach 
consumers or clients ‘choose independently how they will deploy their spending 
power and in turn this will lead to the correct allocation of resources to meet 
those consumer needs’. A hierarchy refers to superordination and subordination 
in the process of coordination. “The administration of a hierarchy is by the 
operationalizing of a set of rules” (Thompson et al., 1991). The hierarchy 
approach refers to firms or organizations in which the management of the 
organization divides up tasks and positions and establishes an authorative 
system of order (Powell, 1991). According to Thompson et al., these rules in the 
form of orders, statutes and the like are designed to ‘govern’ the organization in 
question, which either can be a public or private one (Thompson et al., 1991). 
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network. In contrast to the vertical organized hierarchical forms discussed 
above, a network is considered to be a ‘flat’ organizational form with informal 
relationships between essentially equal social agents and agencies (Thompson 
et al., 1991). Powell explains that networks can be complex, and many scholars 
apply different definitions of a network. In the literature a network is described 
as a form of dense interorganizational relationships, but as Powell argues 
networks can also evolve out of personal ties, or market relationships among 
various parties (Powell, 1991). Networks can exist within organisations, between 
similar organisations or between different organisations or actors. In essence, 
the central coordinating mechanism of the market is price competition, while 
administrative orders are the central coordination mechanism of hierarchies. 
Trust, loyalty and cooperation are the main preconditions for networks. In 
addition to the three coordination mechanisms presented thus far, a fourth 
model can be distinguished: the state or the government. Levačić states that 
“Markets are the arena where the choices of individual economic agents 
determine allocation and distribution; government is the prime embodiment of 
collective choice” (Levačić, 1991). If the market fails to allocate goods and 
services in an efficient way, the government can intervene, e.g. through taxes 
and subsidies, regulation or public sector production (Thompson et al., 1991). 
The state can initiate and allocate job-to-job services and there is a considerable 
variety of ways in which the government can provide, finance and produce or 
outsource these services.  
 
In addition, Streeck and Schmitter suggest that there is another distinctive basis 
of coordination: the associations. The guiding principle of interaction and 
allocation for associations is “organizational concertation or negotiation within 
and among a limited and fixed set of interest organizations that recognize each 
other’s status and entitlements and are capable of reaching and implementing 
relatively stable compromises (pacts) in their pursuit of their interest” (Streeck & 
Schmitter, 1991). Associations are organisations established by their common 
purpose of defending or promoting functionally defined interests, i.e. class, 
sectoral and professional associations (Streeck & Schmitter, 1991). Interactions 
involve the relationships between the associations and their members and their 
interlocutors, i.e. outside actors whose resources or support are necessary for 
the concerted compromise to take effect, e.g. state agencies (Streeck & 
Schmitter, 1991). Besides the above forms of coordination mechanisms, Streeck 
and Schmitter identified another mechanism: the community. Communities are 
based on spontaneous solidarity and can also provide forms of security, 
especially income and combination security. However, communities are less 
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influential in providing employment security at the workplace.3 Therefore, 
communities will not be discussed any further in this thesis. This study focuses 
on job-to-job policies or activities which can be coordinated by negotiations 
between associations (e.g., social partners, i.e., trade unions and employers’ 
associations), by networks (e.g., networks of firms, clients or suppliers), 
hierarchies (i.e., individual firms), and the state (legislation, enforcement, 
funding, subsidies) or by markets. Figure 1.4 presents a second matrix that 
entails the coordination mechanisms identified above, the crucial conditions for 
their operation in general and the forms of security the mechanisms can provide 
in particular. 
 
Figure 1.4: Security Coordination Mechanisms Matrix 

























































































Source: (Borghouts-van de Pas & Wilthagen, 2009)  
 
Above, the process of policy formulation in which the interrelationship between 
actors and their modes of actions play an important role was discussed. By 
coordinating this process policies and activities can be developed. As mentioned 
previously, Gilbert and Specht use the term ‘product’ for a set of policy choices. 
Gilbert and Specht distinguish four (policy) choices which are relevant for 
describing, analyzing and comparing social welfare policies: allocation, provision, 
delivery and finance (Gilbert & Specht, 1974). In later years other scholars applied 
this analytical framework in their publications (Bonoli & Palier, 1998; Gilbert & 
Specht, 1974; Schuyt, Groenendijk, & Sloot, 1976). Allocation and provision refer 
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3  An exception is that in some cultures the communities do provide job security, e.g., 
immigrants who find their jobs within their network of friends and family and move 
from one job to another via the contacts of relatives and friends. The group of 
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Above, the process of policy formulation in which the interrelationship between 
actors and their modes of actions play an important role was discussed. By 
coordinating this process policies and activities can be developed. As mentioned 
previously, Gilbert and Specht use the term ‘product’ for a set of policy choices. 
Gilbert and Specht distinguish four (policy) choices which are relevant for 
describing, analyzing and comparing social welfare policies: allocation, provision, 
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this analytical framework in their publications (Bonoli & Palier, 1998; Gilbert & 
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3  An exception is that in some cultures the communities do provide job security, e.g., 
immigrants who find their jobs within their network of friends and family and move 
from one job to another via the contacts of relatives and friends. The group of 
immigrants is so specific and I will not go into detail here in this thesis. 
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to the question: “Who gets what?” Allocation refers to the ‘who’ question: who is 
eligible for the service or support offered? The ‘what’ refers to the question: 
What service or support is provided? The third choice, regarding delivery, 
encompasses issues pertaining to the adverb “how”: “How does the support or 
provision get to the eligible consumers?” This includes questions as to how to 
structure relationships and responsibilities, connections and exchanges among 
distributors and consumers. Finally, the sources and types of financing of the 
support provided is the fourth dimension of choice (Gilbert & Specht, 1974).  
Based on the previous work of different scholars in regard to the dimension of 
policy choices which have been discussed above, I elaborate in the remainder of 
this section four characteristics which are relevant for describing and analyzing 
employment security systems in different countries: the type of support, 
eligibility, financing and the responsibility, including coordination mechanisms 
and delivery. 
 
1. Type of support 
Employment security is based on the principle that the system should actively 
contribute to (continuing) participation in working life when possible. The 
support in the employment security system may either be passive or active. 
Passive support refers to the contribution of financial support, e.g., benefits 
aimed at income maintenance or severance pay to reduce and ease the 
economical disadvantages of dismissed employees. Thus, features of the 
employment security system are closely connected to the employment 
protection system in a country. Active support is the provision of measures, 
instruments or programmes to enhance the employability of employees whose 
jobs are at risk. Examples of active support are: education, retraining, 
apprenticeships, advice from job coaches, work trials, and training in how to 
write a CV. The duration of the support and the type of security (internal/ 
external) that is provided are also aspects I will take into consideration.  
 
2. Eligibility 
This principle determines who the beneficiaries of the employment security 
system are. Support can be given to the unemployed, people who are still 
employed but whose jobs are at risk, people with a fixed-term or permanent 
contract, the self-employed etcetera. At the company level we can distinguish 
small and medium sized companies and large firms. Eligibility criteria can be 
established at a sectoral level in collective agreements. Furthermore, 
participation in the scheme can be voluntarily or obligatory. The eligibility 
dimension is related to the aim of the employment security system or 
arrangement in a country. The aid can be given only to those who belong to the 







While the eligibility principle determines the beneficiaries of the system, the 
financing principle tells us who has or is willing to pay for it: the state, the 
employer, the employee, citizens at large or someone else. The financing form 
can be tax-based or contribution-based.  
 
4. Responsibility, coordination, and delivery  
The number of possible choices in designing the delivery of job-to-job support is 
quite large. Distributors of job-to-job services may be individual professionals, 
professional groups, companies, public or private agencies or associations. In 
some countries social partners will take the lead, while in other countries there is 
a strong interference by the state in establishing job-to-job policies. Moreover, 
as explained previously, private parties, networks or individual firms can play a 
role in the employment security system. The delivery dimension is related to a 
large extent to the responsibility aspect. Who is responsible for the job-to-job 
transition and which actors are actually involved in delivering and coordinating 
job-to-job support to redundant employees? The responsible actor is not 
necessarily the same actor who carries out the job-to-job support.  
 
1.3.3 Lesson drawing, policy learning and policy transfer 
The main research question of the present study relates to policy learning. The 
Dutch perspective forms the basis for this study, because the present study is 
part of a large-scale research programme on employment security, which is 
financed by the Dutch organisation Stichting Instituut Gak. This research 
programme comprises seven separate studies on employment security. This 
study is one of these seven studies and aims to answer the question: What, from 
a Dutch policy perspective, can be learned from ‘employment security’ 
arrangements or systems in other European countries? This question is easily 
raised, but is difficult to answer. Countries can and do learn, but what is learned, 
to what effect, by whom and how, is difficult to establish. Lesson drawing could 
lead to policy change, but this is not always the case. Thus, policy learning and 
cross-national policy transfer has to be seen in the light of two separate 
processes. However, these concepts are immediately seen to be linked. 
Therefore, I would like to stress that the focus of this study is on policy learning 
rather than on answering the question whether or not the examined employ-
ment security systems or elements could or should be adapted or transferred (or 
not) to the Netherlands. The latter requires a political judgement which is 
outside the scope of this thesis.  
 
Many studies focus on the process of policy transfer and what appears to have 
been transferred or could be transferred between countries and among political 
systems. Policy transfer is described as the process by which the ideas and 
policies in one political system are fed into (and used) in the policy-making arena 
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Dolowitz, 2009). Few of the studies attempt to answer the preceding question: 
What can we learn from observations of other systems? Bennett and Howlett 
point out that different explanations of policy change are based on several 
notions of learning which have emerged in the policy literature. They conclude 
that quite a lot of conceptions of ‘learning’ are utilized by different authors. 
Some components of these theories are compatible, while others are not 
(Bennett & Howlett, 1992). More recently, Dolowitz observed: “even fewer have 
attempted to analyse if the learning-by-observing process (associated with 
much of the transfer literature) leads to the accumulation of harder forms of 
knowledge or reflects little more than the accumulation of softer forms of 
information with little (or no) knowledge updating. Part of this reason for this 
deficit arises out of a general disagreement about what constitutes learning and 
knowledge and thus how these concepts can be integrated into transfer studies” 
(Dolowitz, 2009, p. 317). 
 
Different conceptions of learning 
Although there is an enormous amount of literature on the topic of organisational 
learning, there is no generally shared concept of learning. Bennett and Howlett 
identify five conceptions of learning in literature (Bennett & Howlett, 1992).  
 
1. Political learning  
The political learning approach is based on Heclo’s theory. In his view “learning 
can be taken to mean a relatively enduring alteration in behavior that results from 
experience; usually this alteration is conceptualized as a change in response made 
in reaction to some perceived stimulus (Bennett & Howlett, 1992; Heclo, 1974). 
Heclo was one of the first who argued that public policymaking is not only an 
outcome of the use of power by policymaking actors but also an outcome of 
actors seeking and using information, which is termed ‘puzzling’ (Bannink, 
2004).  
 
2. Social learning 
According to Hall, learning is a more conscious activity, and he defines what he 
calls ‘social learning’ as a “deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or techniques of 
policy in response to past experience and new information. Learning is indicated 
when policy changes as the result of such a process” (Bennett & Howlett, 1992; 
Hall, 1993; Visser & Hemerijck, 1997). Bennet and Howlett point out that both 
Hall and Heclo assume a relationship between policy learning and policy change, 
but they differ in how they approach the issue. Heclo sees ‘political learning’ as a 
response to changes in the external policy ‘environment’, whereas Hall sees 
social learning as a way of the normal public policy making process in which 
decision makers attempt to understand why certain initiatives may have 
succeeded while others failed (Bennett & Howlett, 1992). Both Heclo and Hall 
believe that puzzling and powering are important dimensions of social learning 
and policy change.  
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3) Government learning 
Etheredge developed the concept of ‘government learning’ to describe the 
process by which governments increase their intelligence and sophistication and 
in this manner enhance the effectiveness of their actions (Bennett & Howlett, 
1992). According to Etheredge and Short, the concept is divided into two parts: 
the growth of intelligence and the (related) growth of effectiveness. This means 
that “to say that learning occurs, then there should be evidence for increased 
intelligence and sophistication of thought and, linked to it, increased 
effectiveness of behaviour” (Etheredge & Short, 1983). They argue that the 
crucial criteria for effectiveness are defined by the researcher: “Anything can be 
deemed completely effective if its purpose is to do whatever it is already doing. 
Thus, to evaluate changes in effectiveness, one must first complete a criteria of 
‘effectiveness in doing x’, and a common answer to shortfalls in effectiveness will 
be that the person involved was actually trying to increase or defend his or her 
effectiveness in doing y. But an observed increase in effectiveness in doing x does 
not, by itself, show increased learning. Effectiveness may increase from 
perseverance, money, power, changed public receptivities, or other causes; it is 
evidence of learning per se only where there is a casual link to intelligence. Nor 
does decreased effectiveness necessarily warrant the inference of non-learning.” 
In the author’s view the criteria for effectiveness are not only defined by 
researchers, but also by policymakers. Policymakers formulate policies in order to 
achieve a certain goal. Therefore, they implicitly define criteria for researchers to 
measure effectiveness. 
 
4) Policy-oriented learning 
Another learning approach comes from Sabatier (Sabatier, 1988) and has been 
characterised as the ‘policy-oriented learning’. As he has put it, policy-oriented 
learning involves: ‘relatively enduring alterations of thought or behavioural 
intentions that result from experience and that are concerned with the 
attainment or revisions of the precepts of one’s belief system’ (Bennett & 
Howlett, 1992). Sabatier developed a conceptual framework which borrows a 
great deal from Heclo, but Sabatier differs from Heclo in his emphasis on 
ideologically-based conditions, and in his conception of the dynamics of policy 
oriented learning. Within the framework of policy change, Sabatier distinguishes 
stable external factors, e.g., cultural values, social structure and the basic legal 
structure from more dynamic ones, e.g. changes in systemic governing 
coalitions and policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems. Further-
more, the relationship to other subsystems and to the broader political system 
must be taken into account (Sabatier, 1988). 
 
5) Lesson drawing 
In the early 1990s, Rose used another conception of learning: lesson drawing. 
Rose argued that lesson drawing is a particular type of learning in which policy-
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3) Government learning 
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crucial criteria for effectiveness are defined by the researcher: “Anything can be 
deemed completely effective if its purpose is to do whatever it is already doing. 
Thus, to evaluate changes in effectiveness, one must first complete a criteria of 
‘effectiveness in doing x’, and a common answer to shortfalls in effectiveness will 
be that the person involved was actually trying to increase or defend his or her 
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not, by itself, show increased learning. Effectiveness may increase from 
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In the author’s view the criteria for effectiveness are not only defined by 
researchers, but also by policymakers. Policymakers formulate policies in order to 
achieve a certain goal. Therefore, they implicitly define criteria for researchers to 
measure effectiveness. 
 
4) Policy-oriented learning 
Another learning approach comes from Sabatier (Sabatier, 1988) and has been 
characterised as the ‘policy-oriented learning’. As he has put it, policy-oriented 
learning involves: ‘relatively enduring alterations of thought or behavioural 
intentions that result from experience and that are concerned with the 
attainment or revisions of the precepts of one’s belief system’ (Bennett & 
Howlett, 1992). Sabatier developed a conceptual framework which borrows a 
great deal from Heclo, but Sabatier differs from Heclo in his emphasis on 
ideologically-based conditions, and in his conception of the dynamics of policy 
oriented learning. Within the framework of policy change, Sabatier distinguishes 
stable external factors, e.g., cultural values, social structure and the basic legal 
structure from more dynamic ones, e.g. changes in systemic governing 
coalitions and policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems. Further-
more, the relationship to other subsystems and to the broader political system 
must be taken into account (Sabatier, 1988). 
 
5) Lesson drawing 
In the early 1990s, Rose used another conception of learning: lesson drawing. 
Rose argued that lesson drawing is a particular type of learning in which policy-
makers learn from both positive and negative experiences of others: “That the 
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success or failure of past experience is important is also acknowledged in 
literatures in social psychology and organizational theory. People learn more 
from failure than from success” (Levy, 1994).4  
In his study of lesson drawing Rose concludes that there are three alternatives to 
reduce dissatisfaction with existing policies: 1) turning to the national past, 2) 
speculating about the future and 3) seeking lessons from current experiences in 
other places. In his work Rose points out that lesson drawing helps to describe the 
process by which programmes and policies developed in one country are 
emulated by others and diffused throughout the world (Bennett & Howlett, 
1992). Gaining knowledge about other European employment security systems is 
the starting point of lesson-drawing in this thesis. According to Rose you have to 
make use of what you have learned abroad and design and adjust programmes in 
your own country, rather than photocopying what exists in other nations. He 
points out that a lesson is the outcome of learning (Rose, 2005) and he rejects the 
idea of turning to a single country for lesson-drawing because no one govern-
ment has a monopoly of wisdom. In his view it is important to look at other 
nations for lesson drawing because differences between programmes within a 
country are often greater than those between programmes addressing the same 
problem in different countries (Rose, 2005). Lesson drawing is about “getting to 
grips with technicalities of programmes in different countries, the adaptation of a 
lesson is an exercise in political judgement” (Rose, 2005). Thus, whether or not a 
lesson should be adopted is another fundamental question. Even if a lesson 
appears desirable and a country wants to adopt the lesson, this does not 
guarantee it can be applied at home. Conditions e.g., resources, cultural beliefs 
and norms, have to be met to apply lessons in practice. Thus, the desirability and 
the practicalities have to be taken into account for evaluating lessons.  
 
Bennett and Howlett identified these five types of learning in 1992. Meanwhile, 
other authors have tackled and analysed the processes involved in lesson 
drawing, policy diffusion and policy transfer. For example, Hemerijck and Visser 
distinguish two influential perspectives in the literature of policy learning 
(Hemerijck & Visser, 2003): Social learning and Policy mimicking. Advocates of 
the first type (Bennett and Howlett, 1992; Deutsch, 1963; Etheredge, 1981; 
Heclo, 1974; Hall, 1993; Olsen & Peters, 1996; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993) 
argue that “policy-makers ‘draw lessons’ from failures and apply these lessons 
and new knowledge when dealing with the future”. Hemerijck and Visser use the 
term ‘social learning’ to indicate “learning by all public and private actors in a 
single (national) social system, whether inside or outside government, including 
the social partners, NGOs and so on” and they argue that social learning is a 

4  Levy draws this conclusion based on the work of Hedberg (1981), Paul. T.P. Wong and 
Bernard Weiner (1981) and Sitkin (1992).
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domestic process, mostly induced by failure, based on trial and error, and both 
inward and backward looking. The second type of policy learning is based on the 
imitation of successful behaviour of others, a process which is called ‘mimicking’ 
(Hemerijck & Visser, 2003). Hemerijck & Visser argue that the literature on policy 
transfers and mimicking (Rogers, 1962; Walker, 1969; Rose, 1993; Berry and 
Berry, 1999) suggests that “policy-makers examine ‘best practice’ and apply 
successful models or standards from abroad”.  
 
Collective versus individual learning 
Levy defines learning as a change of beliefs at the individual cognitive level. He 
argues that “the reification of learning to the collective level – and the 
assumption that organizations or governments can be treated as organisms that 
have goals, beliefs and memories – is not analytically viable. Organizations do 
not literally learn in the same sense that individuals do. They learn only through 
individuals who serve in these organizations, by encoding individually learned 
inferences from experience into organizational routines” (Levy, 1994, p. 287). 
This view is widely accepted in the literature. Furthermore, Levy suggests that 
individuals may learn but be deterred from attempting to institutionalize their 
new ideas. They may try but politically fail to change organizational procedures. 
In other words, individual learning is necessary, but not sufficient, for orga-
nizational learning. Governmental learning is even more challenging, because it 
involves the aggregation of learning by multiple organizations and by multiple 
individuals acting either through organizations or independently from them 
(Levy, 1994).  
 
It is not surprising that countries having a hard time handling specific problems 
look for solutions in domestic policies elsewhere. Rose distinguishes seven ways 
of drawing a lesson (Rose, 2005) which are summarized in table 1.2. 
 
Table 1.2: Rose’s seven ways of drawing a lesson 
Photocopying Producing an exact photocopy with a minimum of change in the names of 
institutions and places and dates 
Copying Duplicating almost all the elements of a programme already in effect in 
another place. 
Adaptation Altering details of the design of a programme elsewhere without 
removing major elements 
Hybrid Combining elements of programmes with the same objective in different 
jurisdictions 




Responding to the stimulus of a programme’s inspiration elsewhere by 
creating a novel programme not inconsistent with foreign examples 
Selective 
imitation 
Adopting/imitating attractive, but not necessarily so, parts of other 
programmes while leaving out awkward but essential bits 
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Responding to the stimulus of a programme’s inspiration elsewhere by 
creating a novel programme not inconsistent with foreign examples 
Selective 
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Adopting/imitating attractive, but not necessarily so, parts of other 
programmes while leaving out awkward but essential bits 
Source: (Rose, 2005) 
INTRODUCTION 
36 
The first two ways of drawing a lesson (photocopying and copying) are based on 
one single example: a specific programme or scheme in one single country. 
According to Rose, a measure or programme is a photocopy when you take over 
what is done elsewhere in exactly the same way. Copying means that the 
majority of a programme or scheme in one country is duplicated in another 
country, with only a minor variation in details in order to allow for differences in 
context and preferences of those doing the copy (Rose, 2005). The first two ways 
of lesson drawing, photocopying and copying, are very difficult across national 
boundaries, because of the differences in context, culture, institutions and legal 
procedures. This means that when a country wants to apply a certain model or 
scheme that operates in the country of origin (leader), the details of the model 
should be adapted by the ‘follower’ country: adaptation.  
The other ways of lesson drawing (hybrid, synthesis, disciplined inspiration and 
selective imitation) are based on multiple resources: multiple programmes in 
one country or a comparison of elements of similar programmes in different 
countries. If more than two foreign schemes or models are observed a lesson can 
be drawn that is hybrid: “combining compatible elements of several 
programmes” (Rose, 2005). Another way of drawing a lesson is synthesis. Rose 
formulates the synthesis way of lesson drawing as follows: “A lesson can be a 
synthesis if it combines elements from similar programmes in different countries 
in a distinctive way or if it combines foreign examples with elements of its existing 
domestic programmes” (Rose, 2005). Foreign models, schemes and measures 
can inspire other countries. These foreign examples can be a starting point for a 
series of modifications that go beyond simple adaptation. Rose defines this as 
‘disciplined inspiration’. Sometimes, policymakers only “cherry pick” a few 
features of a foreign model that appears to be interesting, while leaving out “the 
hard parts that impose political costs”. According to Rose this is ‘selective 
imitation’. In my view Rose’s degrees of drawing a lesson also includes a transfer 
part. Photocopying, copying and adopting refer to the way and degree in which 
policies, schemes or measures could be transferred (see table 1.2). 
 
Inspired by the work of Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, 2000) the Danish researcher 
Ilsøe describes several dimensions of cross-national policy transfer, although the 
researcher does not make a clear distinction between policy learning and policy 
transfer. Nevertheless, these dimensions are also relevant for the policy learning 
process. The first dimension relates to the reason for transferability. Transfer can 
be a voluntary action, but also a coercive one with pressure from supranational 
institutions such as the European Union. The degree of transfer also interacts 
with the subject. What is to be transferred? Ilsøe argues that most people think 
about transfer of policy content, when they hear about policy transfer, but 
transfer on many other policy aspects takes place as well, e.g., policy goals, 
administrative instruments or government structures (Ilsøe, 2010). Transfer 
implies a process of copying a policy from one setting to another, but 
comprehensive reviews on policy transfer literature, e.g., Dolowitz en Marsh 
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(1996), show that there are more degrees of transferability. Policy learning can 
be a source of inspiration. A hybridisation of policies represents a mixture, where 
old policies are blended with new ones (Dolowitz, 2009; Ilsøe, 2010). Further-
more, constraints in the setting can hinder the transfer, e.g., if the transferable 
policy conflicts with old institutions, structures or cultures. Policy transfer can be 
counterproductive if the transfer is incomplete or inappropriate, or if the 
policymakers are uninformed.  
 
Table 1.3: Dimensions of cross national policy transfer 































Source: Ilsøe (2008) inspired by Dolowitz & March (1996, 2000) 
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changeability of the terms. Stone argues that “Policy transfer is the broader 
concept encompassing ideas of diffusion and coercion as well as the voluntaristic 
activity of lesson drawing” (Stone, 1999).  
Levy suggests that it is more useful to conceptualize a political learning model as 
involving a two-stage process or causal chain in which 1) the observation and 
interpretation of experience lead to a change in individual beliefs, and (2) belief 
change influences subsequent behaviour. He argues that learning is not 
necessary for policy change. But neither it is sufficient for policy change, because 
not all learning gets translated into changes in policy. Actors may learn from 
experience but be prevented by domestic, economic or bureaucratic constraints 
from implementing their preferred policies based on what they have learned 
(Levy, 1994). 
 
Dolowitz emphasized that there has been a range of studies that have discussed 
learning in the policy-making process, including a number that have attempted 
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set of studies discusses learning and information it tends to be less forthcoming 
on what is meant by learning and whether there are different types of learning 
involved in different instances of transfer. Despite the usefulness of all this 
literature, there is little address to the core issues around learning, including: 
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meant by learning’ when actors and institutions are involved in the examination 
or receipt of information; and how this is related (or not) to the advance process 
of knowledge updating that might occur when an actor comes into contact with 
‘new’ (or newly presented) information” (Dolowitz, 2009). 
 
The present study looks at employment security systems in other European 
countries, seeking to learn lessons from a cross-national perspective. In terms of 
Hemerijck and Visser, this is part of the policy mimicking type of learning. 
However, by looking at experiences in other countries lessons can be learned, 
but it is not possible to take what may be successful in one country and simply 
transplant it into another. The often long-standing interlinkage between the 
different forms of coordination and regulation in any given country cannot easily 
be undone. Three common pitfalls of cross-national mimicking are listed by 
Dolowitz and March (2000): 1) the borrowing country misses crucial information 
about the operation of the policy in the country from which it is taken; 2) crucial 
elements of the policy or its institutional setting are left out in the transfer; and 
3) insufficient attention is being paid to the institutional or cultural conditions in 
which the policy or policy instruments are going to operate (Hemerijck & Visser, 
2003). The countries selected for this study - Sweden, Austria, Spain and the UK 
- can be considered as case studies in which the lessons learned in the domestic 
process will also be explored. In this thesis a clear distinction is made between 
policy learning and transferring. Both elements are part of the concept of lesson 
drawing (see Figure 1.5).  
 








Figure 1.6 presents the analytical model of policy learning and transfer with 
regard to employment security systems. I have explained in this chapter that 
countries can and do learn from their own past experiences, and also from 
experiences in other countries. However, policy learning is not the same as 
policy transfer. It is not the aim of this thesis to provide a detailed prescription on 
how to implement an employment security system in a specific national context. 
In this thesis I study experiences in four European countries which can be a 
source of inspiration for the Netherlands. A better comprehension of other 
policies and practices can contribute to the Dutch discourse in the realm of 
employment security. Moreover, in this study elucidations will be given for the 
way job-to-job arrangements are organized in a country. Feasibility studies are 
necessary to answer the question as to whether or not a system, a scheme, or a 
policy measure can be transferred. This is outside the scope of this thesis. At the 
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1.4 Research design 
 
In this section, the research design of this study is presented. I will elaborate on 
the choice of countries, as well as the analytical framework for assessing what 
the Netherlands can learn from experiences in other countries. Finally, the data 
collection will be discussed. 
 
1.4.1 Choice of countries 
Not all EU Member States can be included in the research. The reason for 
selecting a limited number of countries is the in-depth qualitative approach of 
this study. Four countries were selected, examined and compared with the 
Netherlands (NL). The selected countries are: Sweden (SE), United Kingdom 
(UK), Austria (AT) and Spain (ES). The considerations behind the choice of these 
countries are theoretically guided but also practical. Derived from theories on 
policy learning we can expect to learn from countries which resemble the 
Netherlands. We can also be inspired by countries which differ from the 
Netherlands. Basically there are three ways of selecting the countries. The 
choice of countries is based on the typology of welfare regimes, geographical 
distribution and the historical reference or traditional classification of social 
security systems.  
 
Typologies of welfare regimes 
Esping-Andersen attempts at classifying welfare regimes in a threefold typology: 
1) ‘liberal’ welfare regimes; 2) ‘conservative corporatist’ welfare regimes and 3) 
‘social democratic’ welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Esping-Andersen 
uses the concept ‘regime’ because this concept is considered wider than ‘Welfare 
state’. It implies more than a certain mix of social insurances and national 
provisions and regimes are mainly defined in reference to “the ways in which wel-
fare production is allocated between state, market and households” (Esping-
Andersen, 1999; Vrooman, 2009). In the liberal regime the collective provisions 
are limited, targeted at those in need and the eligibility criteria are strict. On the 
other hand levies are low compared with other welfare regimes and private 
provisions are relatively extensive. In the conservative corporatist welfare 
regime the coverage provided by collective provisions is selective and 
hierarchical. The eligibility criteria are fairly strict and based on the contributions 
paid. The level of the benefit is high and is related to the previous earned 
income. The schemes are financed mainly through fairly high contributions. The 
social-democratic welfare regime covers all inhabitants and the provisions are 
generous. The schemes are financed by general taxes and the level of 
contributions is high compared to the other welfare regime types (Esping-
Andersen, 1990; Vrooman, 2009). Table 1.4 provides a summary of the specific 
features of Esping-Andersen’s three welfare regime ideal-types. The Anglo-
Saxon countries represent variants of the liberal welfare regime, countries of 
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income. The schemes are financed mainly through fairly high contributions. The 
social-democratic welfare regime covers all inhabitants and the provisions are 
generous. The schemes are financed by general taxes and the level of 
contributions is high compared to the other welfare regime types (Esping-
Andersen, 1990; Vrooman, 2009). Table 1.4 provides a summary of the specific 
features of Esping-Andersen’s three welfare regime ideal-types. The Anglo-
Saxon countries represent variants of the liberal welfare regime, countries of 
continental Europe are considered to be representatives of the corporatist 
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welfare regime and Scandinavian countries are reckoned as variants of the 
social-democratic welfare regime. The Netherlands can be considered as a 
country with a hybrid character with both features of the corporatist and social-
democratic welfare regime type.  
 
Table 1.4: Esping-Andersen’s typology of welfare regime  
Welfare regime type 
Features Liberal Corporatist Social-democratic 
Collective benefits    
Coverage Limited  
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Welfare, care, social 
security, education 
Large share of 
middle-ranking 
posts occupied by 
women. 
Sources: (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Esping-Andersen, 1999; Vrooman, 2009)  
 
Geographical distribution 
On the base of Esping-Andersen’s typology many others created other clas-
sifications of countries, e.g., a modified Esping-Andersen’s typology with 
geographical instead of socio-political labels (Bonoli, 1997; Muffels, 2008). Not 
all welfare states fit into the traditional classification of Esping-Andersen’s 
welfare states and in the literature a so-called modified Esping-Andersen 
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Geographical distribution 
On the base of Esping-Andersen’s typology many others created other clas-
sifications of countries, e.g., a modified Esping-Andersen’s typology with 
geographical instead of socio-political labels (Bonoli, 1997; Muffels, 2008). Not 
all welfare states fit into the traditional classification of Esping-Andersen’s 
welfare states and in the literature a so-called modified Esping-Andersen 
typology consisting of four regime types can be observed: liberal or Anglo-Saxon 
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countries, social democratic or Nordic countries, corporatist/ conservative or 
Continental countries, and Southern or Mediterranean countries.  
 
In the 1990s, several scholars (Bonoli, 1997; Ferrera, 1996) suggested that the 
Mediterranean welfare regime has characteristics which distinguish it from other 
welfare regimes. Based on this literature, Gal attempted to sketch the contours of 
an extended family of Mediterranean welfare regimes, which includes Cyprus, 
Greece, Israel, Italy, Malta, Spain, Portugal and Turkey. Besides their geogra-
phical location they have a common historical and cultural background. These 
southern countries can, according to Gal, be typified by late industrialisation, a 
democratic system that is characterised by either discontinuity or has existed for 
a relatively short time period, labour market rigidity and segmentation in the 
labour market. Insiders are protected well within a formal economy, while 
outsiders form a relatively unprotected temporary or informal segment of the 
labour market (Gal, 2010). In addition, Gal argues that these welfare states have 
relatively low levels of economic production and while most Mediterranean 
countries “have undergone a catch-up process of growing social spending in the 
last years, the expenditure levels generally remain lower than in the social-
democratic and corporatist countries, and higher than those in liberal welfare 
regimes” (Gal, 2010). Currently, the Southern countries are hit hard by the 
economic crisis. Furthermore, Southern countries can be characterized by low 
levels of welfare provision and a strong role of the state in regulating most 
spheres of social life and in controlling major social and economic institutions 
(Andreotti et al., 2001; Gal, 2010). However, the state has few resources, which 
can partly be explained by the emergence of shadow economies, with obvious 
implications for the state revenues (Gal, 2010). The proportion of the population 
at risk of poverty in the Southern countries is higher than most other European 
welfare states. Gal addresses, in his recent publication, three broad cultural 
features which the Mediterranean countries have in common and which 
distinguish them from other types of welfare regimes: religion, the family and 
the existence of various forms of clientelistic relationships in the political arena. 
Gal suggests that religion can play a role in the establishment of social welfare 
institutions, or religion can be a source to be opposed. The latter implies that 
social policy can be formulated as a reaction against religion by political actors. 
Furthermore, Gall argues that the separation of state and religion in the 
Southern countries is less clear-cut. Religious organisations and the family play a 
major role in the provision of welfare (Gal, 2010). The participation rates are low 
in the Southern countries, especially among women and young people (Bonoli, 
1997; Hernanz, Origo, Lodovici, & Toharia, 2008). Gal suggests that this feature 
is linked to the dominance of the male-breadwinner model in these countries. 
Family solidarity and marriage is more institutionalised and children remain in 
their parents’ household until a higher age (Gal, 2010). Finally, Gal suggests that 
based on the previous work of, e.g. Eisenstadt and Roniger, that politics in 
southern countries are tainted by patron-client relations that entail the provision 
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of tangible resources in return for political support (Gal, 2010). As noted in the 
previous section, countries can and do learn from similar but also from different 
countries. Therefore, from the Dutch policy learning perspective, it is interesting 
to include a Southern country in the present study.  
 
For different reasons, a Central or Eastern country is not included in this study. 
Although it can be argued that welfare states in post-communist countries differ 
from traditional Western welfare states, the differences between the Eastern 
countries are even larger. For example, Fenger suggests that post-communist 
countries can be subdivided into three groups: 1) former USSR countries e.g. 
Russia, 2) a group of rather successful Central and Eastern European countries, 
e.g. Poland and 3) a group of developing welfare states, e.g. Romania (Fenger, 
2007). Furthermore, literature shows that scholars have different views 
regarding the idea of a ‘new’ welfare regime in addition to Esping-Andersens’ 
typology (Fenger, 2007). Finally, because of the in-depth approach of this study 
and the language barrier in reading primary sources and conducting interviews in 
these countries, an Eastern country was not selected for this study. 
 
Historical reference/traditional classification 
The third selection criterion is based on the traditional classification of the social 
security system. Fairly commonly the traditional classification of social policy 
systems is made between Bismarckian models and Beveridgean models (Bonoli, 
1997). The Bismarckian model departs from social security that is linked to em-
ployee provisions. The Beveridgean social policy model is characterised by univers-
al provision. The focus of the Bismarckian model is on income maintenance for 
employees, whereas Beveridgean social policies aim at the prevention of poverty.  
 
Table 1.5: Bismarckian and Beveridgean model of social policy 
 Bismarckian model Beveridgean model 
Objective Income maintenance Prevention of poverty 
Benefits Earnings-related Flat-rate 
Eligibility Contribution record Residence or need 
Coverage Employees Entire population 
Financing Contributions Taxation 
Source: (Bonoli, 1997) 
 
As mentioned earlier, not all European countries can be selected for this study. 
Table 1.6 provides a summary of the selected countries classified by the above 
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2007). Furthermore, literature shows that scholars have different views 
regarding the idea of a ‘new’ welfare regime in addition to Esping-Andersens’ 
typology (Fenger, 2007). Finally, because of the in-depth approach of this study 
and the language barrier in reading primary sources and conducting interviews in 
these countries, an Eastern country was not selected for this study. 
 
Historical reference/traditional classification 
The third selection criterion is based on the traditional classification of the social 
security system. Fairly commonly the traditional classification of social policy 
systems is made between Bismarckian models and Beveridgean models (Bonoli, 
1997). The Bismarckian model departs from social security that is linked to em-
ployee provisions. The Beveridgean social policy model is characterised by univers-
al provision. The focus of the Bismarckian model is on income maintenance for 
employees, whereas Beveridgean social policies aim at the prevention of poverty.  
 
Table 1.5: Bismarckian and Beveridgean model of social policy 
 Bismarckian model Beveridgean model 
Objective Income maintenance Prevention of poverty 
Benefits Earnings-related Flat-rate 
Eligibility Contribution record Residence or need 
Coverage Employees Entire population 
Financing Contributions Taxation 
Source: (Bonoli, 1997) 
 
As mentioned earlier, not all European countries can be selected for this study. 
Table 1.6 provides a summary of the selected countries classified by the above 
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1.4.2 Data collection 
Several sources are used to answer the research questions: literature and policy 
documents, expert meetings and interviews. In the first phase of the study 
academic literature was consulted to elaborate the theoretical framework in 
regard to employment security systems and policy learning. Policy documents 
and literature were also studied and analyzed in order to provide a first overview 
of the job-to-job arrangements in the selected countries. This overview was 
presented at the first expert meeting held on 11 May 2009 at the Dutch Ministry 
of Social Affairs and Employment in The Hague. The aim of this meeting was to 
share knowledge and to discuss the draft interview protocol with Dutch policy 
actors (see appendix 2). Based on the comments and suggestions made by the 
policy makers, the interview protocol was adjusted and the country visits were 
prepared. In each country interviews were conducted with representatives of 
ministries, Public Employment Services, employers’ associations, trade unions, 
private agencies and other relevant experts. Moreover, the interviewees pro-
vided additional relevant policy documents and literature suggestions. 95% of 
the interviews held were in-depth face-to-face interviews with an average 
duration of two hours. In a few cases it was not possible to arrange an interview 
during the visit to the country and an appointment was made for a telephone 
interview. Furthermore, after the country visits were held and the interviews 
were elaborated, interviewees were contacted by e-mail or telephone to further 
clarify parts of the interviews or to provide additional information. Each 
interview was digitally recorded and transcribed. Subsequently, parts of the 
interviews were coded and analyzed with the qualitative software programme 
ATLAS.ti. Table 1.7 shows a summary of the country visits and the number of 
interviewees. Appendix 1 provides an elaborate overview of visited organisations 





Table 1.7: Overview field work 
Year Country Number of interviewees 
August 2009 Sweden 13 
March 2010 UK 11 
June 2010 Austria 12 
October 2010 Spain 14 
  Total interviewees: 50 
 
It was the intention to conduct all the interviews in English. However, during the 
preparation of the Spanish country visit it soon became clear that it was not 
sensible to do the interviews in English. The language barrier stood in the way of 
good in-depth interviews. Furthermore, several Spanish interviewees indicated 
that they would prefer to do the interviews in their mother tongue. Therefore, a 
Spanish interpreter, who currently lives in the Netherlands and speaks Spanish, 
English and Dutch, was called in to attend all the Spanish interviews.  
One of the research questions is whether or not the investigated employment 
security systems, measures or arrangements are successful in helping people 
from job-to-job in case of redundancy. An in-depth independent evaluation of 
the policies and measures taken by the government and other actors by the 
author is not feasible within the framework and time span of this thesis. 
Nevertheless, in the interviews I raised the question whether or not the policies 
and measures taken in the countries examined, had been evaluated by the 
government or other actors. Thus, the section on performance of the 
employment security system is based on the available secondary data provided 
by the interviewees and additional literature and desk research.  
 
After the country visits, the collected data were analyzed according to the 
analytical framework with the qualitative software programme ATLAS.ti. 
Subsequently, possible lessons for the Netherlands were inferred by the author. 
In order to draw lessons for the Netherlands from the examined foreign cases it 
is necessary to understand the operation of the Dutch job-to-job transition 
system. The sources used for analyzing the Dutch case are based on 
examination of literature and policy documents, input from the expert meetings 
and previous research in the field of labour market issues.5 Subsequently, a 
second expert meeting with Dutch actors was prepared and held on 28 April 
2011 at the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (see appendix 2). 
Representatives of trade unions, employers, private organisations, ministries, 
Public Employment Service and scholars participated. The aim of this meeting 
was to share knowledge and validate the lessons defined by the researcher and 

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
5  See: Best practices in WW preventie (Evers et al., 2004).
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to brainstorm about possible further steps the Netherlands can take to enhance 
job-to-job transitions in the event of forced dismissals. By advanced technology, 
each attended organisation prioritized the presented lessons for the 
Netherlands. A network of several laptops was established. The laptops were 
linked and connected to a server enabling each organisation present to share his 
view via a laptop. Through pressing one button it was possible to provide an 
overview of the results on a large screen. This overview per system feature was 
the starting point of prioritizing these suggestions by the participants and was 
followed by a discussion (see Chapter 8). 
 
1.5  Introduction to chapters 
 
This thesis is structured as follows. To set the scene, I first will present 
comparative labour market indicators and key labour market institutions aimed 
at giving the reader a fuller understanding and background of the countries 
examined. Chapter 2 provides a first overview and places the selected countries 
in a wider context. Subsequently, the employment security systems in the 
countries examined, Sweden, United Kingdom, Austria and Spain, will be 
described and analyzed in separate country chapters (Chapters 3 to 6). These 
four country chapters are the building blocks for the analyses conducted in the 
following chapters. In Chapter 7, the Dutch job-to-job system will be discussed 
and compared with job-to-job systems in the previous described countries. In 
Chapter 8 the possible lessons for the Netherlands are discussed, including 
proposals for the future Dutch job-to-job system. Finally, Chapter 9 summarizes 
the main findings, puts them into perspective, and discusses implications for 
both the policy and research agenda. 
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2.  Setting the scene: facts and figures of the selected countries 
 
In this chapter, comparative labour market indicators will be discussed with the 
aim of giving the reader a fuller understanding and background of general 
similarities and differences of the selected countries, in a wider context. This 
chapter will throw more light on relevant labour market figures, both from the 
supply and demand side. It is neither possible nor necessary to include all 
available labour market indicators. Therefore, the figures which are relevant 
concerning forced mobility and employment security systems in general, will be 
addressed. Furthermore, this chapter will address some of the key labour market 
institutions. Subsequently, Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 elaborate upon these 
features and discuss the specific transition measures and systems which have 
emerged in the separate countries examined. 
 
2.1 General features  
 
Population 
Obviously, large populated countries with fewer available jobs face more 
difficulties in supporting people from one job to another, than small countries 
with fewer employees and more job openings. The job vacancy rates will be 
discussed in section 2.3. Table 2.1 presents general figures regarding the 
population in the selected countries. The UK is the largest country with more than 
60 million inhabitants, followed by Spain with a population of more than 45 
million people. The least populated of the countries examined is Austria with 
approximately 8.2 million inhabitants. Sweden has more than 9 million inhabitants 
and around 16 million people live in the Netherlands. Not all inhabitants are 
available for the labour market. The active population (labour force) is defined as 
the sum of employed and unemployed persons who are looking for a job.  
 
Table 2.1: Total and active population (x1000), 2009 
 NL SE UK AT ES EU27 
Total population  16223,0 9296,7 60734,4 8238,4 45670,7 492221,1 
Active population  8922,8 4906,8 31285,9 4282,0 23037,5 239292,6 
Active population 
as share of the total 
population 




The present study addresses job-to-job transitions with a specific focus on 
forced mobility. In advance of the 2006: European Year of Workers’ Mobility, the 
EC funded a special Eurobarometer survey, which was carried out at the end of 
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The present study addresses job-to-job transitions with a specific focus on 
forced mobility. In advance of the 2006: European Year of Workers’ Mobility, the 
EC funded a special Eurobarometer survey, which was carried out at the end of 
2005 (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
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Conditions, 2006a). The Eurobarometer revealed that 81% of the labour force in 
Europe had not changed employment status within the previous five year 
period, 6.6% had been forced to leave the company, while 8.5% had changed 
jobs voluntarily. The remaining 3.9% had left their previous employer because of 
retirement or gave no reasons for their transition (Andersen, Haahr, Hansen, & 
Holm-Pedersen, 2008). Figure 2.1 presents more recent job mobility figures and 
shows the percentage of employees aged 16-64 with a permanent contract who 
have changed jobs since last year, divided by the reasons for the job change: 
voluntary or involuntary. Those persons could have had a fixed-term contract in 
2007. Involuntary mobility comprises: collective dismissals, individual dismissals 
for economic reasons, and fixed-term contracts which have not been extended. 
This figure is composed of SILC6 data and includes mobility within and between 
companies. 
 
Figure 2.1: Self-reported job change since last year, people aged 16-64 with 
permanent contract in 2008, SILC Longitudinal Data (weighted with cross sectional 
weights), 2007-2008 
 
Source: Muffels, Wilhagen en Dekker (2011), updated figures. 
*  Calculated for EU22, Germany, Denmark and France not included   
**Figures for the UK and France from SILC 2006-2007     
***Figures for Denmark and Germany derived from cross-sectional SILC data for 2008 
 
Figure 2.1 shows that among the countries examined, Sweden has the highest 
mobility rate among people aged 16-64 with a permanent contract in 2008 and a 
self-reported job change since last year (22.3%). It is important that employees 
feel safe enough to take the risk of making a transition to another job. If the 
welfare state provides a safety net and supports the transition, job mobility will 
be more likely. This is typical for social democratic welfare states. Therefore, it is 

6  European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions.
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not surprising that Sweden also has a relatively high voluntary mobility rate 
(18.5%). Compared with the other countries selected for this study, the UK has 
also a relatively high mobility rate (16.7%, from which 14.0% voluntary and 2.7% 
involuntary). The employment protection regulation is relatively low in this 
liberal country. This makes it relatively easy for British employers to fire 
employees. The mobility rates in Austria (8.7%, from which 6.3% voluntary and 
involuntary 2.4%), the Netherlands (7.6%: from which 7.1% voluntary and 0.5% 
involuntary) and Spain (6.4% from which 5.1% voluntary and 1.3% involuntary) 
are below the EU22 average (10%: from which 7.9% voluntary and 2.1% 
involuntary). Figure 2.1 shows that the number of voluntary job changes is 
higher than the involuntary job-to-job transitions. Theeuwes argues that the 
number of Dutch employees who change jobs depends on the business cycle. In 
prosperous periods the number of job changes is higher than in periods of 
recession. When the economy is booming, there are more job openings and 
more opportunities for an employee to find another job which is more attractive 
than the current job. In a period of economic downturn there are fewer vacancies 
leading to fewer people voluntarily changing their jobs (Theeuwes, 2007). 
 
Employment protection 
Employment protection legislation (EPL) is an institutional factor which varies 
across countries and can influence the extent to which job mobility occurs. It can 
be hypothesized that in countries with strict EPL the dismissal costs are high, 
which ultimately will result in the avoidance of dismissals. As previously 
discussed in Chapter 1, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) investigated a large amount of theoretical literature that 
looks at the impact of firing restrictions on labour flows. Strict employment 
protection should reduce worker flows, because companies will reduce both job 
creation and destruction. However, the effect on average employment levels is 
ambiguous (OECD, 2010b). Moreover, if the use of temporary contracts is less 
regulated, while strict employment regulations are maintained for open-ended 
contracts, employers will substitute permanent by temporary employees owing 
to lower costs involved with the termination of the employment relationship at 
the end of a temporary contract. The OECD developed an Employment 
Protection Indicator which measures the procedure and costs in dismissing 
employees, and the procedure in hiring workers on fixed-term or temporary 
work agency contracts.  
2
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Table 2.2: Employment protection legislation (EPL), 2008 











Austria 1.9 2.37 1.5 3.25 
The 
Netherlands 
2.0 2.72 1.19 3 
Spain 3.0 2.46 3.5 3.13 
Sweden 1.9 2.86 0.88 3.75 
UK 0.8 1.12 0.38 2.88 
 Source: OECD7  
 
Table 2.2 shows that the overall employment protection is the least strict in the 
UK. It is relatively easy to fire British employees. Spain has the highest indicator 
of overall employment protection legislation. During the last decade, Spain 
tightened the restrictions on the use of fixed-term contracts. This will be 
addressed more deeply in Chapter 6. In all countries examined, with the 
exception of Spain, the employment protection for collective dismissals is 
stricter than for regular employment and temporary jobs in 2008. 
 
Trade union density, power and number of strikes 
Trade unions can play an important role in the bargaining process to provide 
new employment opportunities in case of (collective) redundancy. Represent-
ativity is a relevant precondition for the power of trade unions. In the countries 
examined, employees can become a member of a trade union. However, the 
trade union density and the power of trade unions vary across the selected 
countries. Table 2.3 shows the development of the trade union density. This rate 
corresponds to the ratio of wage and salary earners that are trade union 
members, divided by the total number of wage and salary earners (OECD 
Labour Force Statistics8). Although Sweden has faced declining union density 
since the mid 1990s, the figure (68.4%) is in 2009 rather high, compared with 




7  <http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=EPL_R>, accessed 27 July 2011.
8  <http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=UN_DEN>, accessed 27 November 2011.
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Table 2.3: Trade union density, 1999-2009 in percentages 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Austria 37.4 36.6 35.7 35.2 34.4 34.1 33.3 31.0 29.9 29.1 28.6 
Netherlands 24.6 22.9 21.9 21.7 21.2 21.3 21.0 20.4 19.3 18.9 19.3 
Spain 16.0 16.7 15.9 16.0 15.8 15.5 15.2 15.0 14.9 15.0 15.9 
Sweden 80.6 79.1 78.0 78.0 78.0 78.1 76.5 75.1 70.8 68.3 68.4 
United 
Kingdom 
30.1 30.2 29.6 29.3 29.6 29.4 28.4 28.1 27.9 27.1 27.2 
Source: OECD, Labour Force Statistics 
 
Derived from the actor-centered institutionalism theory, it can be argued that 
countries in which the typical mode of interaction leads to successful 
agreements between trade unions and employers’ associations, are 
characterized by stability and peace in the labour market (Avdagic, Rhodes, & 
Visser, 2011). However, if trade unions are not satisfied with the course of 
events, they may enforce strikes and lock outs. In some countries redundancy 
processes go hand in hand with industrial actions. Table 2.4 shows the number 
of strikes and lockouts in Sweden, Spain, the UK and The Netherlands between 
1999 and 2008. The ILO9 defines a strike as a temporary work stoppage affected 
by one or more groups of workers with a view to enforcing or resisting demands 
or expressing grievances, or supporting other workers in their demands or 
grievances. A lockout is a total or partial temporary closure of one or more 
places of employment, or the hindering of the normal work activities of 
employees, by one or more employers with a view to enforcing or resisting 
demands or expressing grievances, or supporting other employers in their 
demands or grievances. A large number of strikes is observed in Spain, whereas 
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Table 2.4: Number of strikes and lockouts, 1999-2008 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Spain 749 750 737 688 678 708 685 783 752 811 
United 
Kingdom 
205 226 207 162 138 135 116 158 152 144 
The 
Netherlands 
24 23 16 16 14 12 28 31 20 21 
Sweden 10 2 20 10 11 9 14 9 14 5 
Source: ILO http://laborsta.ilo.org/STP/guest, Austria no data available 
 

9  ILO <http://laborsta.ilo.org/applv8/data/c9e.html>, accessed 6 January 2011.
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Table 2.2: Employment protection legislation (EPL), 2008 











Austria 1.9 2.37 1.5 3.25 
The 
Netherlands 
2.0 2.72 1.19 3 
Spain 3.0 2.46 3.5 3.13 
Sweden 1.9 2.86 0.88 3.75 
UK 0.8 1.12 0.38 2.88 
 Source: OECD7  
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7  <http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=EPL_R>, accessed 27 July 2011.
8  <http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=UN_DEN>, accessed 27 November 2011.
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Table 2.3: Trade union density, 1999-2009 in percentages 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Austria 37.4 36.6 35.7 35.2 34.4 34.1 33.3 31.0 29.9 29.1 28.6 
Netherlands 24.6 22.9 21.9 21.7 21.2 21.3 21.0 20.4 19.3 18.9 19.3 
Spain 16.0 16.7 15.9 16.0 15.8 15.5 15.2 15.0 14.9 15.0 15.9 
Sweden 80.6 79.1 78.0 78.0 78.0 78.1 76.5 75.1 70.8 68.3 68.4 
United 
Kingdom 
30.1 30.2 29.6 29.3 29.6 29.4 28.4 28.1 27.9 27.1 27.2 
Source: OECD, Labour Force Statistics 
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9  ILO <http://laborsta.ilo.org/applv8/data/c9e.html>, accessed 6 January 2011.
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2.2 Features of the labour market supply side 
 
In this section background information and figures about the labour market 
supply side will be presented. These indicators are relevant to understanding 
why governments, or other labour market institutions, put in place a specific 
policy mix to support workers in the transition towards a new job. For example, a 
country with high unemployment rates might prioritize transitions from 
unemployment to employment, rather than investing in job-to-job transitions. 
Moreover, based on these indicators, policy priorities could be given to specific 
target groups, such as young people or the elderly. Furthermore, some 
indicators related to the type of contract (part-time and limited duration 
contracts) are included to give an idea of the degree of precariousness of the 
jobs in the countries examined.  
 
Employment rate 
In 2009, the average employment rate in the 27 countries of the European Union 
was 64.6%. The data presented in this section is derived from the Labour Force 
Survey (LFS). The indicator of employed persons in the LFS is defined as follows: 
“Employed persons are persons aged 15 and over who performed work, even for 
just one hour per week, for pay, profit or family gain during the reference week, 
or were not at work but had a job or business from which they were temporarily 
absent because of, for instance, illness, holidays, industrial dispute, and 
education or training”. In 2009, the EU average female employment rate was 
51.7%. Compared with other selected EU member states the employment rate 
of Dutch and Swedish women was high, respectively 64 and 62.2%.  
Table 2.5 shows that in 2009, the examined countries had high employment 
rates compared with the EU27 average, with the exception of Spain. The 
Netherlands had the highest employment rate among the countries scrutinized. 
However, the employment rate displayed is calculated in persons and not in FTE. 
This is important to notice, because part-time employment as a percentage of 
the total employment, was in the Netherlands, the highest among European 
countries. The Spanish unemployment rate was considerably higher than the EU 
average. The LFS defines unemployed persons as ‘persons aged 15-74 who were 
without work during the reference week, were currently available for work and 
were either actively seeking work in the past four weeks or had already found a 
job to start within the next three months’. The unemployment rate comprises 










Table 2.5: Labour market rates, 2009  
 NL SE UK AT ES EU27 
Employment rate total 77 72.2 69.9 71.6 59.8 64.6 
Employment rate female 64.0 62.2 58.8 58.5 46.9 51.7 
Employment rate male 75.2 67.2 68.4 69.2 60.5 63.9 
Employment rate older 
people (55-64) 
55.1 70.0 57.5 41.1 44.1 46.0 
Employment rate older 
female (55-64) 
44.7 66.7 49.2 31.7 32.3 37.8 
Employment rate older 
male (55-64) 
65.4 73.2 66.2 51.0 56.7 54.8 
Unemployment rate 3.7 8.3 7.6 4.8 18.0 8.9 
Youth unemployment rate  
(< 25 year) 
7.7 25 19.1 10 37.8 19.7 
Share of long-term 
unemployment  
( >12 months, 15-75 years) 
24.8 13.3 24.5 21.3 23.7 33.2 
Part-time employment as 
percentage of total 
employment 
48.3 27 26.1 24.6 12.8 18.8 
Share of employees with 
limited duration contract 
(%) 
18.2 15.3 5.7 9.1 25.4 13.5 
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey 
 
The employment rate of older people (55-64 years) was the highest in Sweden. 
In 2009, 70% of the Swedish people aged 55-64 had a job, while the EU average 
for this group in 2009 was 46%. Also the participation rate of older women (55-
64) was significantly higher in Sweden compared with the other countries. The 
employment rate of the elderly in Austria was the lowest compared with the 
other selected countries. However, from 2004 this rate increased sharply from 
27.4% to 41.1%. The sharpest rise can be observed in the Netherlands. The 
participation rate of Dutch elderly people increased from 34% in 1998 to 55% in 
2009 (see Figure 2.2). 
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Figure 2.3 shows the development of the unemployment rate for the selected 
countries during the period 1983-2009. The crisis of 2008-2009, resulted for the 
countries examined in an increase of the unemployment rate, although in some 
countries the increase was sharper than in others. In Spain, the unemployment 
rate decreased from 19.5% in 1995 to 8.3% in 2007, but has more than doubled 
over the last two years (18% in 2010). The unemployment rate in Sweden has 
fluctuated during the last decades. In the 1990s, Sweden was confronted with a 
sharp increase in the unemployment rate due to the economic crisis. The Swedish 
economy recovered, but the unemployment rate did not decrease to the 1.6% 
rate of 1989. After the financial crisis of 2008, the Swedish unemployment rate 
rose from 6.2% in 2008 to 8.3% in 2009. Since 1993, the unemployment trend in 
Austria seems to have been quite stable varying between 3.6% and 5.2%. The 
Dutch unemployment rate decreased from 8.3% in 1983 to 3.7% in 2009, the 
lowest rate in the EU. The UK unemployment rate gradually decreased during the 
period 1993 to 2004, since when it increased from 4.7% in 2004 to 7.6% in 2009. 
 
Figure 2.3: Development of unemployment rate in percentage, 1983-2009 

Source: Eurostat Labour Force Study
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Viewed in the light of forced job-to-job transitions, it is interesting to compare 
figures regarding the unemployment spell after redundancy. How quickly do 
redundant employees find another job? Unfortunately, there are no comparable 
data available to answer this question. Eurostat has data with regard to the 
duration of unemployment in the countries examined (see table 2.6), but these 
data are static, i.e. the division of the current unemployment population broken 
down by the unemployment duration. In 2009, 1.3% of the Swedish unemployed 
were unemployed for 4 years or longer, which is the lowest percentage of long-
term unemployment compared with the other countries examined. The 
Netherlands has the highest share (6.02%) of long-term unemployment (> 48 
months) among the countries scrutinized, but this figure is still below the EU 
average. 
 
Table 2.6: Duration unemployment in percentages of the unemployment population, 
2009 
 NL SE UK AT ES EU27 
< 1 month 7.53 19.3 11.72 11.22 9.56 8.84 
1-2 months 27.11 24.11 22.44 25.97 21.75 18.86 
3-5 months 21.82 22.64 20.3 23.22 22.23 18.39 
6-11 months 18.21 19.49 20.19 18.18 22.77 19.75 
12-17 months 8.53 5.75 10.35 8.57 11.21 11.23 
18-23 months 2.61 2.8 4.07 2.89 4.57 4.7 
24-47 months 6.69 3.17 6.28 6.37 5.11 8.95 




Youth unemployment rates always tend to be relatively high, but in some 
countries young people have been hit very hard by the 2008-09 recession 
(OECD, 2010b). This is also confirmed by the data from the Labour Force Study. 
The operational definition of youth is here defined as people aged 15-25 years. 
For example, Spain (37.8%) and Sweden (25%) had relatively high youth 
unemployment rates in 2009. During the last decade, the Swedish youth 
unemployment rate increased, doubling from 10.5% in 2000 to 25.2% in 2009. 
The Netherlands and Austria had youth unemployment rates which were lower 
than the EU average. In 2009, the Dutch youth unemployment rate was 7.7%, 
which was the lowest youth unemployment rate in the EU, and the Austrian 
youth unemployment rate was 10%, while the UK had a youth unemployment 
rate around the EU average (19.7%). Since 2001, youth unemployment rose 
gradually in the UK from 11.7% in 2001 to 19.1% in 2009. 
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According to the Labour Force Study, long-term unemployment refers to 
persons who have been unemployed for one year or more. Table 2.6 shows the 
rates for 2009 and figure 2.5 presents the development of long-term unemploy-
ment in the last decade. Overall the share of long-term unemployment has 
decreased in Europe. In 2009, Sweden had the lowest share of long-term 
unemployment (13.3%) of the countries examined. The question is whether this 
can be explained by active policies regarding job-to-job transitions. The 
percentage of long-term unemployment in the Netherlands increased between 
2001 and 2006 from 26.7% to 43.0%, but after this peak the rate declined to 
24.8% in 2009, which is the highest rate among the examined countries. 
Nevertheless, in 2009 all countries studied had a lower percentage of long-term 
unemployment compared with the EU average (33.2%). 
 






The Netherlands is champion in part-time work. A decade ago, the Dutch part-
time rate was 38.9% (see figure 2.6). Today, almost half of the Dutch workforce 
(48.3%) has a part-time job. Moreover, the Dutch workforce does not consider 
these part-time jobs as precarious. Most Dutch employees prefer working part-
time. In the European flexicurity discourse the Netherlands is often referred to as 
a flexicurity example. Dutch flexicurity policies have been developed rather 
deliberately and can generally be reconstructed as the normalisation of atypical 
work while preserving flexibility in the labour market (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2006). This approach, combined with the relatively 
good labour market results over the past years, has served as an example at the 
European level in the early stage of the flexicurity policy-making process. In 
Sweden, the UK and Austria about one quarter has a part-time job. Figure 2.6 
shows that part-time work has increased gradually in Sweden and in Austria. In 
the UK, the rate remained stable. In Spain working part-time is less usual but the 
rate has increased from 7.8% in 1998 to 12.8% in 2009.  
 





The termination of a limited duration employment contract can be considered as 
forced mobility. The question is whether employees with a limited duration 
contract receive the same support as those workers with a permanent contract 
whose jobs are at risk. The Spanish labour market is characterized by a high 
share of employees with a limited duration contract. However, since 2007, there 
has been a declining trend in Spain of employees with a limited duration 
contract. Nevertheless, more than one quarter of the Spanish employees has a 
limited duration contract, whereas the EU average lies at 13.5%. Figure 2.7 
shows that in the Netherlands the percentage of employees with a limited 
duration contract increased during the last decade. In Austria, an increase can be 
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observed of temporary contracts in 2003, which remained stable in the years 
following. In the UK is it less common to have a limited duration contract. In 
2009, only 5.7% of the British employees had a limited duration contract.  
 




2.3  Features of the labour market demand side  
 
The labour market supply side was discussed in the previous section, now the 
comparative figures of the labour demand side will be explored.  
 
Company size 
Obviously, large companies can offer more opportunities to support redundant 
employees than small companies, owing to more internal mobility possibilities 
and more financial means to contribute to job-to-job transitions outside the 
company. However, table 2.7 shows that the majority of the EU workforce in 
2006 was employed in small and medium sized companies. This table displays 




10 The financial services are excluded in the Eurostat Data because of their specific nature 
and the limited availability of most types of standard business statistics in this area.
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Table 2.7: Number of enterprises and employees of the non-financial business 
economy by size-classes, 2006 (% of total)  
  NL (1) SE UK AT ES EU27 (1) 
Number of 
Enterprises 
SME 99.7 99.8 99.6 99.7 99.9 99.8 
  Micro 89.5 94.2 87.5 87.5 92.2 91.8 
  Small 8.7 4.8 10.5 10.5 6.8 6.9 
  Medium 1.5 0.8 1.7 1.6 0.8 1.1 
 Large 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.2 
        
Number of 
Employed persons 
SME 67.3 63.7 54.8 - 78.0 67.4 
   Micro 29.2 24.7 21.5 - 37.7 29.7 
   Small 21.1 20.9 17.9 23.2 25.5 20.7 
   Medium 17.0 18.1 15.4 - 14.8 17.0 
 Large 32.7 36.3 45.2 - 22.0 32.6 
Source: Eurostat (Eurostat European Commission, 2009) / (1) Figures from 2005 
 
The overwhelming majority (99.8%) of the firms were small and medium sized 
companies. The following size classes are used in the Eurostat SBS statistics:  
 Micro enterprises are companies with less than 10 persons employed; 
 Small enterprises are companies with 10 to 49 persons employed; 
 Medium-sized enterprises are companies with 50 to 249 persons employed; 
 Large enterprises are companies with 250 or more persons employed.  
 
The first three categories (micro-, small- and medium-sized) are collectively 
referred to as SMEs. From table 2.7 it can be concluded that in 2006 large 
companies provided approximately one third of the employment in the non-
financial business economy, including industry, construction and distributive 
trades and services. In proportion to the other examined countries, Spain had a 
large share of the workforce employed in small and medium sized companies 
(78%). Moreover, Spain had the highest share of the workforce employed in 
micro enterprises (37.7%) compared with the other selected countries. In the UK 
almost half of the workforce in the non-financial business (45.2%) was employed 
in a large firm. 
 
Vacancy rate 
In order to make successful transitions from job-to-job, theoretically, it is 
necessary that other jobs are available. Therefore, the job vacancy rate in the 
countries studied will now be addressed. Table 2.8 presents the job vacancy rate 
measured by Eurostat, which defines a job vacancy as a newly created, 
unoccupied, or about to become vacant, post: 
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observed of temporary contracts in 2003, which remained stable in the years 
following. In the UK is it less common to have a limited duration contract. In 
2009, only 5.7% of the British employees had a limited duration contract.  
 




2.3  Features of the labour market demand side  
 
The labour market supply side was discussed in the previous section, now the 
comparative figures of the labour demand side will be explored.  
 
Company size 
Obviously, large companies can offer more opportunities to support redundant 
employees than small companies, owing to more internal mobility possibilities 
and more financial means to contribute to job-to-job transitions outside the 
company. However, table 2.7 shows that the majority of the EU workforce in 
2006 was employed in small and medium sized companies. This table displays 




10 The financial services are excluded in the Eurostat Data because of their specific nature 
and the limited availability of most types of standard business statistics in this area.
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Table 2.7: Number of enterprises and employees of the non-financial business 
economy by size-classes, 2006 (% of total)  
  NL (1) SE UK AT ES EU27 (1) 
Number of 
Enterprises 
SME 99.7 99.8 99.6 99.7 99.9 99.8 
  Micro 89.5 94.2 87.5 87.5 92.2 91.8 
  Small 8.7 4.8 10.5 10.5 6.8 6.9 
  Medium 1.5 0.8 1.7 1.6 0.8 1.1 
 Large 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.2 
        
Number of 
Employed persons 
SME 67.3 63.7 54.8 - 78.0 67.4 
   Micro 29.2 24.7 21.5 - 37.7 29.7 
   Small 21.1 20.9 17.9 23.2 25.5 20.7 
   Medium 17.0 18.1 15.4 - 14.8 17.0 
 Large 32.7 36.3 45.2 - 22.0 32.6 
Source: Eurostat (Eurostat European Commission, 2009) / (1) Figures from 2005 
 
The overwhelming majority (99.8%) of the firms were small and medium sized 
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(i) for which the employer is taking active steps to find a suitable candidate from 
outside the enterprise concerned and is prepared to take more steps; and 
(ii)which the employer intends to fill either immediately or in the near future. 
Under this definition, a job vacancy should be open to candidates from outside 
the enterprise. However, this does not exclude the possibility of the employer 
appointing an internal candidate to the post. A vacant post that is open only to 
internal candidates should not be treated as a job vacancy. In table 2.8 the 
figures for the Netherlands and Spain deviate slightly from this definition. Dutch 
job vacancies intended for internal candidates are included. The Spanish figures 
comprise only posts to be filled immediately, and job vacancies intended for 
internal candidates are also included. The job vacancy rate (JVR) is calculated as 
follows: JVR = number of job vacancies / (number of occupied posts + number of 
job vacancies) * 100. Obviously, Spain had the fewest job openings. The 
Netherlands had the most available job opportunities, followed by the UK. 
 
Table 2.8: Job vacancy rate, 2001-2008 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
EU27 : : 1.5 1.6 1.8 2.1 2.2 1.9 
ES 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.6 
NL 2.4 1.6 1.1 1.5 2.2 2.8 3.2 2.9 
AT : : : 1.5 1.4 : : : 
SE 1.8 1.4 1.2 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.2 




Continuous investments in knowledge and skills will contribute to more 
employment security for employees and is therefore relevant for this study. 
Eurostat introduced a lifelong learning indicator which refers ‘to persons aged 25 
to 64 who stated that they received training or education in the four weeks 
preceding the survey. The information collected includes all education and 
training whether or not relevant to the respondent’s current or possible future 
job’. Table 2.9 shows the results and reveals that the percentage of persons that 
received training or education is the highest in Sweden and the lowest in Spain. 
One out of four Swedish persons aged 25 to 64 received training or education in 
the four weeks preceding the survey held in 2010, while one out of nine Spanish 









Table 2.9: Life-long learning in percentages 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
EU27 7.1 7.1 7.2 8.5 9.3 9.8 9.6 9.4 9.4 9.3 9.1 
ES 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.7 4.7 10.5 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.8 
NL 15.5 15.9 15.8 16.4 16.4 15.9 15.6 16.6 17 17 16.5 
AT 8.3 8.2 7.5 8.6 11.6 12.9 13.1 12.8 13.2 13.8 13.7 
SE 21.6 17.5 18.4 : : 17.4 18.4 18.6 22.2 22.2 24.5 
UK 20.5 20.9 21.3 27.2 29 27.6 26.7 20 19.9 20.1 19.4 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Table 2.10 shows the participation rate in education and training by permanency 
of the employment contracts for employees aged 25 to 64 years, for the year 
2009. In all the countries examined it appears that the percentage of employees 
that participated in education and training was higher for those with a 
temporary contract compared with those with a permanent job. The largest 
difference can be observed in Austria. In 2009, 28.8% of the Austrian employees 
with a temporary job participated in education or training, while 14.6% of the 
employees with a permanent contract participated in training or education. 
 








European Union (27 countries) 10.1 14.2 10.6 
Spain 10.7 14.0 11.5 
Netherlands 18.8 24.4 19.5 
Austria 14.6 28.8 15.2 
Sweden 22.1 27.4 27.4 
United Kingdom 22.7 31.4 23.1 
Source: Eurostat 
 
2.4 Concluding remarks 
 
In this chapter, general labour market indicators and key labour market 
institutions of the examined countries have been described. These indicators are 
relevant, because they provide background information in order to understand 
why governments, or other labour market institutions, put in place specific 
policies to support workers in the transition towards a new job, give priority to 
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European Union (27 countries) 10.1 14.2 10.6 
Spain 10.7 14.0 11.5 
Netherlands 18.8 24.4 19.5 
Austria 14.6 28.8 15.2 
Sweden 22.1 27.4 27.4 
United Kingdom 22.7 31.4 23.1 
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2.4 Concluding remarks 
 
In this chapter, general labour market indicators and key labour market 
institutions of the examined countries have been described. These indicators are 
relevant, because they provide background information in order to understand 
why governments, or other labour market institutions, put in place specific 
policies to support workers in the transition towards a new job, give priority to 
certain target groups or why they do not stimulate job-to-job transitions at all.  
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Sweden belongs to the social democratic welfare type. The generous benefits 
are available for all citizens. This implies high collective costs that can only be 
afforded through effective activating labour market policies. Therefore, the 
participation rate is high compared with the European average. However, youth 
unemployment has risen in the last decade and is currently relatively high in 
Sweden (25%). On the other hand, the participation rate of older people is 
significantly higher compared with the other selected countries. Furthermore, 
the participation of Swedish women is considerable. The percentage of long-
term unemployment (13.3%) is low in Sweden. Among the countries examined 
Sweden has the highest rate of employees that participated in training and 
education in 2009. Sweden has the highest mobility rate among people aged 16-
64 with a permanent contract. Apparently, Swedish employees feel safe enough 
to take the risk of making a transition to another job. Sweden has a well-
developed safety net and supports transitions. Another main feature of the 
Swedish labour market is the high trade union density. Collective bargaining, 
including negotiations about job-to-job transitions, is an important trait in 
Sweden. This will be discussed further in Chapter 3.  
 
Austria is an example of the corporatist welfare regime. The participation rate in 
Austria lies above the EU average, but is low compared with Sweden and the 
Netherlands. In contrast to Sweden, the Austrian youth participation is relatively 
high (90%), while the Austrian employment rate of older people is the lowest 
(41.1%) of the countries scrutinized. In Austria, employees with a temporary 
contract participate more often in training and education compared with those 
with a permanent contract. This is also the case in the other countries examined, 
but the difference in education and training participation rate between those 
with a permanent job and those with a temporary job, is the largest in Austria. 
 
Spain has been hit very hard by the financial economic crisis of 2008. The 
Spanish unemployment rate is significantly higher than the EU average. Both 
young and old people face great difficulties to (re)enter the labour market. 
Furthermore, Spain is characterized by a dual labour market with, on the one 
hand, a high percentage of employees with a limited duration contract and 
unemployed people and, on the other hand, the more privileged employees with 
a permanent contract whose jobs are strongly protected by the employment 
protection legislation. Spain has the lowest trade union density and, compared 
with the other countries examined, a large amount of strikes and lockouts. 
Another feature of the Spanish labour market is the relatively high proportion of 
workers employed in micro-enterprises.  
 
In contrast to Spain, the UK has a less restricted employment protection 
regulation and high job mobility. As a consequence, limited duration contracts 
are not often used in the UK. Moreover, one out of three employees with a 
temporary contract participated in training and education in 2009. In the other 
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countries studied this percentage varies from 14.0 to 28.8. Furthermore, almost 
half of the British workers (45.2%) are employed in a large company of more 
than 250 employees.  
 
The Netherlands has the highest employment rate among the countries studied, 
and the lowest youth unemployment rate. Both the share of part-time work and 
the share of limited durations contracts is higher than the EU average. The 
participation rate in education and training lies above the EU average, but is 
lower compared with Sweden and the UK, both for temporary and permanent 
employees. 
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3.   Sweden 
 
In this chapter, the Swedish policies and arrangements regarding support for 
job-to-job transition in case of redundancy will be discussed. Firstly, the Swedish 
context will be described. Attention will be paid to the political background, 
labour market features, and relevant law and legislation. A central feature of the 
Swedish labour market is the role given to collective agreements in regulating 
the labour market (section 3.1). Secondly, the employment security system will 
be discussed. The type of support that is available to help people from job-to-job, 
the eligibility criteria, the financing of the system, the actors involved, their 
responsibility, and the delivery will be addressed (sections 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5). In 
these sections, the job-to-job arrangements and the coordination mechanisms 
will be fleshed out and the motives for cooperating in the system will be explored. 
The performance of the Swedish system, the relevant preconditions for success, 
and the results for the actors involved will be elaborated in sections 3.6 and 3.7. 




3.1.1 Political background 
Since World War II, the Social Democrats have dominated the political arena in 
Sweden. Only during the years of the deep recession in the early 1990s, did they 
yield power to a centre-right government. This government took office in the fall 
of 1991, but became a victim of the crisis between 1990 and 1993, and the Social 
Democrats returned to power again three years later. After the elections in 
2006, which the Social Democrats (Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti) 
lost, a new right-wing government of the Moderate party (Moderata samlings-
partiet) allied with the Centre party (Centerpartiet) and the Liberal People’s party 
(Folkpartiet liberalerna) took office and declared changes in labour market policy 
as well as in the public employment service (Jonung, Kiander, & Vartia, 2008). In 
September 2010, elections were held and a far right-party, the Swedish 
Democrats, entered parliament for the first time, after winning 5.7% of the votes 
for twenty seats in the 349-seat legislature. The current coalition, Reinfeldt’s 
four-party coalition, won 172 seats, three short of a majority, while the left-wing 
opposition achieved 157 seats.  
 
3.1.2 Economic history and labour market features 
Sweden has faced economic downturns but also has experienced recoveries and 
golden decades in the 20th century and the first part of the 21st century. The 
economic crisis of 1921-1922 and the Great Depression in the early 1930s 
confronted Sweden with high unemployment rates which fluctuated at around 
30%. Sweden remained neutral during the First and Second World Wars. The 
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Sweden has faced economic downturns but also has experienced recoveries and 
golden decades in the 20th century and the first part of the 21st century. The 
economic crisis of 1921-1922 and the Great Depression in the early 1930s 
confronted Sweden with high unemployment rates which fluctuated at around 
30%. Sweden remained neutral during the First and Second World Wars. The 
latter period was followed by an era of economic growth. In the late 1940s and 
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1950s, reforms were initiated, including a more generous old-age pension 
scheme, child allowances, and health insurances.  
 
During the 1950s and 1960s, the Swedish economic situation flourished and can 
best be described as prosperous. Unemployment went down after World War II 
and there was almost full employment. The social welfare state expanded 
substantially. This led to high income taxes, even on very low incomes. Even 
today, Sweden has the highest tax burden in the world: it is equivalent to 50% of 
the GDP. This is one of the features of the ‘Swedish model’ which became 
famous because of the way in which economic and social stability was reached 
(Buitendam, Dumas, & Glebbeek, 1990). Other features of this model are a 
large, privately owned industrial sector, a large trade union movement, the state 
playing an active role in labour market policies, and ambitions to achieve an even 
distribution of income and wealth. 
 
Traditionally, Sweden has been an export-oriented country and was therefore 
seriously hit by the oil crisis in 1973-1974. Governmental subsidies, devaluation 
and deregulation were typical features of the 1980s. The devaluation process in 
1982 led to a sharp increase in Swedish exports but also worsened the problems 
of inflation in the long run. Between 1983 and 1990, deregulation led to the 
abolishment of limits on loan amounts and interest rates. Loans increased 
tremendously. As a result, the banking and service sectors nearly collapsed and 
Sweden landed in a severe financial and economic crisis in the early 1990s. 
Unemployment rose from about 1.6% in 1989 to 9.9% in 1997 (see figure 2.3). 
After 1993, the economy stabilised and the unemployment rate decreased to 
5.6% in 2000. In the first years of the 21st century, Sweden was confronted with a 
mild economic downturn. Following a recovery, Sweden was no worse off than 
other countries hit by the global financial crisis which emerged in October 2008. 
The unemployment rate increased from 6.2% in 2008 to 8.3% in 2009. Swedish 
labour demand has fluctuated in the last decades as a result of recessions and 
prosperous periods. In the last 20 years, production has moved to countries with 
lower labour costs as a result of the globalisation process. The Swedish 
employment rate was, in 2009, 72.2%.  
 
The main features of the Swedish labour supply were described previously in 
Chapter 2. Summarizing, it may be stated that Sweden has a high employment 
rate among Swedish women. A second trait is the high labour market 
participation rate of Swedish older workers. In 2009, 70% of the Swedish people 
aged 55-64 still participated in the labour market. This is significantly higher than 
the EU average of 46%. However, Swedish employment rates are relatively high 
but the average hours worked are below the OECD average because of longer 
holidays and other leave reducing the number of weeks worked per year. 
Thirdly, youth unemployment is high in Sweden. Since 2004, the unemployment 
rate among young Swedes (< 25 years) has been higher than the EU average and 
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has doubled from 10.5% in 2000 to 25.2% in 2009. According to the OECD, the 
youth unemployment rate for 15-24 year olds is high even when Swedish full-
time students are taken into account, standing at 14.3% in 2007 (OECD, 2008). 
Furthermore, the OECD concludes that the median age for starting higher 
education in Sweden is rather high.  
 
3.1.3 Legal framework of redundancy and unemployment insurance 
As previously discussed in Chapter 1, the institutional setting influences the 
choices actors make. The legal framework of redundancy is relevant for job-to-
job transitions because it defines the rights and obligations in the event of forced 
dismissals for both employers and employees. A clear insight into the 
unemployment insurance scheme is necessary to determine the extent of income 
security for redundant employees during the period ‘in between’ two jobs.  
 
The Swedish labour market is regulated by both law and collective agreements. 
Strong restrictions on the freedom of employers to fire employees hamper 
external flexibility for the employers. Strong employment protection provides 
employees with job security, i.e., protecting jobs rather than stimulating job-to-
job transitions, and income security rather than employment security. In this 
section, the Swedish legal framework in the case of redundancy will be briefly 
introduced.  
 
The Employment Protection Act 
In 1974, the Law on Employment Protection (Lag om anställningsskydd – LAS) 
came into force. Prior to the enactment of this law employment protection was 
regulated via contractual solutions based on collective bargaining. The aim of 
the law was mainly to protect older workers and therefore a period of notice was 
introduced which provided income security for a certain period in which the 
older workers could look for new employment. To be eligible for this statutory 
employment protection, the employee had to be at least 45 years old and had to 
have been in employment for a minimum period of two years during the three 
years immediately before dismissal (Sebardt, 2006). The 1982 Employment 
Protection Act represents a further development of the 1974 law and regulates 
the protection of employees against arbitrary or unjustified dismissal. It applies 
to all employees except for employees classified as managerial executives; 
workers who are family members of the employer; employees who work in their 
employer’s personal household, and individuals who are given a job which is 
funded by government subsidies to combat unemployment, including protected 
workplaces. The Employment Protection Act applies from the first day of 
employment and holds for all employers including small companies.  
 
Two main categories of reasons for dismissal with a notice period can be dis-
tinguished: redundancy and individual causes. The focus will be on the reasons 
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has doubled from 10.5% in 2000 to 25.2% in 2009. According to the OECD, the 
youth unemployment rate for 15-24 year olds is high even when Swedish full-
time students are taken into account, standing at 14.3% in 2007 (OECD, 2008). 
Furthermore, the OECD concludes that the median age for starting higher 
education in Sweden is rather high.  
 
3.1.3 Legal framework of redundancy and unemployment insurance 
As previously discussed in Chapter 1, the institutional setting influences the 
choices actors make. The legal framework of redundancy is relevant for job-to-
job transitions because it defines the rights and obligations in the event of forced 
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employer’s personal household, and individuals who are given a job which is 
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Two main categories of reasons for dismissal with a notice period can be dis-
tinguished: redundancy and individual causes. The focus will be on the reasons 
relating to redundancy, meaning shortage of work or dismissals motivated by 
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the employers’ right to manage the business in an appropriate way. During the 
notice period the employee is fully paid and has the right to time off in order to 
look for new employment. The statutory notice period for employment 
contracts concluded after January 1997 is at least one month. Each two-year 
period of employment increases the notice period by one month, with a 
maximum of six month’s notice. Section 11 of the LAS specifies the minimum 
period of notice if the employer wishes to terminate the employment contract. 
 
Table 3.1: Duration statutory notice period in Sweden 
Period of employment Statutory notice period 
< 2 years 1 month 
Between 2 – 4 years 2 months 
Between 4 – 6 years 3 months 
Between 6 – 8 years 4 months 
Between 8 – 10 years 5 months 
>10 years 6 months 
 
However, collective agreements can deviate from the statutory notice period 
and in practice longer periods of notice are often agreed (Sebardt, 2006). 
 
In the case of redundancy, the order of selection has to be determined. One 
selection criterion is the seniority principle, also referred to as the ‘Last In First 
Out’ (LIFO) principle, which is regulated in the LAS. Since 2001, small companies 
with ten or fewer employees may deviate from these seniority rules by 
exempting a maximum of two employees who are of key importance to the 
business. Sebardt notes that this rule was first introduced in 1994 and abolished 
in 1995 because of a governmental change, but then brought back again in 2001 
owing to a shift in the parliamentary composition (Sebardt, 2006). Although the 
LIFO procedure is regulated by law, the legislation allows the making of 
collective agreements that deviate from the seniority rules. It is quite common 
for main collective agreements to leave room for deviations in agreements 
concluded at a local level. This means that trade unions and employers can 
bargain about the selection criteria for dismissal and may deviate from the legal 
‘LIFO’ path. The employers want to choose the employees who they want to 
keep in their company on the basis of competences and qualifications. Most of 
the Swedish interviewees, representing different organisations, declare that 
these negotiations are quite common.  
 
The Danish Flexicurity system has been a role model for many European 
countries for ways to create a flexible labour market. Van de Berg states that 
“not the Danes or the Dutch, but the Swedes were the first to formulate the 
basic ideas underlying the notion of ‘flexicurity’” (Berg, 2008). In his work, Van de 
Berg explained that in 1951, two young union economists, Rehn and Meidner, 
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proposed a plan of “policies that would serve to control both inflation and 
unemployment while simultaneously promoting rapid economic growth and 
preserving the LO’s11 position of strength” (Berg, 2008). Rehn and Meidner 
proposed rigorous fiscal restraints combined with a ‘solidaristic’ wage policy, and 
a complementary package of active policies geared to facilitate the smooth and 
rapid flow of labour from declining to expanding industries, including retraining 
programmes and mobility allowances (Berg, 2008). Van de Berg stresses that 
Rehn and Meidner intended to provide employment protection as a substitute 
for job protection. Initially, the LO supported this plan, but in the early 1970s, in 
response to the economic downturn, the LO felt forced to support a series of 
laws, that supported job security rather than employment security. The 
economic circumstances of that time hindered the implementation of the 
theoretical plan designed by Rehn and Meidner. Van de Berg argues that the 
Danish flexicurity model actually ‘does implement the Rehn-Meidner plan more 
or less consistently, but ironically without any pre-conceived overall plan at all’ 
(Berg, 2008). Denmark does not have transition agreements which in Sweden 
are quite common (see section 3.2). An interviewee from the Central 
Organisation of Salaried Employees (TCO) argued that the Swedish system is 
even more flexible than the Danish system, when it comes to collective 
dismissals, because of these collective agreements. In the Danish system it is 
easier to dismiss people for an individual reason, which is quite problematic in 
Sweden, but closing down an entire factory or laying off 50 people is easier in 
Sweden because of these collective negotiations. In practice, local agreements 
differ considerably and statistics and figures on how often unions and 
employers’ associations negotiate about other selection criteria are missing. In 
practice, it seems to be very difficult to research this topic because there are 
many agreements. Usually the negotiations are secret. In times of recession, an 
employer can negotiate with the trade union and make a specific agreement to 
handle the poor economic situation. 
 
In Sweden, a debate is going on about changing the employment protection 
legislation. The TCO interviewee mentioned that the employment protection 
legislation is not as valuable for employment protection as competence and 
education. The Swedish legislation is flexible in the sense that employers can 
deviate from the legislation by reaching agreements with the trade unions. 
Employers who want to downsize can choose among their staff, because they 
are able to negotiate on this issue in a successful way. However, the employ-
ment protection legislation is very important for trade unions because it gives 
them leverage to negotiate for price. In practice, this power is often used to 
focus on education and competence development for those who are to be 
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11  LO is the central organization for trade unions for the blue-collar workers.
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dismissed. This will give them a better labour market position once they have 
left the company.  
 
The order of selection is also important for re-employment after redundancy. The 
1982 Employment Protection Act provides the right for re-employment for 
employees who have been given notice on the grounds of redundancy, including 
those whose fixed-term contract has not been continued for the same reason. 
The re-employment right is valid for the following nine months and is a 
preferential right to re-employment in the company in which they were formerly 
employed. If there are many former employees, the general rule is that the length 
of the employment determines the order of re-employment. The employer has to 
declare whether an employee has a priority right to re-employment in the event 
of redundancy dismissal. 
 
The Employment Promotion Act 
Simultaneously with the Employment Protection Act, the Employment 
Promotion Act (Främjandelagen) came into force in 1974. This Act contains rules 
on promoting the employment of older workers and those experiencing reduced 
working capacities, and facilitating the necessary transitions in the labour 
market. It must be noted that the termination of an employment contract must 
be of an economic nature. The Act obliges employers to notify the County 
Labour Board (Länsarbetsnämden) if the dismissal affects more than five 
employees. If a maximum of 25 employees are affected, the employer must 
notify the County Labour Board at least two months before the dismissal, at 
least four months if 26-100 employees are going to be dismissed and at least six 
months if more than 100 employees are affected (Bergström & Diedrich, 2008). 
The notification should include relevant information regarding the number of 
redundant employees, the cause of the redundancy and, later in the process, the 
names of those to be dismissed and the consultation entered into. In 1995, the 
Employment Promotion Act was amended to meet the requirements of the 
amended EU Directive relating to collective dismissals.12 
 
Co-determination Act 
Another important law is the Co-determination Act (Medbestämmandelagen, 
MBL) which came into force in 1976. This Act obliges employers bound by 
collective agreements to consult with the trade unions on all important changes 
in their organizations or in the labour relations with their workers (Diedrich & 
Bergström, 2006). The aim of this obligation is to make consultations with the 
unions a normal component of the employer’s decision-making process 
(Sebardt, 2006). 
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12  EU Directive 75/129, 92/56 en 98/59/EC.
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Statutory unemployment insurance 
In the late 19th century, the first unemployment insurance fund was established 
by the Swedish Typographers Association, because there was no compulsory 
unemployment insurance available. Many other trade unions followed and 
started similar funds, which provided cash benefits to unemployed members 
who met certain conditions. These payments were financed through member-
ship fees (The Swedish Unemployment Insurance Board (IAF), 2007). This is also 
known as the Ghent system13, in which trade unions are responsible for paying 
unemployment benefits rather than the government. The first Unemployment 
Insurance Act came into effect on the first of January 1935. As from this date, 
unemployment insurance funds could receive government registration and a 
state grant for the payment of benefits. In 1974, an additional system was 
introduced for those who were not covered by the existing unemployment 
insurance scheme: the cash labour market assistance (KAS, Kontant 
arbetsmarknadsstöd). In 1998, a new law on unemployment insurance came into 
force which integrated the cash labour market assistance with the existing 
unemployment insurance scheme.  The payment of unemployment benefit is 
administered by 32 unemployment insurance funds (September 2010). 14 
Historically, these funds have been affiliated with trade unions, but today these 
organisations have to be completely independent from other organisations.  
 
The statutory unemployment insurance (Lag om arbetslöshetsförsäkring – ALF) 
consists of a basic benefit and an income-related benefit. The unemployment 
insurance covers both employees and self-employed. For the latter, the 
compensation is based on the most recent taxed income or, if this is to the 
advantage of the self-employed, on the average of the taxed income over the 
previous two years (Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, 2011). Membership of 
the unemployment insurance fund is voluntary, but it is necessary to be a 
member of an unemployment insurance fund to receive the income-related 
benefit. This means that a person must have been a member of the 
unemployment fund for a minimum period of twelve months prior to the first 
day of unemployment. Working within the sector covered by the unemployment 
fund is required in order to become a member of that fund. Individuals who are 
not employed in the sector at the time of the application are entitled to 
admission if their most recent job was within the sector covered by the 
unemployment insurance fund. Besides the membership condition other 
conditions have to be fulfilled to receive benefits from the unemployment 
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13  The name of the system derives from the Belgian town Ghent where it was first 
introduced.
14     <http://www.iaf.se/English/List-of-the-Swedish-Unemployment-Insurance-Funds-com 
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insurance. The person must: 
 have worked for at least six calendar months during the last twelve-month 
period, with a minimum of 80 hours worked in each month, or have worked 
for at least 480 hours during a continuous six-month period, with a minimum 
of 50 hours in each month; 
 be fit for work and otherwise not impeded from undertaking employment; 
 be prepared to accept offers of suitable employment; 
 be registered as a jobseeker with the employment service; 
 be unable to obtain suitable employment (Confederation of Swedish 
Enterprise Insurance Information, 2010). 
 
The basic benefit is paid to the individual who meets these conditions, but who 
does not fulfil the membership condition. The Unemployment Insurance Fund 
(UIF) of which the person is a member, pays the benefit which amounts SEK 320 
(EUR 35.37 euro) per day calculated on a full-time basis. The basic benefit is paid 
out for a maximum period of 300 days. The highest daily payment for the 
income-related component is SEK 680 (EUR 74.95). The benefit level, which 
decreases as time elapses, is presented in table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2: Duration and compensation level Swedish unemployment insurance 
benefit and the organisation responsible for paying the benefit 
Number of compensation days Compensation level (%) 
of the previous earnings 
Paid by 
On days 1-200 80 
Unemployment 
Insurance Fund 
On days 201-300 70 
Unemployment 
Insurance Fund 
After 300 days jobseekers are invited 
to participate in the work and 
development guarantee programme, 






Source: (Confederation of Swedish Enterprise Insurance Information, 2010). 
 
In addition, after 300 compensation days, parents with children under 18 years of 
age may choose between having an extended period of 150 compensation days 
or participating in the work and development guarantee programme. Benefit 
during this extended period of 150 days is 70%. After this, the work and 
development guarantee programme applies at a compensation level of 65% 
(Confederation of Swedish Enterprise Insurance Information, 2010). In July 2007, 
the Swedish centre-right government introduced the work and development 
guarantee programme for people who have been out of work for 300 days and 
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have used up their time on unemployment insurance.15 In cases of up to 450 days 
of unemployment preparatory measures such as job coaching, career guidance 
and working training is provided by the Public Employment Service. The person 
will be offered a job and receives a basic state benefit from the Social Insurance 
Agency after 450 days of unemployment. This is also known as ‘phase three’. 
Employers receive SEK 5,000 (EUR 551) a month in compensation from the 
state. However, participants are not allowed to perform tasks normally carried 
out by permanent employees. In 2010, only one percent of the ‘phase three’ 
employees moved on to permanent employment. Trade unions and the 
opposition criticise this measure and they argue that employers can effectively 
make use of free labour. In 2011, the Public Employment Service will investigate 
all ‘phase three’ employment and, where employers fail to comply with current 
regulatory frameworks, contracts will be terminated.16  
The first seven days of unemployment are so-called ‘waiting days’ in which there 
is no entitlement to unemployment benefits (The Swedish Federation of 
Unemployment Insurance Funds (SO), 2009). The Swedish unemployment 
insurance system is not a completely public, state-based system, because the 
statutory basic protection is topped up by supplementary insurances provided 
under collective agreements and private schemes.  
 
The replacement rate (RR) is an indicator for comparing benefit levels between 
countries. The OECD indicator measures the proportion of expected income 
from work which is replaced by unemployment and related welfare benefits. The 
OECD net replacement rates during the initial phase of unemployment for 




15  <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2011/03/articles/se1103019i.htm>, accessed 27 
July 2011.





insurance. The person must: 
 have worked for at least six calendar months during the last twelve-month 
period, with a minimum of 80 hours worked in each month, or have worked 
for at least 480 hours during a continuous six-month period, with a minimum 
of 50 hours in each month; 
 be fit for work and otherwise not impeded from undertaking employment; 
 be prepared to accept offers of suitable employment; 
 be registered as a jobseeker with the employment service; 
 be unable to obtain suitable employment (Confederation of Swedish 
Enterprise Insurance Information, 2010). 
 
The basic benefit is paid to the individual who meets these conditions, but who 
does not fulfil the membership condition. The Unemployment Insurance Fund 
(UIF) of which the person is a member, pays the benefit which amounts SEK 320 
(EUR 35.37 euro) per day calculated on a full-time basis. The basic benefit is paid 
out for a maximum period of 300 days. The highest daily payment for the 
income-related component is SEK 680 (EUR 74.95). The benefit level, which 
decreases as time elapses, is presented in table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2: Duration and compensation level Swedish unemployment insurance 
benefit and the organisation responsible for paying the benefit 
Number of compensation days Compensation level (%) 
of the previous earnings 
Paid by 
On days 1-200 80 
Unemployment 
Insurance Fund 
On days 201-300 70 
Unemployment 
Insurance Fund 
After 300 days jobseekers are invited 
to participate in the work and 
development guarantee programme, 






Source: (Confederation of Swedish Enterprise Insurance Information, 2010). 
 
In addition, after 300 compensation days, parents with children under 18 years of 
age may choose between having an extended period of 150 compensation days 
or participating in the work and development guarantee programme. Benefit 
during this extended period of 150 days is 70%. After this, the work and 
development guarantee programme applies at a compensation level of 65% 
(Confederation of Swedish Enterprise Insurance Information, 2010). In July 2007, 
the Swedish centre-right government introduced the work and development 
guarantee programme for people who have been out of work for 300 days and 
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have used up their time on unemployment insurance.15 In cases of up to 450 days 
of unemployment preparatory measures such as job coaching, career guidance 
and working training is provided by the Public Employment Service. The person 
will be offered a job and receives a basic state benefit from the Social Insurance 
Agency after 450 days of unemployment. This is also known as ‘phase three’. 
Employers receive SEK 5,000 (EUR 551) a month in compensation from the 
state. However, participants are not allowed to perform tasks normally carried 
out by permanent employees. In 2010, only one percent of the ‘phase three’ 
employees moved on to permanent employment. Trade unions and the 
opposition criticise this measure and they argue that employers can effectively 
make use of free labour. In 2011, the Public Employment Service will investigate 
all ‘phase three’ employment and, where employers fail to comply with current 
regulatory frameworks, contracts will be terminated.16  
The first seven days of unemployment are so-called ‘waiting days’ in which there 
is no entitlement to unemployment benefits (The Swedish Federation of 
Unemployment Insurance Funds (SO), 2009). The Swedish unemployment 
insurance system is not a completely public, state-based system, because the 
statutory basic protection is topped up by supplementary insurances provided 
under collective agreements and private schemes.  
 
The replacement rate (RR) is an indicator for comparing benefit levels between 
countries. The OECD indicator measures the proportion of expected income 
from work which is replaced by unemployment and related welfare benefits. The 
OECD net replacement rates during the initial phase of unemployment for 




15  <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2011/03/articles/se1103019i.htm>, accessed 27 
July 2011.




Table 3.3: Net Replacement Rates in Sweden in percentages for six family types: 
initial phase of unemployment, 2009, by earning level of average wage (AW) 
 Family type 

























67% of AW 69 69 85 83 80 86 79 
100% of AW 48 48 69 65 58 71 60 
Source: OECD17 
 
No statutory right to severance pay  
In contrast to many other European countries, there is no statutory right to 
receive severance pay in the case of redundancy in Sweden. However, in 
collective agreements, severance pay can be guaranteed in the event of 
redundancy. The conditions for entitlement to severance pay will be further 
discussed in section 3.2. 
 
Collective agreements 
A central feature of the Swedish labour market is the role given to collective 
agreements in regulating the labour market. For example, wages are regulated 
by the collective agreements and the government takes no responsibility for 
ensuring that the collective agreements are enforced (Bergström & Diedrich, 
2008). The collective agreements have a special status in Sweden as they may 
replace certain legislation as binding law (semi-compulsory). This means that the 
law contains rules on, for example, bargaining procedures, industrial action, and 
intervention of mediators in industrial conflicts. By registering agreements, the 
parties in the sector may follow the agreed rules instead of the statutory rules.  
 
3.2 Type of support to find work after redundancy 
 
In Sweden, job-to-job transition is the subject of voluntary regulation between 
the trade unions and employers. As described previously, the collective 
agreements have a special status in the sense that they may replace certain 
statutory provisions as binding law and can be referred to as semi-compulsory 
(Sebardt, 2006). Foundations were set up for the collection of funds and the 
administration of the activities stipulated by the corresponding agreements. The 
first agreements emerged in the 1970s and were called ‘job security’ 

17  <http://www.oecd.org/document/3/0,3343,en_2649_34637_39617987_1_1_1_1,00.html>, 
accessed 12 July 2011.
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agreements. It was LO’s idea that workers should not leave the companies and 
that companies should get support to prevent redundancy. There was a shift in 
focus during the 1990s and the name was changed to transition or adjustment 
agreements. The aim of these agreements is to help people getting another job 
in the event of redundancy and this reflects employment security rather than job 
security. The first foundations were called, for example, Job Security Council 
(Trygghetsråden) or Job Security Foundation (Trygghetsstiftelser). The Swedish 
Trade Unions and employers in the Trade and Industry sector believed that the 
public agency could not help white-collar workers with job matching in a 
satisfactory way and therefore they introduced the transition foundation TRR in 
1974. At that time, the LO, the trade union for the blue-collar workers, was 
satisfied with the activities of the Public Employment Service and was not 
interested in the idea of a transition foundation like the TRR, but the LO 
changed its mind during the 1990s. The different unions affiliated to the LO 
worked with companies or in sectors competing in the international market. It 
was not always possible to keep the company intact, so the workers would lose 
their jobs anyway. Another reason was that the blue-collar side saw that the 
working method of the TRR, helping employed people whose jobs were at risk, 
was much more effective than the working method of the public employment 
service. The white-collar workers received better help and coaching compared 
with the blue-collar workers. Therefore, at the beginning of the new millennium, 
the LO asked the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise to take part in 
negotiations for a new agreement in the Trade and Industry sector. In 2004, the 
agreement was concluded and the foundation TSL (Trygghetsfonden) was 
established. Bäckström has listed the collective adjustment agreements and the 
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agreements have a special status in the sense that they may replace certain 
statutory provisions as binding law and can be referred to as semi-compulsory 
(Sebardt, 2006). Foundations were set up for the collection of funds and the 
administration of the activities stipulated by the corresponding agreements. The 
first agreements emerged in the 1970s and were called ‘job security’ 
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agreements. It was LO’s idea that workers should not leave the companies and 
that companies should get support to prevent redundancy. There was a shift in 
focus during the 1990s and the name was changed to transition or adjustment 
agreements. The aim of these agreements is to help people getting another job 
in the event of redundancy and this reflects employment security rather than job 
security. The first foundations were called, for example, Job Security Council 
(Trygghetsråden) or Job Security Foundation (Trygghetsstiftelser). The Swedish 
Trade Unions and employers in the Trade and Industry sector believed that the 
public agency could not help white-collar workers with job matching in a 
satisfactory way and therefore they introduced the transition foundation TRR in 
1974. At that time, the LO, the trade union for the blue-collar workers, was 
satisfied with the activities of the Public Employment Service and was not 
interested in the idea of a transition foundation like the TRR, but the LO 
changed its mind during the 1990s. The different unions affiliated to the LO 
worked with companies or in sectors competing in the international market. It 
was not always possible to keep the company intact, so the workers would lose 
their jobs anyway. Another reason was that the blue-collar side saw that the 
working method of the TRR, helping employed people whose jobs were at risk, 
was much more effective than the working method of the public employment 
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Table 3.4: Collective agreements on Job Transitions in Sweden 
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Source: (Bäckström, 2008) 
  
The aim of the adjustment agreement is to deal with redundancy problems for 
companies when a work shortage arises. The agreement consists of two 
components: financial support and practical support.  
 
Financial support in transition agreements 
Financial support in the transition agreements refers to the financial compensation 
supplementing the unemployment benefit, e.g., severance pay. There are three 
types of severance pay: 1) avgångsersättning – AGE for most white-collar workers 
and the state sector, 2) avgångsbidrag – AGB for most blue-collar workers and, 3) 
avgångsförmåner – AGF for municipal workers.  
AGE, provided by most white-collar employment security agreements as well as 
that of the state sector, is supplementary to the general income-dependent 
unemployment benefit. The objective of this periodic severance pay is to provide 
an income level corresponding to 70% of the previous salary (including the 
compensation from an Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF). After six months, 
the compensation level is decreased to 50%. Table 3.5 shows that the duration of 
AGE varies with the age of the salaried employee at the end of the notice period. 
Solely persons who have reached the age of 40, and have had at least five years’ 
of continuous employment in the company, who file for redundancy are entitled 
to AGE. Furthermore, the employee should have worked at least five hours a 
week and the redundancy is filed on the grounds of lack of work (Confederation 




Table 3.5: Payment of severance compensation (AGE)  
Age Paid for a period of Compensation level % previous salary 
including the benefit of the 
Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) 
40-44 years 6 months 70 
45-59 years 
6 months 









The AGB was negotiated as part of the blue-collar agreements, with LO as the 
signing party. It is a lump sump that is paid on termination of the contract and 
irrespective of whether the person has found a new job (Confederation of 
Swedish Enterprise Insurance Information, 2010). The AGB, amounts to SEK 
27,900 (EUR 3,075) in 2011 and is paid out as a lump sum by the AFA Insurance.18 
Persons who have been made redundant and who are over 50 receive an extra 
amount of SEK 1,200 (EUR 132) per extra year; thus, those over 51 receive 2,400 
(EUR 264), those over 52 receive SEK 3,600 (EUR 396) and so on up to the age of 
60, and hence the highest AGB sum payable is SEK 41,100 (EUR 4,530) 
(Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, 2011).  
  
When the interviews were conducted in 2009, the municipal sector did not yet 
have a transition agreement. However, on 7 December 2010, the Swedish 
Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SALAR, Sveriges Kommuner och 
Landsting) and all the trade unions representing employees in the local 
Authorities, County Councils and Regions, reached a transition agreement. The 
agreement will be published when it has been accepted by all social partners and 
will supposedly come into force on 1 January 2012.19 Until then, financial support 
is regulated in the Agreement on Severance Benefit for Employees of Local 
Authorities, County Councils and Parishes, also referred to as AGF-KL. As of 1 
January 2012, the AGF-KL will be abolished and replaced by the new transition 
agreement (Sveriges Kommuner och Landsting, 2010b). This AGF-KL 
agreement regulates severance pay for redundant employees in the sector and is 
referred to as the severance benefit AGF. It is a national agreement concluded 
between the Swedish Federation of County Councils (Landstingsförbundet), the 
Swedish Association of Local Authorities (Svenska Kommunförbundet), and the 
Association of Parishes within the Church of Sweden (Svenska Kyrkans 

18  AFA Insurance is the collective name for the following insurance companies: AFA 
Livförsäkring, AFA Sjukförsäkring, AFA Trygghetsförsäkring. 
19  <http://www.resourcecentre.etuc.org/linked_files/documents/Panel%203%20Flexicurity 
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27,900 (EUR 3,075) in 2011 and is paid out as a lump sum by the AFA Insurance.18 
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amount of SEK 1,200 (EUR 132) per extra year; thus, those over 51 receive 2,400 
(EUR 264), those over 52 receive SEK 3,600 (EUR 396) and so on up to the age of 
60, and hence the highest AGB sum payable is SEK 41,100 (EUR 4,530) 
(Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, 2011).  
  
When the interviews were conducted in 2009, the municipal sector did not yet 
have a transition agreement. However, on 7 December 2010, the Swedish 
Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SALAR, Sveriges Kommuner och 
Landsting) and all the trade unions representing employees in the local 
Authorities, County Councils and Regions, reached a transition agreement. The 
agreement will be published when it has been accepted by all social partners and 
will supposedly come into force on 1 January 2012.19 Until then, financial support 
is regulated in the Agreement on Severance Benefit for Employees of Local 
Authorities, County Councils and Parishes, also referred to as AGF-KL. As of 1 
January 2012, the AGF-KL will be abolished and replaced by the new transition 
agreement (Sveriges Kommuner och Landsting, 2010b). This AGF-KL 
agreement regulates severance pay for redundant employees in the sector and is 
referred to as the severance benefit AGF. It is a national agreement concluded 
between the Swedish Federation of County Councils (Landstingsförbundet), the 
Swedish Association of Local Authorities (Svenska Kommunförbundet), and the 
Association of Parishes within the Church of Sweden (Svenska Kyrkans 

18  AFA Insurance is the collective name for the following insurance companies: AFA 
Livförsäkring, AFA Sjukförsäkring, AFA Trygghetsförsäkring. 
19  <http://www.resourcecentre.etuc.org/linked_files/documents/Panel%203%20Flexicurity 
%20Lisbon%20SALAR.pdf>, accessed 27 July 2011.
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Församlingsförbund) as the employers’ associations, on the one hand, and the 
Swedish Municipal Workers’ Union (Kommunal) and a constellation of bargaining 
bodies, consisting of the Central Organisation of Salaried Employees (TCO) and 
the Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations (Sveriges Akademikers 
Centralorganisation SACO), on the other hand. 
Severance benefit AGF-KL may be given out as a single lump sump or in the 
form of a periodic payment (Sebardt, 2006). The level of the lump sum is 
equivalent to 1/3 of the employee’s normal monthly wage immediately prior to 
termination of the employment multiplied by the number of full employment 
years within the whole local government sector (Lindquist & Wadensjö, 2007). 
The maximum lump sum severance benefit corresponds to six monthly wages. 
The periodic severance benefit is based on the length of service and age: the 
minimum age of eligibility is 45 years and the minimum employment period 
required is 210 months. Periodic severance pay, AGF-KL, is computed in a similar 
way as pension benefit: the same time and earnings measures are used, i.e., the 
pensionable years of employment up to the date of termination and the annual 
earning points acquired in the years prior to the termination. Up to retirement 
the periodic severance amount paid is reduced by possible incomes. For 
example, if a person receives unemployment benefit, the AGF-KL will top this 
payment so that the total amount received will be 80% of the individual’s former 
monthly wage during the first 200 days and 70% during the following 100 days; 
250 days for parents (Lindquist & Wadensjö, 2007). When the benefit from the 
unemployment insurance ends, the periodic severance benefit continues to be 
paid if the employee is still unemployed and available for work. In addition to 
severance benefit, wage supplements can be provided for a certain period of 
time, for instance, compensation for retirement pension contributions and 
commuting allowance, if the unemployed person obtains a new job with a lower 
wage (Bäckström, 2008). Table 3.6 summarizes the type of passive support 
provided by the various Swedish transition foundations. 
 






Passive (financial) support provided 
TRS 2004 Severance compensation (AGE) 
Moving expenses 
Commuting expenses 
Compensation training costs 
Compensation for retirement pension contributions 
Return guarantee by the TRS fund for those who found a 












Passive (financial) support provided 
TRF Fastigo 2001 Severance compensation (AGE) 
Compensation for retirement pension contributions 
Wage supplements if an unemployed person obtains a 
new job with a lower wage (max. 6 months) 
Compensation for training costs 
Grants for starting own business 
Introduction support for new employers 
Grants to severance pensions 
Extended period of notice 
TRR 1998 Severance compensation (AGE) 
Temporary wage supplements if an unemployed obtains 
a new job with a lower wage 
Compensation for extended period of notice 
Financial support for training costs, starting own 
business 
Return guarantee for those who found a new job with a 
TRR-affiliated company, but lost it within 5 years from 








1974 Severance compensation (AGE) 
Temporary wage supplements if an unemployed person 
obtains a new job with lower wage (max. 6 months) 
Extended period of notice 
Grant to start own business if the public employment 
service does not provide any support. Grant of SEK 
30,000 for bookkeeping support for one year. 
Retraining wage paid to the new employer in another 
sector/branch (max. 6 months) 
Grants for training: SEK 30,000 for training costs and 
SEK 7,000 for literature 
KFO Trade 
Employment 






1982 Severance grant (AGE) 
Temporary wage supplements if unemployed obtains a 
new job with lower wage (max 6 months) 
Grant to start own business if the public employment 
service does not provide any support. Grant SEK 30,000 
for book-keeping support for one year 
Retraining wage paid to the new employer in another 
sector/branch (max 6 months)  
Grants for training: SEK 30,000 for training costs and 
SEK 7,000 for literature 
TFL Fastigo LO 2005 Severance grant (AGB) 
Compensation for retirement pension contributions  
Temporary wage supplements if an unemployed person 
obtains a new job with lower wage (max. 6 months) 
Introduction support for the new employer 
Grants for training 
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Passive (financial) support provided 
TRF Fastigo 2001 Severance compensation (AGE) 
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new job with a lower wage (max. 6 months) 
Compensation for training costs 
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a new job with a lower wage 
Compensation for extended period of notice 
Financial support for training costs, starting own 
business 
Return guarantee for those who found a new job with a 
TRR-affiliated company, but lost it within 5 years from 








1974 Severance compensation (AGE) 
Temporary wage supplements if an unemployed person 
obtains a new job with lower wage (max. 6 months) 
Extended period of notice 
Grant to start own business if the public employment 
service does not provide any support. Grant of SEK 
30,000 for bookkeeping support for one year. 
Retraining wage paid to the new employer in another 
sector/branch (max. 6 months) 
Grants for training: SEK 30,000 for training costs and 
SEK 7,000 for literature 
KFO Trade 
Employment 






1982 Severance grant (AGE) 
Temporary wage supplements if unemployed obtains a 
new job with lower wage (max 6 months) 
Grant to start own business if the public employment 
service does not provide any support. Grant SEK 30,000 
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Introduction support for the new employer 
Grants for training 









Passive (financial) support provided 
TSn 2008 Extended period of notice 
Paid leave of absence for those taking part in activities 
approved by the Transition Foundation, for example, 
practical training, acclimatization period or education 
Job security income supplements for those who find a 
new job that pays a lower salary 
Supplementary unemployment benefit  
Early retirement and pension  
Preventive measures, e.g., training and other activities, 




1992 Severance compensation 
Grants for training 
Grants for starting own business 
KFS Companies’ 
Employment 
Security Fund  
1994 Severance compensation 
Temporary wage supplements if an unemployed person 
obtains a new job with lower wage (max. 6 months) 
Compensation commuting expenses 
Compensation for rent 
Grants for training 
Education (50% of course and literature expenses) 
Support for starting own business 
Wage compensation for new employer 
Compensation for retirement pension contributions 
Return security/guarantee to the KFS foundation within 
5 years 
TSL 2004 Severance grant (AGB) 
Adjustment support 
Employment 




2005 Severance compensation (AGF) 
Temporary wage supplements if an unemployed person 
obtains a new job with lower wage  
Extended period of notice 
 
Source: Bäckström, 2006 modified and updated: www.tsn.se (accessed Sept 2010), 
http://www.tsn.se/stod-till-enskilda/trygghetsavtalet.aspx, www.fastigo.nl 
 
Active support in transition agreements 
The active support refers to advice to companies, personal consultation, and 
measures to help the dismissed person to find a new job or to start a new 
business. Transition foundations can offer this support. The support provided 
depends on the transition foundation concerned. For example, the TRR, the 
foundation for white-collar workers or salaried employees in the trade and 
industry sector, can provide companies with suggestions regarding redundancy 
and dismissal procedures based on previous experiences. The TRR advisor can 
help a company by:  
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 explaining different options for handling changes relating to a shortage of 
work; 
 giving advice on how to handle the transition process; 
 discussing the company’s situation and the need to act; 
 providing training for managers and union representatives about their role 
during a downsizing operation.20  
 
Furthermore, career adjustment support is provided for dismissed employees 
including personal contact for consultation and guidance throughout the process 
leading up to a new job or business start-up. In addition to individual guidance, 
the TRR offers methods and group activities to meet the job applicant’s various 
needs. The way the active support is organised varies between the transition 
foundations. The TRR works with ‘in-house’ job coaches and consultants. Each 
redundant employee visits a TRR location and has a personal advisor who will 
coach him until he gets a new job. The coaching time is fixed: the upper limit is 
two years, but in some cases it can be prolonged. The amount spent on 
transition support is different for each person. The TRR can, for example, spend 
SEK 50,000 (EUR 5,511) on transition support for someone who has great 
difficulties in finding a new job and SEK 5,000 (EUR 551) on someone who can 
find a new job easily.  
A company in the private white-collar sector can decide to choose an 
outplacement agency rather than relying on the TRR. Trade unions and 
employers on a local level can make an agreement to do so. This happens in a 
small number of cases. The TRR then provides money directly to the employer 
who has to pay the outplacement agency for active support. The amount paid by 
TRR is an average based on the average costs.  
Thus, transition foundations work differently in practice. The TSL, the Transition 
foundation in the private sector for blue-collar workers, is much smaller and 
outsources the coaching activities to private service suppliers. The employer 
who has to lay off employees receives SEK 20,000 (EUR 2,204) for each 
dismissed person from TSL. This is a fixed amount. The local partners (the 
employer and trade unions) determine the programme and negotiate about the 
outplacement supplier which will be contracted. In other words, the decisions on 
the way in which the downsizing process is conducted and on which activities 
will be carried out are made on a local level via local agreements. The TSL 
foundation aims to help private-sector blue-collar workers who have been given 
notice to find another job as quickly as possible or to start their own business. 
The TSL support does not include a change in the individual’s level of 
competence. The help from the TSL is intended for coaching activities and does 
not cover the costs of education. In exceptional cases, TSL pays for a training or 

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
20 <http://www.trr.se/English/English/Services-in-brief/>, accessed 27 July 2011.
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course if the person involved can prove that he needs it to get a specific job, i.e., 
if it is the last obstacle to re-entering the labour market. Broadly speaking, the 
TSL’s task is to help the individual to find a new job within existing conditions.  
The adjustment procedure starts with an assessment of the individual’s level of 
competence. Next the individual’s wishes and aims are clarified, followed by a 
study of the individual’s personal market. Furthermore, the support consists of 
helping the individual with formulating letters of application and writing a good 
CV. An action plan is then devised and the job coach helps the individual with the 
implementation of this plan. On average, an adjustment programme financed 
by the TSL runs for three or four months (TSL, 2009). 
 
The aim of various transition foundations is to provide help as quickly as 
possible. For example, transition foundation TRS tries to provide preventative 
support in order to develop employees’ capabilities based on the need of the 
organization. TSN, the transition foundation for state employees, covers about 
270 governmental bodies employing around 250,000 people. They have about 
40 advisors and administrative personnel who take care of around 3,500 clients 
per year. Besides the normal services to redundant personnel, TSN also offers 
so-called ‘early measures’. If there is a risk of redundancy, TSN can undertake 
redeployment activities, on a voluntary basis. Such activities, normally financed 
by the employer and the foundation, can prepare the employees for new tasks 
with the same employer and thus focus on internal employment security 
(Gazier, Paucard, & Bruggeman, 2010).  
 
In a study by Voss et al., the social partners noted that the transition agreements 
complement the public employment service, provide for additional resources in 
order to support transitions between jobs and are based on the principle of 
sharing costs between employees and employers (Voss, Dornelas, Wild, & 
Kwiatkiewicz, 2011). Employees who have been given notice and who are not 
covered by an adjustment agreement can decide to register at the public 
employment service which mediates between jobseekers and employers. 
Generally, the public employment service does not initiate support for a person 




In 2009, when the interviews were conducted, almost half of the Swedish 
workforce was covered by a transition agreement, i.e., collective agreements on 
practical and financial support for job-to-job transitions. At that time, the 
municipal sector did not have a transition agreement, but a similar agreement 
was under negotiation. The Swedish Municipal Workers’ Union was in favour of 
such an agreement, but the employers in the municipal sector did not foresee 
many redundancies in this specific sector at that time. On the contrary, they 
argued that employers would have a recruiting problem in the future when there 
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is a generation shift in the labour market. During the economic crisis, there may 
be some redundancy problems, but this is nothing compared with the problems 
of redundancy encountered in the metal and car industries. Finally, in December 
2010, the trade unions and the employers’ association reached a transition 
agreement which will come into force on 1 January 2012. This is one of the 
largest transition agreements in the Swedish labour market, covering around 1.1 
million employees, approximately 25% of the workforce (Sveriges Kommuner 
och Landsting, 2010a; Voss et al., 2011). Thus, as from 1 January 2012, the 
majority of all permanent employees will be covered by a transition agreement.  
 
Only people with an open-ended or a so-called ‘permanent’ contract have the 
right to support from the transition foundation. This means that people with a 
fixed-term contract are excluded. As mentioned previously in Chapter 2, 15.3% 
of the Swedish workforce had a limited duration contract in 2009. When a fixed-
term contract is changed into a permanent contract, the employee will be 
covered by the adjustment agreement and the period worked on a fixed-term 
contract will be included for the eligibility criteria. For example, an employee 
who used to work at a company affiliated to the TSL foundation has to meet the 
following criteria to receive support from the TSL foundation: the employee had 
an open-ended contract for at least twelve months prior to the end of the 
employment and during this period the individual concerned was continuously 
employed for at least 16 hours a week (TSL, 2009). The period of employment 
with several employers may be taken into account, on the condition that the 
period of work has been uninterrupted. People who have not yet entered the 
labour market, those who have a temporary contract, and those who are given 
notice for personal reasons are excluded from the TSL transition support. 
In Sweden there is an ongoing debate between trade unions and employers’ 
associations on whether people with a fixed-term contract should be eligible for 
support from the transition foundations. Employees can receive TSL support up 
to and including the month before which they reach the age of 65 if they plan to 
continue working beyond the age of 65. The support will only be granted to an 
individual who intends to complete the entire programme, or until he or she 
finds a new job or starts his or her own business. The financial means for 
adjustment support are granted to the companies who are affiliated with TSL 
through an insurance agreement. Individuals cannot apply for adjustment 
support themselves. Applications for TSL adjustment support have to be 
submitted within one year after the employment contract is terminated. Both 
the company and the trade union should sign the application for transition 
support. Furthermore, the application should include a supplement with 
personal information, signed by the person who has been given notice. After 
TSL has granted adjustment support, the programme must be started within 
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Small and large companies 
Companies that are covered by a transition agreement are also part of other 
agreements on wage, working-time arrangements, etcetera. Companies cannot 
opt for only the adjustment agreement. They have to accept all the agreements 
or stay out of the system of collective bargaining. Both small and large companies 
are represented in the adjustment agreements. Many small companies have 
joined the system, but the ones that are not part of the collective adjustment 
system are mostly small companies. An explanation for this is that small and 
newly started enterprises are not able or willing to pay a certain percentage over 




Employers pay a certain percentage of the wage bill, which is not deducted from 
the wage, to a mutual fund: the transition foundation. By way of illustration, in 
2011, TRR and TSL employers who are member of an employers’ association 
within the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, pay 0.3%21 of the wage bill, 
including the wages for fixed-term contracts, to the foundation. These are fixed 
contributions and a pay roll charge. It is not deducted from the employee’s 
salary. The percentage is the same in economic recession or in times of 
economic boom. In the good years, the foundations saved money, which is now 
used during the crisis. The interviews revealed that a commonly heard argument 
from the employers’ side is that Swedish employers pay twice for the 
employment security of their employees. Firstly, they pay their contribution to 
the transition fund. Furthermore, it happens in practice that employers pay for 
support on the basis of local negotiations with the unions. In the case of 
redundancy, support is provided by the transition foundation, but on top of that 
unions can bargain about lump sums or possibilities for further education. 
Secondly, employers argue that they pay for the public employment system via 
payroll taxes. A counterargument from the employees’ perspective is that 
employers indeed pay for both, but not at the same time for the same individual. 
Those people who receive support from the transition foundation do not 

21  Companies with local collective agreements will pay 0.60% to the TSL foundation in 
2011 and companies that are members of employers’ associations outside of the 
Confederation of Swedish Enterprise pay 0.32%. Companies that are not members of an 
employer’s association within the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise can affiliate 
separately to the TRR provided that the company has signed a collective agreement 
(local collective agreement) with, normally, a PTK-affiliated association. PTK=the 
Council for Negotiation and Co-operation). Local collective agreement companies pay 
0.70% to the TRR foundation compared to member companies in employers’ 
associations within the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise which pay 0.30% 
(Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, 2011).
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necessarily need, at the same time, the help from the public employment 
service. In one of the interviews, it is argued that many people within the TRR 
system will have a new job at a new company before they even have to register 
at the public employment agency. At first glance, it seems that the employee 
does not contribute financially to the transition agreement system. However, 
various Swedish interviewees mentioned that the adjustment agreements are 
part of the collective agreements and financing these agreements has been 
taken from money for pay rise.  
 
3.5 Responsibility, coordination, and delivery  
 
Based on the coordination mechanisms discussed in Chapter 1, different ways of 
providing employment security in situations of redundancy can be distinguished. 
In this section, the Swedish system regarding job-to-job transitions and the roles 
of different institutions and actors in providing support to those who are at risk 
of becoming unemployed will be described. 
 
3.5.1 Associations 
As explained previously, in Sweden, trade unions, employers associations, and 
individual employers play an important role in guaranteeing new employment 
opportunities for workers who have been given notice. They negotiate about, for 
example, the selection criteria and the support provided which result in 
collective adjustment agreements and agreements at the local level. A relevant 
precondition for reaching an agreement is trust and a good relationship amongst 
the actors. Although the Swedish trade union density has declined in the last few 
years, the figure is still rather high compared with other countries: 68.4% in 
October 2009 (see Table 2.3 in the previous chapter). According to the LO, this 
fall in membership can be explained by the recent amendments of the 
unemployment insurance system introduced by the new right-wing government. 
Coupled with trade union density the Swedish collective agreements have an 
almost statutory nature (Sebardt, 2006).  
 
The Swedish Confederation of Enterprise (Svenskt Näringsliv) is the signing party 
for white and blue-collar adjustment agreements and is Sweden’s largest 
business federation representing 50 member organizations and 54,000 member 
companies with some 1.5 million employees. Close to 70% of the 
Confederation's member companies have fewer than 10 employees, only 1.5% 
has 250 employees or more, while virtually all of Sweden's multinationals are 
members. Companies can also sign collective agreements directly with trade 
unions and those companies who do this in practice are almost all small 
companies. Thus, an estimated 80% of companies covered by an adjustment 
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
21  Companies with local collective agreements will pay 0.60% to the TSL foundation in 
2011 and companies that are members of employers’ associations outside of the 
Confederation of Swedish Enterprise pay 0.32%. Companies that are not members of an 
employer’s association within the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise can affiliate 
separately to the TRR provided that the company has signed a collective agreement 
(local collective agreement) with, normally, a PTK-affiliated association. PTK=the 
Council for Negotiation and Co-operation). Local collective agreement companies pay 
0.70% to the TRR foundation compared to member companies in employers’ 
associations within the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise which pay 0.30% 
(Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, 2011).
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necessarily need, at the same time, the help from the public employment 
service. In one of the interviews, it is argued that many people within the TRR 
system will have a new job at a new company before they even have to register 
at the public employment agency. At first glance, it seems that the employee 
does not contribute financially to the transition agreement system. However, 
various Swedish interviewees mentioned that the adjustment agreements are 
part of the collective agreements and financing these agreements has been 
taken from money for pay rise.  
 
3.5 Responsibility, coordination, and delivery  
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providing employment security in situations of redundancy can be distinguished. 
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of different institutions and actors in providing support to those who are at risk 
of becoming unemployed will be described. 
 
3.5.1 Associations 
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opportunities for workers who have been given notice. They negotiate about, for 
example, the selection criteria and the support provided which result in 
collective adjustment agreements and agreements at the local level. A relevant 
precondition for reaching an agreement is trust and a good relationship amongst 
the actors. Although the Swedish trade union density has declined in the last few 
years, the figure is still rather high compared with other countries: 68.4% in 
October 2009 (see Table 2.3 in the previous chapter). According to the LO, this 
fall in membership can be explained by the recent amendments of the 
unemployment insurance system introduced by the new right-wing government. 
Coupled with trade union density the Swedish collective agreements have an 
almost statutory nature (Sebardt, 2006).  
 
The Swedish Confederation of Enterprise (Svenskt Näringsliv) is the signing party 
for white and blue-collar adjustment agreements and is Sweden’s largest 
business federation representing 50 member organizations and 54,000 member 
companies with some 1.5 million employees. Close to 70% of the 
Confederation's member companies have fewer than 10 employees, only 1.5% 
has 250 employees or more, while virtually all of Sweden's multinationals are 
members. Companies can also sign collective agreements directly with trade 
unions and those companies who do this in practice are almost all small 
companies. Thus, an estimated 80% of companies covered by an adjustment 





Motivation of employers 
In the interviews, the question was asked why employers and trade unions want 
to reach an adjustment agreement. The strongest incentive for employers to 
sign the agreement is the possibility of deviating from the LIFO principle. 
Severance pay is very expensive for a company. The trade unions took the 
initiative to introduce the transition agreement. Employers benefit from a settle-
ment with the trade unions, because it provides the employers’ confederation 
bargaining power, which could lead to a trade-off, for example, lower wage 
increases. The agreement could also make the adjustment process in the 
company easier. Employers who have to announce that some of the employees 
have to be dismissed can immediately add that good help will be provided for 
those who are made redundant and thus soften the blow. Employers have an 
interest in keeping the workforce skilled and in the branch. Although an 
employer may have to dismiss people at a certain moment for economic 
reasons, he might need these employees in the future in times of economic 
upswing. It is better that these redundant people continue working with another 
employer and keep their skills up to date rather than being unemployed. The 
transition agreements also bring stability, predictability, and industrial peace for 
the employer. If an employer and trade unions have agreed beforehand how to 
deal with redundancy, then the employer will have more security in his business 
operations. If the financial situation becomes really bad, an employer knows that 
a standard procedure is available to tackle the situation. If a company has to lay 
off employees and the company has to start from scratch this could result in a 
chaotic and costly process, which could harm relations and business operations 
in different ways. Thus, from the company perspective, the system can be seen 
as a solution to the problem of facing a cut-down in personnel. It enables the 
company to include employment security in their personnel policy. Another 
motive that has been put forward in the interviews is that some employers have 
a sense of corporate social responsibility.  
 
Motivation of employees/trade unions  
An incentive for the trade unions to support and collaborate with employers in 
the job-to-job transitions system is to maintain the strength of the union. People 
unite because they have a common interest and that has traditionally been 
working conditions and raising salaries for the employed. The unions finance 
their activities via fees from their members, and their main concern is related to 
those who are actually employed. It is not in the unions’ interest that members 
become unemployed, because this will result in a less powerful union. Therefore, 
unions will do their utmost to prevent unemployment for their members. As 
discussed before, the unions were not satisfied with the way the public 
employment service supported people from one job to another and introduced 





3.5.2 The state: Government and the Public Employment Service 
A key feature of the Swedish labour market is that the social partners 
traditionally deal with many issues by means of collective agreements. The 
central government does not interfere in these adjustment agreements. This 
does not mean that the government does not provide support to employees 
who run the risk of becoming unemployed. Employees who have been given 
notice and those who are not covered by an adjustment agreement can decide 
to register at the public employment service, which mediates between job-
seekers and employers. As mentioned earlier, the trade unions and employers 
were not satisfied with the way the governmental agency was helping white-collar 
workers with job matching, so they introduced the job transition insurance 
foundation, TRR, in 1974. The legitimacy and enforceability of the state regarding 
job-to-job transitions was very low, and there are still hardly any laws and 
legislation on this subject. Thus, the Swedish state plays no active role in the 
adjustment agreements. However, in the Swedish model, there is a long tradition 
focusing on active labour market policies. A government priority is ‘to enable all 
men and women to participate in the labour market’ (Regeringskansliet, 2005). 
The Swedish Public Employment Service (Arbetsförmedlingen) is commissioned 
by Parliament and the government to translate the labour market policy into 
practice, aiming to improve the functioning of the labour market by matching 
jobseekers and employers and contributing to stable and high employment 
rates. Employees who have lost their jobs can register at the Public Employment 
Service. 
 
Public Employment Service 
On 1 January 2008, the Swedish Public Employment Service was established as a 
national integrated agency. It replaced the Swedish Labour Market Administrat-
ion (Arbetsmarknadsverket, AMV), which had two levels: at the central level, the 
national Labour Market Board (Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen, AMS) and, on the 
regional level, the 20 county labour boards, which included the local public em-
ployment services. All 21 agencies making up the Swedish Labour Market 
Administration were separate agencies. They made governance more difficult 
and reduced effectiveness. The aim of the reform was therefore to achieve a 
more effective, uniform and fair public employment service (Regeringskansliet, 
2008).  
 
The role of PES in the employment security system can be described as 
mediating between jobseekers and employers. Jobseekers who register at PES 
Service have different backgrounds. They include school-leavers and 
immigrants. Nevertheless, the support provided by PES is similar to that 
provided to victims of redundancy. PES tries to identify the different capacities 
and the occupations that would suit the jobseeker and match them with the 
labour demand. Extra effort is put into support for individuals with a weak 
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Until 1993, private job-placement services were prohibited in Sweden. The 
Swedish governmental agency, the Labour Market Board (AMS), had the mono-
poly on job matching activities. The deregulation of the sector in 1993 led to a 
significant expansion of the private outplacement industry. Temporary employ-
ment agencies and a number of outplacement agencies provide services to help 
employers in their effort to deal with workforce adjustment. The private out-
placement agencies are mostly directly subcontracted by the employers to 
facilitate quick transitions to new jobs. In other words, these private outplacement 
companies and the transition foundations operate separately. In some cases, the 
private outplacement companies are subcontracted by the transition foundations.  
 
On 1 January 2008, PES replaced the AMS to achieve a more effective, uniform, 
and fair public employment service. Nowadays the public employment service 
engages private companies, for example, for coaching activities. The theory 
behind this is that many private suppliers have contacts and relationships with 
employers which PES does not have to such an extent. In Sweden, the blue-
collar transition foundation, TSL, contracts out the job coaching activities to 
private service providers. Compared with the Netherlands, the outsourcing 
process to private suppliers is still in its infancy.  
 
3.5.4 Hierarchy  
In Sweden, companies with an adjustment agreement are eligible for support in 
job-to-job transitions for employees to whom they have given notice. Large 
companies with enough resources can manage these activities in house. They 
can set up internal programmes and create special units within their operations 
to help the workers find another job in or outside the company. Employers can 
also decide to subcontract a private outplacement company to provide services 
to help people to get another job quickly. Good employership and creating 
goodwill in relation to the trade unions are motives for Swedish employers to 
facilitate job-to-job transitions for their employees. A good relationship with the 
trade unions, based on mutual trust, is necessary for the future collective 
bargaining process.  
 
3.5.5 Networks 
Since the early 1990s, Swedish employers’ networks (Arbetsgivarringar) have 
gained in popularity amongst private companies and public organisations. In 
2004, there were about 50 local networks spread across the country. The main 
focus of employers’ networks is human resource needs, particularly in relation to 
people who return to the workplace after a period of illness or unemployment.22  

22  <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/ewco/2004/08/SE0408NU05.htm/>, accessed 28 July 2011.
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3.5.6 Responsibility for job-to-job transitions 
In the previous sections, different actors were described that play a role in 
helping Swedish redundant employees into a new job. But who is responsible for 
this transition and who should take the lead? These questions were put to the 
Swedish interviewees. All respondents agreed that individuals themselves are 
responsible for job-to-job transitions in the first place, in the sense that people 
are responsible for their own lives. Furthermore, it is especially the trade unions’ 
perspective that, besides strong unemployment insurance and good transition 
agreements, the role of PES is very important. According to several actors, the 
state has the duty of supporting the dismissed employees and, for example, 
providing incentives for lifelong learning and labour market training. In practice, 
collective job transition agreements are signed and developed by both parties: 
employees and employers.  
 
A trademark of the Swedish labour market is to protect people instead of jobs. The 
trade unions and employers’ associations negotiate these collective agreements in 
order to enhance mobility into new sectors. If a collective agreement is in force, 
both the trade unions and the employers maintain industrial peace. If there is no 
collective agreement, the trade union has the freedom to take industrial action, 
but in Sweden industrial action is rare because the trade unions realize that 
globalisation and restructuring is an inevitable change. They have a common 
interest to get people moving from sectors that are outdated. As previously 
mentioned in Chapter 2, in some other countries redundancy processes go hand in 
hand with industrial action and strikes (Table 2.4). Swedish employers’ 
associations as well as the trade unions have a positive attitude towards new 
technologies and new jobs, and are involved in the transition process, in the first 
place via collective adjustment agreements. These ‘gentlemen’s agreements’ 
result in a peaceful labour market situation, because both parties have agreed in 
advance how to help people from job-to-job in cases where jobs are at risk. At the 
time of the interviews, there was not so much a discussion about who should take 
the responsibility, but more who should step in first.  
 
The actual practice is that transition foundations like the TRR and the TSL 
provide their service at an earlier stage. The individual draws up a CV and a plan 
to find a new job in close cooperation with a job coach. However, people who 
want to have access to the public unemployment benefit system have to register 
at PES and provide all the information again. Should an employee go to the job 
transition foundation as well as PES? And in which order? And what happens if 
the employee does not have a new job when the support from the transition 
foundation ends? At this moment these questions, about private and public 
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The labour market indicators presented in Chapter 2 (Table 2.5) give us a general 
overview of the performance of the Swedish labour market. The employment 
rate in Sweden is high (74.3%) compared to the average of the EU27 (65.9%). 
Moreover, the share of long-term unemployment is, in Sweden, the lowest of 
the countries examined (13.3%). This might mean that Swedish unemployed 
people find another job more quickly compared with employees in the other 
selected countries. Furthermore, it seems that insiders in the Swedish labour 
market have more employment security than outsiders. Young Swedish people 
face great difficulties entering the labour market, i.e., the unemployment rate 
amongst young Swedes is high (25%) and lies above the EU27 average (19.7%). 
In contrast with the youth, the participation rate of older people (55-64) is 
extremely high in Sweden (70%), certainly in comparison with the other 
countries examined and the EU27 average (46%). 
 
After discussing the performance of the Swedish market on the basis of general 
labour market indicators, I will now turn to the performance of activities and 
measures to support redundant employees. However, hardly any data are 
available on the fate of dismissed employees. Bergström and Diedrich state that 
the general impression is that around 80% of the dismissed employees find new 
jobs within a period of nine months (Bergström & Diedrich, 2008) and they argue 
that there is a relatively weak relationship between redundancy and unemploy-
ment. This argument is based on previous work by Sjöberg and Tegsjö, who 
show that approximately twelve percent of workers who were notified about 
redundancy in 2002 were unemployed two years later. Figures from Statistics 
Sweden (Statistiska centralbyrån) also show that around 70% of dismissed 
employees find a new job within one year (Sjöberg & Tegsjö, 2007). Bergström 
and Diedrich’s view is that, in the Swedish system, “those who have a job and 
lose it are often transferred into a new job within a relatively short period of 
time. Unemployment primarily hits those who want to enter the labour market – 
young people, migrants – or those who have been absent from the labour 
market for some time due to sick leave or parental leave, and so on” (Bergström 
& Diedrich, 2008).  
Eliason and Storrie collected extensive information on Swedish redundant 
employees who lost a job in 1987 owing to a firm closure and followed them over 
both a predisplacement period of four years and a postdisplacement period 
stretching until 1999. Based on this study, they conclude that the Swedish 
displaced workers suffer both earnings losses and worsened labour-market 
position not only during a transitory period of adjustment but also in the longer 
run (Eliason & Storrie, 2006, 2009). Olsshon and Storrie conclude that there are 
hardly any evaluations available with regard to measures addressed to 
redundant employees. They state that they are not aware of any research on the 
effects of policy measures in the long run and they argue that ‘this is hardly 
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surprising as the data requirements for such research are immense’ (Ohlsson & 
Storrie, 2007).  
 
The transition agreements are an important feature of the Swedish labour 
market in helping people from job-to-job in the case of, e.g., a redundancy. In 
2000, the Swedish government commissioned a study to gather and organize 
the knowledge and experience concerning the transition agreement (SOU, 
2002). However, the committee of inquiry was not able to evaluate the 
adjustment agreements and transition foundation: the evidence and the time 
available were insufficient to meet the requirements of scientific quality. Thus, 
there was, and there still is, no comprehensive independent study available on 
the effectiveness of the adjustment agreements. One of the reasons is that it is 
very difficult to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of the adjustment 
agreements, because the prerequisites for support and the way the foundations 
are organised vary to a large extent. Nevertheless, the report suggests that the 
adjustment agreements have positive effects for those individuals covered by 
the agreement. The risk of unemployment decreases and most employees find a 
new job or start a business very quickly.  
Deadweight loss means that resources have been spent on something that 
would have occurred anyway. According to the commission, the deadweight 
loss of the transition support is small, partly because the resources of the 
foundations are limited and partly because of the individual-oriented approach 
with gradual decision making. Furthermore, neither the employers’ associations 
nor the trade unions, the parties that established the foundations, would have 
agreed to pay for something that is not needed.  
 
The Swedish Agency for Public Management (Statskontoret) supports the 
government in evaluating and following up state and state-financed activities. 
This organisation analyzed and calculated the fiscal impact of the adjustment 
agreements and concluded that positive effects arise mainly through reduced 
costs of unemployment benefits and measures in social policy and by increased 
revenue in the form of income tax, social security contributions, and 
consumption taxes. Based on the calculated inflow to the TRR and the TSN in 
1999, the positive effect on the public finances was estimated at SEK 2.2 billion 
(EUR 0.24 billon) in one year, assuming that the adjustment agreements 
shortens the average time of unemployment by 60%. These calculations date 
from the early 2000 made before the TSL system became effective.  
Support is available for those covered by an agreement. There might be a 
selection effect that some clients embrace the offer of support more easily than 
others, but no data are available that could shed light on this possibility. The 
committee notes that the individual-oriented form of support should help 
reduce the risk of selection effects. Furthermore, the transition agreement 
applies in cases of redundancy. This means that the foundations do not take 
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surprising as the data requirements for such research are immense’ (Ohlsson & 
Storrie, 2007).  
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responsibility for upgrading the skills of the general workforce, but only for those 
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whose jobs are at risk. The committee concludes that the transition foundations 
are important and necessary. The commission has a clear conception that the 
transition agreement foundation should not be subsidized by the state, because 
that could compromise their independence.  
 
In the interviews, the representatives of the transition foundations TRR and TSL 
were asked whether evaluation reports were available. As explained previously, 
the various transition foundations differ in their organization. Firstly, in this 
section the results of the transition foundation of the blue-collar workers in the 
private sector will be described: the TSL system. Secondly, the results of the 
TRR, the foundation for white-collars or salaried employees in the trade and 
industry sector, will be discussed. 
 
TSL system figures 
Table 3.7 presents the number of blue-collar workers in the private sector who 
were granted adjustment support within the TSL system between 2005 and 
2009. Since the start of the financial crisis in the fourth quarter of 2008, the 
number of persons in the TSL system increased dramatically.  
 
Table 3.7: Number of persons granted adjustment support within the TSL system 
from the years 2005 to 2009 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 2004-2009 
Jan 755 1,447 1,111 986 6,459  
Feb 1,105 1,619 1,085 1,149 8,750  
March 1,376 1,480 1,160 1,010 8,807  
April 1,246 1,022 1,234 1,188 8,642  
May 1,073 1,441 658 1,152 7,835  
June 1,434 881 726 1,011 5,014  
July 1,444 480 483 1,315 3,238  
August 798 642 283 775 1,319  
Sept 1,129 1,004 919 1,493 2,724  
Oct 1,360 1,022 810 3,077 3,012  
Nov 1,523 1,227 1,122 4,130 2,801  
Dec 1,210 1,132 1,059 8,894 2,679  
Total 14,454 13,398 10,650 26,180 61,280 125,961 
Source: TSL. 
 
Figure 3.1 shows the results of the TSL adjustment programme. The graph 
displays the distribution of results for persons whose adjustment programme 
was completed between 1 September 2008 and 1 September 2009 and the 
corresponding previous year. Between September 2007 and August 2008, 
12,496 applications for adjustment support were granted. In that period, 9,530 
persons completed their adjustment programmes. In the next year, from 
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September 2008 until August 2009, the number of TSL applications granted 
increased tremendously to 67,659. In that year, 30,361 adjustment programmes 
were finished. Even though the crisis occurred in the fall of 2008, the number of 
persons who found a permanent or fixed-term job increased slightly compared 
with the previous year. Yet, we see a difference in types of contracts after 
completing the TSL programme when the crisis occurred: the number of 
permanent contracts decreased, while the number of fixed-term contracts (six 
months or less) more than doubled. 
 





TRR system figures 
In the last decade, TRR has supported 158,000 redundant employees from 
20,000 affiliated companies. TRR was also confronted with an increase of 
applicants for adjustment support owing to the current crisis. In 2009, 26,970 
new TRR clients applied for support compared with 11,762 in 2008.  
 
Table 3.8: Number of individuals applying for TRR support in the years 2005-2009 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Applicants 
TRR Support 
17,177 11,361 8,730 11,762 26,970 
Source: TRR. 
 
In 2009, 15,143 people left the TRR-system. 76% of them found another job, 8% 
started their own business and 7% started a course.  
Of those persons who found a new job: 
 68% acquired a permanent contract; 
 28% were 50 years or older; 
 48% obtained a job with the same wage level and 25% found a new job with a 
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In 2009, 15,143 people left the TRR-system. 76% of them found another job, 8% 
started their own business and 7% started a course.  
Of those persons who found a new job: 
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 14% obtained a higher function level in the new job, 74% acquired the same 
function level and 12% accepted a lower function level in the new job (source: 
TRR).  
 
In the latest client satisfaction survey among 6,158 TRR customers, the TRR 
evaluated its services. 82% gave the TRR an overall assessment of good or very 
good. One of the questions put to the clients was the following: ‘If you were once 
again made redundant, how likely is it that you would turn to TRR for help during 
this process?’ 84% of the respondents gave a positive reply. Moreover, 77% of 
the respondents assessed the TRR’s advisers as good or very good (source: TRR, 
SIFO, 2009).  
 
As stated already, the transition agreements do not replace the activities of the 
Swedish Public Employment Service (Arbetsförmedlingen), but reduce the case 
load. The PES offers several types of support for jobseekers. Employees who 
have lost their job can also go to the PES and register their CV, search through 
available vacancies, and ask for help from the employment counsellors. 
However, the PES gives priority and special support to people with a weak 
position in the labour market, such as newly arrived immigrants, young people, 
people with disabilities and the long-term unemployed. In 2009, about 490,000 
people registered at the PES were re-employed. 
 
Table 3.9: Jobseekers who found work in 2009 via Arbetsförmdelingen (PES) 
 Number of people 
Young people 121,482 
People born abroad 102,602 
Disabled people 49,833 
Long-term unemployed 41,826 
Other 175,153 
Total 2009 490,896 
Source: PES. 
 
3.7 Success and failure factors 
 
One of the aims of the interviews was to identify success and failure factors of the 
Swedish system. A success factor listed by several Swedish experts is the im-
portance of the collective transition agreements. The trust between trade unions 
and employers’ associations can be seen as a precondition for the collective 
bargaining process. Both parties sign an agreement and feel responsible for a 
successful implementation. It is not something that the government has forced 
them to do. In fact, the trade unions and employers associations can control their 
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own goals for the future, primarily because of the limited intervention from the 
state. Both parties have their own intrinsic motivation to achieve good collective 
bargaining results. The result is a peaceful labour market without many strikes. 
Although one interviewee mentioned that the level of trust was higher before the 
crisis of the 1990s, a good relationship between unions and employers’ 
associations is still one of the main features of the Swedish labour market model. 
This is reflected by the high trade union density. Moreover, Swedish employers 
are highly organised.  
The Swedish system supports transitions, and that in itself is a success factor, 
according to one of the Swedish interviewees from a trade union federation. The 
aim is to support and protect people and not jobs. Some transition foundations 
have existed for a very long time. The Swedish transition foundation can be 
considered a structural system in which relevant parties are involved in order to 
help people from job-to-job in case of redundancy. In times of economic 
upswing, employers paid money into the fund and saved up for bad times.  
According to TSL representatives, there are several key factors that are of great 
importance to successful re-employment. The first one is a rapid start of the 
adjustment programme. This means that the support should start as soon as 
possible after notice has been given. It is even more preferable to start the 
activities during the period of notice itself. Another success factor of the TSL 
adjustment support is that it is a tailor-made programme based on the personal 
needs and requirements of the worker. The TSL experience shows that, as a rule, 
the employees do not need so much help, but they need the right help. This 
means that the support must be designed at the individual level. Standardized 
support has to be avoided. The chance of success is also influenced by the 
commitment of both the individual and the job coach. The individual is 
responsible for the job-to-job transition. Nothing happens by itself and it is no 
good to just ‘wait’. Yet, the job coach must motivate, support, and help the 
individual to take an active role.  
The TRR interviewee also considered early intervention to be as one of the 
success factors. Furthermore, the TRR recruits its job coaches from companies 
within the private sector, normally HR managers, and almost all of them have a 
university degree. They have skills which enable them to gain trust with affiliated 
companies and trade unions as well as clients in transition. The job coach does 
not work for the company or for the trade union, but acts in the best interest of 
the individual who has to make a transition. The TRR coaches have a unique 
freedom to make immediate decisions, including financial support.  
 
As already indicated, at the time when the interviews were conducted almost 
half of the workforce was covered by an adjustment agreement. It can be 
considered positive that also employees working in small companies who are 
covered by an agreement can apply for support if necessary. The other side of 
the coin was that the other half of the Swedish workforce is not (yet) covered by 
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own goals for the future, primarily because of the limited intervention from the 
state. Both parties have their own intrinsic motivation to achieve good collective 
bargaining results. The result is a peaceful labour market without many strikes. 
Although one interviewee mentioned that the level of trust was higher before the 
crisis of the 1990s, a good relationship between unions and employers’ 
associations is still one of the main features of the Swedish labour market model. 
This is reflected by the high trade union density. Moreover, Swedish employers 
are highly organised.  
The Swedish system supports transitions, and that in itself is a success factor, 
according to one of the Swedish interviewees from a trade union federation. The 
aim is to support and protect people and not jobs. Some transition foundations 
have existed for a very long time. The Swedish transition foundation can be 
considered a structural system in which relevant parties are involved in order to 
help people from job-to-job in case of redundancy. In times of economic 
upswing, employers paid money into the fund and saved up for bad times.  
According to TSL representatives, there are several key factors that are of great 
importance to successful re-employment. The first one is a rapid start of the 
adjustment programme. This means that the support should start as soon as 
possible after notice has been given. It is even more preferable to start the 
activities during the period of notice itself. Another success factor of the TSL 
adjustment support is that it is a tailor-made programme based on the personal 
needs and requirements of the worker. The TSL experience shows that, as a rule, 
the employees do not need so much help, but they need the right help. This 
means that the support must be designed at the individual level. Standardized 
support has to be avoided. The chance of success is also influenced by the 
commitment of both the individual and the job coach. The individual is 
responsible for the job-to-job transition. Nothing happens by itself and it is no 
good to just ‘wait’. Yet, the job coach must motivate, support, and help the 
individual to take an active role.  
The TRR interviewee also considered early intervention to be as one of the 
success factors. Furthermore, the TRR recruits its job coaches from companies 
within the private sector, normally HR managers, and almost all of them have a 
university degree. They have skills which enable them to gain trust with affiliated 
companies and trade unions as well as clients in transition. The job coach does 
not work for the company or for the trade union, but acts in the best interest of 
the individual who has to make a transition. The TRR coaches have a unique 
freedom to make immediate decisions, including financial support.  
 
As already indicated, at the time when the interviews were conducted almost 
half of the workforce was covered by an adjustment agreement. It can be 
considered positive that also employees working in small companies who are 
covered by an agreement can apply for support if necessary. The other side of 
the coin was that the other half of the Swedish workforce is not (yet) covered by 
the adjustment agreements, but this will change in the near future. An inter-
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viewee of the Ministry of Employment mentioned that the adjustment 
agreements were concluded in sectors with the fewest redundancies. In other 
words, the agreements are concluded in the sectors where they are least 
needed. Moreover, workers employed in a sector covered by an adjustment 
agreement have a relatively generous transfer programme and they will find a 
job in a reasonable period of time. For outsiders, it was even more difficult to 
enter the labour market in the case of an economic downturn and, if they 
entered the labour market, they were offered temporary contracts instead of 
permanent jobs. However, in December 2010, a transition agreement was 
reached in the public sector. This implies that as from January 2012, the majority 
of the permanent employees will be covered. 
 
3.8 Concluding remarks 
 
In this chapter, the Swedish job-to-job transition arrangements have been 
discussed. The system can be summarized as a complex interconnecting system 
that actually consists of four different pathways which are coordinated by 
different actors.  
 
The first and most important pathway to support redundant employees com-
prises the adjustment agreements and the transition foundations coordinated 
by trade unions and employers’ associations. Several explanatory variables can 
be indicated for the introduction of these transition agreements. The first, and 
most important, reason for the emergence of the agreements is the strong role 
of social partners in regulating the Swedish labour market. Social partners are 
willing to come to an agreement and moderate their demands to reach a 
consensus, because in the future they will meet again around the negotiating 
table. Strikes are rare in Sweden and the trade union density is high. The 
underlying principle is mutual trust. The first transition agreement dates from 
the early 1970s. At that time Sweden was hit by the oil crisis, and the trade 
unions and employers in the Trade and Industry sector believed that the PES 
could not help white-collar workers with job-matching in a satisfactory way. 
Therefore, the TRR transition foundation was established. Another important 
explanation for the existence of the Swedish transition agreements is the 
Swedish view with regard to restructuring. Today, the Swedes, including the 
trade unions, realize that globalisation and restructuring are inevitable. They 
have a positive attitude towards new technologies and new jobs and, during the 
1990s, a shift could be observed from job security to employment security. The 
Swedes rather protect people instead of jobs. The trade union for the blue-collar 
workers, the LO, was, until then, satisfied with the activities of the PES, but 
during the crisis in the early 1990s it became clear that job losses were inevitable 
and job-to-job support was necessary. This was the reason for the LO 
negotiating about a transition agreement for the blue-collar workers. Another 
reason was that the LO saw that the working method of the TRR transition 
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foundation was much more effective than the PES interventions.  
 
The second pathway refers to in-house solutions, which are coordinated by 
individual firms. Large companies with enough financial means can set up 
internal programmes and create special units within the firm to support 
employees in finding another job in or outside the company.  
 
The third pathway refers to the public route via the Public Employment Service, 
which is often not a direct transition from job-to-job, but an indirect one: from 
employed – to unemployment, and again to employment. Employees who have 
been given notices and are not covered by a transition agreement can decide to 
register at the Public Employment Service, which mediates between jobseekers 
and employers. The Swedish government commissioned the PES to find 
unemployed people suitable jobs as quickly as possible, but the problem is that 
fewer jobs are available due to the current crisis. 
 
And finally, private market suppliers play a role in supporting redundant 
employees. The Public Employment Service and individual firms can outsource 
activities to private suppliers in order to support people from job-to-job. Until 
1993, the private job-placement services were forbidden in Sweden but 
deregulation led to a significant expansion of the private outplacement industry. 
 
Each pathway has its own restrictions and preconditions. For example, an 
adjustment agreement applies only to those employees who are working at 
companies that are covered by that agreement. Furthermore, the transition 
foundation can have eligibility criteria (see section 3.3). The in-house solution is 
an option for large companies. The private market route is probably the easiest 
way to take, provided that the employee or the individual himself pays for these 
private services. From past experience, Sweden learned that when the rules of 
the game are changed in one of the four pathways, this will have effects on the 
other pathways which are not necessarily predictable. For example, the Swedish 
government lowered the public unemployment benefit and this had a great 
impact on the transition funds because collective agreements top up the benefit 
to a certain percentage of the final wage. If the basis provided by the public 
government is lowered, the foundations have to compensate more. A trade 
union representative said that this had led to a deterioration of the power of the 
trade unions. The interviewee fears that if that development continues, the 
unions will lose legitimacy, while the government will introduce more legislation. 
The Swedish model with strong associations will then turn into something else.  
Sweden has a well-developed social security system. Most people who are 
unemployed are eligible for unemployment benefit. People do not have to take 
the first job available, but can wait to a certain extent for a ‘suitable’ job. A well-
developed and comprehensive social security system is needed to prevent 
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system has high levels of benefits and a universal coverage. This makes it an 
expensive system, which can only be sustained if there is a consistent 
commitment to full employment. Therefore, job-to-job transitions are important 
in the Swedish context.  
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4.1.1 Political Background 
In the 1930s, the United Kingdom (UK) had a system of social insurances against 
sickness and unemployment that consisted of benefits at a flat rate level, 
combined with residual means-tested assistance for people not covered by the 
insurance. In 1945, the Labour Party won the general election and defeated 
Winston Churchill’s Conservative Party. The new government announced the 
introduction of a new welfare system based on the famous Beveridge report 
(1942). This announcement included the establishment of a compulsory system 
of social security and the erection of the National Health Service (NHS).23 
Several changes were made. Firstly, the insurance programme was made more 
universal and comprehensive. Secondly, although the benefit remained payable 
at a flat rate, the minimum levels were raised. Furthermore, the administration 
was unified (Gerven, 2008).  
 
Between 1945 and 1979, Conservatives and Labour alternated in government. 
During the 1960s, the government introduced new provisions, e.g., the 
Supplementary Benefit (1966) and the social security expenditure rose. Social 
security expenditure on National Insurance and other non-means tested benefits 
increased during the 1960s and 1970s (Adler, 2004). The oil crisis in the mid 
1970s, and the crisis in the early 1980s, hit the UK, resulting in low economic 
growth rates and a sharp increase in unemployment. In 1979, the Conservatives 
won the election and this heralded a new Conservative era, led by Thatcher and 
Major. Thatcher’s ambition was to diminish the role of the state and to ‘end the 
culture of dependency’ and she aimed for more individual and private forms of 
social protection (Gerven, 2008). Incentives were introduced, e.g., reducing tax 
rates, to encourage people to enter into and remain in the labour market. In 
order to reduce public expenditure, earnings-related elements were removed 
and all benefits were made flat-rate. Furthermore, the role of means testing 
increased (Adler, 2004). Nevertheless, due to economic circumstances 
unemployment rose and expenditure on social security increased. Between 1997 
and 2010, the Labour Party was in government, first led by Blair and, in 2007, 
succeeded by Brown. The stricter benefit regime, introduced by the former 
conservative governments, continued, but the government wanted to create a 
new balance between rights and responsibilities. The welfare reform package is 
based on the conception of citizenship that emphasizes equally the importance 
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of “entitlements” and “obligations”, especially the obligation to work. The main 
principle of social policy became “work for those who can; security for those who 
cannot” (Hyde, Dixon, & Joyner, 1999). Several new programmes were 
implemented at different times during the Labour government’s term of office, 
also referred to as the New Deal. The aim of this set of Welfare to Work policies 
was to get young people, long-term unemployed people, and lone parents into 
work. The underlying belief was that work is the best way out of poverty.  
 
In 2002, Jobcentre Plus was established from a merger of the former Public 
Employment Service (PES) and the Benefits Agency. Between 2002 and 2008, a 
network of more than 700 modernised Jobcentre Plus Offices replaced the 1,500 
jobcentres and social security offices across Great Britain (House of Commons 
Committee of Public Accounts, 2008). Jobcentre Plus is responsible for those 
who are able to work, while the Pensions Agency deals with persons who are not 
able to participate in the labour market. Making work pay was one of the 
aspirations of the Labour Government. Therefore, a minimum wage was 
introduced in April 1999. In addition, several tax credits were implemented. 
 
In May 2010, a general election was held. The Conservative Party, received the 
largest proportion of the vote, but did not won outright, falling twenty seats 
short. No party was able to command a majority in the House of Commons. After 
13 years of Labour government, the UK has currently a Coalition Government of 
Conservatives (led by Cameron) and Liberal Democrats (led by Clegg). This 
Coalition Government announced radical reforms stimulated by an urgent need 
for cost effectiveness. The intention is to transfer power from Government to 
individuals, employers and training providers (Department for Business 
Innovation and Skills, 2010a).  
 
4.1.2 Economic history and labour market features 
Early in the 20th century, the UK was involved in World War I (1914-1918). Still 
not totally recovered from the effects of this war, the UK was confronted with a 
profound economic depression in the early 1930s, which lasted until the start of 
World War II. This worldwide economic depression is also known as Great 
Depression or Great Slump (Cole & Ohanian, 2002). The unemployment rate 
increased from averaging 4% during the 20 years before World War I to 
averaging 10% even during the expansion of the late 1920s and late 1930s 
(Benjamin & Kochin, 1982). The British economy recovered after World War II, 
with economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s. In this period the unemployment 
rate varied from 1.1% to 2.2% (Kalachek & Westebbe, 1961). After this period of 
prosperity, with almost full employment, unemployment started to rise due to 
the oil crises in the 1970s. In the 1980s, unemployment rose further with more 
than 3,000,000 unemployed in 1984 (just under 12%) (ILO, Labour Force Survey). 
The economy recovered in the late 1980s and declined below the 2,000,000 (7%) 
in 1990. Subsequently, the UK was hit by another recession and unemployment 
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rose again to nearly 3,000,000 in 1993 (around 10%). Since then, unemployment 
declined during the economic upswing to 1,800,000 in the mid 2008s (5.8%) 
(Leaker, 2009). The boom ended in 2008, when the UK entered a new recession 
brought about by the global financial crisis. In 2009, the unemployment rate 
increased to just under 2,500,000 (7.6%). 
 
4.1.3 Legal framework on redundancy and unemployment insurance 
As previously explained in section 2.1, employment protection in the UK is less 
strict compared to the other countries examined. This does not mean that there 
is no regulation regarding redundancy and dismissals. In this section the 
Employment Rights Act, the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) 
Act and the Company Act will be described. Legislation regarding income 
security after dismissal will also be addressed. This legislation and regulations 
are part of the institutional setting which is a relevant element in the analytical 
framework used in this thesis. 
 
The Employment Rights Act 1996 
In 1996, the Employment Rights Act (ERA) came into force, consolidating the 
right not to be unfairly dismissed previously set out in the Employment 
Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978. This right is irrespective of whether the 
dismissal concerns a single employee or massive redundancy. Employer and 
employee agree in the employment contract on the period of notice. However, 
the ERA regulates, among other things, the statutory minimum period of 
notice.24 The employee, who has been continuously employed for one month or 
more, has at least a one week’s notice if the period of continuous employment is 
less than two years. If the duration of employment is two years or more, but less 
than twelve years, the notice period is one week’s notice for each year of 
continuous employment in this period. The notice period is not less than twelve 
weeks, if the period of continuous employment is twelve years or more. Before 
giving notice, the employer will have to comply with the provisions of the ERA, 
in respect of having a fair reason for dismissal (Kempen et al., 2008). In contrast 
to Sweden, the UK has a statutory right to redundancy pay, which is 
administered under Part XI, section 135 of the ERA. The ERA states that an 
employer can dismiss an employee by reason of redundancy, if the dismissal is 
wholly or mainly attributable to the fact that: 
 the employer has ceased, or intends to cease, to carry on the business for the 
purposes of which the employee was employed; or 
 the employer has ceased, or intends to cease, to carry on the business in the 
place where the employee was employed; or 
 the requirements of the business for employees to carry out work of a 
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24  Section 86 ERA.
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particular kind have ceased or diminished or are expected to cease or 
diminish; or 
 the requirements of the business for the employees to carry out work of a 
particular kind, in the place where they were so employed, have ceased or 
diminished or are expected to cease or diminish.25 
 
Section 162 of the ERA governs the calculation of the statutory redundancy pay 
and is based on the length of service, the age, and the weekly pay, up to a certain 
limit.26 The employee must have worked continuously for the employer for at 
least two years before being made redundant. For each complete year of service 
up to a maximum of 20 years, employees who are declared redundant are 
entitled to: 
 half a week’s pay for each year of service under the age of 22; 
 one week’s pay for each year of service where the employee is aged 22 to 40 
year; 
 one and a half week’s pay for each year of service where the employee is 
aged 41 or over. 
 
The statutory redundancy pay is also due when a fixed-term contract of at least 
two years runs out and is not renewed because of redundancy.27 If the employer 
cannot pay the severance pay because of serious financial problems, the 
government, in the form of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 
(BIS), will pay the redundant employee directly (TUC, 2010a). The following 
employees have no entitlement to statutory redundancy pay: 
 those who have less than two years’ continuous employment; 
 the self-employed; 
 those not employed under contracts of employment; 
 civil servants and other public employees, including NHS workers who are 
covered by their own collective agreements; 
 foreign government employees; 
 seafaring employees paid by share of the catch; 
 domestic workers employed by close relatives; 
 employees who are married to their employer.28  
 
If a company intends to make an employee redundant, the company must 
consider whether there are other jobs available, which the redundant employee 

25  Section 139 ERA.
26 From 1 February 2010 GBP 380.
27 <http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Employment/RedundancyAndLeavingYourJob/Redun 
dancy/DG_10029836>, accessed 22 December 2010.
28  Section 155-161 ERA.
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would be capable of doing. The dismissal is regarded as unfair if there is a 
suitable job available and the employer does not offer it to the redundant 
employee. In that event, the employee can make a claim to an employment 
tribunal. If an employee unreasonably refuses a suitable alternative job offer, the 
law removes the entitlement to have a statutory redundancy pay.29 The 
alternative job offer must be made before the current job ends.  
The employee is entitled to a four weeks’ trial period30, without losing the right 
to statutory redundancy pay. During this trial period the employee can decide 
that the job is unsuitable. The employment rights, including the statutory 
redundancy pay, will not be affected, if the worker informs the employer that 
the new job is not suitable during the trial period.31 
 
Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act (TULRCA) 
In 1992, the British Trade Union and Labour Relation (Consolidation) Act came 
into force. The statutory definition of redundancy in the TULRCA is wider than 
the definition in the ERA. Section 195 of  TULRCA, refers to dismissals as 
redundant as ‘dismissals for a reason not related to the individual concerned or 
for a number of reasons all of which are not so related’. This means that the 
redundancy definition of TULRCA includes those within the ERA, but has also a 
wider application, for example, in a situation where dismissals are not related to 
the conduct or capability of the individuals, but are part of a reorganisation 
where there is no reduction in the overall numbers employed, because the 
employer has recruited new staff (Acas, 2010). The statutory redundancy 
consultation and notification provisions, which are in agreement with the EU 
Directive relating to redundancy (Directive 98/59), are contained in the TULRCA. 
An employer who is to contemplate the dismissal of twenty or more employees 
at one establishment over a period of 90 days or less, has a statutory duty to 
consult representatives of any recognised independent trade union, or if no 
trade union is recognised, other elected employees.32 This consultation period is 
at least thirty days, if the employer is proposing to dismiss more than twenty but 
less than one hundred employees. The consultation period is at least 90 days, if 
the employer is proposing to dismiss one hundred or more employees (section 
188 1a TULRCA). The consultation should include ways of avoiding the 
dismissals, reducing the number of employees to be dismissed and mitigating 
the consequences of dismissals and should be undertaken by the employer with 
a view to reaching agreement with the appropriate representatives (section 188 
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29  Employment rights act, section 141 (2).
30  Negotiators are free to sign contractual agreements which give longer (but not shorter) 
trial periods (Labour Research Department, 2009).
31 <http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Employment/RedundancyAndLeavingYourJob/Redun 
dancy/DG_10029844>, accessed 22 December 2010.
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less than one hundred employees. The consultation period is at least 90 days, if 
the employer is proposing to dismiss one hundred or more employees (section 
188 1a TULRCA). The consultation should include ways of avoiding the 
dismissals, reducing the number of employees to be dismissed and mitigating 
the consequences of dismissals and should be undertaken by the employer with 
a view to reaching agreement with the appropriate representatives (section 188 
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29  Employment rights act, section 141 (2).
30  Negotiators are free to sign contractual agreements which give longer (but not shorter) 
trial periods (Labour Research Department, 2009).
31 <http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Employment/RedundancyAndLeavingYourJob/Redun 
dancy/DG_10029844>, accessed 22 December 2010.




Another requirement is that employers have a statutory duty to notify in writing 
the Secretary of State if they propose to make twenty or more employees 
redundant at one establishment over a period of 90 days or less (section 193 
TULRCA). In practice, this is done by submitting a form to the Redundancy 
Payments Office at the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform (Labour Research Department, 2009). When fewer than twenty 
employees are made redundant, the employer is not legally obliged to carry out 
collective consultation with the trade union or employee representatives, but 
has to carry out individual consultation (Labour Research Department, 2009). 
At the outset of the collective consultation process the employer has to inform 
the employee representatives of: 
 the reasons for the redundancy proposal; 
 the number and descriptions of the proposed redundant employees; 
 the total number of employees of any such description employed by the 
employer and the establishment in question; 
 the proposed method of selecting the employees who will be dismissed; 
 the proposed method of carrying out the dismissals, with due to regard to 
any agreed procedure, including the period over the course of which the 
dismissals are to take effect; and 
 the proposed method of calculating the amount of any redundancy pay (if 
this is more than the statutory minimum). 
 
Objective criteria to determine which employees are to be selected for 
redundancy should be defined and capable of being applied in an independent 
way. These criteria should be narrowed down in consultation with trade union or 
other employee representatives. However, before an employer can apply any 
selection criteria, it must decide on the group of employees from which those to 
be made redundant will be selected (Labour Research Department, 2009). In 
practice, the following selection criteria are commonly used: skills or experience 
(40%), attendance record (35%), performance (31%), disciplinary record (26%), 
length of service (22%), experience (20%), qualifications (19%), knowledge of the 
job (14%), flexibility (14%), last in, first out (12%) (Acas, 2010; Labour Research 
Department, 2009). 
The employer and trade unions should take care that the selection criteria are 
not discriminatory on any grounds. According to the Chartered Institute of 
Personnel and Development (CIPD), the ‘last in, first out’ selection is risky 
because of the age discrimination legislation which came into force in 2006. 
Those with shorter engagement of office are likely to be younger employees and 
employers could lay themselves open to the risk of claims for indirect age 
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discrimination. Therefore, the LIFO principle should not be used as a sole 
method of selection but might be relevant as part of a wider range of selection 
criteria.33 The Labour Research Department, an independent trade union-based 
research organisation, also suggests that LIFO agreements have been 
questioned, because they have the potential to discriminate (Labour Research 
Department, 2009). However, tribunals have mixed views as to whether the 
LIFO procedure is unlawful and it seems that interpretations suggest that LIFO 
as one criterion for selection is acceptable, but having it as the sole criterion is 
more open to challenge (Labour Research Department, 2009). 
 
Fixed-term Employees (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 
2002 (FTER) 
Employees with a fixed-term contract working directly for the employer are 
covered by the Fixed-term Employees (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) 
Regulations 2002 (FTER) and must be treated in the same way as permanent 
employees, including into redundancy rights (Labour Research Department, 
2009). However, agency workers are not treated in the same way as permanent 
employees regarding redundancy rights, unless they can show that they are part 
of the workforce to such an extent that they would be considered to be an 
‘employee’ of the company (Labour Research Department, 2009). 
 
Jobseeker’s allowance act 
An unemployed person who is actively looking for work can apply for a 
Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA). The predecessors of the JSA were a compulsory 
Unemployment Insurance Benefit and a means-tested Supplementary Benefit 
or, as from 1986, Income Support. In 1995, the new JSA Act was introduced. This 
benefit comprises a flat rate insurance paid subject to contributions (contribute-
ion based JSA) and an income based element for those not having any entitle-
ment under the insurance programme. The contribution based Jobseeker’s 
Allowance is based on how much national insurance contributions a person has 
paid in the previous two years, and is paid up to 182 days. The maximum weekly 
rate for those aged 25 or over is GBP 67.50 (EUR 77.68) and for those aged 16-24 
GBP 53.45 (EUR 61.51).34 For the income based Jobseeker’s Allowances the 
claimants’ (household) income, pension and savings are taken into account 
(Jobcentre Plus, 2008). A person might be able to claim income-based JSA if 
he/she did not pay enough national insurance contributions or if the contribution 
based JSA has run out. The maximum weekly rates for the income-based JSA 
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33  <http://www.cipd.co.uk/subjects/emplaw/redundancy/redundancy.htm>, accessed 29 
November 2010.
34  <http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/MoneyTaxAndBenefits/BenefitsTaxCreditsAndOther 
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34  <http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/MoneyTaxAndBenefits/BenefitsTaxCreditsAndOther 
Support/Employedorlookingforwork/DG_10018757>, accessed 11 October 2011
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are, for single people, aged under 25, GBP 53.45 (EUR 61.51), for single people 
aged 25 or over, GBP 67.50 (EUR 77.68), and GBP 105.95 (EUR 121.94) for 
couples both aged 18 or over.35 In order to get a JSA the claimant must fulfil 
several conditions. The person is unemployed or working less than 16 hours per 
week, and actively seeking another job. Furthermore, the claimant must be 
under state pension age36 and over the age of 18, capable of work, living in the 
UK and not participating in full-time education. The claimant also needs a 
‘jobseekers’ agreement’. This document sets out the steps the unemployed 
person will take to find work. Jobcentre Plus administers the JSA and a personal 
adviser checks the progress against the jobseeker’s agreement (Jobcentre Plus, 
2008). At least once every fortnight, the unemployed person has to visit the local 
Jobcentre to sign a declaration that states that he has been looking for work and 
is still available for work and that nothing has changed that could affect the 
Allowance (Jobcentre Plus, 2008). 
The net replacement rates during the initial phase of unemployment are 
presented in table 4.1. The OECD net replacement indicator measures the 
proportion of expected income from work which is replaced by unemployment 
and related welfare benefits. The earning level refers to the average of 
replacement rates for unemployed persons who earned 67% and 100% of 
average working earning at the time of losing their jobs.  
Table 4.1 shows that British employees who lose their jobs will be confronted 
with a considerable income loss during the initial phase of unemployment. 
 
Table 4.1: Net Replacement Rates in UK in percentages for six family types: initial 
phase of unemployment, 2009, by earning level of average wage (AW) 
  Family type 























67% of AW 55 66 59 74 79 68 67 
100% of AW 38 46 49 64 71 57 54 
Source: OECD37 
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35  <http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/MoneyTaxAndBenefits/BenefitsTaxCreditsAndOther 
Support/Employedorlookingforwork/DG_10018757>, accessed 11 October 2011.
36  Currently, 65 for men and 60 for women. The State Pension age for women born on or 
after 6 April 1950 will gradually increase to 65 between 2010 and 2020. The State 
Pension age for both men and women born on or after 6 April 1959 will change further 
from 2024 to reach 68 by 2046 (Jobcenter Plus, 2008). 
37  <http://www.oecd.org/document/3/0,3343,en_2649_34637_39617987_1_1_1_1,00.html>, 
accessed 12 July 2011.
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Companies Act 2006 
In 2006, the Companies Act came into effect. According to this law, company 
directors should consider how their business impacts on people and their 
environment.38 Large businesses are also obliged to publish their impacts in 
annual reports.39 One likely implication could be that companies would like to 
boost their corporate social responsibility image and therefore offer redundant 
employees trajectories through external outplacement bureaus. In 2010, the 
companies Act was evaluated, but unfortunately the evaluation report did not 
address the corporate social responsibility policies in relationship to providing 
job-to-job support (Fettiplace & Addis, 2010) .  
 
4.2 Type of support to find work after redundancy 
 
4.2.1 Jobcentre Plus Rapid Response Service (RRS) 
Jobcentre Plus is an executive agency of the Department of Work and Pensions 
and is responsible for a wide range of UK policies to support the transition from 
unemployment to employment. It brings job finding and benefit services 
together in one organisation. The UK experienced economic growth in the mid 
1990s, but also, during this period of declining unemployment rate (see figure 2.3, 
section 2.2), a number of redundancy situations arose. In the light of closures of 
big companies which resulted in the loss of many jobs, the government 
announced, in 1998, at the TUC Congress, the creation of a Rapid Response Fund. 
The Employment Service, the predecessor of the Jobcentre Plus, introduced 
regional Rapid Response teams at regional level. The Secretary of State for 
Employment then established a flexible Job Transition Service (JTS) in order to 
tackle significant redundancy processes. This was a pilot in 2001 which was 
subsequently renamed the Rapid Response Service (RRS) and which became 
operational in 2002 (House of Commons, 2008; Johnson, 2003; TUC, 2009b). 
Early intervention is the main objective of the RRS. The idea is that the RRS 
prevents redundant employees from making a JSA claim. Unemployed people 
are entitled to use the services of Jobcentre Plus. However, many of these more 
intensive services, e.g., intensive support, guidance and training activities, were 
only available to people who had been unemployed for a long period of time; six 
or twelve months (Johnson, 2003). This was not desirable in the event of large 
scale redundancy, so ‘fast track’ access was organized by the local Jobcentre Plus 
offices, resulting in immediate support for people as soon as they received their 
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38  Section 172 Business Act 2006, http://www.imolin.org/doc/amlid/ UK_Companies 
_Act_2006.pdf .
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notice. As the name suggests, Jobcentre Plus helps employees and employees 
via the RRS by giving those facing redundancy access to the service of Jobcentre 
Plus and its partners before they actually lose their jobs. Originally, Jobcentre 
Plus provided the RRS in cases of ‘significant’ redundancy, which means ‘a ‘large 
scale’ redundancy that is deemed to have a significant impact on the local area 
within which the proposed job losses are to take place’ (Johnson, 2003). A 
redundancy that is relatively small numerically within a small village with few 
alternative job opportunities could also be considered as significant. In response 
to the recent economic downturn, the British Government extended the RRS in 
November 2008 and the service is now available to any employer considering 
dismissing redundant employees (TUC, 2009b). Formerly, the Jobcentre Plus 
contacted and offered support to employers who met the statutory requirement 
to notify the Insolvency Service when making twenty people or more redundant. 
With the expansion of the RRS, Jobcentre Plus currently also makes effort to 
identify companies making fewer than twenty people redundant. Where 
identified40 these employers are also contacted and offered support.  
In the fall of 2008, Jobcentre Plus saw that the economy was starting to slow 
down and some very large companies were going out of business. For example, 
some major retail companies such as Woolworths, a very big chain with shops 
employing 40 to 50 people in most towns of the country, were affected by the 
crisis. In the UK 807 Woolworth’s stores closed between 27 December 2008 and 
6 January 2009 resulting in 27,000 job losses.41 Jobcentre Plus intensified the 
RRS. Companies have been able to contact the national Rapid Response Team 
and inform them how many workers will be made redundant. According to the 
Jobcentre Plus respondent, there is usually good partnership between Jobcentre 
Plus and local employers. The Jobcentre Plus account manager has regular 
contact with local employers to see if they are recruiting someone. The idea is 
that the minute the Jobcentre Rapid Response Team hears of a redundancy or a 
firm closing down everything is called together and Jobcentre Plus sets up the 
RRS. This might mean that a member of the rapid response team gives group 
session presentations in the company or at the local Jobcentre and informs the 
redundant employees about available jobs, the procedure to make a JSA claim, 
and additional support to find another job as quickly as possible.  
 
The local Jobcentres receive from the regional office the notification which 
employers are making redundancies of twenty people or more. Jobcentre Plus 
contacts the employers and asks them what kind of support they would like. 
Subsequently, Jobcentre Plus provides information about the type of support 
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40  <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm081126/text/81126 
w0122.htm>, accessed 22 December 2010.
41  <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7787904.stm>, accessed 2 December 2010.
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they can actually offer in order to support the companies through this process. 
One interviewee of the Jobcentre Plus mentioned that what also occurs is that 
the Rapid Response Team gets in touch with employers who are thinking about 
making redundancies in due time. In the very early stage these conversations are 
confidential and the word ‘redundancy’ is not mentioned in order to prevent 
social unrest in the company.  
 
A redundant employee has to make a JSA claim at the Jobcentre where he lives; 
this is not necessarily the place where he was employed. In practice, this could 
mean that only one redundant worker visits that specific local Jobcentre, 
because other employees of the same company live in other places. In that 
event, Jobcentre Plus can offer a rapid response training course that is put 
together for individual redundant workers from different companies. This is a 
Jobcentre Plus funded programme and is delivered by a training provider.  
 
The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions was asked by Parliament by what 
means his Department has informed employers of the existence of the 
Jobcentre Plus RRS since it was established. On 12th January 2009 this question 
was answered in a letter to Parliament by the chief executive of Jobcentre Plus. 
In this letter he stated: ‘Employers are made aware of the service in three main 
ways. First, Jobcentre Plus is informed by the Department for Business, 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform when employers notify redundancy of 20 or 
more employees. We contact each of those employers to discuss the range of 
support that Jobcentre Plus is able, with its partners, to offer employees, and to 
decide which measures will be helpful. Second, we provide information through 
channels that employers use regularly, including: the Jobcentre Plus website 
www.jobcentreplus.gov.uk/employers, the websites of organisations who help 
to deliver the rapid response service to employers and a range of leaflets and 
business/trade media. Third, some employers receive an account management 
service from Jobcentre Plus in return for their commitment to helping our 
individual customers to find work. In that context, employers facing difficulties 
may discuss their needs directly with Jobcentre Plus and appropriate levels of 
support will be offered’.42  
 
When a small company does not inform Jobcentre Plus about their closing 
down, the local Jobcentre Plus might not find out that employees would lose 
their jobs. Therefore, the Jobcentre RRS, the insolvency trade body R343 and the 
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42 <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090112/text/90112w
0011.htm>, accessed 20 December 2010.
43 R3 is an association of Business Recovery professionals which provides advice concerning insol- 




notice. As the name suggests, Jobcentre Plus helps employees and employees 
via the RRS by giving those facing redundancy access to the service of Jobcentre 
Plus and its partners before they actually lose their jobs. Originally, Jobcentre 
Plus provided the RRS in cases of ‘significant’ redundancy, which means ‘a ‘large 
scale’ redundancy that is deemed to have a significant impact on the local area 
within which the proposed job losses are to take place’ (Johnson, 2003). A 
redundancy that is relatively small numerically within a small village with few 
alternative job opportunities could also be considered as significant. In response 
to the recent economic downturn, the British Government extended the RRS in 
November 2008 and the service is now available to any employer considering 
dismissing redundant employees (TUC, 2009b). Formerly, the Jobcentre Plus 
contacted and offered support to employers who met the statutory requirement 
to notify the Insolvency Service when making twenty people or more redundant. 
With the expansion of the RRS, Jobcentre Plus currently also makes effort to 
identify companies making fewer than twenty people redundant. Where 
identified40 these employers are also contacted and offered support.  
In the fall of 2008, Jobcentre Plus saw that the economy was starting to slow 
down and some very large companies were going out of business. For example, 
some major retail companies such as Woolworths, a very big chain with shops 
employing 40 to 50 people in most towns of the country, were affected by the 
crisis. In the UK 807 Woolworth’s stores closed between 27 December 2008 and 
6 January 2009 resulting in 27,000 job losses.41 Jobcentre Plus intensified the 
RRS. Companies have been able to contact the national Rapid Response Team 
and inform them how many workers will be made redundant. According to the 
Jobcentre Plus respondent, there is usually good partnership between Jobcentre 
Plus and local employers. The Jobcentre Plus account manager has regular 
contact with local employers to see if they are recruiting someone. The idea is 
that the minute the Jobcentre Rapid Response Team hears of a redundancy or a 
firm closing down everything is called together and Jobcentre Plus sets up the 
RRS. This might mean that a member of the rapid response team gives group 
session presentations in the company or at the local Jobcentre and informs the 
redundant employees about available jobs, the procedure to make a JSA claim, 
and additional support to find another job as quickly as possible.  
 
The local Jobcentres receive from the regional office the notification which 
employers are making redundancies of twenty people or more. Jobcentre Plus 
contacts the employers and asks them what kind of support they would like. 
Subsequently, Jobcentre Plus provides information about the type of support 

40  <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm081126/text/81126 
w0122.htm>, accessed 22 December 2010.
41  <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7787904.stm>, accessed 2 December 2010.
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they can actually offer in order to support the companies through this process. 
One interviewee of the Jobcentre Plus mentioned that what also occurs is that 
the Rapid Response Team gets in touch with employers who are thinking about 
making redundancies in due time. In the very early stage these conversations are 
confidential and the word ‘redundancy’ is not mentioned in order to prevent 
social unrest in the company.  
 
A redundant employee has to make a JSA claim at the Jobcentre where he lives; 
this is not necessarily the place where he was employed. In practice, this could 
mean that only one redundant worker visits that specific local Jobcentre, 
because other employees of the same company live in other places. In that 
event, Jobcentre Plus can offer a rapid response training course that is put 
together for individual redundant workers from different companies. This is a 
Jobcentre Plus funded programme and is delivered by a training provider.  
 
The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions was asked by Parliament by what 
means his Department has informed employers of the existence of the 
Jobcentre Plus RRS since it was established. On 12th January 2009 this question 
was answered in a letter to Parliament by the chief executive of Jobcentre Plus. 
In this letter he stated: ‘Employers are made aware of the service in three main 
ways. First, Jobcentre Plus is informed by the Department for Business, 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform when employers notify redundancy of 20 or 
more employees. We contact each of those employers to discuss the range of 
support that Jobcentre Plus is able, with its partners, to offer employees, and to 
decide which measures will be helpful. Second, we provide information through 
channels that employers use regularly, including: the Jobcentre Plus website 
www.jobcentreplus.gov.uk/employers, the websites of organisations who help 
to deliver the rapid response service to employers and a range of leaflets and 
business/trade media. Third, some employers receive an account management 
service from Jobcentre Plus in return for their commitment to helping our 
individual customers to find work. In that context, employers facing difficulties 
may discuss their needs directly with Jobcentre Plus and appropriate levels of 
support will be offered’.42  
 
When a small company does not inform Jobcentre Plus about their closing 
down, the local Jobcentre Plus might not find out that employees would lose 
their jobs. Therefore, the Jobcentre RRS, the insolvency trade body R343 and the 
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42 <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090112/text/90112w
0011.htm>, accessed 20 December 2010.
43 R3 is an association of Business Recovery professionals which provides advice concerning insol- 
 vency and business recovery to employers. For more information see: https://www.r3.org.uk/.
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Insolvency Service 44  have joined forces to develop a system of sharing 
information about possible job losses in struggling companies.45 On 22 October 
2009, this collaboration was laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding.46 In 
the past, Jobcentre Plus was not always aware of the situation in companies who 
registered at the Insolvency Service, but neglected to inform Jobcentre Plus 
about their economic circumstances. With this agreement R3 and the Insolvency 
Service will inform Jobcentre Plus as soon as redundancies are made. This liaison 
enables Jobcentre Plus to help more companies more quickly, so that people 




The first step in the RRS is to make employers aware of the support Jobcentre 
Plus and the Department of Work and Pensions can offer. The help provided by 
the RRS is flexible; it is not a fixed menu or model and depends on the 
employer’s and redundant worker’s needs. The service provided to employers 
and employees are free services. For example, one to one sessions with people 
being made redundant are offered. Furthermore, presentations are given in the 
Jobcentre Plus office or at the employer’s premises. Everyone of the workforce 
can attend these presentations. Usually, Jobcentre Plus liaises with all kinds of 
organisations to get them involved on the same day and to get them into 
presentations as well. For example, in these sessions Jobcentre Plus promotes 
free training which the National Skills Academy can provide. These academies 
deliver specialised skills to employees and learners to help them respond to the 
business needs. They provide free training and employability courses to basically 
everyone, but their work in liaison with the Jobcentre Plus Rapid Response team 
concerns mostly people that have been made redundant and the recently 
unemployed. These Academies operate in several sectors and are established, 
shaped and led by employers.47 
 

44  The Insolvency Service is an executive agency of the Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills (BIS) and has four main goals:1) to maintain and develop world 
class insolvency law framework, 2) to deliver key public services that support the 
insolvency framework, 3) to deliver and promote an effective investigation and 
enforcement regime, 4) to ensure an organisation devoted to continuous improvement 
(Insolvency service, 2010).
45 <http://www.personneltoday.com/articles/2009/10/22/52679/jobcentre-plus-r3-and-the-
insolvency-service-set-up-joint-pre-redundancy-service.html>, accessed 7 December 
2010.
46  See: <http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/iparea/JCP-R3-
IS%20MoU%2022nd%20Oct%2009.pdf>, accessed 7 December 2010.
47 <http://www.businesslink.gov.uk/bdotg/action/layer?=en&topicId=1085744683&=en& 
topicId=1085744683>, accessed 7 December 2010.
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Employees who are formally declared redundant can be helped through RRS 
interventions. However, information, advice and guidance service can be 
accessed before the employer has given the employee their formal notice (TUC, 
2009b). A dismissed worker can make use of the regular information, advice and 
guidance services of Jobcentre Plus. Moreover, redundant employees can be 
advised about vacancies, job search, writing a CV and interview techniques.  
In one of the interviews the Jobcentre Plus respondent explained that Jobcentre 
Plus has a database with vacancies. The Jobcentre Plus database of job 
vacancies is the largest in Britain and takes around 10,000 new vacancies every 
working day (Department for Work and Pensions, 2009b). No employer is forced 
to place vacancies with the Jobcentre Plus; therefore the Jobcentre Plus does 
not have a 100 percent market share of the vacancy market. One of the 
interviewees estimates the Jobcentre Plus vacancy market share at 40 percent. 
This corresponds with 2002 figures derived from the Vacancy Survey which 
suggest that the Jobcentre Plus vacancy market share lies between a third and a 
half (Bentley, 2005). Also, the latest report on the triennial review of the vacancy 
survey suggests that Jobcentre Plus has a partial share, possibly less than half, of 
all vacancies (Office for National Statistics, 2009). When an employer places a 
vacancy at Jobcentre Plus, Jobcentre Plus will put the vacancy on the Directgov 
employment website, on the Jobcentre Plus network of electronic touch-screen 
terminals in Jobcentre Plus offices and in local communities across Britain and 
through Jobseeker Direct. The latter is a Jobcentre Plus phone service for people 
applying for jobs which provides the latest job vacancies and helps people to find 
the right job.  
The RRS can offer a wide range of existing programmes from Jobcentre Plus and 
its partners. Individuals who are threatened by unemployment can have their 
skills assessed. Another form of active support is that training can be provided 
for work in quality jobs that are available in the local market. It is also possible to 
obtain certificates for previously uncertified skills (TUC, 2009b). 
An employee who has lost his job can register at a local Jobcentre office. The 
Jobcentre Plus advisers are able to provide the local services to the newly 
unemployed which are, e.g., referrals to training courses or job search activities. 
After about two weeks of claiming a JSA, Jobcentre Plus gives newly 
unemployed people the chance to come to a group session meeting. They get a 
presentation on the different ways they can improve their job search and the 
services that are offered in the Jobcentre Plus office, and what training providers 
can offer them. Furthermore, details of the latest vacancies are presented. These 
group session meetings are optional for the newly unemployed.  
 
The members of the Rapid Response Team meet a lot of workers who will lose 
their jobs in the near future. If the Rapid Response Team identifies a customer as 
a potential employee for another employer, they inform the matching team and 
encourage the redundant employee to apply for the vacancy. Jobcentre Plus 
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information about possible job losses in struggling companies.45 On 22 October 
2009, this collaboration was laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding.46 In 
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registered at the Insolvency Service, but neglected to inform Jobcentre Plus 
about their economic circumstances. With this agreement R3 and the Insolvency 
Service will inform Jobcentre Plus as soon as redundancies are made. This liaison 
enables Jobcentre Plus to help more companies more quickly, so that people 




The first step in the RRS is to make employers aware of the support Jobcentre 
Plus and the Department of Work and Pensions can offer. The help provided by 
the RRS is flexible; it is not a fixed menu or model and depends on the 
employer’s and redundant worker’s needs. The service provided to employers 
and employees are free services. For example, one to one sessions with people 
being made redundant are offered. Furthermore, presentations are given in the 
Jobcentre Plus office or at the employer’s premises. Everyone of the workforce 
can attend these presentations. Usually, Jobcentre Plus liaises with all kinds of 
organisations to get them involved on the same day and to get them into 
presentations as well. For example, in these sessions Jobcentre Plus promotes 
free training which the National Skills Academy can provide. These academies 
deliver specialised skills to employees and learners to help them respond to the 
business needs. They provide free training and employability courses to basically 
everyone, but their work in liaison with the Jobcentre Plus Rapid Response team 
concerns mostly people that have been made redundant and the recently 
unemployed. These Academies operate in several sectors and are established, 
shaped and led by employers.47 
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Innovation and Skills (BIS) and has four main goals:1) to maintain and develop world 
class insolvency law framework, 2) to deliver key public services that support the 
insolvency framework, 3) to deliver and promote an effective investigation and 
enforcement regime, 4) to ensure an organisation devoted to continuous improvement 
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Employees who are formally declared redundant can be helped through RRS 
interventions. However, information, advice and guidance service can be 
accessed before the employer has given the employee their formal notice (TUC, 
2009b). A dismissed worker can make use of the regular information, advice and 
guidance services of Jobcentre Plus. Moreover, redundant employees can be 
advised about vacancies, job search, writing a CV and interview techniques.  
In one of the interviews the Jobcentre Plus respondent explained that Jobcentre 
Plus has a database with vacancies. The Jobcentre Plus database of job 
vacancies is the largest in Britain and takes around 10,000 new vacancies every 
working day (Department for Work and Pensions, 2009b). No employer is forced 
to place vacancies with the Jobcentre Plus; therefore the Jobcentre Plus does 
not have a 100 percent market share of the vacancy market. One of the 
interviewees estimates the Jobcentre Plus vacancy market share at 40 percent. 
This corresponds with 2002 figures derived from the Vacancy Survey which 
suggest that the Jobcentre Plus vacancy market share lies between a third and a 
half (Bentley, 2005). Also, the latest report on the triennial review of the vacancy 
survey suggests that Jobcentre Plus has a partial share, possibly less than half, of 
all vacancies (Office for National Statistics, 2009). When an employer places a 
vacancy at Jobcentre Plus, Jobcentre Plus will put the vacancy on the Directgov 
employment website, on the Jobcentre Plus network of electronic touch-screen 
terminals in Jobcentre Plus offices and in local communities across Britain and 
through Jobseeker Direct. The latter is a Jobcentre Plus phone service for people 
applying for jobs which provides the latest job vacancies and helps people to find 
the right job.  
The RRS can offer a wide range of existing programmes from Jobcentre Plus and 
its partners. Individuals who are threatened by unemployment can have their 
skills assessed. Another form of active support is that training can be provided 
for work in quality jobs that are available in the local market. It is also possible to 
obtain certificates for previously uncertified skills (TUC, 2009b). 
An employee who has lost his job can register at a local Jobcentre office. The 
Jobcentre Plus advisers are able to provide the local services to the newly 
unemployed which are, e.g., referrals to training courses or job search activities. 
After about two weeks of claiming a JSA, Jobcentre Plus gives newly 
unemployed people the chance to come to a group session meeting. They get a 
presentation on the different ways they can improve their job search and the 
services that are offered in the Jobcentre Plus office, and what training providers 
can offer them. Furthermore, details of the latest vacancies are presented. These 
group session meetings are optional for the newly unemployed.  
 
The members of the Rapid Response Team meet a lot of workers who will lose 
their jobs in the near future. If the Rapid Response Team identifies a customer as 
a potential employee for another employer, they inform the matching team and 
encourage the redundant employee to apply for the vacancy. Jobcentre Plus 
tries to find as many options as possible, with the view of trying to help a 
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customer to find work as quickly as possible. It also depends on the job the 
customer has left and the qualifications he has as to how much additional 
training can be provided. 
 
The Rapid Response team can put the redundant customer in touch with the 
national skills advisory teams, so that they can provide very early support and 
access to training which is available and free. Jobcentre Plus advisers spend the 
first thirteen weeks after the JSA claim, encouraging the customers to look for 
jobs that they feel they are able to do, based on their existing skills and their 
existing experience. When they have been unemployed for a longer period of 
time i.e., six months, the Jobcentre Plus adviser sits down with the customer and 
looks at their skills and considers what kind of jobs they would be able to do. 
They can identify training for a customer to help them to use their existing skills 
in a particular sector with a realistic view. One of the tools that is provided as 
part of the package is the Skills Transfer Analysis. This tool compares the skills 
the redundant employee has with those required to find work in the labour 
market. An overview of their transferable skills will be provided and advice will 
be given about skills that are in demand locally. Where skills gaps are identified, 
the RRS can offer early access to programmes. Moreover, job focused training 
can be followed in order to fill the skills gaps quickly. The aim of this training is to 
help the person to gain the necessary skills to find work quickly. This does not 
mean that this training leads directly to a qualification.48 
Specialist Advisers can help workers identify their transferable skills and give 
advice about skills that are in demand locally. Where this analysis identifies a 
specific problem, the Rapid Response Service can offer early access to a wide 
range of existing programmes such as Work Based Learning for Adults or 
Programme Centres. Where practicable, people can be put on a programme up 
to three months before they become unemployed. 
 
Financial support 
Jobcentre Plus is also responsible for the administration of social security in the 
UK. A Jobcentre Plus new claim adviser, or a personal adviser, can explain to the 
redundant worker how to make a claim for the JSA. The JSA provides income 
security for the period in-between jobs. The Jobcentre Plus respondent explains 
that they try to coordinate the activities. So, if Jobcentre Plus staff knows that 
someone is being made redundant, they try to book an appointment the day 
after. The Trade Union Congress argues that advice about tax issues, self-
employment, benefits and pensions will be available at Jobcentre Plus or its 
partners, but they cannot offer the sort of advice that is better provided by an 

48 <www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090223/text/ 
90223w0019.htm#09022327001 173>, accessed 22 December 2010.
CHAPTER 4 
123 
independent financial adviser (TUC, 2009b). Jobcentre Plus can also offer one-
off support to address individual barriers to re-employment linked to specific job 
offers, e.g., tools, travel costs (TUC, 2009b). As a response to the economic 
downturn, Jobcentre Plus provided extra help for new JSA customers, including 
information and support about finding work, and additional financial help with 
mortgage payment (Department for Work and Pensions, 2009b). 
 
4.2.2 Response to Redundancy Programme (R2R) 
The Skills Funding Agency is an agency of the Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills (BIS) and is one of the successors of the Learning and Skills 
Council (LCS), which was dissoluted on 31 March 2010. In section 4.6.2, the 
history and the function of the LCS will be described. The Skills Funding Agency 
finances and regulates further education for those aged 19 and over and has 
several programmes.49 One of the biggest national programmes is the Train to 
Gain programme which was introduced in April 2006 (Department for Business, 
2009). This scheme aims to meet the needs of employers through on the job 
training to improve the skills of their workers as a route to improving their 
business performance.50 In response to the current economic downturn, the 
Train to Gain programme provided additional support to help companies tackle 
these tougher times, including more fully funded training, and funding for 
shorter, focused training programmes for small and medium sized companies in 
the private sector.51 In other words, the Train to Gain programme was set up as a 
service for employers which helps them to improve their productivity by 
developing the skills of their workforce (Skills Funding Agency, 2010b). 
However, in the light of the inevitable constraints on the public finances, the 
Government has decided that Train to Gain will be abolished (HM Treasury, 
2010b). Henceforth, funding for workplaces training on SMEs will be prioritized 
(Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2010a). 
 
Moreover, the Skills Funding Agency has programmes aimed at the delivery of 
appropriate skills provision to the unemployed; Jobcentre Plus customers are a 
priority group. The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) enters into 
contracts with providers to deliver support to the unemployed Jobcentre Plus 
customers. The Jobcentre Plus support includes job search support and 
employability training, but does not normally include occupational or vocational 
skills training. One of the interviewees argues that the service of the Jobcentre 

49 <http://skillsfundingagency.bis.gov.uk/aboutus/faqs/#_How_is_it>, accessed 17 January 
2011.
50  <http://www.traintogain.gov.uk/Helping_Your_Business/extrasupport/>, accessed 15 
December 2010.
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advice about skills that are in demand locally. Where this analysis identifies a 
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Programme Centres. Where practicable, people can be put on a programme up 
to three months before they become unemployed. 
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Jobcentre Plus is also responsible for the administration of social security in the 
UK. A Jobcentre Plus new claim adviser, or a personal adviser, can explain to the 
redundant worker how to make a claim for the JSA. The JSA provides income 
security for the period in-between jobs. The Jobcentre Plus respondent explains 
that they try to coordinate the activities. So, if Jobcentre Plus staff knows that 
someone is being made redundant, they try to book an appointment the day 
after. The Trade Union Congress argues that advice about tax issues, self-
employment, benefits and pensions will be available at Jobcentre Plus or its 
partners, but they cannot offer the sort of advice that is better provided by an 
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independent financial adviser (TUC, 2009b). Jobcentre Plus can also offer one-
off support to address individual barriers to re-employment linked to specific job 
offers, e.g., tools, travel costs (TUC, 2009b). As a response to the economic 
downturn, Jobcentre Plus provided extra help for new JSA customers, including 
information and support about finding work, and additional financial help with 
mortgage payment (Department for Work and Pensions, 2009b). 
 
4.2.2 Response to Redundancy Programme (R2R) 
The Skills Funding Agency is an agency of the Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills (BIS) and is one of the successors of the Learning and Skills 
Council (LCS), which was dissoluted on 31 March 2010. In section 4.6.2, the 
history and the function of the LCS will be described. The Skills Funding Agency 
finances and regulates further education for those aged 19 and over and has 
several programmes.49 One of the biggest national programmes is the Train to 
Gain programme which was introduced in April 2006 (Department for Business, 
2009). This scheme aims to meet the needs of employers through on the job 
training to improve the skills of their workers as a route to improving their 
business performance.50 In response to the current economic downturn, the 
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these tougher times, including more fully funded training, and funding for 
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the private sector.51 In other words, the Train to Gain programme was set up as a 
service for employers which helps them to improve their productivity by 
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2010b). Henceforth, funding for workplaces training on SMEs will be prioritized 
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Moreover, the Skills Funding Agency has programmes aimed at the delivery of 
appropriate skills provision to the unemployed; Jobcentre Plus customers are a 
priority group. The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) enters into 
contracts with providers to deliver support to the unemployed Jobcentre Plus 
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RRS is about how to get into a new job very quickly and to help with things like 
CV writing or letters of application, which is very basic level support. The 
interviewee continues with: “It is not that the RRS provides proper skills training 
or vocational training. The RRS now arranges funding and they can buy it in. The 
pot of money of the RRS has been increased to GBP 12 million (EUR 13.5 
million), but the Skills Funding Agency invests more than GBP 4 billion (EUR 4.5 
billon) each year to fund in training. So the skills support that the Skill Funding 
Agency can provide is far greater and far richer than that provided by the Rapid 
Response Service”. The Skills Funding Agency mentions on its website that: 
‘Through the delivery of an Integrated Employment and Skills Service, new joint 
working arrangements should help to ensure that the Skills Funding Agency and 
Jobcentre Plus offer complementary packages of flexible and responsive 
provision to meet the needs of Jobcentre Plus customers and employers in the 
local economy’.52 
 
The Skills Funding Agency’s programme for the unemployed includes the 
Employability Skills Programme, Response to Redundancy Programme and the 
Six Month Offer.53 The aim of the Employability Skills Programme is to deliver 
basic skills to Jobcentre Plus costumers aged 18 and above with basic skills 
needs, such as timekeeping, communicating at work, reliability, numeracy and 
literacy. This provision can be accessed from Day 1 of the Jobseeker’s Allowance 
Claim, this in contrast to the Six Month Offer programme which is targeted at 
jobseekers who have reached the six month stage of their Jobseeker’s Allowance 
(JSA). The Six Month Offer Programme focuses on vocational skills required to 
provide a significant increase in the skills of the unemployed, making them more 
attractive for potential employers. The most relevant Skills Funding Agency 
programme for this study is the Response to Redundancy Programme (R2R), for 
those under consultation or notice of redundancy. The aim of the programme is 
to deliver the skills, not necessarily qualifications, needed by recruiting 
employers and therefore the R2R provides vocational training. The training may 
involve updating or accrediting skills in a sector where the worker has previously 
acquired experience, or it may mean building on a transferable skills base to 
make the individual more attractive to employers in different or related sectors 
(Skills Funding Agency, 2010b). The R2R programme is for those who need a 
short, job-focused intervention, not total reskilling, whilst under notice of 
redundancy or once they are out of work and claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance.54 
The Skills Funding Agency allocates funding to training providers through an 
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52  <pfu.skillsfundingagency.bis.gov.uk>, accessed 17 January 2010.
53  <pfu.skillsfundingagency.bis.gov.uk>, accessed 17 January 2010.
54  <http://pfu.skilsfundingagency.bis.gov.uk/programmes/responsetoredundancy/, 
accessed 20 January 2011.
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open and competitive tender process. The interviewee mentioned that generally 
this would be one or two training suppliers per region of the country which are 
contracted to provide the training. One requirement formulated in the R2R 
programme guidance for suppliers is that ‘Providers will be expected to develop 
working links with Jobcentre Plus in order to provide support and skills 
development activities that are relevant to both identified vacancies and 
forthcoming sectoral based skills demand in the local labour markets’ (Skills 




As previously mentioned, the RRS is now available to any company that makes 
Jobcentre Plus aware that they consider to lay off employees (TUC, 2009b). 
Jobcentre Plus will proactively make contact with companies that propose to 
make twenty or more people redundant, or in any area where the District 
Manager considers that the overall scale will have a significant impact on the 
(regional) labour market. Redundant employees can be supported by the RRS 
when ‘under threat’ or ‘under notice’ of redundancy. The TUC states that the full 
range of services is only provided when the company has actually given 
employees their formal notice of redundancy, but information, advice and 
guidance can be accessed before this (TUC, 2009b). The self-employed are not 
eligible for the RRS.  
At the start of the RRS in the early 2000s, the precondition for the proposed 
support was that there must be a partnership approach. Each redundancy is 
different and therefore the composition of the partnership could vary. However, 
at that time the RRS could not be offered without the engagement of Jobcentre 
Plus, a Regional Development Agency and the Learning Skills Council.55 In a 
more recent document these criteria became more flexible and the TUC states 
that, in particularly large redundancies, a partnership approach is taken to 
develop a proposed package of support, and that it would be surprising if 
Jobcentre Plus, the Regional Development Agency and the Learning Skills 
Council were not involved. The following organisations could be involved: 
Employer(s), Trade Union, outplacement agencies, local authorities, Chamber of 
Commerce, Members of Parliament, Business Links (TUC, 2009b).  
The RRS is a voluntary service and employers are free to take it up or make their 
own arrangements to support their redundant staff. However, the TUC 
respondent underlines that the RRS can support redundant employees though 
much depends on the willingness of the employer. The interviewee argues that 
sometimes employers do not want their customers to know that they are in that 
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open and competitive tender process. The interviewee mentioned that generally 
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programme guidance for suppliers is that ‘Providers will be expected to develop 
working links with Jobcentre Plus in order to provide support and skills 
development activities that are relevant to both identified vacancies and 
forthcoming sectoral based skills demand in the local labour markets’ (Skills 
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poor economic position.  
 
The Response to Redundancy Programme is a national programme ‘targeted to 
support people under consultation or notice of redundancy, people recently 





Jobcentre Plus is financed by the Department for Work and Pensions, the 
Employment Ministry in the UK. The Department for Work and Pension is funded 
on a three year funding cycle and is audited against its aims and objectives. The 
public service agreements describe how targets will be achieved and how 
performance will be measured. Normally, several government departments will 
contribute to achieve the aims, with one lead department. The departmental 
strategic objectives are translated into departmental strategic objectives and 
management targets of the delivery agencies. Since the Department’s three 
year plan for 2009-2012 was published in May 2009, the Government has 
significantly increased the budget for the Department. According to the 
Department for Work and Pensions’ Business Plan 2009-2010, the additional 
resource totals GBP 4.6 billion (EUR 5.18 billion) over the Comprehensive 
Spending Review 2007. The British government’s aim is to maintain the active 
labour market regime and ensure that all jobseekers receive the right level of 
support (Department for Work and Pensions, 2009b). In order to maintain its 
services to unemployed people, Jobcentre Plus received additional funding from 
HM Treasury and extra staff was recruited. Via this extra investment the 
government wants to ensure that the recently unemployed receive personal 
help and advice from day one of a Jobseeker’s Allowance claim, so that everyone 
who needs it can get: advice on finding a new job, help to write a new CV and fill 
in job applications, help on retraining and skills advice and access to new 
vacancies (Department for Work and Pensions, 2009b). In the financial year 
2010-2011 the total budget set aside to deliver employment programmes was 
GBP 2,432 million (EUR 2,739 million). However, the government announced cut 
backs and the budget was decreased by GBP 320 million (EUR 360 million). 
These savings resulted in a revised overall budget of GBP 2,112 million (EUR 
2,378 million) for 2010-2011 (Grayling, 2010).  
 
Owing to the economic crisis Jobcentre Plus expanded the RRS and has worked 
closely with employers who announce redundancy. In the financial year 
2008/2009 an additional GBP 3 million (EUR 3.38 million) was available for the 
RRS to support the expansion of the service. In total there was GBP 6 million 
(EUR 6.76 million) available for RRS in 2008/2009. A further investment of GBP 6 
million (EUR 6.76) was also available for the next financial year bringing the RRS 
total budget for 2009/2010 to GBP 12 million (EUR 13.52 million) (Groves, 2009). 
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In March 2009, the former Chief executive of Jobcentre Plus argued, in a letter to 
the House of Commons, that the additional funds for 2008/2009 were already 
available for direct support to individuals’ redundancy rather than for recruiting 
extra Jobcentre Plus staffing and added that Jobcentre Plus delivers the RRS in 
partnership with other local agencies, for example, the Learning and Skills 
Council. He pointed out that the RRS was designed to ensure that support which 
individuals need in a specific situation, but cannot be sourced from partners’ 
existing programmes, is delivered. The Rapid Response Managers in each 
Jobcentre Plus district have been financed from the resources for extra staff 
announced for Jobcentre Plus in the Pre-Budget Report, rather than from the 
additional funds for the RRS. The additional funding for the RRS has been 
equally been allocated between each region and a similar amount is held 
centrally in a contingency fund for those who need to call on any extra funds.56 
The intention is to retain the RRS in its current form for the 2010-2011 financial 
years. However, in common with all departmental programmes, the longer term 
future of the service will be considered as part of the forthcoming 
comprehensive spending review (Grayling, 2010). 
 
The Response to Redundancy Programme (R2R) is part of a package of 
measures in response to the economic downturn and the Skills Funding Agency 
has GBP 100 million to support workers affected by redundancy; GBP 50 million 
(EUR 56.33 million) has been made available from the European Social Fund and 
GBP 50 million (EUR 56.33) through the Train to Gain budget. The total amount 
of GBP 100 million (EUR 112.64 million) was available from April 2009 until 
March 2011 (Skills Funding Agency, 2010a). The representative of the Skills 
Funding Agency mentioned in the interview that ‘the national R2R programme 
was received very well and the number of persons we have helped has been 
significant’. The Skills Funding Agency has the intention of replacing the R2R 
programme with another European Social Funded Programme.  
 
4.5 Responsibility, coordination, and delivery  
 
4.5.1 Associations 
Traditionally, the system of industrial relations in the UK consists of voluntary 
relationships between social partners, with a minimal level of interference from 
the government. Although, this relationship without intervention of the state is 
still the case in the non-legally binding nature of collective agreements and by 
the fact that trade unions and employers have little statutory involvement in 
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public policy, legally established employment rights would now appear to be a 
permanent characteristic of the UK system. The collective agreements are not 
legally binding, but the terms of collective agreements could be incorporated 
into individual contracts of employment that are then legally enforceable. An 
important feature of the UK is single-employer bargaining (Traxler, 1996). Since 
the 1950s, multi-employer bargaining has declined. This decline accelerated in 
the 1980s, as multi-employer agreements were replaced by single employer or, 
in some cases, plant-level contracts (Katz, 1993). 
 
The Trade Union Congress (TUC) is the national trade union confederation with 
58 affiliated unions representing nearly seven million employees. In response to 
the current crisis, the trade unions called for greater state intervention in order 
to combat the increasing unemployment rates. In their view, the government 
should play a more active role in promoting the role of unions in collective 
bargaining (Eurofound, 2009; TUC, 2010b). As previously explained, employers 
have special obligations if they want to dismiss twenty or more workers. This 
includes consulting representatives of the workplace. 
 
According to the TUC respondent, the role of trade unions in the redundancy 
process is concentrated on negotiating the best deal for the workers who are 
being made redundant. It tends to focus on trying to stop the redundancy 
happening in the first place and, if that is inevitable, most unions will campaign 
strongly for no compulsory redundancy and for a voluntary severance package 
to be put in place, to encourage those who wish to leave to go first (TUC, 2009c). 
The trade unions focus on redundancy pay; obtaining something better than the 
statutory minimum. During the last recession, there were many negotiations 
about pay restraints in return for job security. Especially in the manufacturing 
sector, many unions agreed to a pay freeze in return for no redundancies. In the 
past, there was talk about unions offering support for redundant people in 
getting new jobs, but the TUC respondent mentioned that he had not seen a lot 
of that actually taking place. What has been more common is that trade unions 
signpost and make sure that their members are aware of the RRS. As of the start 
of the current recession, the TUC recommended the improvement of the RRS. 
They argued that the Jobcentre Plus RRS was marketed only as a service to 
employers, while they believed that it could play a much stronger role in helping 
redundant employees who have not yet became unemployed (TUC, 2009a). 
They advised the government that Jobcentre Plus should offer advice and 
immediate access to benefit entitlements and advice on where job opportunities 
are still available. Furthermore, Jobcentre Plus should inform the claimants 
which skills and qualifications offer the best route to employment and help them 
in applying for jobs. Therefore, the TUC was tremendously pleased with the 
Government’s decision to expand the Rapid Response Service in 2008.  
Another interviewee confirms the TUC respondents’ view. He said that trade 
union’s first objective is to prevent the job transition in the first place and the 
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transition bid would be the second best solution for them. The role of trade 
unions is to press the government for intervention. They lobby for retraining 
initiatives and strong government support for the unemployed. 
 
The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) is the employers’ confederation. CBI 
represents about 3,000 individual companies, mostly large companies in the 
private sector, and around 150 trade associations. The British industry relations 
are decentralized and the role of employers’ organisations in the country’s 
industrial relations in the UK is not overtly prominent. During the 1980s, national 
sectoral level agreements ceased to function and companies began to negotiate 
with trade unions at a lower level (Eurofound, 2009). The CBI proposed, in the 
summer of 2009, an Alternative to Redundancy Scheme (ATR). The proposal 
was an alternative to the short-time working schemes that were adopted in 
many other European countries. The CBI explained that businesses in the UK 
experienced very similar challenges at the height of the recession, needing to 
reduce labour costs sharply as demand had fallen, but wanting to retain highly 
valued, and often highly skilled employees. A formal short-time working 
compensation scheme would have been one option, but the CBI representative 
mentioned that after reviewing the evidence, the CBI decided this could pose 
significant costs to government with no guarantee of success. The experience 
from the only formal scheme the UK has had – in the late 1970s/early 1980s – 
was that, as soon as compensation was withdrawn, many jobs were lost. The 
effect was merely to delay job losses rather than to avoid them altogether. With 
this in mind, the CBI felt that the ATR scheme would offer a cost effective and 
likely more successful alternative, allowing employers, employees, and 
government to share the burden of cost, while avoiding any possibility of 
propping up failing industries. In the proposed approach, the employer could 
place the employee on the scheme for up to six months instead of making the 
worker redundant. Contracts of employment would remain in force. The 
employee would be paid an ATR allowance to the equivalent of Jobseeker’s 
allowance (JSA) paid by the government. An employer could make higher 
payments should they wish to do so (CBI, 2009). Not all parties were in favour of 
the ATR scheme. The TUC’s argument against the scheme was that it was not 
desirable that the employees did not work in the meantime. The TUC general 
secretary said: “It is better to keep people in work and training with their 
employer, even if on short term working, rather than sitting at home, which is 
why unions and other employer groups are campaigning for the kind of wage 
subsidies that now is common in the rest of Europe”.57 The CBI representative 
mentioned that as recession progressed, it became clear that unemployment 
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union’s first objective is to prevent the job transition in the first place and the 
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transition bid would be the second best solution for them. The role of trade 
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57  The Guardian, 6 July 2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/jul/06/cbi-redund 
ancy -scheme>, accessed 17 January 2011.
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was not going to reach the peaks that been forecast. The CBI’s experience was 
that firms have made wages and hours flexible, and made other changes to 
working patterns to reduce cost, rather than making redundancies. As it turned 
out, the government decided against adopting the ATR measure. However, the 
CBI still thinks that the ATR scheme would be useful in anticipation of similar 
recessionary periods in future, when demand falls so markedly and quickly. 
According to the CBI respondent, the trade unions have an advisory capacity for 
their members, but they have no formal role in supporting people from job-to-
job. He also points out that the role of the employers association is rather 
limited. The CBI interviewee concludes that, in the UK, predominantly individual 
large firms and the state are the ones that are supporting job-to-job transitions. 
Individual firms, mostly large companies, can outsource activities to private 
organisations which provide outplacement services. However, the company has 
to have a certain amount of financial means in order to use these kinds of 
services. A representative of an outplacement company argues that a normal 
HR-person does not have the time to really help redundant employees to find a 
new job. Another important motive for individual companies to outsource this 
job-to-job activity to an outplacement company is their reputation and a sense 
of corporate social responsibility.  
 
4.5.2 The state: Government and Public Employment Service 
The government has an important task in supporting people to find another job, 
once they are unemployed. Jobcentre Plus does the case management for the 
unemployed normally up to twelve months. After this first year the case 
management is the responsibility of the private sector and they are paid on a 
result basis by Jobcentre Plus. However, during the first twelve months 
Jobcentre Plus also refers people to private provisions. In 2002, the Benefit 
Agency and the Employment service merged. Around 1,500 Jobcentres and 
social security offices across the UK were modernised and merged into a new 
integrated service, Jobcentre Plus (House of Commons Committee of Public 
Accounts, 2008). In March 2009, 741 Jobcentre Plus offices were operational.  
 
Table 4.2: Jobcentre Plus offices as at 30 March 2009 (by region) 
 Customer Facing Jobcentres 
East of England 57 
East Midlands 53 
London 74 
North East 45 
North West 97 
Scotland 99 
South East 74 




West Midlands 63 
Yorkshire and the Humber 59 
Totals 741 
Source: Jobcentre Plus58  
 
The Jobcentre Plus respondent mentioned that approximately 92% of 
unemployed people find work in the first twelve months. As explained 
previously, the RRS of Jobcentre Plus goes one step further. They try to help 
redundant people once they have received their formal notice and information, 
but advice and guidance service can also be accessed before this time, although 
money can only be spent on training and support services (TUC, 2009b). With 
this early intervention Jobcentre Plus tries to prevent unemployment. 
Sometimes there are on-site 'jobshops,' and, in organisations with significant 
numbers working shifts, these have opened at times when Jobcentres and 
Jobcentre Plus offices will all be closed (TUC, 2009b). 
 
Besides Jobcentre Plus, other organisations are involved in the RRS. As 
mentioned previously in section 4.4, the RRS’ point of departure is a partnership 
approach. Usually, the former Learning and Skills Council (LSC) was represented 
in the RRS, particularly in large redundancies (TUC, 2009b). The LSC started 
their work in April 2001 and was a non-departmental public body funded by the 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and the Department for Children, 
Schools and Families. The main objective of LSC was to improve the skills of 
young people and adults to ensure the UK has a workforce of world-class 
standard. The LSC was planning and funding high quality education and training 
for everyone in England other than those in universities.59 The LSC had a 
national office, nine regional councils and 150 local partnership teams 
throughout the country. The local partnerships were covering the same areas as 
the 150 local authorities in England. The regional councils were led by employers 
(Learning and Skills Council, 2009). The LSC responded to the economic 
downturn by introducing new flexible measures to help employees update their 
skills and by providing support to those at risk of redundancy. The flexibility 
concerns the approach to make it more responsive to real needs and to improve 
and develop what is on offer to ensure that it remains relevant and attractive for 
both employers and employees. By joining up pre- and post-employment 
programmes it would be easier for people to continue their training after getting 
a job. These measures were developed all in close cooperation with the 
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w0029.htm>, accessed 17 January 2011.
59 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100104221519 and <http://www.lsc.gov. 




was not going to reach the peaks that been forecast. The CBI’s experience was 
that firms have made wages and hours flexible, and made other changes to 
working patterns to reduce cost, rather than making redundancies. As it turned 
out, the government decided against adopting the ATR measure. However, the 
CBI still thinks that the ATR scheme would be useful in anticipation of similar 
recessionary periods in future, when demand falls so markedly and quickly. 
According to the CBI respondent, the trade unions have an advisory capacity for 
their members, but they have no formal role in supporting people from job-to-
job. He also points out that the role of the employers association is rather 
limited. The CBI interviewee concludes that, in the UK, predominantly individual 
large firms and the state are the ones that are supporting job-to-job transitions. 
Individual firms, mostly large companies, can outsource activities to private 
organisations which provide outplacement services. However, the company has 
to have a certain amount of financial means in order to use these kinds of 
services. A representative of an outplacement company argues that a normal 
HR-person does not have the time to really help redundant employees to find a 
new job. Another important motive for individual companies to outsource this 
job-to-job activity to an outplacement company is their reputation and a sense 
of corporate social responsibility.  
 
4.5.2 The state: Government and Public Employment Service 
The government has an important task in supporting people to find another job, 
once they are unemployed. Jobcentre Plus does the case management for the 
unemployed normally up to twelve months. After this first year the case 
management is the responsibility of the private sector and they are paid on a 
result basis by Jobcentre Plus. However, during the first twelve months 
Jobcentre Plus also refers people to private provisions. In 2002, the Benefit 
Agency and the Employment service merged. Around 1,500 Jobcentres and 
social security offices across the UK were modernised and merged into a new 
integrated service, Jobcentre Plus (House of Commons Committee of Public 
Accounts, 2008). In March 2009, 741 Jobcentre Plus offices were operational.  
 
Table 4.2: Jobcentre Plus offices as at 30 March 2009 (by region) 
 Customer Facing Jobcentres 
East of England 57 
East Midlands 53 
London 74 
North East 45 
North West 97 
Scotland 99 
South East 74 




West Midlands 63 
Yorkshire and the Humber 59 
Totals 741 
Source: Jobcentre Plus58  
 
The Jobcentre Plus respondent mentioned that approximately 92% of 
unemployed people find work in the first twelve months. As explained 
previously, the RRS of Jobcentre Plus goes one step further. They try to help 
redundant people once they have received their formal notice and information, 
but advice and guidance service can also be accessed before this time, although 
money can only be spent on training and support services (TUC, 2009b). With 
this early intervention Jobcentre Plus tries to prevent unemployment. 
Sometimes there are on-site 'jobshops,' and, in organisations with significant 
numbers working shifts, these have opened at times when Jobcentres and 
Jobcentre Plus offices will all be closed (TUC, 2009b). 
 
Besides Jobcentre Plus, other organisations are involved in the RRS. As 
mentioned previously in section 4.4, the RRS’ point of departure is a partnership 
approach. Usually, the former Learning and Skills Council (LSC) was represented 
in the RRS, particularly in large redundancies (TUC, 2009b). The LSC started 
their work in April 2001 and was a non-departmental public body funded by the 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and the Department for Children, 
Schools and Families. The main objective of LSC was to improve the skills of 
young people and adults to ensure the UK has a workforce of world-class 
standard. The LSC was planning and funding high quality education and training 
for everyone in England other than those in universities.59 The LSC had a 
national office, nine regional councils and 150 local partnership teams 
throughout the country. The local partnerships were covering the same areas as 
the 150 local authorities in England. The regional councils were led by employers 
(Learning and Skills Council, 2009). The LSC responded to the economic 
downturn by introducing new flexible measures to help employees update their 
skills and by providing support to those at risk of redundancy. The flexibility 
concerns the approach to make it more responsive to real needs and to improve 
and develop what is on offer to ensure that it remains relevant and attractive for 
both employers and employees. By joining up pre- and post-employment 
programmes it would be easier for people to continue their training after getting 
a job. These measures were developed all in close cooperation with the 

58  <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090421/text/90421 
w0029.htm>, accessed 17 January 2011.
59 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100104221519 and <http://www.lsc.gov. 
uk/ aboutus/organisation/>, accessed 15 December 2010.
UNITED KINGDOM 
132 
Department for Work and Pensions and Jobcentre Plus (Learning and Skills 
Council, 2009). 
 
In March 2008, the White Paper ‘Raising Expectations: Enabling the System to 
Deliver’ was presented to the Parliament by the Secretary of State for Children, 
Schools and Families and the Secretary of State for Innovation, Universities and 
Skills, in which the abolition of the LSC and the introduction of its successor 
bodies were announced. In the light of the 2020 skills ambitions, the 
government wants to ensure that public funding for qualification and training 
deliver economically valuable skills: “And to do this, we must ensure that when 
employers and individuals go to colleges and training providers for solutions, 
what they get is the skills they really need, delivered in a way they need and to 
the highest standard” (Department for Children Schools and Families & Skills, 
2008). On 1 April 2010, the LSC was disbanded and the functions were transfer-
red to local authorities and two new agencies: The Young People’s Learning 
Agency and the Skills Funding Agency. The first successor organisation is funded 
by the Department of Education and their mission is to deliver training and 
education to all 16-19 year olds in England. 60 The second successor, the Skills 
Funding Agency, is funded by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 
and their mission is to ensure that people and companies can access the skills 
training they need and to regulate adult further education.61 
 
Usually, the Regional Development Agencies (RDA) are involved in the Rapid 
Response Service package, particularly in large scale redundancies (TUC, 
2009b). The first RDAs were established in 1999 and they are non-departmental 
public bodies. At this moment, there are nine RDAs and they have five statutory 
purposes62: 
1. To further economic development and regeneration; 
2. To promote business efficiency, investment and competitiveness; 
3. To promote employment; 
4. To enhance development and application of skill relevant to employment; 
5. To contribute to sustainable employment. 
 
The RDAs do also make an effort to ensure that skills training matches the needs 
of the labour market.63 However, in the June 2010 UK Budget Report, the new 
coalition government has announced the abolishment of these Regional 

60  <http://www.ypla.gov.uk/ retrieved>, accessed 15 December 2010.
61  <http://skillsfundingagency.bis.gov.uk/aboutus/ >, accessed 15 December 2010.
62  Regional Development Agency Act 1998, section 4.
63 <http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/regional-economic-development/englands-regional-
development-agencies>, accessed 15 December 2010.
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Development Agencies by 2012 and the government intends to replace them by 
strong Local Enterprise Partnerships (HM Treasury, 2010a). The abolition forms 
part of the governments’ deficit reduction plan. 
 
4.5.3 Market 
According to one of the interviewees the UK has one of the most open and 
liberal policies towards private recruitment agencies in Europe. The government 
places no restrictions on them and considers them as a complementary service. 
An interviewee from the Department of Work and Pensions mentioned that for 
certain niche sectors private agencies are often the best place for people to look 
for work. Jobcentre Plus has a broad variety of vacancies and, particularly in the 
latest recession, they had a broad variety of employers. They do get highly 
skilled vacancies placed with them but, for certain niche occupations, Jobcentre 
Plus encourage people to send them to a private sector agency. Also, sometimes 
private agencies place vacancies with Jobcentre Plus. As discussed previously, 
the case management for unemployed people during the first twelve months 
lies with Jobcentre Plus and after this year the responsibility is handed over to 
the private sector. In these first twelve months, the customer is given job search 
support and access to other services. Jobcentre Plus can refer unemployed 
people to private provisions if that is necessary to help them to understand their 
options and, for example, to build and maintain the customer’s confidence and 
motivation. Over the last ten years, the state has gradually outsourced job 
search activities and training to a mixture of public and private providers. 
 
4.5.4 Hierarchy  
Several interviewees mentioned in the interviews, held in 2010, that British 
companies give preference to labour hoarding over dismissing employees in the 
current crisis. Labour hoarding is defined as the practice of keeping more 
workers on the payroll than are necessary for the current output. However, 
recent research conducted by CIPD and KMPG revealed that the number of 
organisations which are confronted with redundancies has arisen. In spring 2011, 
56% of the public sector employers were planning to make redundancies (almost 
40% in 2010) and around three in ten private sector firms intended to make 
redundancies (around 25% in 2010). Almost seven percent of the employees 
would be made redundant among those companies that were planning cuts in 
the workforce, and 65% of redundancies were expected to be compulsory (CIPD 
& KPMG, 2011). As already explained in section 4.2.2, the institutional setting 
requires that if a company intends to make an employee redundant, the 
company must consider whether there are other jobs available which the 
redundant employee would be capable of doing. The dismissal is regarded as 
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Development Agencies by 2012 and the government intends to replace them by 
strong Local Enterprise Partnerships (HM Treasury, 2010a). The abolition forms 
part of the governments’ deficit reduction plan. 
 
4.5.3 Market 
According to one of the interviewees the UK has one of the most open and 
liberal policies towards private recruitment agencies in Europe. The government 
places no restrictions on them and considers them as a complementary service. 
An interviewee from the Department of Work and Pensions mentioned that for 
certain niche sectors private agencies are often the best place for people to look 
for work. Jobcentre Plus has a broad variety of vacancies and, particularly in the 
latest recession, they had a broad variety of employers. They do get highly 
skilled vacancies placed with them but, for certain niche occupations, Jobcentre 
Plus encourage people to send them to a private sector agency. Also, sometimes 
private agencies place vacancies with Jobcentre Plus. As discussed previously, 
the case management for unemployed people during the first twelve months 
lies with Jobcentre Plus and after this year the responsibility is handed over to 
the private sector. In these first twelve months, the customer is given job search 
support and access to other services. Jobcentre Plus can refer unemployed 
people to private provisions if that is necessary to help them to understand their 
options and, for example, to build and maintain the customer’s confidence and 
motivation. Over the last ten years, the state has gradually outsourced job 
search activities and training to a mixture of public and private providers. 
 
4.5.4 Hierarchy  
Several interviewees mentioned in the interviews, held in 2010, that British 
companies give preference to labour hoarding over dismissing employees in the 
current crisis. Labour hoarding is defined as the practice of keeping more 
workers on the payroll than are necessary for the current output. However, 
recent research conducted by CIPD and KMPG revealed that the number of 
organisations which are confronted with redundancies has arisen. In spring 2011, 
56% of the public sector employers were planning to make redundancies (almost 
40% in 2010) and around three in ten private sector firms intended to make 
redundancies (around 25% in 2010). Almost seven percent of the employees 
would be made redundant among those companies that were planning cuts in 
the workforce, and 65% of redundancies were expected to be compulsory (CIPD 
& KPMG, 2011). As already explained in section 4.2.2, the institutional setting 
requires that if a company intends to make an employee redundant, the 
company must consider whether there are other jobs available which the 
redundant employee would be capable of doing. The dismissal is regarded as 
unfair if there is a suitable job available, but the employer does not offer it to the 
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redundant employee. In that case the employee can make a claim to an 
employment tribunal. If an employee unreasonably refuses a suitable alternative 
job offer, the law removes the entitlement to have statutory redundancy pay.64  
 
Companies who have enough financial means can hire outplacement companies 
to support redundant workers to a job in another company. According to one of 
the interviewees, the outplacement industry has increased in the UK. Nowadays 
providing outplacement support to exiting employees has become standard 
business practice for many firms. A survey by Reed Consulting reveals that more 
than half of the respondents answered that support had been offered for at least 
85% of those separated from the organisation. Furthermore, the survey asked 
employers how they provided employment support: 81% of employers engage 
help from external outplacement providers for some part of outplacement, 
whilst 50% use solely external outplacement companies (Reed Consulting, 
2006). Human Capital Consultancy HDA has delivered outplacement services 
across the UK and internationally for over 30 years and conducts an annual 
outplacement survey. Key findings of the 2009 HDA outplacement survey, in 
which more than 100 companies participated, are:  
 90% of the organisations surveyed have been affected by the current 
economic climate, citing ‘decreasing revenue, downsizing, cutbacks…’  
 Of those organisations that have experienced a restructuring in the last 
twelve months, the majority (90%) offered outplacement support to 
employees.  
 Nearly 70% of respondents offer outplacement support to maintain staff 
morale or to assist leavers in securing roles.  
 According to 90% of the respondents outplacement support provides value 
for money and fosters positive post-employment relations.  
 The most important considerations for organisations to choose an 
outplacement provider are: consultant experience, value for money, ability to 
support managers, staff at all levels, innovative and flexible programmes 
(HDA, 2009).  
 
An interviewee mentioned that outplacement companies have evolved in the 
last years and they counsel generally senior people who have been made 
redundant. These companies charge the company a lump sump amount to 
counsel these, mostly high skilled, employees, e.g. through personal coaching. A 
representative of an outplacement agency said in the interview: “in the last years 
our company has experienced that it is harder to win work at the lower levels, 
unless you are really doing it at very low prices. In the crisis, companies have less 
money to spend on outplacement and why should they pay for services that also 
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have been provided by the government?” The interviewee further adds that it 
seems that the outplacement company prefers professional career consultations 
and coaching and believes that if Jobcentre Plus provided a very good service at 
the middle level then companies would probably stop spending money at 
private outplacement companies.  
 
Recruiting companies work in a different way. They provide free services for 
candidates looking for work. For example, a candidate who comes to register at 
recruitment agency Randstad – a temporary work agency of Dutch origin - can 
get advice and Randstad would not make any charge for that. When the 
candidate finds another job via Randstad, the new employer pays a fee for the 
recruitment services. Randstad also goes onto the company’s premises and offers 
redundant employees support in looking for work. While other outplacement 
companies charge the company for the outplacement service, the interviewee of 
Randstad argues that they would not make any charge for that service, until the 
candidate has been placed in a job with another employer. The new employer will 
be charged for the recruitment service. The Randstad respondent’s view is that it 
would be unethical to go and speak to redundant workers and then charge the 
company that has to let go a part of their skilled staff.  
 
In 2009, Randstad introduced a new service for companies to enable them to 
reduce costs without having to cut headcount. As a result of the economic crisis, 
companies had to cut costs, but they do not want to lose skilled employees. The 
Randstad offsetting service offers companies the opportunity to offset 
employees. This means that Randstad is attempting to find a suitable alternative 
job with other local employers and pays the hourly rate for the job undertaken, 
so that the company who has to save costs can offset this against the 
employee’s normal salary. The employee maintains his position with the 
employer and the offsetting period could be from one week to ten months. With 
this solution the employee would go through the normal redundancy consult-
ation process, but would be offered the offsetting alternative as a way of staying 
in the employment of the company (Randstad, 2009). Particularly for small 
business this could be an interesting solution to survive in a downturn, when 
difficult decisions need to be made about reducing costs, while they do not want 
to lose their best employees of the team. The company still pays the national 
insurances and other contracted benefits, but in return for this offsetting service 
they will have no redundancy costs or outplacement costs and in future when 
the economy has recovered, they will not have recruitment costs, because the 
skilled employee is still a member of the workforce. 
Randstad states that the offsetting service goes beyond the CBI’s Alternative to 
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The interviewees are not aware of existing networks of companies that 
collaborate to enhance job-to-job transitions for those whose jobs are at risk. 
Several respondents mentioned that if there are any networks, their existence 
would be pretty ad hoc in the UK labour market. Some employers recruit 
employees who have been made redundant in another company. But this is not 
organised in a structural way and happens naturally. For instance, Woolworth’s 
shops closed down in December 2008, while other retail companies, such as 
Wilkinson’s, expanded. What tended to happen was that employees who had 
been made redundant were made aware that a new retail store was actually 
opening up in the local area and, according to one of the interviewees, they even 
used the same shops. However, the RRS can also be seen as a network. In this 
partnership approach a pluriformity of many different actors participates. The 
RRS network on a local level consists of more different organisations rather than 
solely employers. Each redundancy process will be different and the 
constellation of the parties involved can vary. Representatives of Jobcentre Plus, 
the employer(s), Trade Unions, outplacement companies, local authorities, 
Regional Development Agency, Learning and Skills Council/Skills Funding 
Agency, Chamber of Commerce can be involved. This list is not exhaustive and it 
depends on the local circumstances as to which parties will be involved (TUC, 
2009b). As mentioned previously, since 2009, the insolvency trade body R3 and 
the Insolvency Service have collaborated with Jobcentre Plus to share 
information about possible job losses so that early intervention can take place.  
 
In one of the interviews the NHS job service was mentioned. NHS is the National 
Health Service employers’ organisation. The NHS job service was introduced in 
2003 and is an electronic recruitment service. NHS employers place vacancies 
online and job seekers can look via this online service for available jobs. 
Currently, all NHS Trusts make use of NHS Jobs (NHS, 2010). The NHS job 
service can be regarded as a network of job opportunities rather than a network 
of employers in the health sector.  
 
Local Employment Partnership (LEP) 
In 2007, the British government proposed, in the green paper ‘In work, better 
off’, to collaborate with employers to open up opportunities for the long-term 
unemployed (Department for Work and Pensions, 2007; TUC, 2008). The 
government stated in this green paper that they ‘would like employers to 
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consider disadvantaged customers for their vacancies and in return they will get 
help in identifying and preparing the right people for those vacancies. This might 
mean committing to work trials; providing suitable induction and technical 
training for individuals without the appropriate work experience; and 
considering employee mentoring’ (Department for Work and Pensions, 2007). 
The Local Employment Partnerships (LEP) were introduced in 2007. In 2009, the 
government expanded the LEPs between Jobcentres and local employers to 
respond to the challenges from the economic slowdown (Department for Work 
and Pensions, 2009a). Alongside the original target group of those with great 
barriers to entering the labour market, the LEP currently also includes the newly 
unemployed. Through these local partnerships Jobcentre Plus can introduce 
unemployed people to the local employers who might not otherwise get an 
interview. Jobcentre Plus can offer services to employers based on their needs. 
Until December 2009, the LEPs helped more than 430,000 persons into work. 
Furthermore, the original target of 250,000 jobs achieved through LEP was 




Another type of network is a Task Force. One of the interviewees mentioned the 
MG Rover case. Two Task Forces were set up in the West Midlands region to deal 
with closures and redundancies at Rover. Task Forces are set up to work on a 
single defined task or activity in a time limited way. The first Rover Task Force 
was set up in 2000 at the time when BMW divested itself of most of Rover and 
split the company up (Bentley, Bailey, & Ruyter, 2009). In 2005, MG Rover went 
into administration, with the loss of 6,300 jobs directly and the RDA, Advantage 
West Midlands (AWM) and the national government set up a new Rover Task 
Force. The AWM took the lead and different organisations and agencies were 
included in the Task Force: the department of Trade and Industry, local mem-
bers of parliament, local authorities, Skills Agencies, employers’ organisations, 
employers, trade unions (Bentley et al., 2009). The government announced a 
GBP 156 million (EUR 175.86 million) package of support in 2005 (House of 
Commons, 2007). This amount was later increased to GBP 176 million (EUR 
198.40) through additional support of Advantage West Midlands and from 
Birmingham City Council (National Audit Office, 2006). 
 
Table 4.3: The closure of MG rover and the regional support package  
Nature of support Amount Sources 
Training for workers made 
redundant at MG Rover and 
suppliers 
Up to GBP 50 million (EUR 
56.40 million) 
Department of Trade 
and Industry, ESF, 
Learning and Skills 
Council 
Redundancy pay and 
compensation awards  
Over GBP 40 million (EUR 
45.12 million) 
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Nature of support Amount Sources 
Loans fund available to 
former MG Rover suppliers 
and dealers 
GBP 25 million (EUR 28.20 
million) 
Advantage Transition 
Bridge Fund was 
established. Funding 
was provided by 
Department of Trade 
and Industry and 
Advantage West 
Midlands 
Grant support to former MG 
rover suppliers 
GBP 41.6 million (EUR 
46.92 million) 
Advantage West 
Midlands and Rover 
Task Force 
Department of Trade 
and Industry 
Grants for technology and 
innovation infrastructure 
GBP 9 million (EUR 10.15 
million) 
Department Trade and 
Industry 
Measures to address 
community impact 




Total GBP million 176 (EUR 
198.40 million) 
 
Source: (National Audit Office, 2006) 
 
4.5.6 Responsibility for job-to-job transitions 
In the interviews the question was asked who would be responsible for job-to-
job transitions for those whose jobs are at risk. The opinions of the British 
interviewees differ on this matter. Some respondents state that the general view 
is that the employer that has to lay off employees is responsible. Other 
organisations argue that it is a joint responsibility and that each actor has its own 
task in the transition process to another job. A representative of Jobcentre Plus 
explains that the UK model is based on rights and responsibilities. Furthermore, 
it is about ensuring that individual jobseekers are aware of everything that is 
available to them, and then each agency should support their customers through 
their journey to make sure that they will get back to work. The idea is that 
support is provided and that the individual makes the right choices. Another 
respondent mentions that the basic skills training is a government responsibility, 
while for the intermediate and high skill level it is a function of the education 
sector or sometimes the employer. Furthermore, in his view the employee has to 
be motivated and is responsible in terms of taking advantage of job 
opportunities. The CBI interviewee mentioned that primarily, in the UK system 
the individual is responsible for their job search, supported by the state. The 
former employer has a responsibility with regard to redundancy pay. But he 
argues that, in essence, it is the responsibility of the individual and Jobcentres 
Plus. Another independent expert said that ideally, it should be partly the 
responsibility of all the actors and that it depends on the stage of the process 
who intervenes. In his view, some people might say that in a way it is the 
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responsibility of the individual to make sure that he is employable enough; that 
if the person were to lose his job then he could move on to another job. Another 
might say that an employer who is engaging a big redundancy programme 
should show some responsibility in helping the redundant workers to another 
job. He also argues that the state has a responsibility, but the problem is that it is 
not easy to assess the appropriate time to intervene, because if the state does so 
too early you might take away from the responsibility of the individuals and 
employers themselves.  
The representative of the Skill Funding Agency answered that the government, 
the Learning and Skills Council and Skills Funding Agency had chosen to spend 
the money of the European Social Fund and the Train to Gain programme on 
job-to-job transition support via the Response to Redundancy Programme. 
Because this was agreed, the Skills Funding Agency is now responsible for 
spending that money in a sensible way; spending it to deliver value for money. 
However, the Skills Funding Agency can only do that when employers allow the 
training providers in to work with their candidates.  
  
The current Coalition Government has set out an investment strategy for the 
further education system in which shared responsibility is a key principle. Skills 
are vital for Britain’s future and the government emphasizes that the employers 
and citizens must take greater responsibility for ensuring their own skills needs 
are met (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2010b). In the near 
future, bold changes are expected in skills policies. The government wants to 
abandon a culture of bureaucratic central planning and regulator control. In the 
past public funds have been absorbed by regulation rather than devoted to what 
learners want and employers need (Department for Business Innovation and 
Skills, 2010b). In the new system, funding support for low skilled people will be 
prioritized, while there will be an expectation that learners and employers will 
co-invest alongside Government in meeting the costs of intermediate and higher 




As described before in section 2.2, the UK employment rate in 2009 was 69.9%. 
This is slightly above the EU27 average. Compared with the other selected 
countries the UK has the lowest share of employees with a limited duration 
contract (5.7%). Table 4.4 shows that the number of redundancies peaked in the 
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Table 4.4: Redundancy levels and rates in the UK calendar quarters, 2005-2010 
  People Level (000s) Rate* 
2005 Q1 131 5.3 
  Q2 132 5.3 
  Q3 163 6.5 
  Q4 145 5.8 
2006 Q1 138 5.5 
  Q2 140 5.6 
  Q3 144 5.7 
  Q4 133 5.3 
2007 Q1 141 5.6 
  Q2 121 4.8 
  Q3 136 5.4 
  Q4 110 4.3 
2008 Q1 106 4.2 
  Q2 126 5.0 
  Q3 164 6.4 
  Q4 263 10.3 
2009 Q1 284 11.2 
  Q2 272 10.8 
  Q3 213 8.6 
  Q4 168 6.8 
2010 Q1 161 6.5 
  Q2 155 6.3 
  Q3 157 6.3 
Source: ONS Labour Force Survey 
*The redundancy rate is the ratio of the redundancy level for the given quarter to the number 
of employees in the previous quarter, multiplied by 1,000.  
 
In 2009, the Secretary of State was asked in the House of Commons debate, 
how the performance against objectives of the Jobcentre Plus RRS was 
measured. In a letter from Groves, the former CEO of Jobcentre Plus, dated 22 
April 2009, he answered that Jobcentre Plus has kept an administrative record of 
the number of employers who take up the RRS since the service was expanded 
in November 2008.66 Furthermore, he explained in this letter that Jobcentre Plus 
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does not attempt systematically to record other information, such as the 
numbers of employees who are given advice and support through RRS, or the 
job outcomes achieved for the former employees of particular employers, as to 
do so would be prohibitively expensive. Accordingly, information on the 
numbers of job outcomes achieved for people who access support through the 
RRS is not available. Groves also states that Jobcentre Plus does not record the 
numbers of people finding jobs during the delivery of RRS support. ‘The RRS is 
just one part of the overall service we provide to people who lose their jobs and 
need help to move back into work as quickly as possible’.67 
 
Between 2009 and 2010 Jobcentre Plus offered the RRS to more than 2,500 
diverse employers (Jobcentre Plus, 2010). Upon enquiry, it appeared that over 
5,000 employers have accepted RRS support since November 2008 and 
September 2010.  
Jobcentre Plus takes around 10,000 new vacancies every working day 
(Department for Work and Pensions, 2009a). These job opportunities, together 
with the advice and support provided through Jobcentre Plus, have the result 
that most of those who become unemployed can find another job quickly. On 
26th November 2008, in the House of Commons debate, a representative of the 
government who spoke on behalf of the Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions, said that over half of new claimants leave jobseeker’s allowance within 
three months and around three quarters leave within six months.68 These figures 
still hold true for the following year. Between 2009 and 2010 Jobcentre Plus 
received 4 million new Jobseeker’s Allowance claims. This is an increase of 
600,000 compared with the previous year (Jobcentre Plus, 2010). During this 
period, around 50% of people ended their Jobseeker’s allowance claim after 
three months, around 75% after six months and around 90% after twelve 
months (Jobcentre Plus, 2010). 
 
In section 4.6.5, the MG Rover Task Force was discussed. The closure of MG 
Rover was one of the largest mass redundancy processes in British history, with 
the loss of 6,300 jobs. In 2008, The Coventry University Business School carried 
out a survey of 204 ex MG Rover workers. The main question was what had 
happened to the ex-MG Rover workers after the closure in 2005. Furthermore, 
in-depth interviews with 30 ex-workers and 30 local and regional practitioners 
and policy makers were conducted. The researchers concluded that, after three 
years, almost 90% of the ex-employees had found new employment and most 
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Table 4.4: Redundancy levels and rates in the UK calendar quarters, 2005-2010 
  People Level (000s) Rate* 
2005 Q1 131 5.3 
  Q2 132 5.3 
  Q3 163 6.5 
  Q4 145 5.8 
2006 Q1 138 5.5 
  Q2 140 5.6 
  Q3 144 5.7 
  Q4 133 5.3 
2007 Q1 141 5.6 
  Q2 121 4.8 
  Q3 136 5.4 
  Q4 110 4.3 
2008 Q1 106 4.2 
  Q2 126 5.0 
  Q3 164 6.4 
  Q4 263 10.3 
2009 Q1 284 11.2 
  Q2 272 10.8 
  Q3 213 8.6 
  Q4 168 6.8 
2010 Q1 161 6.5 
  Q2 155 6.3 
  Q3 157 6.3 
Source: ONS Labour Force Survey 
*The redundancy rate is the ratio of the redundancy level for the given quarter to the number 
of employees in the previous quarter, multiplied by 1,000.  
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does not attempt systematically to record other information, such as the 
numbers of employees who are given advice and support through RRS, or the 
job outcomes achieved for the former employees of particular employers, as to 
do so would be prohibitively expensive. Accordingly, information on the 
numbers of job outcomes achieved for people who access support through the 
RRS is not available. Groves also states that Jobcentre Plus does not record the 
numbers of people finding jobs during the delivery of RRS support. ‘The RRS is 
just one part of the overall service we provide to people who lose their jobs and 
need help to move back into work as quickly as possible’.67 
 
Between 2009 and 2010 Jobcentre Plus offered the RRS to more than 2,500 
diverse employers (Jobcentre Plus, 2010). Upon enquiry, it appeared that over 
5,000 employers have accepted RRS support since November 2008 and 
September 2010.  
Jobcentre Plus takes around 10,000 new vacancies every working day 
(Department for Work and Pensions, 2009a). These job opportunities, together 
with the advice and support provided through Jobcentre Plus, have the result 
that most of those who become unemployed can find another job quickly. On 
26th November 2008, in the House of Commons debate, a representative of the 
government who spoke on behalf of the Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions, said that over half of new claimants leave jobseeker’s allowance within 
three months and around three quarters leave within six months.68 These figures 
still hold true for the following year. Between 2009 and 2010 Jobcentre Plus 
received 4 million new Jobseeker’s Allowance claims. This is an increase of 
600,000 compared with the previous year (Jobcentre Plus, 2010). During this 
period, around 50% of people ended their Jobseeker’s allowance claim after 
three months, around 75% after six months and around 90% after twelve 
months (Jobcentre Plus, 2010). 
 
In section 4.6.5, the MG Rover Task Force was discussed. The closure of MG 
Rover was one of the largest mass redundancy processes in British history, with 
the loss of 6,300 jobs. In 2008, The Coventry University Business School carried 
out a survey of 204 ex MG Rover workers. The main question was what had 
happened to the ex-MG Rover workers after the closure in 2005. Furthermore, 
in-depth interviews with 30 ex-workers and 30 local and regional practitioners 
and policy makers were conducted. The researchers concluded that, after three 
years, almost 90% of the ex-employees had found new employment and most 
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of them were in permanent jobs. However, despite all the help on offer for the 
ex-workers in finding another job, 70 percent said they had found a new job 
through their own initiative or through personal contacts rather than via formal 
channels (Bentley et al., 2009). The forced transition to another job resulted in 
significant income loss for most workers, with average pay falling by GBP 5,640 
(EUR 6,355) per year (Bailey et al., 2009). The researchers concluded that ‘judged 
against national levels, it does appear that the ex-Rover workers moved into jobs 
with lower levels of autonomy, challenge and skill use and fewer opportunities 
for progression than other workers in the UK’ (Bailey et al., 2009).  
 
In 2010, the Department for Work and Pensions commissioned research in order 
to monitor satisfaction with Jobcentre service delivery. The study includes all 
services delivered by the Jobcentre and is not specifically focussed on job-to-job 
support. Overall, respondents are satisfied with the services offered. 88% were 
satisfied, with 34% saying that they were very satisfied. 10% of the respondents 
were dissatisfied (Howat & Pickering, 2011). Customers actively looking for work 
appreciated the proactive role of the advisers, meaning that they suggested 
different types of work other than that which the customers were interested in. 
However, advisers suggesting jobs that respondents felt were unsuitable for 
them resulted in dissatisfaction. Thus, it is important that advisers have a clear 
understanding of which jobs fit the customers needs and skills (Howat & 
Pickering, 2011). 
 
4.7 Success and failure factors 
 
The interviewees were asked to name the success and failure factors of the UK 
system. One of the interviewees suggested that, in the UK system, there are not 
many constraints on the speed with which employers can make people 
redundant. Because of this, British employers are, compared with other foreign 
companies, more likely to take on people and this creates more opportunities for 
the unemployed. However, a shorter legal redundancy process may mean that 
employers spend less time in thinking about possible job-to-job transitions. In 
his view, there are no particular barriers that prevent employers from supporting 
job-to-job transitions, but the interviewee adds that voluntariness is both the 
weakness and strength of the UK system. Employers have wide freedom to 
support job-to-job transitions, but that may be precisely nothing in practice. 
Compared with other countries the UK system is geared around making it easier 
to dismiss people and then having appropriate forms of public intervention for 
people once they are unemployed, so that they get back into another job. 
According to a British expert ‘there is not a great deal of emphasis on job-to-job 
transitions in the UK’. A representative of a British employers’ organisation 
mentioned that in response to the crisis employees have shown themselves 
willing to maintain employment above other issues. This has resulted in more 
flexibility from both employers and employees to avoid redundancy, e.g. 
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through wage constraints and acceptance of temporary reduction in working 
hours. This view has been confirmed by another interviewee, who says that the 
crisis in the UK has been associated more with recruitment cutbacks than 
redundancies: ‘Employers and employees have been sharing the costs of 
adjustment, but it also means that there are somewhat fewer jobs vacancies that 
might otherwise be the case’.  
 
Early intervention and early access to relevant support is a success factor for job-
to job transitions, according to several respondents. This is why several 
interviewees, including the TUC, are satisfied with the establishment and 
expansion of the Jobcentre RRS and the more flexible approach. In the UK it is 
now possible for people to get more advice or more intensive support earlier in 
their claim. The representative of Jobcentre Plus adds that, for a successful 
transition service, ‘you need to have the right groups of agents around the table, 
without those it does not work’. Therefore, a relevant network is very important. 
This is also confirmed by a representative of a staffing and recruiting agency. 
This company informed companies in their informal network that they had to lay 
off some employees and that they were looking for other jobs. This resulted in 
short-term and long-term contracts with other employers. Another success 
factor mentioned by one of the interviewees is a good relationship between 
managers of a company and staff of the local Jobcentre Plus offices. This is in 
line with the previous mentioned success factor. Furthermore, it is important 
that managers take the initiative to visit local Jobcentres or invite Jobcentre Plus 
staff into the company.  
 
Several interviewees commented that it is important that employees invest in 
their skills. An employer representative mentioned that people have to be 
encouraged to invest in their skills to be attractive for employers. The view of 
another interviewee is that “it is all about having the right skills for the job that 
you know you are going to be in”. This means that those organisations who 
support job-to-job transfers must understand the demands of the new 
employers, including the culture within these businesses. In the vast majority of 
business sectors, including the health sector, National Vocational Qualifications 
(NVQ) are available and helpful to prepare employees for their next step. These 
NVQs are work-related qualifications and give employees the skills employers 
are looking for. Related to the up-skilling and re-skilling of people, an 
interviewee adds the following: ‘I think we do a lot of work on the skills, but I 
think when you work in the industry and recruit people you largely depend on 
behaviours. You can teach people skills, but by taking candidates with the right 
behaviour that fits within the company, and teaching them the skills that they 
will need in the new business, that puts them in a very strong position’. 
 
In the UK lessons have been learned from the MG Rover case. The findings of the 
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through wage constraints and acceptance of temporary reduction in working 
hours. This view has been confirmed by another interviewee, who says that the 
crisis in the UK has been associated more with recruitment cutbacks than 
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adjustment, but it also means that there are somewhat fewer jobs vacancies that 
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off some employees and that they were looking for other jobs. This resulted in 
short-term and long-term contracts with other employers. Another success 
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their skills. An employer representative mentioned that people have to be 
encouraged to invest in their skills to be attractive for employers. The view of 
another interviewee is that “it is all about having the right skills for the job that 
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and understand better what support is available. Information was in fact 
available to those being made redundant, but the employees losing their jobs, 
especially on the scale of the MG Rover closure, were in shock. They needed help 
in understanding the information. The researchers argue that a more tailored 
approach to workers is needed, not only professionally, but also psychologically. 
While there was a speedy response to the crisis, the interviews with the ex-
workers suggested that there is a need to be more sensitive to people who have 
never been unemployed and do not know how to make claims for benefit or 
search for jobs. There is also a need to help people feel that it is not their fault 
that they have become unemployed (Bailey et al., 2009; Bentley et al., 2009). 
The researchers of the Coventry University Business School note that the British 
government wanted to be seen to be doing something about the impact of the 
MG Rover closure by setting up a Task Force, because of its ‘iconic status and 
also because of timing-during the 2005 General Election’ (Bentley et al., 2009). 
Although the researchers claim that the MG Rover Task Force was largely 
successful in displaying effective governance, they suggest that the Task Force 
failed in one important respect, in terms of gaining legitimacy for its role. 
Despite the wide range of help available, take up was variable. Surprisingly few 
workers felt adequately supported by government (Bailey et al., 2009; Bentley et 
al., 2009). 
 
4.8 Concluding remarks 
 
In the British job-to-job model for employees who lose their jobs because of 
redundancy, the state and individual companies play the most significant role in 
supporting people into another job as quickly as possible.  
 
In general the liberal welfare regime is characterized by a central role for the 
market and a marginal role for the state, but economic downturns have urged 
the British government to intervene. Therefore, the state is currently involved in 
providing job-to-job support through the Jobcentre Plus RRS. In 2001, in the 
light of closures of big companies which resulted in the loss of many jobs, the 
Job Transition Service, was implemented. In response to the global crisis in 2008, 
the Department of Work and Pensions expanded the RRS. Furthermore, the 
Department of Business, Innovation and Skills co-financed the Skills Funding 
Agency’s Response to Redundancy Programme (R2R) for those under 
consultation or notice of redundancy. The aim of the R2R-programme is to 
deliver skills needed by recruiting companies by providing vocational training. 
Ideally, the Skills Funding Agency and the Jobcentre Plus should deliver an 
Integrated Employment and Skills Service and offer complementary packages of 
flexible and responsive provision to meet the needs of Jobcentre Plus costumers 
and the employers in the local area. The state support has been made more 
flexible in the last years. In the past, Jobcentre Plus had a model which was very 
rigid in terms of help that could be provided for people at different times. The 
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longer people were unemployed, the more intense help they received. Jobcentre 
Plus is now moving to a more flexible approach in which people can access more 
help at an earlier stage.  
 
Providing outplacement support to employees who have to leave the company 
has become standard business practice for many, mostly large, companies. HR-
managers do not have the time to really help their redundant employees to a 
new job. Another motive to outsource this job-to-job activity to a private 
company is that companies do not want to damage their reputation. 
Outplacement companies tend to provide professional career coaching and 
counselling to the more senior level employees, whereas the lower skilled 
employees receive support from Jobcentre Plus. 
 
Networks of companies that collaborate to enhance job-to-job transitions are 
scarce. However, in the RRS and the LEPs, different actors cooperate closely and 
each redundancy process will have a different constellation of parties that are 
involved, depending on the local circumstances.  
 
As mentioned previously in this chapter, the role of associations in supporting 
redundant employees to another job is limited. This can be explained by the fact 
that trade unions concentrate on negotiating the best deal for the redundant 
employees. This tends to focus on trying to stop the redundancy happen in the 
first place. British employees are willing to maintain employment above other 
issues. This has resulted in more flexibility from both employers and employees 
to avoid redundancy, e.g. through wage constraints and acceptance of temporary 
reduction in working hours. In the event that forced dismissals are inevitable, 
most unions will campaign strongly for no compulsory redundancy and for a 
voluntary severance package to be put in place, rather than for active job-to-job 
support.  
The role of employer’s confederation CBI is also limited in the job-to-job process. 
This can be explained by an important feature of the UK: the lack of multi-
employer bargaining.  
 
The UK is characterized by relatively less stringent employment protection 
legislation. In contrast to other countries examined, it is in the UK relatively easy 
to dismiss employees. Because of this less strict employment protection 
regulation, British employers are more likely to hire people and this creates more 
employment opportunities for the unemployed. Moreover, the less stringent 
employment protection rules explain the high mobility rates in the UK. Thus, in 
the UK the policies and regulations are geared around making it easy to dismiss 
employees and having appropriate forms of public intervention to redundant 
employees once they are unemployed. 
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longer people were unemployed, the more intense help they received. Jobcentre 
Plus is now moving to a more flexible approach in which people can access more 
help at an earlier stage.  
 
Providing outplacement support to employees who have to leave the company 
has become standard business practice for many, mostly large, companies. HR-
managers do not have the time to really help their redundant employees to a 
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The conclusion can be drawn that the job-to-job transition system in the UK is not 
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a structural one. Programmes have been introduced and expanded by the 
government in response to the crisis, but these programmes do not have a 
structural funding. In the event of a redundancy, local partners are called together 
through the RRS to support those under notice to another job as quickly as 
possible. Another British approach to deal with large scale redundancies in a time 
limited way, is the set up of a Task Force, e.g. the MG Rover task force. 
 
One of the challenges for the British government is to build up good 
relationships with employers. Training and education should fit the employer’s 
demands. Recent initiatives such as the introduction of Local Employment 
Partnerships are a step forward. Policymakers should be aware of the motives 
and willingness of employers to invest in job-to-job transitions and training. For 
example, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills wanted to drive the 
joining up of pre-employment training and ongoing training in the workplace. 
Therefore, one of the requirements of the R2R programme was that training 
providers placed the candidates in sustainable jobs with ongoing training in the 
workplace in the first three months. According to the representative of the Skills 
Funding Agency, the reality was that employers do not want to invest in 
employees during their probation period. Many employers take on the 
employee for three months and at the end of these three months the probation 
period is over and the employee gets the full rights as everybody else who is 
employed in the company. The experience was that employers do not want to 
invest in people who might leave the company within three months and the 
government decided to drop the requirement that it has to be a job with training 
and just got back that it has to be a job that lasted at least four weeks. 
 
The current government intends to change the skills and education system. The 
strategy document from the Department for Business Innovation and Skills 
describes that for too long the skills system has been micromanaged from the 
centre, with Government setting skills targets that ought to be delivered, and 
with learners and colleges following funding rather than colleges responding to 
the needs of employers and the choices of learners. This government is also in 
favour of shared responsibility and expects that learners and employers will co-
invest in training courses and that they will take greater responsibility for 
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5  Austria 
 
In this chapter, the Austrian job-to-job arrangements will be discussed. Firstly, 
the Austrian context will be described. Attention will be paid to the political 
background, labour market features, and relevant law and legislation (section 
5.1). Secondly, the employment security system will be explored. The following 
features will be addressed: the type of support that is available to help people 
from job-to-job, the eligibility criteria, the financing of the system and the way 
the support is delivered and coordinated (sections 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5). In these 
sections, the job-to-job arrangements and the coordination mechanisms will be 
fleshed out and the motives for cooperating in the system will be explored. The 
performance of the Austrian system, the relevant preconditions for success, and 
the results for the actors involved will be elaborated in sections 5.6 and 5.7. 




5.1.1 Political background 
Between 1945 and 1955, Austria was under the occupation of the Allies (the 
Russians, French, British and Americans). After World War II, Austria was divided 
into five zones (one zone per occupier and Vienna, which was a joint zone of the 
occupiers). In 1955, Austria became a sovereign state and political stability 
occurred. Between 1945 and 1966, Austria was governed by a grand coalition of 
the two major parties: the Austrian People’s Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, 
ÖVP) and the Socialist Party of Austria (Sozialistische Partei Österreich, SPÖ69). In 
1966, the ÖVP won the elections and ruled alone during the following four years. 
Between 1970 and 1999, the SPÖ came back into office and ruled either alone or 
with junior coalitions. Although the SPÖ was the strongest party in the elections 
in 1999, they formed the opposition together with the Greens, while the ÖVP 
formed a coalition with the right-wing Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs FPÖ). The ÖVP won the elections in 2002 and, although the FPÖ lost 
more than half of its voters, the ÖVP renewed its coalition with FPÖ in 2003. 
SPÖ won the election in 2006 and led a coalition with the ÖVP, but the coalition 
collapsed because of disputes. In 2008, new elections were held and another 
grand coalition was formed between the SPÖ and ÖVP. The distribution of seats 
after this parliamentary election was as follows: 57 seats for the SPÖ, 51 for the 
ÖVP, 35 for the FPÖ, 20 for the Greens (Grüne) and 21 for BZÖ (Alliance future 

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Austria, Bündnis Zukunft Österreich).70 The popularity of right-wing political 
parties has grown since 2006 and resulted in the FPÖ receiving 18% of the votes 
in the 2008 elections. The former leader of the FPÖ, Joerg Haider, split from the 
party in 2005 and formed a new party: the Alliance future Austria (BZÖ). This 
party gained success in the 2008 elections with 10.7% of the votes. Shortly after 
the elections Haider died in a car accident.71 
 
5.1.2 Economic history and labour market features 
After World War II, the Austrian government nationalized Austria’s manufacturing, 
transportation and financial services and, after gaining independence in 1955, 
Austria has grown into one of the developed economies in Europe. Since the 
1950s, Austria has carried out a comprehensive structural change and has been 
transformed from an agrarian society into a well-developed industrial and service 
economy (WKO, 2009). In the late 1980s and 1990s, the government privatised 
sectors. Shares of nationalized companies were sold to private businesses. Today, 
Austria can be characterized as a highly developed industrialised country with a 
high standard of living. Two important events contributed to this development: 
the Austrian membership of the European Union in 1995 and the adoption of the 
Euro in 2002 (Thomas White Global Investing, 2008). Eastern countries that 
entered the European Union provided a boost for the economy and Austria is 
among the largest investors in neighbouring EU member states (OECD, 2007). 
 
In Austria, there is a distinction between the Federal Government and nine 
individual provinces (Bundesländer)72, in which the corporatist structure is well-
developed. In a corporatist structure there is close voluntary cooperation between 
employers’ and employees’ representatives and the state. Labour relations are 
based upon the principles of negotiation and co-operation, rather than 
confrontation. The so-called ‘social partners’ influence the decision making 
process of the government. The Austrian employers’ interests are represented 
by the Economic Chamber of Commerce (Wirtschaftskammer, WKO) and the 
Chamber of Agriculture (Landwirtschaftskammer, LK), while the employees are 
represented by the Chamber of Labour (Arbeiterkammer, AK) and the Industrial 
Trade Unions (Austrian federation of trade unions, Österreichische Gewerkschafts-
bund ÖGB). These organisations are part of many corporatists’ councils and 
committees and, in cases where these partners can present a united front, they 

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system.html>, accessed 21 March 2011.
71  <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3165.htm#econ>, accessed 21 March 2011.




have a lot of power which goes beyond consultation.73 According to WKO, the 
common goal of consensus is still one of Austria’s features in helping to create 
stable economic conditions and confidence in Austria as a business location 
(WKO, 2009). 
The economic downturn of 2008 led to a deep recession in Austria, but the 
unemployment rate is still one of the lowest in Europe (see table 2.5 in Chapter 
2). This could partly be explained by the crisis measures taken by the Austrian 
Government and individual employers. In section 5.5, these measures will be 
addressed further. The Austrian labour market participation in 2009 was 71.6%, 
which lay above the EU average (64.6%). Compared with the other countries 
examined, Austria had a lower participation rate than Sweden (72.2%) and the 
Netherlands (77%). In contrast to Sweden, the Austrian youth participation was 
relatively high (90%), while the Austrian employment rate of older people was 
the lowest (41.1%) of the selected countries in 2009. Furthermore, in Austria the 
percentage of employees with a limited duration contract in 2009 was 9.1%, 
while the EU average was 13.5%. Only the UK had a lower percentage of 
employees with a limited duration contract (5.7%).  
 
5.1.3 Legal framework of redundancy and unemployment insurance 
In Austria several acts apply when an employment contract is terminated on the 
initiative of the employer. The most important laws, which in the analytical 
framework of this study are elements of the institutional setting, are the Civil 
Code (Algemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, ABGB), the Labour Constitution Act 
(Arbeitsverfassungsgesetz) and the White-collar Workers Act (Angestelltengesetz, 
AngG). White-collar workers are individuals who are employed to carry out 
primarily commercial, senior non-commercial or office work. All other employees 
are considered blue-collar workers. One interviewee mentioned that the 
distinction has lost much of its former significance, because the rights have been 
aligned. However, there are still some slight differences in, e.g., notice periods. 
Most blue-collar workers are subject to the Industrial Code (Gewerbeordnung, 
GewO). In the case of collective dismissals the Labour Market Promotion Act 
(Arbeitsmarktförderungsgesetz) applies. The reform of the Austrian severance 
pay system and income security after dismissal will also be discussed in this 
section. 
 
Civil Code  
Besides termination of the employment contract by mutual consent, an 
individual contract can be terminated by the employer. There is a distinction 
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between ordinary dismissals with notice and immediate dismissal for good 
cause. In general, no grounds are required for termination of the contract 
(Kempen et al., 2008), but notice periods must be observed. Section 1162 of the 
Civil Code provides that an employment contract can be terminated for 
‘important reasons without notice’. 
 
White-collar Workers Act  
The White-collar Workers Act (Angestelltengesetz) regulates periods of notice for 
terminating an employment contract. In the event of termination of the 
employment contract on the initiative of the employer, a notice period of six 
weeks must be observed. The law extends the notice periods for longer periods 
of continuous employment.  
 
Table 5.1: Notice periods white-collar workers when the employment contract is 
terminated on initiative of the employer 
Period of continuously employment Notice period 
Less than 2 years 6 weeks 
2-5 years 2 months 
5-15 years 3 months 
15-25 years 4 months 
More than 25 years 5 months 
Source: section 20 White-collar workers act 
 
The notice period for blue-collar workers is in absence of any other agreement, 
14 days. 
 
Labour Constitution Act (Arbeitsverfassungsgesetz) 
As explained previously, no grounds or good reasons are required in the event of 
ordinary dismissal. However, notice can be contested in court as being socially 
unjustified or on the basis of certain employee activities, e.g. joining a trade 
union or a call-up for military service (section 105 Labour Constitution Act). 
Section 105 of the Labour Constitution Act regulates that the employer must 
inform and notify the works council of the intended termination. This procedure 
is required both for individual and collective dismissals. The works council has 
five working days to respond to the dismissal proposal.  
 
Labour Market Promotion Act (Arbeitsmarktförderungsgesetz, AMFG) 
In the event of a collective redundancy within a thirty-day period, the employer 
has to notify the regional office of the Public Employment Service (Arbeits-
marktservice, AMS). This is regulated in section 45a of the Labour Market 
Promotion Act (AMFG) and in line with the EU directive 98/59/EC. The 




 at least five employees in a company with more than 21 and less than 100 
employees; 
 at least five percent of the workforce in a company with 100 to 600 
employees; 
 at least 30 employees in companies with more than 600 employees; 
 at least five employees aged over 50. 
 
Public Employment Service Act (AMSG) 
In 1994, the Austrian labour market was reformed. The Public Employment 
Service Act (Arbeitsmarketservicegesetz) came into force on 1 July 1994. With this 
reform the Labour Market Administration Authority (Arbeitsmarktverwaltung, 
AMV) was outsourced from the Federal Ministry of Employment, Health und 
Social Affairs to become an employment service under public law. The Public 
Employment Service, AMS (Arbeitsmarktservice), was established. According to 
the Ministry the aims of the reform were: 
1.  to enable quick and flexible interventions in labour market developments 
through decentralisation of decision-making authority, more flexible use of 
resources and expanded terms of reference at regional level; 
2.  to relieve the public employment service of matters which do not belong to 
the core tasks of labour market policy (for example, parental leave benefits); 
3.  to achieve greater inclusion of representative bodies of employers (Economic 
Chamber, Federation of Austrian Industry) and of employees (Chamber of 
Labour, trade unions) in the decision-making structures and the implement-
ation of labour market policy; 
4.  to improve active labour market policy, in particular for people 
disadvantaged in the labour market (women, older workers, the long-term 
unemployed, people with disabilities and so forth); 
5.  to licence private placement agencies; 
6. to ensure control by the court of audit (Bundesministerium für wirtschaft und 
arbeit, 2005). 
 
Reform of the severance pay system (Abfertigung Neu) 
The reform of the severance pay system serves in policy documents as an 
interesting example of flexicurity (European Commission, 2006). Before this 
reform is discussed in more detail, an overview of the historical development of 
the Austrian severance pay will be provided. The first severance pay was 
introduced by the 1921 White-collar Workers Act (Angestelltengesetz) and 
applied only to white-collar employees. After 50 years, in 1979, the severance 
pay was extended to blue-collar workers in the Wage Earners’ Severance Pay Act 
(Arbeiterabfertungsgesetz) (Cardinale & Orszag, 2005). In the 1970s, another 
reform took place. Severance pay was available for those who left the company 
voluntarily under the precondition that the employee had worked for at least ten 
years in the company (Klec, 2007). During the 1990s, a reform of the old 
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4.  to improve active labour market policy, in particular for people 
disadvantaged in the labour market (women, older workers, the long-term 
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Reform of the severance pay system (Abfertigung Neu) 
The reform of the severance pay system serves in policy documents as an 
interesting example of flexicurity (European Commission, 2006). Before this 
reform is discussed in more detail, an overview of the historical development of 
the Austrian severance pay will be provided. The first severance pay was 
introduced by the 1921 White-collar Workers Act (Angestelltengesetz) and 
applied only to white-collar employees. After 50 years, in 1979, the severance 
pay was extended to blue-collar workers in the Wage Earners’ Severance Pay Act 
(Arbeiterabfertungsgesetz) (Cardinale & Orszag, 2005). In the 1970s, another 
reform took place. Severance pay was available for those who left the company 
voluntarily under the precondition that the employee had worked for at least ten 
years in the company (Klec, 2007). During the 1990s, a reform of the old 
severance pay system (Abfertigung Alt) was debated. The first argument for a 
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reform was the low coverage of the previous system. In the old system only one 
third of the workforce enjoyed entitlement to severance pay (Klec, 2007). The 
minimum precondition for qualifying for severance pay was that the 
employment relationship had lasted at least three years and was terminated by 
one of the following reasons: 
 Dismissal by the employer; 
 Termination by mutual agreement; 
 Expiration of the term of a fixed-term employment contract. 
 
The Austrian Federation of Trade Unions (ÖGB) wished to include employees 
who had not worked continuously for at least three years in one company. 
Another disadvantage of the old severance system was that employees who 
terminated their employment contract voluntarily, lost their entitlement to 
severance pay. Klec argues that this could reduce external mobility because 
employees, even those who could have found a better job elsewhere, frequently 
remained in the job in order not to lose their entitlement to severance pay (Klec, 
2007). Also the ÖGB was in favour of ending the loss of acquired rights in the 
event of voluntary resignation.  
 
From the employers’ perspective, the reform should lead to a reduction of 
severance costs. The level of the severance pay increased with the duration of 
the employment contract. After three years of service the entitlement was a two 
month’s severance pay, after 25 years of service the level was a twelve month’s 
pay. Employees who were declared redundant and were entitled to severance 
pay received the payment as a lump sum when the contract was terminated. 
This could lead to cash-flow difficulties or liquidity problems for firms who have 
to pay simultaneous severance payments, especially for SMEs (Klec, 2007). 
Several interviewees mentioned that the government expected that the reform 
also should contribute to the expansion of the underdeveloped second pension 

















Figure 5.1: Entitlements severance pay in the old system 
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From 1 January 2003, the old severance pay system (Abfertigung Alt) was 
reformed into a new system by the Betriebliches Mitarbeitervorsorgegesetz. The 
underlying goals of the new law, also referred to as Abfertigung Neu, are to 
enhance job mobility, to address liquidity problems, to extend severance pay 
entitlements and to expand the second pension pillar. The new law introduced a 
contribution based system of individual saving accounts. The direct payment of 
severance pay from employer to employee at the end of the employment 
contract was abolished and replaced by a monthly employers’ contribution of 
1.53% of employees’ gross wage in an employee provision fund (Mitarbeiter-
vorsorgekassen, MVKs). The collection of the severance pay contributions starts 
from the second month of the employment contract. Nine privately managed 
companies collect the monthly contributions and distribute the severance pay to 
those who become eligible (Klec, 2007). The following nine MVKs have been 
established and licensed by the public authorities: BAWAG Allianz 
Mitarbeitervorsorgekasse AG, APK-Mitarbeitervorsorgekasse AG, BUAK 
Mitarbeitervorsorgekasse GesmbH, BONUS Mitarbeitervorsorgekasse AG, 
Niederösterreichische Vorsorgekasse AG, ÖVK Vorsorgekasse AG, Siemens 
Mitarbeitervorsorgekasse AG, VBV Mitarbeitervorsorgekasse AG, Victoria 
Volksbanken Mitarbeitervorsorgekasse AG (Hofer, 2006). 
 
When an employment relationship is terminated the employees are entitled to 
the capital accumulated in their individual account. However, the value of the 
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severance pay is not guaranteed and depends on the return on investments. 
Furthermore, administration costs are deducted. In the event of dismissal or 
termination by mutual agreement, the severance pay can be left in the fund as a 
capital provision or be paid out as a lump sum. Two criteria have to be met in 
order to cash the severance pay: contributions must have been paid for at least 
three years by one or more employers, and the termination must not be on the 
initiative of the employee. If one of these conditions is not met, the severance 
pay stays in the fund and cannot be withdrawn or it will be moved to the new 
fund of the new employer (Rucksackprinzip). The severance pay will be paid out 
at the latest at the time of retirement. 
The new law applies to any employment relationship commencing on or after 1 
January 2003. There are three options for employment contracts already in place 
on this date. Employees can decide to stay with the old system, opt for a total 
transfer to the new system or choose a partial transfer to the new system. In 
practice, few contracts were transferred to the new system (Klec, 2007). This 
means that currently, in Austria, two different systems of severance pay are in 
place.  
 
Since the introduction of the new severance pay scheme, more employees are 
entitled to severance pay. In December 2008, about two thirds of employees 
were covered. A significant increase can be observed at the end of the year 2008. 
Hofer explains that this could be a result of the extension of the system. Since 
2008, self-employed persons are obliged to be included in the system and 
freelancers and farmers have been given the option of opting into the severance 
pay system voluntarily (Hofer, Schuh, & Walch, 2011). According to the second 
Austrian Reform Programme for Growth and Jobs 2008-2010, this amendment 
meant that 500,000 freelancers, self-employed persons and agricultural and 
forestry workers were also covered by the new severance pay system. 





Figure 5.2: Coverage new severance pay law 
 
 
Source: Hofer, Schuh, Walch, 2011 
 
Another interesting result of Hofers’ study is that in 2006 88% of all employees 
who had the option to withdraw money out of the system, did so. The objective 
of the government to extend a second pension pillar is currently not being met 
(Hofer et al., 2011). Several interviewees mentioned that an employee who 
withdraws the money out of the fund can spend the money on whatever the 
worker wants and this does not enhance the employability of the workers. 
 
The Unemployment Insurance Act  
In the event of becoming unemployed, the Unemployment Insurance Act 
(Arbeitslosenversicherungsgesetz, AlVG) provides regulations for income security. 
To be entitled to unemployment benefits (Arbeitslosengeld), the employee must 
be subject to compulsory health insurance (Krankenversicherung, KV). 
Furthermore, the applicant for the unemployment benefit should be able to 
work, available for job offers and willing to work. This latter requirement refers 
to the readiness of the unemployed person to take on an acceptable job offered 
by a regional AMS office (bmask, 2010).  Jobseekers who claim unemployment 
benefit for the first time, need to have been in unemployment insurance (UI) 
contributory employment for at least 52 weeks during the last two years. This 
period is reduced to one year for claimants who have received unemployment 
benefit (arbeitslosengeld) before, whereby the claimant must prove that he/she 
has worked for 28 weeks within the last year. Young people under the age of 25 
have only to prove 26 weeks of contributory employment within the last year 
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The duration of unemployment benefit depends on the period the person has 
been insured and his/her age, and has a duration of twenty weeks. Unemploy-
ment benefit duration is: 
 30 weeks in the event of 156 weeks of contributory employment within the 
preceding five years;  
 39 weeks in the event of 312 weeks of contributory employment within the 
preceding 10 years, if the unemployed person is at least 40 years of age ; 
 52 weeks in the event of 468 weeks of contributory employment within the 
preceding 15 years, if the unemployed person is at least 50 years of age.75  
The benefit duration can be extended if the unemployed person participates in 
an AMS retraining or up skilling programme. For participants in a labour 
foundation the unemployment benefit duration can be extended by a maximum 
of 156 weeks. If the person is aged 50 or over, or the training course lasts for a 
longer period, unemployment benefit can be extended by 209 weeks (bmask, 
2010). In section 5.2.1 the labour foundations will be further discussed. The level 
of the basic unemployment benefit is equivalent to 55% of the previous net 
earnings. Owing to family supplements and additional supplements, the actual 
rate was over 61% in 2009 (bmask, 2010). 
 
In September 2010, Austria replaced the social assistance regulations, which 
could differ in each land, by one federal means-tested system (Bedarfsorientierte 
mindestsicherung, BMS). This system guarantees, under certain circumstances, a 
standardized basic income in 2011 for a single person EUR 753 and, for (married) 
couples EUR 1,129.76 
Since 1 January 2008, employees with a non-standard employment contract are 
also compulsorarily insured under the unemployment insurance (section 4 of the 
General Insurance Act, ASVG). From 1 January 2009, self-employed persons 
have the possibility of voluntary opting in to the unemployment insurance 
(bmask, 2010).  
 
The OECD net replacement rates for Austria during the initial phase of 
unemployment are presented in table 5.2. This indicator refers to the income in 
the initial phase of unemployment relative to earnings when working. The 
replacement rate (RR) is an indicator for comparing benefit levels between 
countries. The OECD indicator measures the proportion of expected income 
from work which is replaced by unemployment and related welfare benefits.  
The earning level refers to the average of replacement rates for unemployed 
persons who earned 67% and 100% of average working earning at the time of 
losing their jobs.  
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Table 5.2: Net Replacement Rates Austria in percentages for six family types: initial 
phase of unemployment, 2009, by earning level of average wage 
 Family type 
Earning 
level 
























67% of AW 55 57 80 71 73 85 70 
100% of AW 55 56 77 67 69 81 68 
Source: OECD77 
 
5.2 Type of support to find work after redundancy  
 
5.2.1 Labour foundations (Arbeitsstiftung) 
In several interviews, the labour foundations (Arbeitsstiftungen) were mentioned 
as an instrument for supporting unemployed people in finding work after 
redundancy. In 1987, the privatization and down-sizing of nationalized steel 
companies led to large scale redundancies. It became clear that there would be 
no further legislation that would have allowed early retirement. Furthermore, 
there was an atmosphere of fear, helplessness and lack of personal perspective 
among the redundant workers. Against this background, the works council and 
the manager of the steel company launched a joint initiative. The first labour 
foundation, VOEST-Alpine Stahlstiftung, was established (Winter-Ebmer, 2001). 
The idea behind this Steel Foundation was that money and a social plan are 
valuable, but the best help is active support into another job. Therefore, the 
works council and the management of the steel companies negotiated about the 
organization and financial structure of the labour foundation. Already twelve 
companies were involved in the Steel Labour Foundation at the start in 1987. In 
1988, this number increased to 22 firms and in 1998, 58 firms participated 
(Winter-Ebmer, 2001). In September 2008, 71 companies were member of the 
VOEST-Alpine Stahlstiftung. Seven months later, in April 2009, this number 
increased to 83 companies and stabilized in January 2011 with 81 member 
companies.78 Today, the labour foundations are a common used labour market 
instrument in Austria. In all nine federal states (Bundesländer) and regions labour 
foundations are in place. 
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67% of AW 55 57 80 71 73 85 70 
100% of AW 55 56 77 67 69 81 68 
Source: OECD77 
 
5.2 Type of support to find work after redundancy  
 
5.2.1 L bour foundations (Arbeitsstiftung) 
In several interviews, the lab ur foundations (Arbeitsstiftungen) were mentioned 
as a  instrument for sup orting unemployed people in fi ding work aft r 
redundancy. In 1987, the privatization and down-sizing of nationalized steel 
c mpani s l d to large scale redundancies. It bec me clear that there would be 
no further legislation that would ave allowed early retirement. Furthermore, 
there was an atmosphere of fear, helplessness and lack of pers nal perspective 
among the redundant workers. Against this background, the works council and 
the m nager of the steel company launched a joint initiative. The first labour 
foundation, VOEST-Alpin  Stahlstiftung, was established (Winter-Ebmer, 2001). 
The idea ehind this Steel Foundation was that money and a social plan ar  
valuable, but the best help is active support into another job. Therefore, t  
works council and the management of the steel companies negotiat d about th  
organization and financial structure of the labour found tion. Already twelve 
companies were involved in the Steel Labour Fou dation at the start in 1987. In 
1988, this number increas d to 22 firms and in 1998, 58 firms participated 
(Winter-Ebm r, 2001). In September 2008, 71 companies were member of the 
VOEST-Alpine Stahlstiftung. Seven months later, in April 2009, this nu r 
increased to 83 companies and stabilized in J nuary 2011 with 81 memb r 
companies.78 Today, the labour foundations are a common use  labour market 
instrument in Austria. In all nine federal states (Bundesländer) and regions labour 
foundations are in place. 
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In 1998, labour foundations were embedded in law.79 The legal basis for the 
establishment of a labour foundation is regulated in section 18 of the Unemploy-
ment Insurance Act (AlVG). Furthermore, the statutory regulations regarding 
the financing of labour foundations are embedded in the Employment Service 
Act, (Arbeitsmarktservice gesetz, AMSG), section 32 and 34 (Jandl-Gartner, 
Jellasitz, Nagl, Röhrich, & Schweighofer, 2010). The Austrian Public Employment 
Service, AMS, has drawn up federal guidelines for the recognition, promotion 
and implementation of labour foundations. The first federal guideline dates from 
1993.80 The labour foundations evolved over the years and in the 1993 federal 
guideline four types of labour foundation were distinguished:  
 Company Foundation (Unternehmensstiftung)  
 Foundation established by a company affected by redundancy, in close 
cooperation with the works council; 
 Insolvency Foundation (Insolvenzstiftung)  
 Foundation established by a local authority or by another legal entity for one 
or more companies that are not able to support redundant employees to 
another job, because they are declared insolvent; 
 Sectoral Foundation (Branchenstiftung) 
 A foundation established by several companies in a specific sector in which 
large scale redundancies occur. 
 Regional Foundation (Regionalstiftung) 
 Foundation established in a region, comprising several companies that are 
affected by large scale redundancy in close cooperation with trade unions 
and local authorities. Regional foundations give small and medium sized 
companies the opportunity to join a regional foundation and in this way 
obtain access to the labour foundations’ measures. 
 
The Vienna Employment Promotion Fund (Wiener Arbeitnehmerinnen 
Förderungsfonds; WAFF) was founded in June 1995. In the beginning, the WAFF 
coordinated and implemented activities of already established outplacement 
foundations in close cooperation with the AMS, education providers and other 
companies. For example, the WAFF managed the AUFLEB81 and AUSPED82 
foundations. These sectoral foundations in, respectively, the food and transport 
sector, are a joint initiative from social partners and they still exist. The WAFF 
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79  Bundesgesetzblad (BGBL). Nr 232/1988 section 18. Abs 5 and 6 Arbeitslosenver-
sicherungsgesetz (AlVG).
80  Federal Guideline (Bundesrichtlinie) from 9 December 1993, BMAS Zl. 37.007/30-13/1993.
81  AUFLEB= Arbeitsstiftung des Ausbildungs- und Unterstützungsvereines für Arbeitslose 
aus der Lebensmittelbranche; branch labour foundation in the food industry.




also provided support to establish company foundations and introduced a 
regional insolvency foundation (Regionale Insolvenzstiftung Wien, RIW). Until the 
late 1990s, WAFF’s aim was to ‘bundle’ existing foundations and to provide help 
to create new foundations (Weishaupt, 2009). Currently, the WAFF is in Wien 
and the surrounding area, the central institution for labour foundations. In close 
cooperation with companies, works councils and the AMS, the WAFF developed 
two types of labour foundations. The first one is the regional labour foundation 
“Offene Arbeitsstiftung Wien” (OAW) which was introduced in 2000. The OAW 
enables small and medium sized (SME) Viennese companies to join this labour 
foundation. The companies pay a fee per participant for a part of the training 
costs. The other part is financed by the federal government, Wien and the AMS. 
SMEs and companies with a weak financial position pay a lower fee per 
participant. The second type is the Regionale Insolvenzstiftung Wien (RIW). 
Employees of bankrupt or insolvent companies can start a new career through 
the RIW. The support provided is equal to that in the OAW. However, the 
insolvent company is not able to co-finance the RIW. 
 
From 1998 onwards, not only redundant employees of companies weathering 
difficult circumstances, but also persons already unemployed, could participate 
in labour foundations. This was regulated in a decree83 by the Ministry of 
Employment, Health and Social Affairs (the Bundesministerium für Arbeit, 
Gesundheit und Soziales (BMAGS) of 28 September 1998 (Jandl-Gartner et al., 
2010).  
 
The federal guideline from 15 June 200284 has made an important distinction 
between two main types of labour foundation: the outplacement foundation 
(Outplacementstiftung) and the implacement foundation (Implacementstiftung). 
Outplacement foundations are used in the event of expected large-scale job 
losses. The company foundation, the insolvency foundation and the regional 
foundation are examples of outplacement foundations.  
An implacement foundation is used in the event of personnel shortages. The aim 
of the implacement foundation is to involve companies who want to recruit staff 
in needs-oriented qualification measures for unemployed people. Furthermore, 
implacement foundations can bridge the gap between the qualifications 
demanded by hiring companies and the non-utilisable qualifications held by 
unemployed people (Holzer, 2006). Holzer argues that ‘implacement foundations 
should be seen as service providers for enterprises. In growth sectors they offer 
firms a chance to have the skilled labour that they are seeking, specifically trained 
for their needs. At the same time, they give job-seekers the opportunity to gain 
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83  Decree BMAGS, ZI. 33.202/30-2/1998 from 28 September 1998.
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 Foundation established in a region, comprising several companies that are 
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obtain access to the labour foundations’ measures. 
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Förderungsfonds; WAFF) was founded in June 1995. In the beginning, the WAFF 
coordinated and implemented activities of already established outplacement 
foundations in close cooperation with the AMS, education providers and other 
companies. For example, the WAFF managed the AUFLEB81 and AUSPED82 
foundations. These sectoral foundations in, respectively, the food and transport 
sector, are a joint initiative from social partners and they still exist. The WAFF 
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also provided support to establish company foundations and introduced a 
regional insolvency foundation (Regionale Insolvenzstiftung Wien, RIW). Until the 
late 1990s, WAFF’s aim was to ‘bundle’ existing foundations and to provide help 
to create new foundations (Weishaupt, 2009). Currently, the WAFF is in Wien 
and the surrounding area, the central institution for labour foundations. In close 
cooperation with companies, works councils and the AMS, the WAFF developed 
two types of labour foundations. The first one is the regional labour foundation 
“Offene Arbeitsstiftung Wien” (OAW) which was introduced in 2000. The OAW 
enables small and medium sized (SME) Viennese companies to join this labour 
foundation. The companies pay a fee per participant for a part of the training 
costs. The other part is financed by the federal government, Wien and the AMS. 
SMEs and companies with a weak financial position pay a lower fee per 
participant. The second type is the Regionale Insolvenzstiftung Wien (RIW). 
Employees of bankrupt or insolvent companies can start a new career through 
the RIW. The support provided is equal to that in the OAW. However, the 
insolvent company is not able to co-finance the RIW. 
 
From 1998 onwards, not only redundant employees of companies weathering 
difficult circumstances, but also persons already unemployed, could participate 
in labour foundations. This was regulated in a decree83 by the Ministry of 
Employment, Health and Social Affairs (the Bundesministerium für Arbeit, 
Gesundheit und Soziales (BMAGS) of 28 September 1998 (Jandl-Gartner et al., 
2010).  
 
The federal guideline from 15 June 200284 has made an important distinction 
between two main types of labour foundation: the outplacement foundation 
(Outplacementstiftung) and the implacement foundation (Implacementstiftung). 
Outplacement foundations are used in the event of expected large-scale job 
losses. The company foundation, the insolvency foundation and the regional 
foundation are examples of outplacement foundations.  
An implacement foundation is used in the event of personnel shortages. The aim 
of the implacement foundation is to involve companies who want to recruit staff 
in needs-oriented qualification measures for unemployed people. Furthermore, 
implacement foundations can bridge the gap between the qualifications 
demanded by hiring companies and the non-utilisable qualifications held by 
unemployed people (Holzer, 2006). Holzer argues that ‘implacement foundations 
should be seen as service providers for enterprises. In growth sectors they offer 
firms a chance to have the skilled labour that they are seeking, specifically trained 
for their needs. At the same time, they give job-seekers the opportunity to gain 
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AUSTRIA 
162 
qualifications that hold out the (relatively) sure promise of employment at the 
end of the training process.' The implacement foundations provide vocational 
guidance and staff selection procedures, work experience programmes, support 
with active job searches and training (Holzer, 2006). The support, including the 
basic and further training, can last up to three years; and for persons aged 50 and 
over even up to four years (Jandl-Gartner et al., 2010).  
Besides the previously mentioned labour foundations, Austria has foundation-
style measures which deviate from the labour foundations in terms of financing 
(not based on the AlVG but AMFG or AMSG based) and target group but not in 
the support provided, e.g., career guidance, active job search, training or further 
education, apprenticeships. These measures are called “Stiftungsähnlichen Maß-
nahmen” (SÄM) (Jandl-Gartner et al., 2010). These measures are procedurally 
identical to those of the labour foundations, the difference being that they are 
implemented by the AMS (Holzer, 2006). 
 
The target group foundations, the so-called Zielgruppenstiftungen, are 
implacement- or outplacement foundations that have been established by 
employers and employees’ representatives (WKO and ÖGB) for specific target 
groups who face great difficulties in (re-) entering the labour market, e.g., the 
young unemployed, long-term unemployed and returners. In response to the 
crisis, a new reform was announced in 2009. A special youth foundation (Jugend-
stiftung) was laid down in statutory regulations.85 The aim is to support 2,000 
unemployed young people (aged 19-24) who have previously worked at least 
three months with a SME or temporary agency (bmask, 2009) by providing 
individual support and training programmes. These measures should open up 
new career prospects. A precondition for participation is that the company pays 
EUR 1,000 per person to the labour foundation. The unemployment benefit for 
the unemployed young people is extended. Furthermore, participants in the 
youth foundation receive, in addition to the unemployment benefit, a grant of 
EUR 100 per month (Jandl-Gartner et al., 2010). Some of the labour foundations 
have existed for a long time. As discussed previously, the Steel labour 
foundation which was established in 1987, is still in place. Other foundations run 
for a specific period and have already disappeared.  
 
The aims of the labour foundations 
The aims of the labour foundations are formulated in the AMS federal guideline 

85  § 18 para 6-9 AlVG, Federal Law Gazette (BGBl) I No. 12/2009, entered into force on 1 
February 2009 and further elaborated in BGBl. I Nr. 90/2009, entered into force 1. June 
2009(Arbeitsmarktpaket II) and in Federal guideline AMS BGS/AMF/022/9904/2009 
from 1 November 2009.
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effective from July 2010.86 The foundations should: 
 contribute to the reorientation and higher qualification measures for the 
unemployed aimed at their re-integration into the labour market; 
 support structural change in a region and provide purposeful qualifications 
measures for companies who have to lay off people and companies who 
want to recruit employees; 
 integrate regional and local labour market policies in the event that one or 
more companies are affected by redundancies.  
 
According to an interviewee of the Arbeiterkammer Wien, the outplacement 
foundation is “a bridge between an old and a new job”. One precondition for 
entering a labour foundation is that the employment contract is terminated. AK 
Wien advises work councils concerning the possibilities offered by labour 
foundations. The employee who has lost his or her job can voluntarily choose to 
participate in a labour foundation under the precondition that the employer is a 
member of a foundation and is willing to pay a fee per participant. The financing 
of the different labour foundations is further elaborated in section 5.4. 
 
Type of support 
The labour outplacement foundations should provide continuous support 
between entering and leaving the labour foundation. The support comprises: 
professional orientation, education and (re-)training, practical training, 
internships, and active job search. 
 
The first step in the labour foundation is professional orientation. The 
unemployed person, together with a qualified trainer, will explore the new 
professional perspectives. An individual action plan will be developed. The 
maximum duration of the professional orientation period is six weeks. In special 
circumstances (e.g. owing to individual problems) this period can be extended 
up to twelve weeks. The concept of the labour foundation is that at least two 
thirds of the participants move on from the professional orientation phase to the 
education and training module.87 The training should contribute to further 
qualification and fit within the maximum timeframe of three or four years. In the 
individual action plan, theory lessons can be combined with practical training. 
The practical training supports the theoretical training and may not be used 
exclusively to bridge the gap between theoretical training elements. Each 
practical training module should be preceded by a theoretical introduction. The 
weekly amount of practical training may not exceed the maximum legal or 
contractual regular working hours. In the final step, the phase of active job 
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effective from July 2010.86 The foundations should: 
 contribute to the reorientation and higher qualification measures for the 
unemployed aimed at their re-integration into the labour market; 
 support structural change in a region and provide purposeful qualifications 
measures for companies who have to lay off people and companies who 
want to recruit employees; 
 integrate regional and local labour market policies in the event that one or 
more companies are affected by redundancies.  
 
According to an interviewee of the Arbeiterkammer Wien, the outplacement 
foundation is “a bridge between an old and a new job”. One precondition for 
entering a labour foundation is that the employment contract is terminated. AK 
Wien advises work councils concerning the possibilities offered by labour 
foundations. The employee who has lost his or her job can voluntarily choose to 
participate in a labour foundation under the precondition that the employer is a 
member of a foundation and is willing to pay a fee per participant. The financing 
of the different labour foundations is further elaborated in section 5.4. 
 
Type of support 
The labour outplacement foundations should provide continuous support 
between entering and leaving the labour foundation. The support comprises: 
professional orientation, education and (re-)training, practical training, 
internships, and active job search. 
 
The first step in the labour foundation is professional orientation. The 
unemployed person, together with a qualified trainer, will explore the new 
professional perspectives. An individual action plan will be developed. The 
maximum duration of the professional orientation period is six weeks. In special 
circumstances (e.g. owing to individual problems) this period can be extended 
up to twelve weeks. The concept of the labour foundation is that at least two 
thirds of the participants move on from the professional orientation phase to the 
education and training module.87 The training should contribute to further 
qualification and fit within the maximum timeframe of three or four years. In the 
individual action plan, theory lessons can be combined with practical training. 
The practical training supports the theoretical training and may not be used 
exclusively to bridge the gap between theoretical training elements. Each 
practical training module should be preceded by a theoretical introduction. The 
weekly amount of practical training may not exceed the maximum legal or 
contractual regular working hours. In the final step, the phase of active job 
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87  Federal guideline (bundesrichtlinie) BGS/AMF/0722/9938/2010 AMF/18-2010.
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search, the participants will receive support and advice to find a new job. 
Furthermore, the participants can use the job offers from the Public 
Employment Service. Some labour foundations provide help for them to start 
their own business. The weekly load of activities in the foundation must be 
equivalent to the previous working hours and must be at least 50% of the normal 
working hours regulated in collective agreements.88 Figures 5.3 and 5.4 illustrate 
the different pathways in, respectively, the Steel Foundation and the Vienna 
Employment Promotion Fund (OAW). 
 





The support provided in the OAW includes several phases (see figure 5.4). The 
professional orientation phase comprises the assessment of the individual 
professional goals and the feasibility of this ambition, the training steps and the 
approval of a corresponding career plan. Courses, occupational experience, and 
also the opportunities to finish school or higher education are possible steps in 
the education phase. Development of individual application strategies, support 
application activities, provision of relevant information about the labour market, 
support in finding another job, and aftercare are elements of the active job 
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search. The implacement phase serves to qualify for a future job with a specific 
employer. The training period and the practical and theoretical education 
needed will be negotiated with the future employer. The OAW has a special 
module for persons aged 50 and over, in which they can receive specific, more 
intensive coaching. This module can be used as an option in all phases 
(education, implacement and internships) and comprises e.g. health training, 
motivation training, training in how to use the internet, communication training, 
self-presentation training and training in how to apply for jobs. 
 




The foundations provide training and courses for the unemployed with a 
prospect of job entry afterwards. These training measures fit the future 
employers’ needs.  
 
Financial support 
The AMS pays the unemployment benefit to the participants for the duration of 
their participation in the labour foundation. The maximum period of participation 
in a foundation is four years, which is longer than the duration of the normal 
unemployment benefit, which can last for up to 52 weeks. The labour foundation 
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the Steel labour foundation pays a minimum grant of EUR 170 per month. The 
maximum grant is EUR 370 per month. An additional amount of EUR 75 can be 
provided for sole wage earners and EUR 40 per each dependent child.89 The 
monthly grant for participants in the OAW is currently EUR 200. The OAW 
calculates that each participant on average has a training and education budget 
of EUR 3,860.90 The labour foundation provides financial security during the 
period of participation. However, some interviewees mentioned that the level of 
unemployment benefit in Austria is very low compared with other European 
countries. Many Austrian unemployed people cannot afford to invest in longer 
phases of education or training, because of recurring expenses and their need of 
income. They apply for jobs with lower wages rather than investing in training 
and education. 
 
5.2.2 Training network (Qualifizierungsverbünde) 
The labour foundations provide an interim period between two jobs. As 
explained previously, the participants in the labour foundations receive an 
unemployment benefit. Strictly speaking therefore, the labour foundations do 
not provide for direct job-to-job transition. The training networks, Qualifizie-
rungsverbünde, were mentioned in the interviews as being an unemployment 
preventive instrument. The training network is an association of at least three 
companies and at least 50% of these participating companies are small or 
medium sized companies. Their joint aim is to provide training to their employees 
which is based on the needs of the employers and is transferable to other 
companies.91 The companies share the costs of the training and education. In 
order to qualify for a financial contribution from the AMS, the employers should 
outsource the training activities to external professional training providers. 
Training costs and staff expenses for the participants during paid working hours 




5.3.1 Labour foundation (Arbeitsstiftung) 
Companies can establish a labour foundation or become a member of a labour 
foundation if they have to lay off staff because of economic reasons. Depending 
on the type of foundation the erection of the foundation is a result of 
negotiations between the company, trade unions, works councils and 
municipalities. The selection criteria for who can participate in the foundation 
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89  These amounts apply to those who entered the Steel foundation after 1-1-2011. 
<www.stahlstiftung.at >, accessed 16 February 2011.
90  <www.waff.at>, accessed 16 February 2011.
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are also discussed between the company, the works council or the trade union, 
and the AMS. The AMS has to approve the establishment of a foundation. In 
general, people who have lost their jobs at these companies and who are 
entitled to an unemployment benefit are eligible to enter a labour foundation. 
Currently, also people who are unemployed can enter a regional labour 
foundation. One interviewee mentioned that employees with a fixed-term 
contract which will not be extended because of economic reasons can also enter 
a foundation. For example, the OAW is open to companies which have to reduce 
staff because of economic reasons and are located in the Vienna area. The 
precondition is that the companies that have to lay off people are willing to pay a 
fee per participant. This requirement does not apply for the RIW, i.e. the labour 
insolvency foundation for companies which are insolvent or bankrupt. The 
employees who have lost their jobs at a company which joined the OAW or RIW, 
can enter the foundation provided that they are entitled to an unemployment 
benefit and living in Vienna. Another example is the Steel foundation. 
Employees that are dismissed by a member company of the Steel foundation, 
because of economic reasons can enter the Steel foundation. Thus, as 
mentioned previously, participants in the labour foundations are unemployed 
and the foundation serves as a bridge between two jobs. The self-employed are 
not eligible to enter a foundation. Small companies which are not able to 
establish a company foundation by themselves can join a regional foundation. 
 
Not unexpectedly, the financial crisis in 2008 did have an impact on the 
establishment of labour foundations. The number of outplacement foundations 
almost doubled between 2007 and 2009 (see table 5.3).92  
 
Table 5.3: Absolute numbers labour foundations in Austria between 2007-2009 
 2007 2008 2009 
Outplacement foundations 79 96 141 
Implacement foundations 114 147 175 
Source: Bmask 
 
5.3.2 Training network (Qualifizierungsverbünde) 
Any employer can participate in a training network provided that at least three 
companies are members of the training network and more than 50% of these 
companies are SMEs. SMEs are companies which have less than 250 employees 
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5.4.1 Labour Foundation (Arbeitsstiftung) 
The federal guideline for the recognition, promotion and implementation of 
labour foundations (Bundesrichtlinie zur Anerkennung, Förderung und 
Durchführung von Arbeitsstiftungen) regulates the criteria for implementing a 
labour foundation. One of the criteria is that the founders submit a financial 
plan. The AMS has to approve the establishment of a labour foundation. The 
financing of a labour foundation depends on the type of foundation (company, 
sectoral, insolvency, regional foundations) and is based on negotiations between 
the managers of the company, staff representatives and co-financers such as the 
AMS, WAFF and local authorities.  
 
Table 5.4: Founders and financing of the various Austrian labour foundations 
 Founders Financing 
















Several companies, Trade 
unions, Employers’ 








In principle, the co-financing of the AMS is limited to the provision of benefits to 
participants, mostly in company outplacement labour foundations. The costs of 
the infrastructure of the foundation should be financed by the companies or 
other parties. However, if the external funding is not enough, the AMS can 
provide extra funding, i.e., for insolvency labour foundations up to 50% of the 
establishment costs and for regional labour foundations up to 25% of these 
expenditures (Jandl-Gartner et al., 2010). 
 
Insolvency, regional, sectoral and target group outplacement foundations can 
partly re-claim costs for vocational guidance measures, education and training 
provided by an external training provider, active job search and training-related 
additional costs. The AMS co-finances only training-related costs for activities in 
company foundations with a duration of at least 6 months. Table 5.5 presents 





Table 5.5: Financial support from the AMS 
 Cost Reimburse- 
ment  




participants in the 





measures, education and 
training provided by an 
external training provider, 
active job search and training-
related additional costs 
60% maximum of 156 
weeks, max, in justified 











measures, education and 
training provided by an 
external training provider, 
active job search and training-
related additional costs 
35% maximum of 156 
weeks, max, in justified 





Training related additional 
expenses for measures with a 
duration of at least 6 months 
35% maximum of 156 
weeks, max, in justified 
cases 209 weeks 
Source: AMS  
 
In some labour foundations both redundant employees and employees who are 
still employed within the company contribute to the labour foundations. For 
example, in the Steel foundation (Stahlstiftung), the employees of companies 
affiliated to the Steel foundation pay 0.5% of their monthly gross income to the 
foundation. This is considered as a solidarity contribution. Furthermore, the 
redundant employees who will participate in the foundation deposit 50% of their 
statutory severance pay interest, with a maximum of EUR 7,267.94 The affiliated 
companies contribute to the infrastructure of the foundation. 
 
As explained previously, small companies can also send their redundant 
employees to a regional foundation. Companies have to pay a contribution for 
each participant in the foundation. The Regional Foundation in Vienna (Offene 
Arbeitsstiftung Wien) has reduced rates for Viennese employees from small and 
medium sized companies and for redundant employees from companies with a 
weak financial position. 
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Table 5.6 presents the expenditure from the AMS to the labour foundations. The 
contributions of the companies and other regional actors as well as the benefits 
provided by the AMS to the participants are not included in these figures. 
 
Table 5.6: Expenditure AMS to the labour foundations in Euro’s 
Expenditures 2007 2008 2009 
Implacement 
foundations 
1,795,330.64 1,436,722.23 1,253,669.86 
Outplacement 
foundations 
838,171.06 82,598.71 1,732,037.82 
Total labour 
foundations 
2,633,501.70 1,519,320.94 2,985,707.68 
Source: Bmask95 
 
5.4.2 Training network (Qualifizierungsverbünde) 
The training networks (Qualifizierungsverbünde) are an initiative from the AMS 
and the European Social Fund (ESF) and they partly subsidize the training costs 
and staff expenses. 75% of the compensation is at the expense of the ESF. The 
other 25% is co-financed by the AMS (AMS, 2011). In the federal guideline the 
level of the grant depends on the size of the company and the age of the 
participant (see Table 5.7). 
 
Table 5.7: Compensation rate AMS/ESF and employers’ contribution for training costs 
 AMS/ESF Employer 
Participants > 50 year SMEs 80% of training costs 20% of the training cost 
Participants > 50 year in 
large companies 
70% of the training costs 30% of the training costs 
Participant aged 45-50 in 
SMEs 
70% of the training costs 30% of the training costs 
Participant aged 45-50 in 
large companies 
60% of the training costs 40% of the training costs 
 
However, the regional AMS can deviate from this guideline. For example, in the 
federal state Tirol the AMS and ESF pay: 
 50% of the training costs for participants under the age of 45; 
 60% of the training costs for participants aged 45-50; 
 70% of the training costs for participants aged 50 and over (P&K 
Unternehmensberatung GmbH, 2011b). 
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95  <http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIV/AB/AB_03590/imfname_177113.pdf>, 
accessed 5 April 2011.
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Furthermore, the AMS Tirol and the ESF pay a contribution of 60% of the 
personnel expenses during the normal working hours for participants aged 45-50 
and 70% for participants aged 50 or over. In the region Oberösterreich the AMS 
and the ESF pay: 
 70% of the training costs for women and men aged 50 and over; 
 60% of the training costs for: 
1. women < 50 years; 
2. men aged 45-50 years;  
3. men aged < 45 years who only a have high school degree or have finished 
an apprenticeship or who are on parental leave (P&K Unternehmens-
beratung GmbH, 2011a). 
 
In June 2011, the EC approved a subsidy of EUR 9.5 million from the European 
Globalisation Fund (EGF). The application submitted by the Austrian authorities 
in Styria and Lower Austria aims to help 356 former employees in basic metal 
enterprises, and 74 redundant workers from a leading Printed Circuit Board 
manufacturer, to find new jobs.96 
 
5.5 Responsibility, coordination, and delivery  
 
5.5.1 Associations 
Social partnership is the backbone of Austrian society and is alive at every level 
of governance. As described previously in section 5.1.2, the employers’ interests, 
including labour market issues, are represented by the Economic Chambers of 
Commerce (WKO) and the Austrian Chamber of Agriculture (LK), whereas the 
employees are represented by the Chamber of Labour (AK), and the Austrian 
Federation of Trade Unions (ÖGB). While the Federal Ministry of Labour, Social 
Affairs and Consumer Protection (BMASK) sets the overall goals for the Austrian 
labour market, the tripartite governing board of the AMS develops specific 
targets and indicators on an annual basis. These targets are negotiated with all 
of Austria’s regional as well as local tripartite Public Employment Service offices. 
Thus, social partners are strongly involved in law- and labour market policy 
making at all levels. The influence of the social partners is formalised in 
committees and boards at all levels and includes more than consultation. Details 
of new laws are discussed at great length before they are passed to Parliament. 
One interviewee mentioned that the social partners are inextricably bound up 
with the state and illustrated this by saying that the Public Employment Service 
AMS is run by social partners. Social partners are represented in the board of the 
AMS, but they do not at the operational level support individuals to find a new 
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job. Besides the influential role of social partners in elaborating active labour 
market policies, employers and trade unions negotiate and conclude social plans 
in the event of lay offs. However, an interviewee from the AMS mentioned that 
in most social plans the focus is on providing extra money rather than on 
practical support to help redundant employees to another job. As explained 
previously, active support is provided in the labour foundations in which 
individual employers, works councils, employers’ organisations and trade unions 




The Austrian Economic Chambers of Commerce (WKO) are public bodies and 
represent the interests of more than 400,000 companies.97 Membership is a 
statutory requirement for all companies. This is in contrast to, for example, the 
Swedish employers’ association. The foundation of the Austrian Economic 
Chambers of Commerce and their main activities are regulated by law 
(Wirtschaftskammergesetz). Besides representing the interests of their members, 
the WKO are involved in decision making and administrative procedures and 
fulfil an advisory role to their members about issues such as taxation, labour law, 
vocational training etcetera. The Chambers of Commerce are involved in law 
and regulation making processes, both on the federal as well as on the provincial 
level. 
The WKO are also involved in collective bargaining with trade unions. The 
federal Economic Chamber of Commerce is the national umbrella organisation 
for the nine provincial chambers. The latter have 82 local offices to provide 
service near to their members.98 The Chambers are established by law and their 
main activities are regulated by statute. This differs from an employers’ 
association, which is established by private agreement.  
 
Employees’ representatives 
The Arbeiterkammer represents the workers’ interests in the public policy 
making process, and the Austrian Trade Union Federation ÖGB takes part in the 
collective bargaining, which is conducted almost exclusively on the sectoral level 
with a high level of coordination between the actors (Afonso & Mach, 2011). The 
relationship between the Arbeiterkammer and ÖGB is considered to be good 
and is based on cooperation rather than competition. In contrast to the ÖGB, 
membership in the Arbeiterkammer is compulsory. The coverage of collective 
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agreements is high in Austria. This can be explained by the compulsory 
membership of all companies in the WKO. All companies are bound by the 
collective agreements negotiated by the umbrella organisation and this in turn 
extends to all employees independent of whether they are trade union members 
or not (Afonso & Mach, 2011).  
 
Motivation of employers for the establishment of labour foundations 
An interviewee of the Federal Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Consumer 
protections (Bundesministerium für Arbeit, Soziales und Konsumentenschutz, 
BMASK) argues that companies establish a labour foundation because they have 
certain obligations towards their former employees. These obligations are 
stated in a social plan. Furthermore, some big companies envisage these 
foundations as a kind of personnel pool. The former employees will be trained 
during their participation partly at the expense of the AMS. And sometimes 
these companies will hire them again after the former employees have left the 
foundation. Another employers’ motive for establishing or contributing to a 
labour foundation is to side step the period of notice.  
 
The Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) in Vienna conducted a study in 2005 in 
which representatives of the WKO were interviewed about their labour 
foundation experiences. The WKO representatives were very positive about the 
outplacement foundations. The establishment of a labour foundation ensures 
social peace and maintains the motivation of employees in case of redundancies. 
Furthermore, the active support in the labour foundations provides a daily 
structure for the redundant employee and their families. When someone loses 
his or her job this time structure is lost. The active support in the labour 
foundation is important, on the one hand, for their re-integration into the labour 
market and, on the other hand, it also has an important psychological function 
both for the person involved and the family. The person leaves for the office in 
the morning and comes back in the evening (Wagner & Lassnigg, 2005). In the 
same study managers of companies with a labour foundation were also 
interviewed. The reasons given by the managers for the establishment of a 
labour foundation can be divided in the benefits for the persons who lose their 
jobs and the benefits for the company. The corporate social responsibility and 
fairness to the employees was one motive strongly emphasised in these 
interviews (Wagner & Lassnigg, 2005). According to the managers interviewed 
by researchers from IHS, the advantages for redundant employees who entered 
a labour foundation are: professional assistance in finding another job, an 
extended unemployment benefit, financing of further education and training, 
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Motivation of employees for participation in a labour foundation 
The interviewee of the WAFF explained in the interview that the labour 
foundation is a unique chance for participants to think about their future 
professional life. The training and education provided can even lead to a career 
change. The AMS representative explained that the labour foundations provide 
a broad and intensive service, with a good diagnosis and orientation phase and 
subsequently a comparatively long qualification period. Furthermore, participat-
ion in the labour foundation is on a voluntary basis.  
The study of IHS revealed that the trade union interviewees were very positive 
about the labour foundation. Although they emphasize that preventing 
redundancy is their first priority, trade unions argue that a labour foundation is a 
very useful tool to mitigate the consequences of a lay off (Wagner & Lassnigg, 
2005). The works councils consider the active support, e.g. in how to apply for a 
new job, especially for those redundant employees who have been employed for 
many years at the company, as a very important feature of the labour found-
ation. Furthermore, they deem the retraining facilities and the possibility of 
making another step in the employee’s career as very valuable.  
In the IHS study several works councils elucidate that the instrument of the 
labour foundation is less relevant for those who want to continue their 
profession in the same kind of job as before and for those who have good 
chances of finding another job without additional training (Wagner & Lassnigg, 
2005). 
 
5.5.2 The state: Government and Public Employment Service 
The Austrian federal government sets out the goals for the Austrian labour 
market policy. This includes guidelines to:  
 achieve and maintain full employment; 
 increase labour market participation of older employees; 
 take active measures to raise the level of qualifications; 
 increase transparency in the labour market; 
 re-integrate the unemployed; 
 combat long-term unemployment.99 
 
The tripartite governing board of the AMS is responsible for the implementation 
of these labour market policy guidelines and for the provision of unemployment 
benefits. The AMS develops specific performance targets on an annual basis and 
these targets are negotiated with the regional and local AMS offices. In 1994, 
the Labour Market Administration Authority (AMV) was outsourced from the 
Federal Ministry of Employment, Health and Social Affairs and became a legal 
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public body on its own: the AMS.100 Today, the AMS is structured into one 
federal, nine regional offices in each of the provinces and 99 local offices in 
nearly all municipalities. The Federal Economic Chambers of Commerce, the 
Federal Chamber of Labour and the Austrian Trade Union Federation are 
represented in the AMS and influence the labour market policies at the federal, 
provincial and local level. The AMS supports the (recently) unemployed to find a 
job as quickly as possible. Furthermore, the AMS is involved in the labour 
foundation which can be seen as a bridge between two jobs. As discussed in the 
previous section, the AMS has to approve the establishment of a labour 
foundation and can be involved as co-financer. One interviewee mentioned that 
the AMS spends a lot of money in these foundations, especially when 
participants stay in the foundation for the maximum of four years. However, the 
interviewee argues that the average participation duration is less than these four 
years. This is also confirmed by table 5.8 in section 5.6. The AMS contracts out 
services to private organisations in order to qualify the (recently) unemployed. 
The AMS calls for tenders mainly in the qualification and educational area. 
However, the biggest educational suppliers for adult education are run by social 
partners, e.g. the Wirtschaftsförderungsinstitut (WIFI) of the WKO. 
 
In response to the economic downturn in 2008, the Austrian government and 
companies introduced several measures to tackle the crisis. These measures are 
summarized in a publication of the Economic Chamber of Commerce (Gleißner, 
2009). Although these measures focus on internal secondary preventive 
measures to avoid redundancies and not on curative measures geared towards 
direct job-to-job transitions, the measures will be briefly described in this section 
and in section 5.5.4. One important measure that the Austrian government has 
implemented is the short-time work arrangement (Kurzarbeit). Companies in 
difficult circumstances can reduce the employees’ working hours while keeping 
the employment relationship intact, because the Public Employment Service 
(Arbeitsmarktservice, AMS) supports companies by means of a government-
subsidized special allowance in order to cover a large part of the earnings 
shortfall (Gleißner, 2009). To be eligible for Kurzarbeit, companies and individual 
employees or the works council should consent to the temporary reduction of 
working hours. Kurzarbeit can be implemented after other measures have not 
had the desired effect. The social partners negotiate and try to reach a collective 
agreement about the scope and the duration of the reduced working hours. The 
initial maximum period for Kurzarbeit was six months. In early 2009, the 
government extended the period up to 18 months because of the economic 
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downturn. In extreme cases the support can last up to 20 months.101 Besides the 
normal short-time work arrangements, Austrian employers have the possibility 
of using the instrument of short-time work with training (Kurzarbeit mit 
Qualifiziering).102 The employer can receive an allowance from the AMS which is 
15% higher than the support provided during the normal short-time work period. 
The precondition for this extra support is that the employee is trained during the 
reduced working hours. 
 
5.5.3 Market 
Some large companies provide outplacement services to their redundant 
employees but, according to several interviewees, this is not a widespread 
phenomenon. An argument put forward by one of the interviewees is that the 
Austrian economy is mainly driven by SMEs which, in contrast to large 
employers, do not always have the financial means to outsource these activitities. 
Another possibility for downsizing companies is to contact a non-profit 
temporary work agency to re-employ their workers. These non-profit temporary 
work agencies behave just as any commercial temporary works agency, but they 
do not have to make any profits. Their aim is to support unemployed people and 
generally they cooperate with the regional AMS (European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2006b). Examples of non-profit 
temporary employment agencies are: Job-Transfair 103  (affiliates of the 
vocational training institute BFI (Berufsförderungsinstitut Österreich) owned by 
the Chambers of Labour and the Austrian Trade Union Federation), itworks 
Personalservice104 (active in the regions of Vienna, Burgenland, Styria and 
Carynthia) and Trendwerk (active in the regions of Vienna and Burgenland).105 
 
5.5.4 Hierarchy 
As mentioned previously, the government and Austrian companies introduced 
preventative measures to tackle the crisis which started in 2008. The use of 
these measures depends on the duration and the intensity of the companies’ 
crises. Initially, when there is lack of work, companies try to balance holiday 
leave, overtime credits, and abolish Sunday and night shifts. Furthermore, most 
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102  Section 37c AMSG.
103 <http://www.jobtransfair.at> and < http://www.ams.at/wien/sfa/14340_10223.html>, 
accessed 30 March 2011.
104 <http://www.itworks.co.at/> and < http://www.ams.at/wien/sfa/14340_10222.html>, 
accessed 30 March 2011.
105 <http://www.trendwerk.at/> and < http://www.ams.at/wien/sfa/14340_10224.html>, 




collective agreements provide that the normal weekly hours can be extended 
and that these hours can be compensated by decreased hours in times of 
economic downturn. If the reduction of leave and overtime pay or the 
distribution of normal working hours is not sufficient, companies and employees 
can agree to reduce the working hours with a corresponding pay reduction on a 
temporary or permanent basis. Normally, the employees will only agree with a 
partial pay reduction. Furthermore, as already explained in section 5.5.2, 
companies can, under certain conditions, be eligible for Kurzarbeit. This is a 
measure implemented by the government geared towards avoiding forced 
dismissals.  
 
When examining curative measures geared towards supporting direct job-to-job 
transition it can be concluded that the role of Austrian firms is limited to the 
ones that establish or participate in a labour foundation and to some large 
companies who provide outplacement services to their redundant employees. 
However, the outplacement service is not widespread in Austria. According to 
one interviewee the companies’ existence is based on making profits and their 
goal is not to support people into employment. In their view the AMS is 
responsible for supporting people back into the labour market. The Austrian 
companies try to prevent redundancies in the first place by internal preventive 




With the exception of the company foundations, the labour foundations can be 
considered as a network between social partners, the state, companies and 
regional partners. The sector foundations are established by several companies 
in a specific sector in which large scale redundancies occur. Moreover, the 
previously mentioned training networks (Qualifizierungsverbünde) are 
worthwhile referring to here (see section 5.2.2). The aim of this network is to 
provide training which fits the new employers’ needs (AMS, 2011). 
One interviewee tried to set up a network of small and medium sized companies 
to support redundant people from one company to another company in another 
sector, but it did not work out. “The reason was that the transition between 
sectors meant for most employees a change in income, e.g., someone who 
changes jobs from the construction industry to the retail industry is confronted 
with a decrease in income of 30 to 35%. It was not possible to bargain about this 
income loss. The AMS invests a lot in retraining measures, so why would SMEs 
invest in schemes, while people quickly find a job anyway?”  
 
5.5.6 Responsibility for job-to-job transitions 
All Austrian interviewees consider the job-to-job transition as a shared 
responsibility between the state and social partners. If the employee is not able 
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
101  Companies who were granted support from the AMS for Kurzarbeit before the end of 
2010 can be eligible for support for maxim 24 months (section 37b abs 4 AMSG).
102  Section 37c AMSG.
103 <http://www.jobtransfair.at> and < http://www.ams.at/wien/sfa/14340_10223.html>, 
accessed 30 March 2011.
104 <http://www.itworks.co.at/> and < http://www.ams.at/wien/sfa/14340_10222.html>, 
accessed 30 March 2011.
105 <http://www.trendwerk.at/> and < http://www.ams.at/wien/sfa/14340_10224.html>, 




collective agreements provide that the normal weekly hours can be extended 
and that these hours can be compensated by decreased hours in times of 
economic downturn. If the reduction of leave and overtime pay or the 
distribution of normal working hours is not sufficient, companies and employees 
can agree to reduce the working hours with a corresponding pay reduction on a 
temporary or permanent basis. Normally, the employees will only agree with a 
partial pay reduction. Furthermore, as already explained in section 5.5.2, 
companies can, under certain conditions, be eligible for Kurzarbeit. This is a 
measure implemented by the government geared towards avoiding forced 
dismissals.  
 
When examining curative measures geared towards supporting direct job-to-job 
transition it can be concluded that the role of Austrian firms is limited to the 
ones that establish or participate in a labour foundation and to some large 
companies who provide outplacement services to their redundant employees. 
However, the outplacement service is not widespread in Austria. According to 
one interviewee the companies’ existence is based on making profits and their 
goal is not to support people into employment. In their view the AMS is 
responsible for supporting people back into the labour market. The Austrian 
companies try to prevent redundancies in the first place by internal preventive 




With the exception of the company foundations, the labour foundations can be 
considered as a network between social partners, the state, companies and 
regional partners. The sector foundations are established by several companies 
in a specific sector in which large scale redundancies occur. Moreover, the 
previously mentioned training networks (Qualifizierungsverbünde) are 
worthwhile referring to here (see section 5.2.2). The aim of this network is to 
provide training which fits the new employers’ needs (AMS, 2011). 
One interviewee tried to set up a network of small and medium sized companies 
to support redundant people from one company to another company in another 
sector, but it did not work out. “The reason was that the transition between 
sectors meant for most employees a change in income, e.g., someone who 
changes jobs from the construction industry to the retail industry is confronted 
with a decrease in income of 30 to 35%. It was not possible to bargain about this 
income loss. The AMS invests a lot in retraining measures, so why would SMEs 
invest in schemes, while people quickly find a job anyway?”  
 
5.5.6 Responsibility for job-to-job transitions 
All Austrian interviewees consider the job-to-job transition as a shared 
responsibility between the state and social partners. If the employee is not able 
to find a job by himself the general view is that AMS, in which the social partners 
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are represented, should support these workers to find another job. In practice, 
the AMS primarily focuses on the transition from unemployment to 
employment. The direct transition from job-to-job, i.e. without an 




The performance of job-to-job systems or activities can be measured by the 
unemployment duration. Ideally, in a perfect job-to-job system there would be 
no unemployment spell, because redundant employees would make a smooth 
transition from one job to another job. 
 
In 2009, the unemployment spell for 37.3% of the unemployed was less than two 
months, for 23.3% three to five months and for 18.1% six to eleven months 
(Statistik Austria, 2010). However, these data are static, i.e. the division of the 
current unemployment population broken down by the unemployment duration, 
and tells us nothing about the job-to-job flow duration with an unemployment 
period in between the two jobs.  
 
The labour foundations are an important instrument in supporting Austrian 
people back into work. In 2009, 141 outplacement foundations and 175 
implacement foundations existed in Austria. Table 5.8 shows the number of 
participants in labour foundations between 2000 and 2009. 
 
Table 5.8: Labour foundations – number of participants, duration and expenditures 
(2000-2009) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Number of 
participants 
3,487 3,609 4,413 5,332 5,310 4,811 4,864 4,660 4,912 7,677 
Inflow 4,333 4,965 5,879 7,256 5,961 4,961 4,739 5,007 5,490 10,743 
Average durat-
ion (in days) 
285 269 267 727 296 350 350 349 340 295 
Expenditure  
(x 1000)106  





10,775 8,575 7,715 7,798 9,878 13,421 14,734 13,790 13,050 10,595 
Source: Data Warehouse (DWH) Bmask and AMS (Jandl-Gartner et al., 2010) 
 

106  These expenditures include the unemployment benefits (AlvG) provided by the AMS to 
the participants. Expenditures for training costs are not included, neither are the 
expenditures included from companies and other regional actors. 
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Table 5.9 comprises data of both the outplacement and implacement 
foundations. Since 2005, the Data Warehouse from Bmask and AMS have made 
a distinction between outplacement and implacement foundations. Table 5.9 
shows the inflow of participants in outplacement and implacement foundations. 
These figures are higher compared with the inflow figures in table 5.8. It is 
unclear as to how this difference can be explained. It might be that table 5.8 
comprises double counting, i.e. persons who entered both an outplacement and 
implacement foundation. 
 
Table 5.9: Inflow participants in implacement and outplacement foundations 
between 2005 and 2009 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Inflow Implacement 
foundation 
5,035 5,285 6,367 6,641 7,435 
Inflow Outplacement 
foundation 
1,833 1,458 1,162 1,466 5,772 
Labour foundation old 
style 
54 51 33 45 63 
Total inflow labour 
foundations 
6,922 6,794 7,563 8,157 13,270 
Source: Data Warehouse (DWH) Bmask and AMS (Jandl-Gartner et al., 2010) 
 
In 2009, 2,556 participants entered a company outplacement foundation, 2,529 
people a regional outplacement foundation, and 644 people an insolvency 
outplacement foundation. 
 
Figure 5.5 presents the gross effects of the labour foundations in 2005. The 
figures are derived from the Data Warehouse Bmask (Jandl-Gartner et al., 2010) 
and show that 67% of the participants were employed a year before their 
participation in the labour foundation. This amount decreased to 17% a week 
before the persons were eligible to enter a labour foundation. Furthermore, the 
figure shows that 51% of the participants were employed immediately after they 
left the foundation and 31% became unemployed once again. One year after 
leaving the labour foundation 69% of the employees was employed and 11% 
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Figure 5.5: Gross effects labour foundations, 2005 (persons) 
 
Source: (Jandl-Gartner et al., 2010) Quelle: DWH mon_vb_ueb2.mdc 
 
Research institute Synthesis Forschung analysed the career paths of 3.134 
participants in labour foundations in Vienna between 1995 and 2002. 
 












Fully  43% 42% 43% 43% 
Mostly 23% 24% 24% 24% 
Insufficient 16% 15% 15% 15% 
Unemployed 15% 13% 15% 14% 









Source: Synthesis (Wagner & Lassnigg, 2005) 

107  Synthesis considers persons who left the labour foundation and are employed for at 
least 35 hours a week as fully integrated. Mostly integrated are those who are employed 
for less than 100%, but at least for 50% of their labour market potential. Insufficient 
means that a person is employed for less than 50% of their labour market potential. 
Inactive persons are those who are not economically active, e.g., persons on maternity 
leave or on pension (Wagner & Lassnigg, 2005).
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Table 5.10 shows that one year after leaving a labour foundation 67% are fully or 
mostly active in the labour market. There are no significant differences in results 
between the types of foundations.  
 
However, figure 5.5 and table 5.10 do not present the net effects of labour 
foundation interventions. In 2008, the Research Institute for Vocational Training 
and Adult Education (Institut für Berufs- und Erwachsenenbildungsforschung, IBE) 
of Linz University published an evaluation report regarding the Elektra Bregenz 
Arbeitsstiftung. Owing to restructuring in the mother company, Arcelik, in 2003, 
Elektra Bregenz108 had to close down the Elektra Bregenz AG and Elektra 
Bregenz production mbH Schwaz. This tense situation in the Tyrol labour 
market resulted in the lay off of 240 employees and the establishment of a 
labour foundation. After five years the IBE evaluated the labour foundation. The 
effects of the interventions for the 97 participants of the foundation (LF_EB) 
were compared with the effects for a control group (CG), i.e., 97 former Elektra 
Bregenz employees, who did not enter the labour foundation (Kellermayr, 
Niederberger, & Sepp, 2008).  
 
Table 5.11: Employment status after participation in the Elektra Bregenz (EB) 
labour foundation in comparison with a control group 
Employed in months 
after the  intervention 
3 months  6 months  12 months  24 months  
 LF-EB CG LF-EB CG LF-EB CG LF-EB CG 
Employed 75% 49% 79% 58% 82% 62% 83% 66% 
Unemployed 14% 36% 12% 27% 6% 19% 6% 17% 
Out of labour force 6% 12% 6% 13% 9% 15% 11% 15% 
Training/Education 6% 3% 3% 2% 2% 3% 0% 1% 
Source: Institut für Berufs- und Erwachsenenbildungsforschung (IBE Linz) of Linz 
University (Kellermayr et al., 2008). 
 
Table 5.11 shows that the employment rates three months after the intervention 
are significantly higher for participants in the Elektra Bregenz Labour Found-
ation (75%) compared with their control group (49%). Although the difference 
decreases over time, it appears that even after two years the participants of the 
Elektra Bregenz labour foundation have a higher employment rate compared 
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108  A company which manufactures household appliances.
AUSTRIA 
182 
Table 5.12: Employment rates participants Elektra Bregenz labour foundation divided 
by age, level of education and duration of participation in the labour foundation 
Employed in months after 
the  intervention 
3 months  6 months 12 months  24 months  
Age     
< 34 years  97% 96% 97% 98% 
35- 44 years  74% 85% 90% 95% 
45 > years 62% 63% 64% 63% 
Level of education     
Compulsory education109  68% 72% 75% 76% 
Vocational secondary 
education110 
80% 86% 88% 88% 
Higher education111 80% 80% 86% 92% 
Duration participation in EB labour foundation   
< 6 months  85% 89% 88% 88% 
6 – 12 months 74% 76% 80% 83% 
> 1 year 59% 71% 76% 72% 
Source: Institut für Berufs- und Erwachsenenbildungsforschung (IBE Linz) of Linz 
University (Kellermayr et al., 2008) 
 
The IBE Linz study also revealed (see table 5.12) that: 
 The younger the participants of the EB labour foundation, the higher the 
employment rates after the intervention; 
 The higher the education level of the participants in the EB labour 
foundation, the greater the chances of employment after the intervention; 
 The shorter the intervention (participation in the EB labour foundation), the 
higher the employment rates thereafter (Kellermayr et al., 2008). 
 
Most of the interviewees consider the labour outplacement foundations to be a 
successful instrument. One interviewee mentions that the results of the training 
in the labour foundations are better and that the success rates of the labour 
foundation in terms of reintegration is higher compared with the general 
qualification measures and interventions provided by the AMS. However, some 
of the interviewees comment that the success rates can vary among the labour 
foundations and that these foundations are rather expensive. Furthermore, one 
interviewee adds that in his view the participation period of a maximum of four 
years is too long, saying: “If a person in a labour foundation starts with an 

109  Pflichtschule
110  Berufsbildende Mittlere Schule (BMS) + Lehre




education which last for three years, this means that the person does not 
participate on the labour market for three years. Furthermore, from the 
employers’ perspective there has to be a link between the education followed and 
the future demands of the employers. The view from the Trade Union or 
Arbeiterkammer is different. They consider the labour foundation as an 
instrument in which the person can make his own career path”. In 2009, the 
average duration of the participation in a labour foundation was 295 days (see 
table 5.8). 
 
5.7 Success and failure factors 
 
Besides some comments (see section 5.6), the majority of the interviewees 
consider the outplacement labour foundations as a successful instrument in 
supporting people from job-to-job. According to an interviewee from the 
Arbeiterkammer, an important factor for the establishment of a successful 
labour foundation is mutual trust between the several actors. The involvement 
of the works council or the trade union at the local level is also mentioned as a 
success factor. Furthermore, one interviewee adds that you need to operate fast 
and that you need to have money for the establishment and operation of the 
foundation: “If there is some additional money to spend on those who are to be 
dismissed, and if there is a climate of trust and dialogue between the 
management and the works councils and there is an infrastructure, e.g., in 
Vienna with the ‘offene arbeitsstiftung Wien’, things can go really fast. You can 
create an arbeitsstiftung within 14 days. People need security and local 
politicians need something positive to say about a bad thing. And managers 
have security about the follow-up for their former employees. Furthermore, the 
public employment service should be able to react fast”. A regional network in 
which the public employment service, trade unions and employers are involved 
and pull in the same direction is another important success factor according to 
several interviewees. 
 
One interviewee mentioned that the previous labour foundations’ success rates 
are an important reason for current companies to establish a labour foundation. 
These success rates are not only relevant for the management of the companies, 
but also for the employees who stay in the company. The possible participation 
in a labour foundation for those whose jobs are at risk, eases the conscience of 
employees who are not supernumerary. It creates ‘peace’ on the work floor, 
because employees know that they are working for an enterprise which is taking 
care of you, even when your job will disappear. A successful labour foundation 
also contributes to the positive image of the company. “We know that big 
companies with a long tradition of these kinds of labour foundations are 
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of the works council or the trade union at the local level is also mentioned as a 
success factor. Furthermore, one interviewee adds that you need to operate fast 
and that you need to have money for the establishment and operation of the 
foundation: “If there is some additional money to spend on those who are to be 
dismissed, and if there is a climate of trust and dialogue between the 
management and the works councils and there is an infrastructure, e.g., in 
Vienna with the ‘offene arbeitsstiftung Wien’, things can go really fast. You can 
create an arbeitsstiftung within 14 days. People need security and local 
politicians need something positive to say about a bad thing. And managers 
have security about the follow-up for their former employees. Furthermore, the 
public employment service should be able to react fast”. A regional network in 
which the public employment service, trade unions and employers are involved 
and pull in the same direction is another important success factor according to 
several interviewees. 
 
One interviewee mentioned that the previous labour foundations’ success rates 
are an important reason for current companies to establish a labour foundation. 
These success rates are not only relevant for the management of the companies, 
but also for the employees who stay in the company. The possible participation 
in a labour foundation for those whose jobs are at risk, eases the conscience of 
employees who are not supernumerary. It creates ‘peace’ on the work floor, 
because employees know that they are working for an enterprise which is taking 
care of you, even when your job will disappear. A successful labour foundation 
also contributes to the positive image of the company. “We know that big 
companies with a long tradition of these kinds of labour foundations are 





The involvement of the former employers in the labour foundation is also 
considered to be a success factor behind the labour foundations. The former 
employer continues to shoulder some responsibility for redundant employees by 
means of financial contributions to the foundations. Furthermore, the former 
employers can provide, free of charge, workshops, machinery and tools that 
might become necessary for retraining (Suschnigg, 2001). 
 
The intensive and wide variety of services and the tailor-made approach 
contribute to the success rate of the labour foundation. One interviewee said: “A 
good diagnosis and orientation phase is the first step and from then on 
participants can follow training, even lengthy education, or they can participate 
in other activities. It is a very broad, wide range of services which is offered in the 
labour foundations”.  
 
Participation in the labour foundations is voluntary. Companies can set up a 
labour foundation and offer in this way services to their redundant staff, but it is 
not obligatory for these employees to participate in the foundation. This means 
that participants in the labour foundation are intrinsically motivated to work on 
their future career and this influences the success rate of the labour foundations.  
 
5.8 Concluding remarks 
 
The Austrian government, the Public Employment Service AMS, and indirectly 
also the social partners, play the main role in supporting people from job-to-job 
in the event of redundancy. The role of social partners in this corporatist 
structure cannot be detached from the role of the state in this process. They are 
strongly involved in the law and labour market policy making process. The social 
partners are represented in committees and boards at all levels of the AMS. For 
example, the reform of the severance pay system (Abfertigung Neu) has been 
developed through a process of social dialogue at national level. This reform 
serves in policy documents as an interesting example of flexicurity (European 
Commission, 2006). The aim of the new labour law measure is to support 
employment transitions. According to the European commission: “the Austrian 
reform provides an interesting example of a radical shift away from a system 
based on the traditional employment relationship between one worker and one 
firm to one based on a broader employee benefit provision fund operated at 
national level. The link was cut between being laid off by an employer and the 
payment of a once-off severance award. The new rules allow workers to leave 
when they find alternative employment rather than stay in a particular job for 
fear of losing the accompanying severance payment. The reform removed the 
threat to a firm's existence which could be posed by the sudden cost of 
redundancies, while the employer's contribution to the individual savings fund 
can be spread over time. From the employee’s perspective, the new system 
reduces the cost of job mobility since workers no longer lose all of their 
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entitlement to severance payments when taking a new job.” (European 
Commission, 2006, p.9). However, as previously discussed in section 5.1.3, it 
appears that an employee who withdraws the severance pay out of the fund can 
spend the money on whatever the worker wants. This does not enhance the 
employability of the workers and the question presents itself as to whether this 
reform contributes to finding a new job quickly after employees have been given 
notice. The debate about the severance reform started in the 1990s. The 
following underlying explanations can be identified for reform: the low coverage 
of the previous system, the loss of entitlements when an employee voluntarily 
terminated the contract and, from the employers’ perspective, the high 
severance costs. Furthermore, the aims of the new law were to address liquidity 
problems, and to extend the second pension pillar which was underdeveloped in 
Austria. 
 
An instrument for supporting job-to-job transitions for redundant employees 
mentioned in the interviews is the labour foundation. The first labour 
foundations were established by large companies as a result of the privatization 
and down-sizing of nationalized steel companies, which led to large scale 
redundancies in the 1980s. At that time, there was an atmosphere of fear, 
helplessness and lack of personal perspective and further legislation that would 
allow early retirement was not expected. The idea behind the first labour 
foundations was that money and a social plan are valuable, but the best help is 
active support into another job. The labour foundations evolved over time. Over 
the years, the target group and infrastructure enlarged with the introduction of 
regional and sectoral labour foundations and the distinction between 
outplacement and implacement foundations. There are several underlying 
motives for establishing a labour foundation. Companies have certain 
responsibilities towards their former employees which are formalised in a social 
plan, or companies consider the foundations as a kind of personnel pool in which 
former employees will be trained at the expense of the public employment 
service. Furthermore, the success rates of other labour foundations and motives 
of social corporate responsibility are reasons to establish a labour foundation. 
The conditions for the establishment of a labour foundation are laid down in an 
AMS guideline (AMS, 2010), but the further implementation is based on 
agreements between the actors involved. This makes the instrument of labour 
foundation flexible, because the foundation can be adjusted to the employers, 
employees and regional labour market actors’ needs. Actors should pull in the 
same direction and that implies the need not to over regulate things, but rely on 
mutual trust and common interests.  
 
In response to the question as to what can be improved with respect to the 
Austrian job-to-job transition system, one interviewee mentioned that Austria 
can implement schemes that are targeted on employed people rather than 
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retraining opportunities and facilities for the employed. Labour foundations 
function as a bridge ‘in between jobs’ and the participants of the labour 
foundations are unemployed, i.e., they receive an unemployment benefit from 
the AMS. Therefore, strictly speaking, these labour foundations are preventative 
measures geared towards avoiding long-term unemployment (tertiary 
prevention). 
 
According to an interviewee who was involved in the establishment of different 
labour foundations, excessive additional payments in the agreements between 
the company and the trade unions or works council should be avoided, especially 
when the majority of the redundant employees are older workers. The interest in 
setting up a labour foundation faded among older workers, because they 
wanted extra money to tide over a period of unemployment until retirement. 
They did not see the importance of retraining and education, and thus in the 
establishment of a labour foundation. This led to tough negotiations because, 
for younger redundant employees, a labour foundation is a better solution. The 
chance for retraining in the foundation could provide them better future 
perspectives.  
 
An interesting conclusion from the Austrian labour foundations is that the 
former employer continues to shoulder the responsibility for their redundant 
employees. The former employers deposit a sum of money in the labour 
foundation. In addition, the companies who have to lay off employees can 
contribute by providing tools, personnel or equipment free of charge, which 
might become necessary for retraining (Suschnigg, 2001).  
 
The Austrian training networks, in which at least three companies - from which 
50% are small and medium sized companies - collaborate, can be considered as 
primary prevention measures. The joint aim is to provide training to their 
employees while sharing the costs of training and education. 
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6.1.1 Political Background 
Between 1939 and 1975, the dictator Francisco Franco ruled over Spain. When 
Franco came into power, political opponents were suppressed or tightly 
controlled. For example, the Spanish Trade Union Organisation (Organización 
Sindical Español, OSE112) was established in 1940 and was regarded as the only 
legal trade union organisation in Spain, while the trade unions Confederación 
Nacional del Trabajo (CNT) and the Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT) were 
outlawed.113  At that time strikes were forbidden. Under Franco’s regime 
permanent jobs were protected by high redundancy pay and administrative 
authorisation procedures. Work organisation was strictly governed by labour 
regulations (Ordenanzas laborales) which were a substitute for collective 
bargaining (Rhodes, 1997). Franco died on the 20th November 1975 and Juan 
Carlos was crowned king. Spain made the transition from an authoritarian 
regime to a modern capitalist democracy. After Franco’s death, King Juan Carlos 
appointed Suárez as head of the new government. Between 1976 and 1977, 
Suárez presented a political programme in which a new law for political reform 
and democratic elections were announced. In June 1977, general elections were 
held. The results, and how the seats of the Spanish congress (Congreso de los 
Diputados) were divided, are presented in table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1: Results general elections 15 June 1977, Spain 
Party Votes % Seats 
 Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD)  6,310,391 34.5 165 
 Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE)  5,371,866 29.4 118 
 Partido Comunista de España (PCE)  1,709,890 9.4 20 
 Alianza Popular (AP)  1,504,771 8.2 16 
 Pacte Democràtic per Catalunya (PDC)  514,647 2.8 11 
 Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV)  296,193 1.6 8 
 Partido Socialista Popular-Unidad Socialista (PSP-US)  816,582 4.5 6 
 Unió del Centro i la Democracia Cristiana de Catalunya  
 (UC-DCC)  
172,791 1.0 2 
 Esquerra de Catalunya-Front Electoral Democràtic (EC-FED)  143,954 0.8 1 
 Euskadiko Ezkerra-Izquierda de Euskadi (EE-IE)  61,417 0.3 1 
 Candidatura Aragonesa Independiente del Centro (CAIC)  37,183 0.2 1 
 Candidatura Independiente del Centro (CIC)  29,834 0.2 1 
 Others  1,308,566 7.2 0 
Source: http://electionresources.org/es/congress.php?election=1977 

112  Also known as the Vertical Syndicate (Sindicato Vertical).
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In 1978, the Spanish constitution was approved by a referendum and several 
reforms took place. One important labour market reform was the reconstruction 
of a democratic system of labour relations through the recognition and 
implementation of the rights of associations, collective bargaining and strikes 
(Rodríguez Piñero Royo, 2001).  
In 1982, the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, 
PSOE), led by Felipe González Márquez, won the elections and ruled for the next 
13 years. In 1996, the People’s Party (Partido Popular, PP), led by José María 
Aznar, won the elections and governed with the support of the Basque 
Nationalist Party, the Catalan Convergence and Union, and the Canarian 
Coalition. In 2000, the PP gained an absolute majority. In 2004, new elections 
were held, only a few days after one of the bloodiest terrorist attacks ever 
experienced in Europe. Ten bombs exploded on three separate commuter trains 
in Madrid during the morning rush hour. The PP lost 35 seats, while the Spanish 
Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) vote rose by 8.5%, achieving a gain of 39 seats 
(Chari, 2004). In 2008, the Spanish Prime Minister, Jose Luis Rodriguez Apatero 
of the PSOE, was re-elected to a second term with 43.36% of the votes.114 Since 
1977, Spain has had no coalition government.  
 
6.1.2 Economic history and labour market features 
All parties benefited from the transition from dictatorship to democracy in the 
mid 1970s: the unions legitimised themselves as social actors, the employers 
were rewarded with wage moderation and an institutional framework for labour 
relations, and the state was able to promote social peace and controlled 
modernisation. However, the price to be paid was high.  
After Franco’s regime, Spain’s unemployment rate increased from 5.1% in 1977 
to 21% in 1985 (Rhodes, 1997). Different reform processes have taken place, 
beginning with the constitution of 1978. Spain was transformed into a 
decentralized state with strong regional governments, called “Comunidades 
Autónomas” (Rodríguez Piñero Royo, 2001). Rhodes states that the increase in 
unemployment between 1977 and 1985 can be explained by the rapid 
restructuring of the Spanish economy after its post-Franco liberalisation, the 
massive destruction of agricultural employment, the impact of the oil shocks in 
the 1970s, and the substantial increase in female workforce participation 
triggered by social and cultural modernisation (Rhodes, 1997). Furthermore, 
Rhodes argues that the heritage of the stringent institutional framework of the 
labour market under Franco’s regime played a key role in the sharp increase in 
unemployment rates.  
 

114  The real truth, 17 March 2008, Spanish election results – What next for Spain, 
http://www.realtruth.org/news/080317-002-europe.html, accessed 14 June 2011.
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Several measures were taken in the 1980s aimed at introducing higher levels of 
flexibility in the labour market, e.g. the introduction of a wide range of fixed 
term contracts. In section 6.1.3, the several reforms which took place after 
Franco’s era will be discussed in more detail. Labour reforms in which there is a 
shift in the balance of power and responsibility between unions, employers and 
the state turned out to be difficult in Spain. All attempts at reform since the mid 
1980s provoked general strikes. In the second half of the 1980s, the Spanish 
economy recovered, but the unemployment rate itself never fell below 15% 
(Jimeno & Toharia, 1994). In the early 1990s, Spain was confronted with another 
recession and unemployment rose again, with a peak in 1994 (19.5%) (see also 
figure 2.3 in section 2.2). In 1994, a second wave of reforms was announced in 
which employers’ rights were widened in the contract of employment and 
collective bargaining was given a wider role in the setting of working conditions 
(Rodríguez Piñero Royo, 2001). Between 1995 and 2007, the Spanish 
unemployment rate decreased from 19.5% to 8.3%, but has increased explosively 
since then owing to the 2008 economic crisis. In 2010, the unemployment rate 
rose to 18%. Spain is characterized by a dual labour market, where employees 
with a permanent contract are still well protected compared with people with a 
temporary contract.  
 
6.1.3 Legal framework on redundancy and unemployment insurance 
In Spain several laws are relevant in the framework of redundancy, e.g., the 
Workers’ Statute (Ley del Estatuto de los Trajbajadores), Royal Decrees, the 
collective redundancy legislation (Expediente de Regulación de Empleo, ERE). 
During the last decades, Spanish law has been reformed several times. In this 
section, the several legal reforms will be discussed in more detail, including the 
recent law 35/2010 which implements a set of urgent measures to reform the 
current labour market.  
 
Spanish labour market reforms in a nutshell 
In 1977, the Royal Decree of Industrial Relations came into force. The single trade 
union Organización Sindical Español (OSE), which was established under Franco’s 
regime, was discontinued and free trade unions were legalized (Aguirregabiria & 
Alonso-Borrego, 2009). The Workers’ Statute dates from 1980 and its reform in 
1984 established the conditions for a modern system of collective bargaining, 
but it should be pointed out that nothing changed regarding the legal and 
administrative restrictions on dismissals. Under the Franco regime the labour 
market was characterised by a very flexible wage-setting process, combined 
with a very rigid employment system which, de facto, guaranteed lifetime jobs 
to employees in exchange for compliance on wages and political acquiescence. 
Jimeno and Toharia state that the Francoist system “did allow dismissals for 
workforce adjustment (those related to union or political activities were 
considered disciplinary dismissals and hence carried no costs for the employer). 
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Several measures were taken in the 1980s aimed at introducing higher levels of 
flexibility in the labour market, e.g. the introduction of a wide range of fixed 
term contracts. In section 6.1.3, the several reforms which took place after 
Franco’s era will be discussed in more detail. Labour reforms in which there is a 
shift in the balance of power and responsibility between unions, employers and 
the state turned out to be difficult in Spain. All attempts at reform since the mid 
1980s provoked general strikes. In the second half of the 1980s, the Spanish 
economy recovered, but the unemployment rate itself never fell below 15% 
(Jimeno & Toharia, 1994). In the early 1990s, Spain was confronted with another 
recession and unemployment rose again, with a peak in 1994 (19.5%) (see also 
figure 2.3 in section 2.2). In 1994, a second wave of reforms was announced in 
which employers’ rights were widened in the contract of employment and 
collective bargaining was given a wider role in the setting of working conditions 
(Rodríguez Piñero Royo, 2001). Between 1995 and 2007, the Spanish 
unemployment rate decreased from 19.5% to 8.3%, but has increased explosively 
since then owing to the 2008 economic crisis. In 2010, the unemployment rate 
rose to 18%. Spain is characterized by a dual labour market, where employees 
with a permanent contract are still well protected compared with people with a 
temporary contract.  
 
6.1.3 Legal framework on redundancy and unemployment insurance 
In Spain several laws are relevant in the framework of redundancy, e.g., the 
Workers’ Statute (Ley del Estatuto de los Trajbajadores), Royal Decrees, the 
collective redundancy legislation (Expediente de Regulación de Empleo, ERE). 
During the last decades, Spanish law has been reformed several times. In this 
section, the several legal reforms will be discussed in more detail, including the 
recent law 35/2010 which implements a set of urgent measures to reform the 
current labour market.  
 
Spanish labour market reforms in a nutshell 
In 1977, the Royal Decree of Industrial Relations came into force. The single trade 
union Organización Sindical Español (OSE), which was established under Franco’s 
regime, was discontinued and free trade unions were legalized (Aguirregabiria & 
Alonso-Borrego, 2009). The Workers’ Statute dates from 1980 and its reform in 
1984 established the conditions for a modern system of collective bargaining, 
but it should be pointed out that nothing changed regarding the legal and 
administrative restrictions on dismissals. Under the Franco regime the labour 
market was characterised by a very flexible wage-setting process, combined 
with a very rigid employment system which, de facto, guaranteed lifetime jobs 
to employees in exchange for compliance on wages and political acquiescence. 
Jimeno and Toharia state that the Francoist system “did allow dismissals for 
workforce adjustment (those related to union or political activities were 
considered disciplinary dismissals and hence carried no costs for the employer). 
However, dismissals for economic reasons were considered “unwarranted” and 
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hence usually involved severance payments, the level of which was left to the 
discretion of the judge deciding the case. Additionally, in the case of collective 
dismissals, an administrative procedure had to be followed” (Jimeno & Toharia, 
1994, p.92). The Workers’ Statute widened the grounds for economic and 
technological redundancies and imposed stricter limits on the discretion 
previously enjoyed by the judges in settling dismissal cases. Furthermore, the 
Workers’ Statute defined periods for the resolution of the collective dismissals 
(Jimeno & Toharia, 1994). 
 
Following the introduction of the Workers’ Statute, temporary or fixed-term 
contracts were allowed. These contracts could be terminated with much less 
severance pay than the 20 or 45 days per year of service for permanent 
contracts. Furthermore, these contracts could be terminated without court or 
regulatory intervention (Aguirregabiria & Alonso-Borrego, 2009). The use of 
temporary contracts was previously limited to jobs that were temporary in 
nature, e.g. seasonal work (Polavieja, 2003). The increasing unemployment rate 
at that time, together with employers’ dissatisfaction regarding the strict 
employment legislation, forced the government to broaden the scope of 
temporary contracts aiming to boost employment (Aguirregabiria & Alonso-
Borrego, 2009). The reform of 1984 did not alter the stringent dismissal 
regulations for permanent or indefinite duration contracts, but regulated that 
the use of temporary contracts was no longer limited to the principle of 
causality, meaning that any temporary contract could be applied to any activity, 
temporary or not. In the context of an economic downturn the government 
approved several kinds of temporary contracts, some of which already existed 
and some were completely new. For example, the temporary contract for 
employment promotion aimed to provide less costly and more flexible entries 
into the labour market. In order to encourage employment, in 1984 the 
restrictions on this type of fixed-term contract were lifted in order to provide 
more flexibility to employers to adjust the workforce, aiming at encouraging 
employment creation in a situation of economic downturn.  
The dismissal costs for temporary contracts were low (12 days per year of 
service) and temporary contracts could be renewed for only up to three years 
(Aguirregabiria & Alonso-Borrego, 2009). Moreover, the employer was obliged 
to either convert the temporary contract into a permanent contract or to put an 
end to the employment relationship when the termination date expired 
(Polavieja, 2003). Following the 1984 reform, the number of employees with a 
temporary contract increased significantly in Spain to 35% in 1995. Spain stands 
out as having by far the highest temporary employment rate in the European 
Union. As pointed out by Polavieja, the 1984 reform opened up opportunities for 
new entrants in flexible labour, while workers on permanent contracts continued 
to enjoy the privileges of rigid employment security legislation, which imposes 
very high dismissal costs for permanent employment (Polavieja, 2003). Thus far, 
Spain had liberalised temporary employment contracts in the 1980s, but still 
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nothing had been done to relax the employment protection legislation for 
employees with a permanent contract. This resulted in a growing segmentation 
of the labour market: the temporary part of the labour market was becoming 
more precarious as it grew in size, while the permanent core was becoming 
more secure as it shrank. 
 




In the early 1990s, the unemployment rate rose again and there was a strong 
consensus for the need for action. In 1993, the government put forward reform 
proposals, which were adopted in 1994. The regulation regarding severance pay 
remained unchanged, but the grounds for ‘justified’ individual and collective 
dismissals were expanded and clarified. Furthermore, regulations of working 
time were altered in an effort to allow companies greater internal flexibility and 
overtime pay would be set by collective bargaining instead of the 50% obligatory 
premium. Apprenticeship contracts were introduced. The employers did not 
have to pay social security contributions for these apprenticeship workers, nor 
were these employees entitled to unemployment benefits. Moreover, the role of 
collective bargaining was strengthened and decentralised in the regulation of 
labour relations (OECD, 2009). Until then, private employment agencies and 
temporary employment agencies were forbidden. The labour reforms of 1993-
1994 legalised the non-private employment agencies and temporary 
employment agencies. All other profit-making private employment agencies 
were still forbidden.  
 
In 1994, the ‘temporary contract for employment promotion’ was restricted to 
specific groups (employees aged over 45 and the long-term unemployed) in 
order to reduce the rate of temporary employment. However, it turned out that 
the restriction of this type of contract led to greater use of other types of 
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nothing had been done to relax the employment protection legislation for 
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of the labour market: the temporary part of the labour market was becoming 
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employment promotion was completely abolished in 1997 and a new contract, 
with the approval of lower dismissal costs (33 days per year of service with a 
maximum of 24 months), was introduced: the “permanent employment 
promotion contracts” (contrato para el fomento de la contratación indefinida), 
which is applicable only to certain categories of workers (young unemployed, 
long-term unemployed and unemployed aged over 45).115 The payroll taxes were 
reduced by between 40 and 90% for newly signed permanent contracts and by 
50% for conversions of temporary into permanent contracts (Kugler, Jimeno, & 
Hernanz, 2005). In 2001, the government aimed to reduce segmentation by the 
introduction of severance costs for temporary contracts which are not renewed; 
eight days per year of service (Dolado, García-Serrano, & Jimeno, 2002). 116 
 
In the 2001-2002 reform the target group for the use of permanent employment 
promotion contracts was extended. From then employees aged 16-30 years, as 
well as the unemployed with more than six months of registered unemployment 
(instead of one year), could be eligible for a permanent employment promotion 
contract. Furthermore, the firm’s obligation to pay interim wages when 
dismissed workers appealed to labour court was abolished, as long as the firm 
acknowledged the dismissal as being unfair and deposited the severance pay (45 
days’ wages per year of service) in court within two days of the dismissal 
(Bentolila, Dolado, & Jimeno, 2008). However, the number of temporary 
employees as a percentage of the total number of employees remained high. 
According to Bentolila, Dolado en Jimeno, the conversion rate into open-ended 
contracts was around 4% of the total number of contracts. In 2006, a new reform 
took place. Temporary workers aged 31-45 years could be eligible for a 
permanent employment promotion contract. This was a temporary measure 
which lasted until the end of 2007. Furthermore, with this reform tax deductions 
were introduced for employers who converted temporary contracts into 
permanent employment promotion contracts, and contracts lasting for two 
years in the same job within the came company during a period of 30 months 
were automatically converted to open-ended contracts (Bentolila et al., 2008). 
As can be observed from figure 6.1, this reform did have an effect on the number 
employees with a temporary contract. There was a substantial reduction from 
34.1% in 2006 to 25% in 2010. 
 
In June 2010, the Spanish government announced measures to reform the 
labour market. These measures were deemed necessary as result of the severe 
unemployment situation, the high number of employees with a temporary 
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115 Royal Decree-Law 8/1997Royal Decree-Law 9/1997.
116  Act 12/2001 of 9 July 2001 on Urgent Measures Reforming the Job Market in Order to 
Increase and Improve the Quality of Employment.
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contract, the scarce use by employers of the possibilities for internal flexibility 
provided by the law, the insufficient capacity of the Public Employment Service 
(Servicio Público de Empleo Estatal), and the discrimination towards women, 
disabled and older employed persons. For many years, Spanish employers have 
strived for lower severance pay and more flexibility, i.e. less rigid employment 
protection legislation for those with a permanent contract. In 2010, the 
conversation between trade unions and employers’ organisations to reform the 
labour market reached a total deadlock and consequently the government felt 
forced to intervene. The government put forward the plan for the reform as a bill 
to Parliament, so that political parties which were not positive about the reform 
could propose amendments. On 19 September 2010, law 35/2010 (ley 35/2010 de 
medidas urgentes para la reforma del mercado de trabajo) entered into force.  
The preamble states that the aim of the new law is to reduce unemployment and 
to increase the productivity of the Spanish economy. Furthermore, the 
objectives of the measures are described in the preamble, which are: 
 to reduce the temporary/permanent duality, promoting the creation of 
quality, stable employment; 
 to strengthen the measures for internal flexibility in employment, 
particularly, the reduction of hours, as a mechanism to maintain employment 
during crisis situations;  
 to increase the opportunities for the unemployed, particularly the young 
unemployed. 
 
The preamble also states that all regulations in connection with permanent 
employment contracts should remain unchanged because the aim of this law is 
to reduce unemployment and the amount of temporary contracts and all 
measures are focused on that. It adds that the intermediation mechanisms can 
be improved in order to promote opportunities for the unemployed. The aim is 
to preserve a central authority and to strengthen the role of the Public 
Employment Service. Furthermore, the new law includes the possibility for 
private profit employment agencies to cooperate with the Public Employment 
Service. This public-private cooperation was prohibited before the reform of 
2010. How this cooperation will take shape and will be implemented, remains to 
be seen. 
 
The law introduces urgent measures to reform the labour market and includes 
measures: 
 to reduce duality and the number of temporary contracts; 
 to promote internal flexibility and the reduction of working hours as 
elements in temporarily adjusting employment; 
 to promote the employment of young people and the unemployed; 
 to improve labour mediation and equal treatment of temporary employees 
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disabled and older employed persons. For many years, Spanish employers have 
strived for lower severance pay and more flexibility, i.e. less rigid employment 
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2010. How this cooperation will take shape and will be implemented, remains to 
be seen. 
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 to introduce a capitalisation fund (à la the Austrian Abfertigung Neu) (Guitart 
Carrero & Ortiz Palma, 2010). 
 
Collective dismissals 
In the event of collective dismissals the employer has to request the competent 
Labour Authority for permission to terminate the employment contracts. This 
procedure is required when the collective dismissal will take place within a 
period of 90 days and the dismissal is planned for: 
 10 workers in a company with fewer than 100 employees; 
 10% of the number of workers, in the company in which there are at least 
between 100 and 300 employees; 
 30 workers in companies which employ 300 or more employees (Ministerio 
de Trabajo e Inmigración Spain, 2009).  
 
For companies with more than 50 employees it is obligatory to draw up a social 
plan (El plan social) which contains measures to avoid or reduce the impact of 
collective dismissal. The social plan needs to be filed together with the collective 
dismissal request (Expediente de Regulación de Empleo, ERE) and further 
negotiated with the legal representatives of the employees, i.e., the Works 
Council or Trade Unions (Aragón Medina, Rocha Sánchez, & De La Fuente Sanz, 
2010; Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración Spain, 2009). 
 
Statutory severance pay 
In Spain the statutory severance pay amounts to twenty days’ salary per year of 
service with a maximum of one years’ salary.117 The severance pay in the event of 
unfair dismissal equates to 45 days’ salary per year of service up to a maximum 
of 3.5 years. As explained previously, the introduction of Law 35/2010118 
implements a set of urgent measures to reform the Spanish labour market. The 
severance compensation for the promotion of permanent employment 
contracts (contrato para el fomento de la contratatción indefinida) is not changed 
if the contract is terminated on objective grounds and the termination is deemed 
to be unfair. In that case the severance pay is 33 days’ salary per year of service 
with a maximum of two years, instead of 45 days’ salary per year of service. One 
of the measures of the new reform is that the target group for this type of 
contract is extended (Guitart Carrero & Ortiz Palma, 2010). Since 2001, Spanish 
law has permitted the design of contracts to encourage indefinite employment 
for specific groups with a severance pay of 33 days’ salary per year of service in 
the event of unfair dismissal, e.g. for people 16-30 years old, those over 45, 

117  Workers’ Statute (Estatuto de los Trabajadores), sec, 53(1) (b).
118  Ley 35/2010, de medidas urgentes para la reforma del Mercado de trabajo, Boletin ofical 
del Estado, 18 de septiembre de 2010.
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unemployed women and individuals employed for more than a half year.119 The 
new law 35/2010 has extended the possibilities of concluding contracts for the 
promotion of permanent employment and now the contracts can be used in the 
following cases: 
 Unemployed women registered at the Public Employment Service who, in 
the first two years following the start of labour, take care of a minor, who join 
the labour market after a period of unemployment of 5 years or who are 
victims of domestic violence or human trafficking; 
 Unemployed people who have been registered at the Public Employment 
Service for at least one month; 
 Unemployed people who in the two years prior to the signing of the contract 
were exclusively hired under temporary contracts, including training 
contracts; 
 Employees working for the same company under a temporary contract 
(including training contracts), agreed before 18 June 2010, and whose 
contracts are converted into contracts for the promotion of permanent 
employment before 31 December 2010; 
 Employees working for the same company under a temporary contract, 
including training contracts agreed on or after 18 June 2010, and whose 
contracts are converted into contracts for the promotion of permanent 
employment before 21 December 2011, provided that the duration of the 
temporary contract has not exceeded six months. This maximum will not 
apply to training contracts (Guitart Carrero & Ortiz Palma, 2010). 
 
Furthermore, the employee receives a compensation for the period between the 
actual dismissal date and the date that the court decides that the dismissal is 
unlawful, usually a period of four months (Kempen et al., 2008). In the event of 
collective dismissals the severance pay is equal to twenty days’ salary for each 
year of service, up to a maximum of twelve months’ pay. In practice, it has 
turned out that it has been easier for employers to dismiss an employee by 
paying him the unfair dismissal indemnification of 45 days of the earned salary 
per year of service, than to dismiss the employee because of reasons of 
redundancy and pay the 20 days’ per year of service. In the event of collective 
dismissals the trade unions and employers negotiate and try to reach a social 
plan. In theory two possibilities can occur: 
 The trade union and the employer reach an agreement and the employer 
pays the negotiated severance pay which is usually higher than the statutory 
minimum; 
 The parties do not reach an agreement and the labour authorities authorize 
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In Spain the statutory severance pay amounts to twenty days’ salary per year of 
service with a maximum of one years’ salary.117 The severance pay in the event of 
unfair dismissal equates to 45 days’ salary per year of service up to a maximum 
of 3.5 years. As explained previously, the introduction of Law 35/2010118 
implements a set of urgent measures to reform the Spanish labour market. The 
severance compensation for the promotion of permanent employment 
contracts (contrato para el fomento de la contratatción indefinida) is not changed 
if the contract is terminated on objective grounds and the termination is deemed 
to be unfair. In that case the severance pay is 33 days’ salary per year of service 
with a maximum of two years, instead of 45 days’ salary per year of service. One 
of the measures of the new reform is that the target group for this type of 
contract is extended (Guitart Carrero & Ortiz Palma, 2010). Since 2001, Spanish 
law has permitted the design of contracts to encourage indefinite employment 
for specific groups with a severance pay of 33 days’ salary per year of service in 
the event of unfair dismissal, e.g. for people 16-30 years old, those over 45, 
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117  Workers’ Statute (Estatuto de los Trabajadores), sec, 53(1) (b).
118  Ley 35/2010, de medidas urgentes para la reforma del Mercado de trabajo, Boletin ofical 
del Estado, 18 de septiembre de 2010.
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unemployed women and individuals employed for more than a half year.119 The 
new law 35/2010 has extended the possibilities of concluding contracts for the 
promotion of permanent employment and now the contracts can be used in the 
following cases: 
 Unemployed women registered at the Public Employment Service who, in 
the first two years following the start of labour, take care of a minor, who join 
the labour market after a period of unemployment of 5 years or who are 
victims of domestic violence or human trafficking; 
 Unemployed people who have been registered at the Public Employment 
Service for at least one month; 
 Unemployed people who in the two years prior to the signing of the contract 
were exclusively hired under temporary contracts, including training 
contracts; 
 Employees working for the same company under a temporary contract 
(including training contracts), agreed before 18 June 2010, and whose 
contracts are converted into contracts for the promotion of permanent 
employment before 31 December 2010; 
 Employees working for the same company under a temporary contract, 
including training contracts agreed on or after 18 June 2010, and whose 
contracts are converted into contracts for the promotion of permanent 
employment before 21 December 2011, provided that the duration of the 
temporary contract has not exceeded six months. This maximum will not 
apply to training contracts (Guitart Carrero & Ortiz Palma, 2010). 
 
Furthermore, the employee receives a compensation for the period between the 
actual dismissal date and the date that the court decides that the dismissal is 
unlawful, usually a period of four months (Kempen et al., 2008). In the event of 
collective dismissals the severance pay is equal to twenty days’ salary for each 
year of service, up to a maximum of twelve months’ pay. In practice, it has 
turned out that it has been easier for employers to dismiss an employee by 
paying him the unfair dismissal indemnification of 45 days of the earned salary 
per year of service, than to dismiss the employee because of reasons of 
redundancy and pay the 20 days’ per year of service. In the event of collective 
dismissals the trade unions and employers negotiate and try to reach a social 
plan. In theory two possibilities can occur: 
 The trade union and the employer reach an agreement and the employer 
pays the negotiated severance pay which is usually higher than the statutory 
minimum; 
 The parties do not reach an agreement and the labour authorities authorize 
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the collective dismissal. Then the severance pay will be the statutory 
minimum of twenty days per year of service up to a maximum of one years’ 
salary. 
 
However, in practice, the labour authorities do not authorize collective 
dismissals if the trade union and employer do not reach an agreement. There-
fore, employers try to reach an agreement as early as possible in the redundancy 
process, to avoid the risk of strikes. In some cases, e.g. force majeure or small 
companies in financial difficulties, the severance pay is covered by the Wage 
Guarantee Fund (FOGASA, Fondo de Garantia Salarial120). The Wage Guarantee 
Fund is a public body with a tripartite board and is wholly financed by employers’ 
contributions. Since 2010, the Wage Guarantee Fund will pay the severance pay 
directly to the employee with a permanent contract, under the conditions that 
the contract is terminated on objective grounds, the contract started from 18th 
June 2010, and the agreement has been in force for at least 10 months. This is a 
temporary measure and will apply until the introduced capitalisation fund starts 
to operate. This capitalisation fund is similar to the Abfertigung Neu system in 
Austria and envisages the creation of a lifelong individual fund for workers in 
order to minimise the high severance costs assumed by Spanish employers. The 
employee will be able to make use of the fund in, e.g. dismissal or retirement. 
The fund should come into force on 1 January 2012. However, in the interviews, 
both trade unions and employers’ associations wonder if and how the fund will 
be implemented. An interviewee from the employers’ association is very 
doubtful about the implementation and argues that it is too expensive. The 
government launched a new capitalisation fund, but trade unions and employers 
should negotiate about the further implementation of this fund. How will it be 
financed is the main question, and it is clear that expectations for financial 
contributions from the government are out of the question, because the 
government is confronted with high deficits. It seems that among trade unions 
and employers’ associations there is less support for the implementation of the 
capitalisation fund. 
 
From 2001, employees with a fixed-term contract were entitled to severance pay 
equal to eight days’ salary per worked year.121 In 2010, it was decided that the 
statutory severance pay for the termination of a temporary contract will 
gradually increase from eight to twelve days’ salary per worked year by 2015. 
With the 2010 reform, the limitation on the duration of temporary contracts for a 
specific job or service to three years has been maintained, but can be extended 

120  <http://www.mtin.es/fogasa/>, accessed 13 April 2011.
121  Act 12/2001 of 9 July 2001 on Urgent Measures Reforming the Job Market in Order to 
Increase and Improve the Quality of Employment.
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for up to one year under a state collective agreement and industry-specific 
collective agreement. After this period has elapsed, the employees acquire the 
status of permanent employees (Guitart Carrero & Ortiz Palma, 2010). Further-
more, the new law continues to take the chain of temporary employment 
contracts into consideration. Employees who have been employed for more 
than two years in a period of 30 months, with or without interruption in the same 
or in another company within the group, will become permanent employees 
(Guitart Carrero & Ortiz Palma, 2010). 
With the labour law reform in 2010, the definition of the economic grounds for 
dismissal based on objective grounds was relaxed. A situation of actual or 
expected losses is deemed sufficient. However, the company still has to prove 
that dismissals are justified in order to maintain or improve the company’s 
competitive position in the market. The OECD concludes that the labour market 
reform legislation of September 2010 still leaves much room for judicial 
interpretation, and that it is unclear as to what extent the legislation will change 
the practice whereby firms prefer to pay upfront the highest severance pay in 
order to avoid going to court (OECD, 2010a). The notice period is reduced from 
30 to 15 days.122 
 
The unemployment benefit 
Employees who lose their jobs are eligible for unemployment benefit, provided 
that the employee has paid social security contributions over 360 days in the six 
years prior to the occurrence of unemployment. The duration of an 
unemployment benefit depends on the work experience in the six years prior to 
the situation of becoming unemployed. The maximum duration of the 
unemployment benefit is two years.  
 
Table 6.2: Duration of the contribution-based unemployment benefit 
Period of work for which contributions 
have been made during the 6 years prior 
to unemployment 
Duration of the  
unemployment benefit 
360 – 539 days 120 days 
540 – 719 days 180 days 
720 – 899 days 240 days 
900 – 1079 days 300 days 
1080 – 1259 days 360 days 
1260 – 1439 days  420 days 
1440 – 1619 days 480 days 
1620 – 1799 days 540 days 
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121  Act 12/2001 of 9 July 2001 on Urgent Measures Reforming the Job Market in Order to 
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for up to one year under a state collective agreement and industry-specific 
collective agreement. After this period has elapsed, the employees acquire the 
status of permanent employees (Guitart Carrero & Ortiz Palma, 2010). Further-
more, the new law continues to take the chain of temporary employment 
contracts into consideration. Employees who have been employed for more 
than two years in a period of 30 months, with or without interruption in the same 
or in another company within the group, will become permanent employees 
(Guitart Carrero & Ortiz Palma, 2010). 
With the labour law reform in 2010, the definition of the economic grounds for 
dismissal based on objective grounds was relaxed. A situation of actual or 
expected losses is deemed sufficient. However, the company still has to prove 
that dismissals are justified in order to maintain or improve the company’s 
competitive position in the market. The OECD concludes that the labour market 
reform legislation of September 2010 still leaves much room for judicial 
interpretation, and that it is unclear as to what extent the legislation will change 
the practice whereby firms prefer to pay upfront the highest severance pay in 
order to avoid going to court (OECD, 2010a). The notice period is reduced from 
30 to 15 days.122 
 
The unemployment benefit 
Employees who lose their jobs are eligible for unemployment benefit, provided 
that the employee has paid social security contributions over 360 days in the six 
years prior to the occurrence of unemployment. The duration of an 
unemployment benefit depends on the work experience in the six years prior to 
the situation of becoming unemployed. The maximum duration of the 
unemployment benefit is two years.  
 
Table 6.2: Duration of the contribution-based unemployment benefit 
Period of work for which contributions 
have been made during the 6 years prior 
to unemployment 
Duration of the  
unemployment benefit 
360 – 539 days 120 days 
540 – 719 days 180 days 
720 – 899 days 240 days 
900 – 1079 days 300 days 
1080 – 1259 days 360 days 
1260 – 1439 days  420 days 
1440 – 1619 days 480 days 
1620 – 1799 days 540 days 
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122  Law 35/2010.
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1800 – 1979 days 600 days 
1980 – 2159 days 660 days 
2160 or more 720 days 
Source: Spanish Ministry of Employment and Immigration (Ministerio de Trabajo e 
Inmigración Spain, 2009) 
 
The level of unemployment benefit depends on the social security contributions 
paid in the 180 days prior to the date of unemployment. In the first 180 days of 
unemployment the benefit level equals 70% of the regulatory base and from day 
181, 60% of the regulatory base. When the entitlements for the contribution-
based unemployment benefit expire, the jobseeker can be eligible for a welfare 
benefit of EUR 421.79 per month. The duration of the welfare benefit depends 
on the age of the jobseeker and any possible family responsibilities and lasts for 
maximum of 30 months. 
 
Table 6.3 presents the net unemployment replacement rates according to the 
OECD indicator for the initial phase of unemployment. The earning level refers 
to the average of replacement rates for unemployed persons who earned 67% 
and 100% of average working earning at the time of losing job.  
 
Table 6.3: Net Replacement Rates in Spain for six family types: initial phase of 
 unemployment, 2009, by earning level of average wage (AW) 
 Family type 























67% of AW 78 74 89 75 75 88 80 
100% of AW 60 60 77 75 75 85 72 
Source: OECD123  
 
6.2 Type of support to find work after redundancy 
 
In Spain there are no specific job-to-job measures to support redundant 
employees. In the event of redundancies, trade unions dedicate themselves to 
keeping the jobs, i.e., they strive for job security rather than employment 
security. Once it is clear that job losses are inevitable trade unions try to 
negotiate the best financial severance pay for the redundant employees, i.e. a 
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123  <http://www.oecd.org/document/3/0,3343,en_2649_34637_39617987_1_1_1_1,00.html>, 
accessed 12 July 2011.
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severance pay which is higher than the statutory minimum (see section 6.1.3). 
According to several interviewees, the trade unions do not focus on active job-
to-job support, but they make every effort to achieve the best financial deal for 
their employees (passive support). A person who loses his job can go to the 
Public Employment Service to register as unemployed. There are 17 regional 
Public Employment Services in Spain124 and each regional office can develop its 
own active labour market policy. Furthermore, the Public Employment Service 
provides the unemployment benefit. The criteria for the level of the 
unemployment benefit is the same in each region and depends on the social 
security contributions paid in the period prior to unemployment (see also section 
6.1.3). Several interviewees mention that the Spanish unemployment rate is 
currently so high that the public employment services are tied up with providing 
unemployment benefits. The Public Employment Services have no time to 
support people in finding another job. Furthermore, as already explained in 
section Chapter 2, Spain has fewer job openings compared with other European 
countries, which makes it more difficult to find another job quickly. 
From the perspective of preventing unemployment, several interviewees 
mentioned the Tripartite Training Foundation (Fundación Tripartita para la 
Formación en el Empleo) which facilitates training possibilities for employed 
people to improve their skills. The foundation supports the Public Employment 
Service in developing programmes and in the management and control of 
vocational training. The board of this national foundation has a tripartite 
character and consists of representatives from government (Ministry of 
Employment and Immigration and Autonomous Communities), employers’ 
organisations (CEOE and CEPYME) and trade unions (CCOO, UGT and CIG). 
According to one interviewee the tripartite foundation does not explicitly focus 
on job-to-job transition, but the training measures can be considered as 
preventative unemployment measures. The training supported by the Tripartite 
Training Foundation consists of two types: demand oriented training and supply 
oriented training. The demand oriented training comprises two versions: 
training activities in companies and individual training leave in order to obtain 
formal qualifications or professional certificates. Both types seek to address the 
specific training needs raised by employers and employees (Fundación Tripartita 
para la Formación en el Empleo, 2010a).  
 
The credit allocated for training is provided by a reduction in the social security 
contribution and depends on the size of the company.125 In 2008, the credit 
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124  Andalusia, Asturias, Canary Islands, Castile and Léon, Catalonia, Galicia, Murcia, Basque 
country, Aragon, Balearic Islands, Cantabria, Castile-La Mancha, Extremadura, Madrid, 
Navarre, La Rioja, Community of Valencia.
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severance pay which is higher than the statutory minimum (see section 6.1.3). 
According to several interviewees, the trade unions do not focus on active job-
to-job support, but they make every effort to achieve the best financial deal for 
their employees (passive support). A person who loses his job can go to the 
Public Employment Service to register as unemployed. There are 17 regional 
Public Employment Services in Spain124 and each regional office can develop its 
own active labour market policy. Furthermore, the Public Employment Service 
provides the unemployment benefit. The criteria for the level of the 
unemployment benefit is the same in each region and depends on the social 
security contributions paid in the period prior to unemployment (see also section 
6.1.3). Several interviewees mention that the Spanish unemployment rate is 
currently so high that the public employment services are tied up with providing 
unemployment benefits. The Public Employment Services have no time to 
support people in finding another job. Furthermore, as already explained in 
section Chapter 2, Spain has fewer job openings compared with other European 
countries, which makes it more difficult to find another job quickly. 
From the perspective of preventing unemployment, several interviewees 
mentioned the Tripartite Training Foundation (Fundación Tripartita para la 
Formación en el Empleo) which facilitates training possibilities for employed 
people to improve their skills. The foundation supports the Public Employment 
Service in developing programmes and in the management and control of 
vocational training. The board of this national foundation has a tripartite 
character and consists of representatives from government (Ministry of 
Employment and Immigration and Autonomous Communities), employers’ 
organisations (CEOE and CEPYME) and trade unions (CCOO, UGT and CIG). 
According to one interviewee the tripartite foundation does not explicitly focus 
on job-to-job transition, but the training measures can be considered as 
preventative unemployment measures. The training supported by the Tripartite 
Training Foundation consists of two types: demand oriented training and supply 
oriented training. The demand oriented training comprises two versions: 
training activities in companies and individual training leave in order to obtain 
formal qualifications or professional certificates. Both types seek to address the 
specific training needs raised by employers and employees (Fundación Tripartita 
para la Formación en el Empleo, 2010a).  
 
The credit allocated for training is provided by a reduction in the social security 
contribution and depends on the size of the company.125 In 2008, the credit 
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124  Andalusia, Asturias, Canary Islands, Castile and Léon, Catalonia, Galicia, Murcia, Basque 
country, Aragon, Balearic Islands, Cantabria, Castile-La Mancha, Extremadura, Madrid, 
Navarre, La Rioja, Community of Valencia.
125  Real Decreto 395/2007.
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amounted for employers: 
 With more than 100 employees: 50%; 
 50 to 249 employees: 60%; 
 10 to 49 employees: 75%; 
 6 to 9 employees: 100%; 
 Less than five employees: a discount of EUR 420 per company (Fundación 
Tripartita para la Formación en el Empleo, 2010a). 
 
At the beginning of each year, companies know how much credit there is 
available for training and education for their employees. In order to reclaim the 
social security contribution, companies should register themselves via a digital 
information system of the Public Employment Service. The Tripartite Training 
Foundation is responsible for the maintenance and the development of this 
system and provides information about the amount of the credit to be available 
for their employees. Companies who are registered in the internet application of 
the Public Employment Service can apply and manage the assigned training 




As explained in previous sections, there are no specific measures in Spain to 
support redundant employees to find a new job quickly. Employees who lose 
their jobs can register at the Public Employment Service. The training credit 
described in the previous section can be considered as a preventative measure 
and not as a curative job-to-job transition instrument.  
The Tripartite Training Foundation finances training and education for: 
 Employees with permanent and fixed term contracts (but not temporary 
agency workers) and self-employed; 
 Seasonal workers during the period that they are not working; 
 Redundant employees; 
 Employees who become unemployed while they are following an education 
or training.  
Initially, the Tripartite Training Foundation financed only training and education 
for employees, but since the introduction of the Royal Decree in 2007, the 




The Tripartite Training Foundation provides financial support to companies and 
their employees who want to follow training courses and education. The 
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126  Real Decreto 395/2007, de 23 de marzo 2007.
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Foundation is financed by the contribution of both employers and employees. 
From the gross salary 0.70% is deducted to be paid into the national fund for 
training. 0.60% is at the expense of the employers and the remaining 0.10% is 
paid by the employees. Furthermore, the Tripartite Training Foundation is 
financed by a subsidy from the European Social Fund. In 2010, the subsidy was 
EUR 250,000,000 and in total the Tripartite Training Foundation had at its 
disposal EUR 2,571,633,130. From this budget, 60% is intended for education and 
training for employees and the remaining 40% for training for the unemployed. 
Thus, in 2010 there was a budget of EUR 1,545.4 million available for training and 
education for Spanish employees (Fundación Tripartita para la Formación en el 
Empleo, 2010b). 
 
6.5 Responsibility, coordination, and delivery  
 
In Spain there is no clear division of responsibilities concerning active job-to-job 
support for employees whose jobs are at risk. Active support is lacking. Usually, 
redundant employees become unemployed and receive an unemployment 
benefit from the state.  
 
6.5.1 Associations 
Companies with 50 or more employees which initiate a redundancy procedure 
should add a social plan to request the competent labour authority to terminate 
the labour relationship (Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración Spain, 2009). These 
social plans can contain a range of measures aimed at avoiding or reducing the 
impact of the collective dismissal process and minimising the consequences for 
those eventually affected by the collective dismissal process. In a study 
conducted by the Ministry of Employment and Immigration (Ministerio de 
Trabajo e Inmigracion) in collaboration with the 1st May Foundation (la Fundación 
1 de Mayo), six case studies in different Spanish companies and sectors were 
analyzed. These case studies of restructuring companies with a social plan show 
that alternative support can be offered besides the financial compensation, e.g., 
training, internal redeployment, external outplacement or delayed relocation. 
Although the six case studies described can serve as good examples of 
alternative negotiated measures to reduce the impact of the collective dismissal, 
there is consensus among Spanish scholars that Spanish social plans have little 
impact on job-to-job transitions (Aragón Medina et al., 2010). This is also 
confirmed by the interviewees. Their first argument is that the Spanish labour 
market is based on micro and very small sized companies (see also table 2.7 in 
Chapter 2), which means that the majority of the dismissals are not covered by 
the collective redundancy legislation (Expediente de Regulación de Empleo, ERE) 
and thus are not obliged to negotiate a social plan. Micro and small sized 
companies have been hit hard by the economic crisis. Many companies have 
gone bankrupt and many jobs have been lost. Micro and small sized companies 




amounted for employers: 
 With more than 100 employees: 50%; 
 50 to 249 employees: 60%; 
 10 to 49 employees: 75%; 
 6 to 9 employees: 100%; 
 Less than five employees: a discount of EUR 420 per company (Fundación 
Tripartita para la Formación en el Empleo, 2010a). 
 
At the beginning of each year, companies know how much credit there is 
available for training and education for their employees. In order to reclaim the 
social security contribution, companies should register themselves via a digital 
information system of the Public Employment Service. The Tripartite Training 
Foundation is responsible for the maintenance and the development of this 
system and provides information about the amount of the credit to be available 
for their employees. Companies who are registered in the internet application of 
the Public Employment Service can apply and manage the assigned training 




As explained in previous sections, there are no specific measures in Spain to 
support redundant employees to find a new job quickly. Employees who lose 
their jobs can register at the Public Employment Service. The training credit 
described in the previous section can be considered as a preventative measure 
and not as a curative job-to-job transition instrument.  
The Tripartite Training Foundation finances training and education for: 
 Employees with permanent and fixed term contracts (but not temporary 
agency workers) and self-employed; 
 Seasonal workers during the period that they are not working; 
 Redundant employees; 
 Employees who become unemployed while they are following an education 
or training.  
Initially, the Tripartite Training Foundation financed only training and education 
for employees, but since the introduction of the Royal Decree in 2007, the 




The Tripartite Training Foundation provides financial support to companies and 
their employees who want to follow training courses and education. The 

126  Real Decreto 395/2007, de 23 de marzo 2007.
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Foundation is financed by the contribution of both employers and employees. 
From the gross salary 0.70% is deducted to be paid into the national fund for 
training. 0.60% is at the expense of the employers and the remaining 0.10% is 
paid by the employees. Furthermore, the Tripartite Training Foundation is 
financed by a subsidy from the European Social Fund. In 2010, the subsidy was 
EUR 250,000,000 and in total the Tripartite Training Foundation had at its 
disposal EUR 2,571,633,130. From this budget, 60% is intended for education and 
training for employees and the remaining 40% for training for the unemployed. 
Thus, in 2010 there was a budget of EUR 1,545.4 million available for training and 
education for Spanish employees (Fundación Tripartita para la Formación en el 
Empleo, 2010b). 
 
6.5 Responsibility, coordination, and delivery  
 
In Spain there is no clear division of responsibilities concerning active job-to-job 
support for employees whose jobs are at risk. Active support is lacking. Usually, 
redundant employees become unemployed and receive an unemployment 
benefit from the state.  
 
6.5.1 Associations 
Companies with 50 or more employees which initiate a redundancy procedure 
should add a social plan to request the competent labour authority to terminate 
the labour relationship (Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración Spain, 2009). These 
social plans can contain a range of measures aimed at avoiding or reducing the 
impact of the collective dismissal process and minimising the consequences for 
those eventually affected by the collective dismissal process. In a study 
conducted by the Ministry of Employment and Immigration (Ministerio de 
Trabajo e Inmigracion) in collaboration with the 1st May Foundation (la Fundación 
1 de Mayo), six case studies in different Spanish companies and sectors were 
analyzed. These case studies of restructuring companies with a social plan show 
that alternative support can be offered besides the financial compensation, e.g., 
training, internal redeployment, external outplacement or delayed relocation. 
Although the six case studies described can serve as good examples of 
alternative negotiated measures to reduce the impact of the collective dismissal, 
there is consensus among Spanish scholars that Spanish social plans have little 
impact on job-to-job transitions (Aragón Medina et al., 2010). This is also 
confirmed by the interviewees. Their first argument is that the Spanish labour 
market is based on micro and very small sized companies (see also table 2.7 in 
Chapter 2), which means that the majority of the dismissals are not covered by 
the collective redundancy legislation (Expediente de Regulación de Empleo, ERE) 
and thus are not obliged to negotiate a social plan. Micro and small sized 
companies have been hit hard by the economic crisis. Many companies have 
gone bankrupt and many jobs have been lost. Micro and small sized companies 
cannot file for a redundancy process and the dismissal procedure is 
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individualized. This leaves much room for micro and small companies to get rid 
of the employees, but job-to-job support for their redundant employees is hardly 
ever offered. Employees who lose their job at a micro or small sized company 
will become unemployed and are thrown back onto the service of the Public 
Employment Service. 
 
The second argument is that the content of the average negotiated social plan 
between trade unions and large companies is poor and is focused on financial 
measures (the severance pay) (Aragón Medina et al., 2010). One interviewee 
argues that employers’ and employees’ representatives negotiate the amount of 
the severance pay and access to early retirement rather than alternative 
measures to support people from job-to-job. This is confirmed by several other 
interviewees, including representatives from employers’ organisations and trade 
unions. One trade union interviewee explained that trade unions try to negotiate 
alternative measures to minimize the impact for the employees, but that in the 
Spanish culture employees still choose the financial compensation. The 
alternative measures are less accepted by the employees. Representatives of 
employers’ organisations confirm this in the interviews. In their view, trade 
unions are not really interested in training measures or reduction of working 
hours, but they strive for the highest severance pay.  
 
Thirdly, to carry out a social plan is quite expensive for employers, according to a 
representative of the employers’ organisation. They have to pay for the 
outplacement and training costs and eventually pay the severance pay also. 
Finally, during the negotiations employees’ representatives very often tend to 
focus more on understanding the reasons for the company filing for redundancy 
rather than on anything else. This can be explained by the lack of transparency, 
but also because the consultation with the employee representatives only 
happens at the stage of execution of the collective dismissal plan. This implies 
that employees become opposed to the reasons for the collective dismissal and 
mistrust the company (Aragón Medina et al., 2010). An atmosphere of distrust 
does not contribute to finding job-to-job transition solutions supported by both 
employees’ and employers’ organisations. One interviewee mentioned that 
Spanish people with a permanent contract do not want to make a transition to 
another job, even though it is inevitable. It seems that Spanish workers prefer 
job security rather than employment security. 
 
The trade unions and employers’ organisation play a very important role in 
vocational training for the employed. As explained in section 6.2, this can be 
seen as a preventative measure for unemployment. Employees’ (CCOO, UGT, 
CIG) and employers’ organisations (CEOE and CEPYME) are part of the Tripartite 




6.5.2 The state: Government and Public Employment Service 
The Spanish Public Employment Service consists of one national public 
employment service and 17 regional public employment services. The 
interviewees from the Ministry of Labour and the national Public Employment 
Service reported that the state and the public employment service are not 
involved in direct job-to-job transitions for people whose jobs are at risk. The 
PES’ priorities are targeted on the unemployed, by designing professional 
pathways towards the labour market, and on providing (unemployment) 
benefits. Some interviewees argue that the employment policies and the 
intervention of the Public Employment Service could be more active (Aragón 
Medina et al., 2010) and endorse that the 17 regional Public Employment 
Services have insufficient resources and skilled people to serve the high number 
of unemployed. One interviewee mentioned that the PES does not have the 
time and resources to offer actual professional pathways and guidance. 
Furthermore, some interviewees argue that there is no coordination between 
the national Public Employment Service and the 17 regional Public Employment 
Services, nor indeed between the 17 regional Public Employment Services.  
 
As previously explained in section 6.1.3, in 2010, the severe labour market 
situation with an increasing unemployment rate and strained relations between 
trade unions and employers’ organisations, forced the state to interfere and the 
Spanish government introduced plans to reform the labour market. The new law 
should preserve a central authority and strengthen the role of the Public 
Employment Service in order to promote the opportunities for the unemployed.  
 
6.5.3 Market 
Although the concept of outplacement is known in Spain it seems that the 
application of these services are scarce compared with other European countries 
(Kieselbach, Wagner, Mader, & Beelmann, 2001). Several explanations can be 
suggested for the limited use of outplacement services. Firstly, until 1993, the 
Public Employment Service had a monopoly on providing employment services. 
Since 1993, private employment agencies have been legal in Spain and allowed 
the incorporation of two types of private employment agencies: non-profit 
private employment agencies and temporary employment agencies. However, 
the space for private employment agencies to act on the labour market is still 
relatively small, because of the stringent Spanish labour law. Article 16 of the 
Workers’ statute regulates that the private employment agencies are not 
allowed to make any profit. Only non-private employment agencies that are 
authorized by the Public Employment Service and registered in a public register 
are allowed to provide employment services. As Piñero points out, the state 
controls the employment service and private employment services which are 
allowed to provide employment service are under strict controls and have little 
possibility of developing (Rodríguez Piñero Royo, 2001). Secondly, Kieselbach et 




individualized. This leaves much room for micro and small companies to get rid 
of the employees, but job-to-job support for their redundant employees is hardly 
ever offered. Employees who lose their job at a micro or small sized company 
will become unemployed and are thrown back onto the service of the Public 
Employment Service. 
 
The second argument is that the content of the average negotiated social plan 
between trade unions and large companies is poor and is focused on financial 
measures (the severance pay) (Aragón Medina et al., 2010). One interviewee 
argues that employers’ and employees’ representatives negotiate the amount of 
the severance pay and access to early retirement rather than alternative 
measures to support people from job-to-job. This is confirmed by several other 
interviewees, including representatives from employers’ organisations and trade 
unions. One trade union interviewee explained that trade unions try to negotiate 
alternative measures to minimize the impact for the employees, but that in the 
Spanish culture employees still choose the financial compensation. The 
alternative measures are less accepted by the employees. Representatives of 
employers’ organisations confirm this in the interviews. In their view, trade 
unions are not really interested in training measures or reduction of working 
hours, but they strive for the highest severance pay.  
 
Thirdly, to carry out a social plan is quite expensive for employers, according to a 
representative of the employers’ organisation. They have to pay for the 
outplacement and training costs and eventually pay the severance pay also. 
Finally, during the negotiations employees’ representatives very often tend to 
focus more on understanding the reasons for the company filing for redundancy 
rather than on anything else. This can be explained by the lack of transparency, 
but also because the consultation with the employee representatives only 
happens at the stage of execution of the collective dismissal plan. This implies 
that employees become opposed to the reasons for the collective dismissal and 
mistrust the company (Aragón Medina et al., 2010). An atmosphere of distrust 
does not contribute to finding job-to-job transition solutions supported by both 
employees’ and employers’ organisations. One interviewee mentioned that 
Spanish people with a permanent contract do not want to make a transition to 
another job, even though it is inevitable. It seems that Spanish workers prefer 
job security rather than employment security. 
 
The trade unions and employers’ organisation play a very important role in 
vocational training for the employed. As explained in section 6.2, this can be 
seen as a preventative measure for unemployment. Employees’ (CCOO, UGT, 
CIG) and employers’ organisations (CEOE and CEPYME) are part of the Tripartite 




6.5.2 The state: Government and Public Employment Service 
The Spanish Public Employment Service consists of one national public 
employment service and 17 regional public employment services. The 
interviewees from the Ministry of Labour and the national Public Employment 
Service reported that the state and the public employment service are not 
involved in direct job-to-job transitions for people whose jobs are at risk. The 
PES’ priorities are targeted on the unemployed, by designing professional 
pathways towards the labour market, and on providing (unemployment) 
benefits. Some interviewees argue that the employment policies and the 
intervention of the Public Employment Service could be more active (Aragón 
Medina et al., 2010) and endorse that the 17 regional Public Employment 
Services have insufficient resources and skilled people to serve the high number 
of unemployed. One interviewee mentioned that the PES does not have the 
time and resources to offer actual professional pathways and guidance. 
Furthermore, some interviewees argue that there is no coordination between 
the national Public Employment Service and the 17 regional Public Employment 
Services, nor indeed between the 17 regional Public Employment Services.  
 
As previously explained in section 6.1.3, in 2010, the severe labour market 
situation with an increasing unemployment rate and strained relations between 
trade unions and employers’ organisations, forced the state to interfere and the 
Spanish government introduced plans to reform the labour market. The new law 
should preserve a central authority and strengthen the role of the Public 
Employment Service in order to promote the opportunities for the unemployed.  
 
6.5.3 Market 
Although the concept of outplacement is known in Spain it seems that the 
application of these services are scarce compared with other European countries 
(Kieselbach, Wagner, Mader, & Beelmann, 2001). Several explanations can be 
suggested for the limited use of outplacement services. Firstly, until 1993, the 
Public Employment Service had a monopoly on providing employment services. 
Since 1993, private employment agencies have been legal in Spain and allowed 
the incorporation of two types of private employment agencies: non-profit 
private employment agencies and temporary employment agencies. However, 
the space for private employment agencies to act on the labour market is still 
relatively small, because of the stringent Spanish labour law. Article 16 of the 
Workers’ statute regulates that the private employment agencies are not 
allowed to make any profit. Only non-private employment agencies that are 
authorized by the Public Employment Service and registered in a public register 
are allowed to provide employment services. As Piñero points out, the state 
controls the employment service and private employment services which are 
allowed to provide employment service are under strict controls and have little 
possibility of developing (Rodríguez Piñero Royo, 2001). Secondly, Kieselbach et 
al. argue that voluntary agreement between labour unions and businesses to use 
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outplacement services is lacking (Kieselbach et al., 2001). Sentmarti et al., explain 
that outplacement services can be part of companies’ human resource policy, but 
that it is not obligatory to launch this support for their redundant employees 
(Sentmarti, Lemkow, Espluga, & Baltiérrez, 2002). The interviews revealed that 
the use of outplacement services is still today not widespread in Spain.  
Thus, until the reform of 2010, the existence of profit-making outplacement 
agencies was forbidden. However, in Spain there are a few so-called Service-
Sector companies which, thanks to a loophole in the Spanish constitution, 
provide outplacement services for companies (Arellano, Felguersoso, Vázquez, 
& González, 2008; Kieselbach et al., 2001). These individual outplacement 
services are not widespread127, are usually provided for high skilled managers, 
mostly male, aged between 35 and 45, and are commissioned by big 
multinational companies (Arellano, 2007). The company wanting to get rid of 
high skilled employees pays for the outplacement services. The reform of 2010 
allows private employment agencies to collaborate with the Public Employment 
Service, which was prohibited before. However, this collaboration is still in its 
infancy and the future will show if the outplacement service will develop further 
in Spain. The development of the outplacement services in Spain will depend on 
whether or not the Spanish companies feel responsible for job-to-job transition, 
or if they envisage this transition as an individual responsibility, or if both 
Spanish employers and employees envisage job-to-job transition as a state 
responsibility. Traditionally, in Spain the predominant view was that to earn a 
profit on other people’s work is unethical. And although the temporary 
employment agencies and non-profit employment agencies were legalised in the 
early 1990s, there still was an atmosphere of mistrust and these organisations 
were put under heavy controls (Rodríguez Piñero Royo, 2001). It remains to be 
seen how the reform of 2010 will turn out for private employment agencies. 
Several interviewees mention that the introduction of private employment 
agencies could be a solution for the current severe unemployment situation. 
They argue that the private employment agencies work with standardized 
methods, while the public employment services in the different regions have 
their own labour market policies. Diplomas and certificates obtained via the 
Public Employment Service in one region can have no value in another region. 
Furthermore, one interviewee from a large temporary employment agency 
mentioned that his organisation is willing to support the Public Employment 
Service to help unemployed people into the labour market, so that the Public 
Employment Service could focus on priority groups, i.e. people who are at the 
margin of the labour market. However, until recently this was not legal. 

127  According to Arellano et al., in 2008, there were five important outplacement 





Large companies are obliged by law to negotiate with trade unions about a 
social plan when they file for a redundancy process. Training or alternative 
measures can be part of the plan, but, as already seen in section 6.5.1, the social 
plans that integrate financial measures and alternative job-to-job measures are 
rare (Aragón Medina et al., 2010). As examined in the previous section, the use 
of outplacement service is not widespread in Spain, but might further develop 
because employment agencies have been allowed to provide employment 
services in the labour market since the 2010 reform. Kieselbach argues that 
individual persons are responsible for employment and that Spanish companies 
do not feel responsible for job-to-job transitions. This is confirmed by the 
interviewees who also state that the consequences of unemployment are 
collectivised and put aside to the state and the social security system (Kieselbach 
et al., 2001). 
 
6.5.5 Networks 
None of the interviewees are aware of networks of companies that help each 
other in supporting redundant employees from job-to-job.  
 
6.5.6 Responsibility for job-to-job transitions 
In the Spanish interviews the question is asked, who should be responsible for 
job-to-job transitions for those whose jobs are at risk. Some Spanish 
interviewees mention this should be a joint responsibility. The individuals 
themselves should be convinced that life-long learning is important during their 
entire career and that they should continuously invest in their skills. Further-
more, employers should be responsible for job related training and training 
providers should be aware of the future needs of employers. Another 
interviewee states that trade unions and employers should alert the Public 
Employment Service in the case of redundancies and that subsequently the 
Public Employment Service should be responsible for supporting people to 
another job as quickly as possible. However, in practice, no Spanish actor feels 
truly responsible for job-to-job transition in the case of forced dismissal. One 
interviewee mentioned that there is no specific institutionalised official service 
for job-to-job transitions. The Public Employment Service has no specific 
services for redundant employees, which implies that most employees who lose 




As explained previously, in Spain there is no active job-to job support for 
employees whose jobs are at risk, but as several interviewees mentioned the 
activities financed by the Tripartite Training Foundation can be envisaged as 
preventive unemployment measures. The employers’ association is satisfied 
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Thus, until the reform of 2010, the existence of profit-making outplacement 
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Sector companies which, thanks to a loophole in the Spanish constitution, 
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in Spain. The development of the outplacement services in Spain will depend on 
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profit on other people’s work is unethical. And although the temporary 
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were put under heavy controls (Rodríguez Piñero Royo, 2001). It remains to be 
seen how the reform of 2010 will turn out for private employment agencies. 
Several interviewees mention that the introduction of private employment 
agencies could be a solution for the current severe unemployment situation. 
They argue that the private employment agencies work with standardized 
methods, while the public employment services in the different regions have 
their own labour market policies. Diplomas and certificates obtained via the 
Public Employment Service in one region can have no value in another region. 
Furthermore, one interviewee from a large temporary employment agency 
mentioned that his organisation is willing to support the Public Employment 
Service to help unemployed people into the labour market, so that the Public 
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Large companies are obliged by law to negotiate with trade unions about a 
social plan when they file for a redundancy process. Training or alternative 
measures can be part of the plan, but, as already seen in section 6.5.1, the social 
plans that integrate financial measures and alternative job-to-job measures are 
rare (Aragón Medina et al., 2010). As examined in the previous section, the use 
of outplacement service is not widespread in Spain, but might further develop 
because employment agencies have been allowed to provide employment 
services in the labour market since the 2010 reform. Kieselbach argues that 
individual persons are responsible for employment and that Spanish companies 
do not feel responsible for job-to-job transitions. This is confirmed by the 
interviewees who also state that the consequences of unemployment are 
collectivised and put aside to the state and the social security system (Kieselbach 
et al., 2001). 
 
6.5.5 Networks 
None of the interviewees are aware of networks of companies that help each 
other in supporting redundant employees from job-to-job.  
 
6.5.6 Responsibility for job-to-job transitions 
In the Spanish interviews the question is asked, who should be responsible for 
job-to-job transitions for those whose jobs are at risk. Some Spanish 
interviewees mention this should be a joint responsibility. The individuals 
themselves should be convinced that life-long learning is important during their 
entire career and that they should continuously invest in their skills. Further-
more, employers should be responsible for job related training and training 
providers should be aware of the future needs of employers. Another 
interviewee states that trade unions and employers should alert the Public 
Employment Service in the case of redundancies and that subsequently the 
Public Employment Service should be responsible for supporting people to 
another job as quickly as possible. However, in practice, no Spanish actor feels 
truly responsible for job-to-job transition in the case of forced dismissal. One 
interviewee mentioned that there is no specific institutionalised official service 
for job-to-job transitions. The Public Employment Service has no specific 
services for redundant employees, which implies that most employees who lose 




As explained previously, in Spain there is no active job-to job support for 
employees whose jobs are at risk, but as several interviewees mentioned the 
activities financed by the Tripartite Training Foundation can be envisaged as 
preventive unemployment measures. The employers’ association is satisfied 
with the way the Tripartite Training Foundation works. Many employees have 
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been trained through this system, according to one interviewee. In the near 
future some agreements are going to be renewed to improve the system for 
vocational training. The employers’ association underlines the necessity of good 
evaluations. The current evaluations focus on financial and quantitative 
elements, and not on qualitative data. This is confirmed in an interview with a 
representative from the Association of Temporary Employment Agencies. 
According to this interviewee the training subsidized by the Tripartite Training 
Foundation should be evaluated, what works and what does not work? What are 
the results of the training? The Tripartite Training Foundation only audits if the 
financial means are used for the purpose for which they have been granted. 
Furthermore, the training provided should fit the employers’ needs, but that is 
not taken into account in the evaluations. Thus, data about the performance of 
the Tripartite Training Foundation is limited in this section to quantitative data, 
i.e. regarding the used training credits and the number of employees that have 
received training or used the individual training leave. 
 
In 2008, 201,030 companies used the credit system to finance training for their 
employees and the total costs amounted to EUR 575,260,266 (Fundación 
Tripartita para la Formación en el Empleo, 2009). Table 6.4 shows that the 
amounts of the credits used increased by 24% between 2007 and 2008. The 
sharpest increase can be observed by the micro enterprises. The training credits 
used by companies with one to five employees increased by almost 70% 
between 2007 and 2008.  
 
Table 6.4: Development of the assigned and used training credits by size of com-
panies and sector in Euro 2007-2008 
 Credits assigned Credits used Ratio 
Company size 
(number of  
Employees) 
2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 
1-5  24,321,286 40,883,881 20,194,114 34,271,314 83.0 83.8 
6-9 12,592,397 19,470,396 9,079,100 13,776,493 72.1 70.8 
10-49  81,685,898 113,235,023 51,061,611 67,187,314 62.5 59.3 
50-99  45,169,015 55,532,040 27,639,063 33,236,613 61.2 59.9 
100-249  65,891,055 77,306,117 39,956,636 46,463,980 60.6 60.1 
250-499  40,364,341 46,559,029 26,019,870 30,464,491 64.5 65.4 
500-999  36,702,131 42,831,055 25,582,127 28,881,661 69.7 67.4 
1,000-4,999  76,506,645 86,651,053 54,969,511 61,082,923 71.8 70.5 
More than 
4,999  
80,762,185 92,737,905 61,285,174 74,509,086 75.9 80.3 
Sector       
Agriculture 3,298,197 8,666,339 2,207,572 2,866,112 66.9 33.1 
Industry 133,671,762 158,492,716 86,443,188 102,956,386 64.7 65.0 
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Construction 49,168,813 62,730,322 31,145,126 39,332,920 63.3 62.7 
Trade 57,329,329 71,970,777 42,541,876 53,748,770 74.2 74.7 
Hotel 20,138,692 26,083,389 13,591,280 18,281,226 67.5 70.1 
Other  185,605,532 229,621,785 130,085,571 161,108,243 70.1 70.2 
       
Total 464,045,175 575,260,266 315,814,799 390,036,809 68.1 67.8 
Source: (Fundación Tripartita para la Formación en el Empleo, 2009) 
 
Training activities in companies 
More than 200,000 registered companies reported that they conducted training 
for one or more employees in 2008 (see table 6.5). The number of participants 
increased from 1,562,710 in 2007 to 1,998,458 in 2008 (Fundación Tripartita para 
la Formación en el Empleo, 2009). 
 
Table 6.5: Companies that have conducted training and the number of participants 












1-5 130,138 93,997 113,485 
6-9 38,347 27,824 53,990 
10-49 77,726 58,348 294,686 
50-99 12,716 40,568 158,474 
100-249 7,322 6,404 224,555 
250-499 2,199 1,973 157,432 
500-999 974 893 155,693 
1,000-4,999 653 602 358,382 
More than 4,999 117 102 481,083 
Other situations* 3,214 319 678 
Total 273,406 201,030 1,998,458 
Source: Fundación Tripartita para la Formación en el Empleo. 
*Average is less than one employee in the previous year because of insolvency situations, 
mergers or takeovers. 
 
Individual training leave 
The individual training leave aims to promote professional and personal 
development of employees. With the permission of the employer the employee 
can be absent for training for up to 200 hours. In 2008, 2,578 persons completed 
individual training leave (Fundación Tripartita para la Formación en el Empleo, 
2010a). 
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6.7 Success and failure factors 
 
Since there is no active job-to-job policy and support in Spain for employees 
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whose jobs are at risk, the success and failure factors discussed in the interviews 
are generalized to Spanish labour market issues. When Spanish employees 
become redundant, people generally go through a phase of unemployment. 
One interviewee mentioned that the active labour market policies from the 
Public Employment Service could be improved. According to the interviewee an 
estimated 12 to 15% of the job vacancies are managed by the Public Employ-
ment Service. The challenge is to make active labour market policies more 
efficient. The interviews revealed that this is easier said than done. Interviewees 
argue that the management of the Public Employment Service is in the hands of 
regional governments and it is difficult to coordinate labour market policy 
because of the different interests of regional political parties. 
Furthermore, trust is an important key to success. It seems that trust is lacking at 
more than one level of the Spanish labour market: the employee does not trust 
the employer and has no faith in the government and trade unions do not trust 
employers’ associations. 
 
In several interviews the duality of the Spanish labour market is mentioned as a 
failure factor for job mobility. The trade union representative clarified in the 
interview that the authorisation of temporary work, which at the time everybody 
thought was a good idea, turned out “to be a patch that created crappy employ-
ment conditions and in the end a postponed problem”. Employers’ represent-
atives believe that the dismissal regulation is still too strict and that dismissal 
costs are too high in Spain. Spanish employees are focussed on obtaining and 
retaining a permanent contract. Whether or not you like the job, the permanent 
job is the ultimate goal. Temporary contracts are considered to be precarious 
jobs. One interviewee adds that for companies it is very difficult to continue with 
these kinds of contracts, because this does not provide internal flexibility. In the 
past a lot of companies disappeared or had to lay off employees. Prior to the 
bankruptcy or redundancy process, the management informed employees that 
the company was in poor circumstances, and that the firm could follow two 
paths. The first path was to reduce the salaries and all employees would be kept 
in work. The alternative path was to maintain the salaries and the company 
would start a reorganisation plan. The interviewee clarifies that Spanish workers 
are not flexible and prefer to work in a permanent contract and, if this is no 
longer possible, they wait until they will be dismissed. Thus, in essence, Spanish 
workers prefer job security and the financial compensation, i.e., severance pay 
instead of employment security. One interviewee states that the challenge is to 
change the mindset of employees and future employees and illustrated this by 
an example. The interviewee recently gave a lecture to 100 students and asked 
which of them wanted to be an employer. Only 4 students raised their hands. 
Then the question was asked ‘Who wants to be a civil servant?’, and almost all 
students raised their hands. The explanation for this division is that the jobs of 
civil servants are jobs for life. Another interviewee mentioned that in Spain 
employers have a bad image inherited from the period of dictatorship that 
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ended in 1975. Jimeno and Toharia explained that stemming from the Franco 
period authoritarianism was common practice in many large firms and that a 
growing gap occurred between management and labour (Jimeno & Toharia, 
1994). Young people have grown up with an anti-corporate approach and one 
interviewee from the employers’ side believes that this might have killed the 
entrepreneurial spirit.  
 
Another characteristic of the Spanish labour market is that the core of Spanish 
employees is between 25 and 45 years old. An interviewee from the employers’ 
association explained that companies do not hire young people aged 25 or 
younger because they lack work experience, and persons aged 45 years and over 
are not hired because they are considered to be old. And with the current high 
youth unemployment rate (41.6% in 2010, Eurostat) the interviewee fears a lost 
generation. Spain urgently is looking for a mechanism for young unemployed 
people to enter the labour market so that they can build up work experience. 
With regard to successful job-to-job transitions, one interviewee states that 
communication is an important precondition. If the Public Employment Service 
is responsible for job-to-job transitions, then it is important for it to com-
municate with employers that have to lay off people and with employers with 
vacancies. But the Public Employment Service does not have the capacities, the 
skills and the network with employers that is necessary to support people from 
job-to-job, according to several interviewees. In the current economic situation 
the employees of the Public Employment Service spend most of their time on 
administrative duties. 
 
6.8 Concluding remarks 
 
The interviews revealed that there is no active job-to-job support for Spanish 
workers whose jobs are at risk. The labour market policies are focussed on 
supporting the unemployed into work. Employees who lose their job because of 
redundancy will generally go through a phase of unemployment before they find 
a new job. Thus, instead of a direct job-to-job transition, Spanish redundant 
employees will make an indirect transition from employment to unemployment 
and, hopefully, quickly to another job. The national Tripartite Training Found-
ation supports employees and companies in facilitating vocational training. This 
can be considered as a preventative measure.  
 
For many years, the Spanish labour market was strongly regulated, but 
deregulation through allowing temporary employment has generated important 
inequalities, with a lot of protection for permanent employees and more 
precarious jobs for temporary employees. For many years, Spain has fought 
duality in the labour market but, according to one interviewee, the discussion is 
always about reducing firing costs for permanent jobs and not about how labour 
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interviewee from the employers’ side believes that this might have killed the 
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redundancy will generally go through a phase of unemployment before they find 
a new job. Thus, instead of a direct job-to-job transition, Spanish redundant 
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and, hopefully, quickly to another job. The national Tripartite Training Found-
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For many years, the Spanish labour market was strongly regulated, but 
deregulation through allowing temporary employment has generated important 
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conditions and employment security can be improved for the flexible section of 
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the labour market. In this flexible section of the labour market Spain has pre-
carious conditions, with no elements of life-long learning and career perspect-
ives. One third of the employees are working on a flexible basis and are not fully 
exploited to their potential. This is damaging if Spain wants to develop as a 
modern economy with high value services and high productivity levels. 
 
The importance of a constructive social dialogue is important, according to 
several interviewees. At the time when the interviews were conducted, the 
relationship between trade unions, employers’ associations and the government 
was tense. One interviewee said: “The social dialogue is currently not broken but 
quite ill”. Another interviewee pointed out that reforms go more smoothly when 
laws are supported and signed by both trade unions and employers’ associat-
ions. If trade unions and employers’ organisations reach collective agreements 
there is commitment for further implementation and a basis for influence in 
every company. And, although the Spanish trade union density is compared to 
other countries rather low (see table 2.3), the unions are politically powerful. 
One interviewee mentioned that it is important to have the trade unions on your 
side once you plan to enforce new laws or policies. 
 
In the past Spain has struggled with several labour market issues and the country 
is currently challenged to combat the highest unemployment rate in Europe. In 
this chapter the Spanish labour market reforms have been described and 
explained. One interviewee mentioned that actually, these are not real reforms 
but alterations to the old system. The interviewee compared the Spanish labour 
market with a broken old bridge inherited from the Franco era with strict rules, 
and the general view that the government is the grandmother that looks after 
the employees. Spain has tried to board up the bridge by piling up new labour 
market measures, but the bridge remains unstable and if nothing is done the 
bridge will fall down. In his view Spain should build a new bridge that is more 
secure and future proof. A long-term strategy is needed to combat the current 
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This study aims, firstly, at understanding job-to-job transitions systems in four 
different countries (Sweden, United Kingdom, Austria and Spain) and, secondly, 
attempts to answer the following question: What lessons can, from a Dutch 
policy perspective, possibly be learned from these foreign job-to job systems or 
arrangements? In order to infer lessons for the Netherlands it is important to 
understand how the Dutch job-to-job system is organized. Therefore, first of all, 
the Dutch job-to-job approach will be discussed along the various system 
features. Attention will be paid to the legal framework of redundancy, the type of 
support provided, eligibility, financing, responsibility, coordination and delivery, 
performance, and the success and failure factors. The research method for ana-
lyzing the Dutch job-to-job transition system deviates from the method used in 
the previous described countries and is solely based on the examination of policy 
documents and literature. Secondly, the Dutch job-to-job model will be compared 
with, respectively, the Swedish, the British, the Austrian and the Spanish job-to-
job practices and procedures. More specifically, the similarities and differences in 
the job-to-job arrangements between the Netherlands and the other four 
countries will be discussed. These four comparisons serve as a prelude to the next 
chapter, in which possible lessons for the Netherlands will be addressed.  
 
7.2 The Dutch job-to-job transition ‘system’ 
 
7.2.1 Legal framework of redundancy and unemployment insurance 
In this section the institutional setting which influences the behaviour and 
decisions of Dutch labour market actors will be discussed. In the event of 
redundancy several labour law regulations apply in the Netherlands: the 
Dismissal Decree (Ontslagbesluit), the Collective Redundancy Notification Act 
(Wet melding collectief ontslag), the Dutch Civil Code (Burgerlijk wetboek), the 
Works’ Council Act (Wet op de ondernemingsraden) and the Extraordinary Decree 
on Labour Relations (Buitengewoon besluit arbeidsverhoudingen).  
 
Three pathways can be followed by Dutch employers to terminate an 
employment contract.  
The first route is termination of the employment contract by mutual consent. The 
employers and employees can put the agreements down in writing in a so-called 
“vaststellingsovereenkomst” or “beeïndigingsovereenkomst”. From 1 October 2006, 
the blameworthy criterion has changed in the Unemployment Act, resulting in 
employees feeling less compelled than before to oppose a proposed dismissal 
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employers and employees can put the agreements down in writing in a so-called 
“vaststellingsovereenkomst” or “beeïndigingsovereenkomst”. From 1 October 2006, 
the blameworthy criterion has changed in the Unemployment Act, resulting in 
employees feeling less compelled than before to oppose a proposed dismissal 
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contract by mutual consent have increased (Knegt & Tros, 2007). Frequently, the 
Cantonal Court Formula is the basis for voluntary severance pay in settlements 
between the employer and employee. Below, the Cantonal Court Formula will 
be discussed in more detail. 
 
The second route is termination by giving notice (opzegging). The Extraordinary 
Decree on Labour Relations (Buitengewoon Besluit Arbeidsverhoudingen), which 
came into force in 1945, applies if the employer ends the labour relationship by 
giving notice without the employee’s approval. Prior to the notice, the employer 
has to apply for a dismissal permit to UWV WERKbedrijf. UWV WERKbedrijf is 
the Public Employment Service and is responsible for administrating 
unemployment benefits and helping the unemployed to find a new job. 
Permission for dismissal will be granted by UWV WERKbedrijf for different 
business economic reasons: 
 a bad financial position of the company; 
 structural decrease in turnover; 
 closure of plants or a part of the business activities; 
 development and changes in technology, e.g. automation; 
 relocation of the company.128 
 
The majority of the dismissal applications is approved by UWV WERKbedrijf. In 
2009 UWV WERKbedrijf settled 48,011 dismissal applications, of which 76% 
were permitted, 8% were rejected and 16% were withdrawn (Ministerie van 
Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 2010).  
 
The employer has to comply with the appropriate notice period. Article 7:672 in 
the Dutch Civil Code regulates the statutory notice period. The notice period 
depends on the duration of the employment contract. It is possible to deviate 
from the statutory notice period via stipulations in collective agreements, but 
the notice period must be at least one month. Table 7.1 presents the statutory 
notice periods. 
 
Table 7.1: Statutory notice periods in the Netherlands 
Duration employment contract Notice period: 
Less than 5 years 1 month 
5-10 years 2 months 
10-15 years 3 months 
15 years or over 4 months 

128  <http://www.uwv.nl/Werkgevers/ik_wil_mijn_medewerker_ontslaan/ontslag_aanvrag 
en/ontslag_om_\bedrijfseconomische_redenen.aspx>, accessed 30 June 2011.
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Article 7:681 of the Dutch Civil Code rules that if the employer or employee 
terminates the employment contract by giving notice in a manifestly unfair 
manner (kennelijk onredelijk ontslag), the court may grant the other party 
compensation. UWV tests whether termination of the employment contract is 
socially reasonable. Thereafter, the judge still may conclude that the notice is 
manifestly unfair for personal reasons. 
 
The third dismissal route is termination by court (ontbinding). This is regulated in 
the Dutch Civil Code, article 7:685. The lower court will approve the dismissal if 
there are ‘important reasons’ for ending the employment relationship. Important 
reasons refer to circumstances that create an urgent cause for termination (e.g. 
falsified diplomas and certificates, committing fraud, deception, violation regard 
to requirement of confidentiality) or changes in circumstances (e.g. the employee 
functions badly or there is a conflict between the employer and employee which 
cannot be solved) that justify the termination of the employment relationship 
immediately or at very short notice (Kempen et al., 2008).  
 
The cantonal judge can grant a severance pay when the dismissal is approved. 
Cantonal judges use the Cantonal Court Formula to determine the redundancy 
pay. The exact severance pay is based on multiplying three factors: 
A:  the adjusted number of years of service of the employee: the years of service 
up to age 35 will count as 0.5, between 35 and 45 years will count as 1, 
between 45 and 55 will count as 1.5 and above age 55 will count as 2; 
B: the corrected monthly gross salary; 
C: a correction factor that is usually 1.0, but may be determined at a higher or 
lower level by court in order to come to a fair and adequate severance pay 
taking into account e.g. the behaviour of both employer and employee, the 
labour market position of the employee and the financial position of the 
employee. 
 
The Dutch dismissal system has a dual and preventative character. This implies 
that an employer who wants to terminate the employment contract without the 
consent of the employee, can choose between two routes: a dismissal permit via 
UWV WERKbedrijf or termination by court. The UWV WERKbedrijf dismissal 
procedure acts as a preventative check to determine the reasonableness of any 
intended dismissal and is less costly than the court route, but it takes longer. If 
the dismissal is not sufficiently founded on reasonable grounds, the employer is 
denied a permit to dismiss; if dismissal nonetheless follows, the employee has 
legal grounds to contest its validity.  
 
Article 25 of the Works Council Act (adviesrecht) regulates that collective 
redundancies are subject to advice of the Works Council. 
The Collective Redundancy Notification Act (Wet Melding Collectief Ontslag) 
regulates that an employer who wants to dismiss at least twenty employees in a 
7
THE DUTCH JOB-TO-JOB APPROACH COMPARED WITH SE, UK, AT AND ES  
216
contract by mutual consent have increased (Knegt & Tros, 2007). Frequently, the 
Cantonal Court Formula is the basis for voluntary severance pay in settlements 
between the employer and employee. Below, the Cantonal Court Formula will 
be discussed in more detail. 
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Permission for dismissal will be granted by UWV WERKbedrijf for different 
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The majority of the dismissal applications is approved by UWV WERKbedrijf. In 
2009 UWV WERKbedrijf settled 48,011 dismissal applications, of which 76% 
were permitted, 8% were rejected and 16% were withdrawn (Ministerie van 
Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 2010).  
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
128  <http://www.uwv.nl/Werkgevers/ik_wil_mijn_medewerker_ontslaan/ontslag_aanvrag 
en/ontslag_om_\bedrijfseconomische_redenen.aspx>, accessed 30 June 2011.
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certain area within a three-month period, is obliged to give reasoned notice to 
trade unions. The notice should include the following information: 
 reason for the collective redundancy; 
 an estimated number of employees who will be made redundant; 
 a timetable for the collective redundancy; 
 selection criteria; 
 methods of calculating possible severance compensation; 
 information as to whether a works council is in place; 
 information as to whether or not the decision is subject to the advice of the 
works council; 
 the stage at which the works council should become involved. 
 
The aim of the Collective Redundancy Notification is to consider whether dis-
missals can be prevented or mitigated and whether a social plan can be drawn up. 
 
Before March 2006, the last-in-first-out principle applied in the Netherlands. 
From March 2006, new selection criteria have been introduced in the Dismissal 
Decree based on the reflection principle (afspiegelingsbeginsel). This implies that 
employees with similar positions are divided into age groups. Within each age 
group, employees with the shortest employment contract are the first to qualify 
for dismissal (Kempen et al., 2008). 
 
Unemployment insurance benefit 
The redundant employee who becomes unemployed can, under certain 
conditions, qualify for an unemployment insurance benefit. Under the Unem-
ployment Benefit Act (Werkloosheidswet, WW) employees who lose their jobs 
can be eligible for a basic unemployment benefit and possibly an extended 
unemployment benefit. The duration of the basic unemployment benefit lasts 
three months at most. The level of the unemployment benefit is, in the first two 
months of unemployment, 75% and, after these first two months, 70% of the 
last earned wage. To qualify for the basic unemployment insurance the person 
must have worked at least 26 weeks during the 36 weeks prior to the first 
unemployment day. To be eligible for the extended unemployment benefit 
persons must have worked four years for at least 52 days per year in the last five 
years prior to the first day of unemployment. The extended unemployment 
insurance pays 70% of the last earned wage. The duration of the extended 
unemployment benefit depends on the employment record of the employee. 
For each year of service the unemployment benefit is extended by one month, 
with a maximum of 35 months. The total duration of the basic and extended 
benefit adds up to a maximum of three years and two months. Table 7.2 shows 
that almost 30% of the employees who are entitled to unemployment insurance 
benefit are eligible for a benefit which lasts for more than two years. The 
average age of persons who are eligible for unemployment benefit which last for 
CHAPTER 7 
219
two years or more is 50.8 years. This is unsurprising because, as explained 
previously, the extended unemployment insurance depends on the employment 
record of employees. The employment record is obviously longer for older 
employees.  
 
When the first year of unemployment is taken under review from all 
unemployment insurance benefit recipients, the UWV data show that 51% find 
another job within the first year, 18% reach the maximum unemployment 
duration and 12% flow out because of other reasons. The remaining 19% receive 
at least one year of unemployment benefit (UWV, 2010). 
 
Table 7.2: Average age and proportion of inflow in the unemployment insurance 
benefit by the maximum duration for payment of the unemployment insurance 
benefit 
Maximum duration in 
months 
< 3 3-6 6-12 12-18 18-24 24-38 Total 
Average age 34.2 29.6 30.5 36.0 41.1 50.8 40.1 
Proportion inflow 
unemployment benefit (in %)  
16 9 15 14 15 30 100 
Source: (UWV, 2010) 
 
In 2008, 46% of the unemployment benefits ended because the benefit recipients 
were re-employed. Furthermore, 29% of the unemployment benefit ended 
because the person involved reached the maximum unemployment benefit 
duration and was not entitled for another benefit. 16% of the benefit recipients 
received a welfare benefit (Wet Werk en Bijstand, WWB) after the unemployment 
benefit ended and the remaining 8% did not immediately receive a welfare 
benefit, but were eligible for another benefit, e.g. benefit paid under the national 
old age pensions act (Algemene Ouderdomswet, AOW). The number of 
unemployment benefits which ended because of reaching the maximum duration 
increased from 11% in 2002 to 29% in 2008 (UWV, 2009). 
 
Table 7.3 shows the Dutch net replacement rates. The OECD indicator measures 
the proportion of expected income from work which is replaced by 
unemployment and related welfare benefits. The earning level refers to the 
average of replacement rates for unemployed persons who earned 67% and 
100% of the average working earning at the time of losing their jobs.  
The overall average of the Dutch net replacement rate is quite high during the 
initial phase of unemployment, which means that income security is guaranteed 
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Table 7.3: Net replacement rates in the Netherlands for six family types: initial 
phase of unemployment, 2009, by earning of average wage (AW) 
 Family type 























67% of AW 76 88 84 75 84 81 81 
100% of 
AW 
74 76 82 77 86 80 79 
Source: OECD129 
 
7.2.2 Type of support to find work after redundancy 
The type of support provided to redundant employees varies and can include 
education, secondment, outplacement, support to start own business, job 
search activities etcetera. Several actors can be involved in supporting job-to-job 
transitions, e.g. individual companies can support their redundant employees, or 
support can be provided via public Mobility Centres or private outplacement 
agencies. Furthermore, employers and redundant employees can agree that it is 
permissible to apply for another job during working hours or work part-time. 
Financial arrangements that could be provided are: wage supplements, 
reimbursements for moving expenses or travelling expenses and severance pay. 
Referring to the latter, Verhulp asks the question what the (legal) foundations 
are of severance pay. Is it meant as compensation for damage and suffering as a 
result of the dismissal, or is severance pay meant to be financial support in order 
to find another job (prevention of unemployment)? (Verhulp et al., 2008). 
Companies can conclude social plans in close consultation with trade unions or 
the works council. It is not legally mandatory to draw up a social plan, but a 
social plan can be made compulsory through collective agreements. In 2008, the 
Council for Work and Income (Raad voor Werk en Inkomen, RWI) commissioned 
EIM Business & Policy Research to conduct research regarding job-to-job 
activities set up in social plans. Between 2004 and 2007, about 1,130 social plans 
were concluded in 1,050 different companies (Kok, Uitert, Hauw, & Grijpstra, 
2008). EIM collected 729 social plans which came into effect from 1 January 2004 
and took a random sample survey of 198 social plans. Table 7.4 shows the 
degree to which practical and financial support is regulated in the 198 social 
plans examined.  
 

129  http://www.oecd.org/document/3/0,3343,en_2649_34637_39617987_1_1_1_1,00.html>, 
accessed 12 July 2011.
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Table 7.4: Degree to which active job-to-job activities and financial arrangements 
and regulations occur in social plans 
Type of activity or arrangements Number of social plans that mention 
this type of activity/arrangement (in 
percentages of total number of social 
plans)* 
Severance pay 67% 
Education and training 65% 
Applying for jobs during working hours 62% 
Incentive arrangement for redundant 
employees who voluntarily leave the 
company 
44% 
Wage supplements 34% 
Reimbursement moving expenses or 
increased travelling expenses 
34% 
Replacement arrangement: employees 
who are not declared redundant get a 




Support to set up own business 11% 
External labour market pool 6% 
Internal labour market pool 3% 
Other arrangements (remission of study 
debts, compensations for negative 
consequences for pensions and health 
insurances) 
73% 
Source: EIM (EIM, 2010)/ *based on a sample of 198 social plans 
 
The active support provided to redundant employees can be organized in 
different ways. Employers can choose to provide support by themselves 
(internal support), erect Mobility Centres or contract job-to-job support out to 
private market suppliers. Table 7.5 presents the ways of organizing job-to-job 
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
129  http://www.oecd.org/document/3/0,3343,en_2649_34637_39617987_1_1_1_1,00.html>, 
accessed 12 July 2011.
CHAPTER 7 
221
Table 7.4: Degree to which active job-to-job activities and financial arrangements 
and regulations occur in social plans 
Type of activity or arrangements Number of social plans that mention 
this type of activity/arrangement (in 
percentages of total number of social 
plans)* 
Severance pay 67% 
Education and training 65% 
Applying for jobs during working hours 62% 
Incentive arrangement for redundant 
employees who voluntarily leave the 
company 
44% 
Wage supplements 34% 
Reimbursement moving expenses or 
increased travelling expenses 
34% 
Replacement arrangement: employees 
who are not declared redundant get a 




Support to set up own business 11% 
External labour market pool 6% 
Internal labour market pool 3% 
Other arrangements (remission of study 
debts, compensations for negative 
consequences for pensions and health 
insurances) 
73% 
Source: EIM (EIM, 2010)/ *based on a sample of 198 social plans 
 
The active support provided to redundant employees can be organized in 
different ways. Employers can choose to provide support by themselves 
(internal support), erect Mobility Centres or contract job-to-job support out to 
private market suppliers. Table 7.5 presents the ways of organizing job-to-job 
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Table 7.5: Ways of organizing job-to-job transitions in social plans taking effect 
between 2004 and 2007  
Way of organizing Number of social plans (in % of the 
total 198 examined social plans) 
Internal support 76% 
Mobility centre 18% 
Calling in or contracting out to private 
market suppliers (outplacement/ temporary 
work agencies) 
74% 
Calling in UWV 9% 
Source: EIM (Kok et al., 2008)  
 
Although the ways of organizing job-to-job transitions can be mentioned in 
social plans; this does not automatically mean that employees know what they 
can expect from their employers. Kok et al. argue that in the most minimal 
elaboration the social plan states that the employer will support the redundant 
employee in order to find another job quickly in or outside the company, without 
making explicit what this support implies and in what way the support will be 
organised (Kok et al., 2008). In 18% of the social plans examined the employer 
and employee representatives agreed to set up a Mobility Centre. A company 
can establish an internal Mobility Centre within the company or employers can 
use services provided by external suppliers.  
 
7.2.3 Eligibility 
In the Netherlands the majority of the job-to-job transition support derives from 
social plans negotiated between employers and trade unions or the works 
council. However, almost three-quarters of the 1,130 social plans established 
between 2004 and 2007 were implemented amongst large companies with more 
than 100 employees (EIM, 2010). A logical explanation for this is that in the event 
of collective redundancies with twenty or more employees involved, employers 
are obliged by law to give reasoned notice to trade unions. Many collective 
agreements oblige companies to draw up a social plan (EIM, 2010). Furthermore, 
the type of contract is relevant, because social plans mostly only apply to 
permanent employees (Kok et al., 2008). Thus, Dutch employees with permanent 
contracts employed in large companies who are declared redundant enjoy a 
privileged position in comparison with temporary employees who have lost their 
jobs. Dutch SMEs do not have a structural approach regarding job-to-job 
transitions, but this does not mean that small companies do not invest in job-to-
job transition policies and activities (Borghouts-van de Pas et al., 2009). There 
are SMEs that invest in job-to-job policy and activities but, as table 7.6 shows, 






Table 7.6: Job-to-job policy within Dutch companies and actual applied job-to-job 
activities in the last five years 
  Applied job-to-job activities in the last 
5 years (in percentages) 
Company size/ 




5-9  9 14 8 
10-19 16 24 14 
20-49 22 36 22 
50-99 16 52 34 
100-499 45 77 57 
500 > 69 86 67 
Total economy 15 27 18 
Source: OSA (Borghouts-van de Pas et al., 2009) 
 
This is also confirmed in a research conducted by EIM in 2010. 40% of the 
examined SME companies were confronted with employees leaving the 
company. In 18% of these companies the leaving employees were affected by 
redundancy. Table 7.7 presents the job-to-job transition efforts made by the 
companies where employees were forced to find another job because of reasons 
of redundancy. It shows that 26% of the SME companies with redundant 
employees provided job-to-job transition support, and EIM estimates that 32% 
of redundant employees employed at SMEs received job-to-job transition 
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permanent employees (Kok et al., 2008). Thus, Dutch employees with permanent 
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Table 7.6: Job-to-job policy within Dutch companies and actual applied job-to-job 
activities in the last five years 
  Applied job-to-job activities in the last 
5 years (in percentages) 
Company size/ 




5-9  9 14 8 
10-19 16 24 14 
20-49 22 36 22 
50-99 16 52 34 
100-499 45 77 57 
500 > 69 86 67 
Total economy 15 27 18 
Source: OSA (Borghouts-van de Pas et al., 2009) 
 
This is also confirmed in a research conducted by EIM in 2010. 40% of the 
examined SME companies were confronted with employees leaving the 
company. In 18% of these companies the leaving employees were affected by 
redundancy. Table 7.7 presents the job-to-job transition efforts made by the 
companies where employees were forced to find another job because of reasons 
of redundancy. It shows that 26% of the SME companies with redundant 
employees provided job-to-job transition support, and EIM estimates that 32% 
of redundant employees employed at SMEs received job-to-job transition 
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Table 7.7: The number of SMEs with forced mobility and the number and type of 













transition support to 
their redundant 
employees. 
All examined SMEs 100% 
(N=943) 
  
Number of companies where 
employees left the company 
40%   
Number of companies where 
employees left the company 
because of reasons of 
redundancy 
18% 100%  
Of which redundant employees have 
left the company without support 
provided by the company 
 74%  
Of which redundant employees left 
the company with job-to-job support 
from the company 
 26% 100% 
    
The practical job-to-job support provided:  
Active support:   
Education   57% 
Secondment   48% 
Support to set up own business   16% 
Support through Mobility Centre or 
outplacement agency 
  9% 
    
Passive/financial support   
Possibility to apply during 
working hours 
  75% 
Wage supplement    9% 
Compensation moving 
expenses or increased 
travelling costs 
  0% 
Severance pay   52% 
Part-time work   25% 
Other arrangements   30% 




Thus, in the Netherlands the chance of receiving job-to-job support is greater for 
redundant employees employed in large companies than for those employed in 
small companies. Small and medium sized companies often neither have social 
plans nor the means to set up a Mobility Centre. Furthermore, the flexibility to 
offer redundant employees another job within the company is lacking in small 
companies. Redundant employees who were employed in small companies and 
have become unemployed must, like other jobseekers, register themselves at 
the Public Employment Service. 
 
7.2.4 Responsibility, coordination, and delivery  
 
Associations 
Dutch trade unions, employers and employers’ associations negotiate and 
discuss social economic issues. In the Netherlands the common name for 
employers’ and employees’ associations is “social partners”. Social partners can 
establish collective agreements and social plans. Before addressing the specifics 
of the collective agreements, it needs to be pointed out that even though new 
collective agreements use the term “employment security” more frequently, the 
meaning of the term differs and sometimes it is used to mean “job security”. In 
September 2009, for instance, Menzies Cargo, a company that serves 60 airlines 
at Schiphol and Rotterdam Airports, and the trade union agreed to exchange a 
large part of the ‘thirteenth month’ for employment security, meaning that jobs 
are guaranteed until the end of 2010.130 Hence, this was actually job security 
through a form of wage flexibility. Another example is the collective agreement 
reached by the Dutch Railway NS and the Trade Union in 2009, in which the 
employer tried to prevent forced dismissals until 31 December 2010. With this 
agreement the Dutch Railway NS wanted to invest in employment security for 
the employees, but in fact it was focused on job security rather than 
employment security.  
Furthermore, there are examples of collective agreements in which social 
partners agree that the employer will do his utmost to help employees to 
another job in the case of redundancy. For instance, in April 2009 one of the 
largest Dutch banks, the Rabobank, and the Trade Union reached a collective 
agreement in which employment security was emphasized.131 The bank is willing 
to invest in education for its employees to increase their chances in the labour 
market, either within or outside the company, but employees should also work 

130 <http://www.penoactueel.nl/arbeidsvoorwaarden/cao-akkoord-menzies-cargo-werk 
zekerheid-voor-13e-maand-4407.html>, accessed 7 September 2009.
131  <http://www.cnvdienstenbond.nl/branches-en-bedrijven/financieel/rabobank/artikel/ 
36442/?tx_ttnews%5Byear%5D=2009&tx_ttnews%5Bmonth%5D=04&cHash=99d336a5
f1>, accessed 7 September 2009.
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partners agree that the employer will do his utmost to help employees to 
another job in the case of redundancy. For instance, in April 2009 one of the 
largest Dutch banks, the Rabobank, and the Trade Union reached a collective 
agreement in which employment security was emphasized.131 The bank is willing 
to invest in education for its employees to increase their chances in the labour 
market, either within or outside the company, but employees should also work 

130 <http://www.penoactueel.nl/arbeidsvoorwaarden/cao-akkoord-menzies-cargo-werk 
zekerheid-voor-13e-maand-4407.html>, accessed 7 September 2009.
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36442/?tx_ttnews%5Byear%5D=2009&tx_ttnews%5Bmonth%5D=04&cHash=99d336a5
f1>, accessed 7 September 2009.
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on their personal development. The crucial condition for this coordination 
mechanism is mutual trust. Employees have to trust the employer in making 
efforts to help redundant employees to another job outside the company, and 
employers should have the faith that employees work on their employability. 
Yet the stipulations on employment security in the collective agreements are 
quite new and the question arises as to what the practical implications are 
regarding flexibility and employment security.  
As explained previously, most collective agreements oblige employers in 
collective dismissal procedures to draw up a social plan in close collaboration 
with the trade union or works council. 
 
Sectoral funds 
The Dutch sectoral training and development funds (sectorfondsen, or so-called 
O&O fondsen) are private foundations managed by social partners. The first 
sector funds were established in the 1980s owing to stipulations concerning 
education in collective agreements.  
In mid-2007 an estimated 140 sectoral funds existed in 116 sectors (Donker van 
Heel et al., 2008). The objectives of the sectoral funds are formulated by the 
social partners and differ across sectors. The general aim is the recruitment and 
retention of skilled employees by means of promoting employment, stimulating 
training and education, and providing good working conditions (quality of 
labour). These funds collect premiums from employers and/or employees and 
subsequently distribute the means according to criteria agreed by the social 
partners. Currently, the Dutch sectoral funds do not have a systematic and 
structural role in providing transition support in the case of redundancy (Donker 
van Heel et al., 2008). Donker van Heel et al. conclude that sectoral funds 
support job-to-job transition services occasionally and on an ad hoc basis. There 
is no systematic job-to-job transition approach by the sectoral funds. In their 
view individual employers and employees are responsible for job-to-job 
transitions. The Dutch Labour Foundation shares this opinion.132 The Dutch 
Labour Foundation (Stichting van de Arbeid, STAR) was established in 1945 and is 
a national consultative body organised under private law. Its members are the 
three trade union federations and three employers’ associations in the 
Netherlands.133 
 
The state: Government and the Public Employment Service 
In the 1990s, the Netherlands was confronted with an economic recession. At 
that time the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment brainstormed ideas to 
prevent unemployment. In 1999, the Unemployment Benefit Act was adjusted 

132  <http://www.mkb.nl/images/20090616_vwnw1.pdf>, accessed 12 January2011.
133  <http://www.stvda.nl/>, accessed 6 October 2011.
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and introduced possibilities to deviate from the existing legislation in the form of 
experiments. One of the experiments, which was focussed on forced job-to-job 
transitions, was laid down in a temporary decree (Tijdelijk Besluit Preventieve 
inzet Wachtgeldfondsen) which came into force in August 2000. This decree 
regulated that UWV should provide financial means to promote job-to-job 
support for redundant employees whose contract would be terminated within 
four months owing to collective redundancy. The activities should be focussed 
on external transitions, meaning transitions to other companies. The Inspection 
Work and Income (Inspectie Werk en Inkomen, IWI) concluded in 2004 that the 
experiment was not effective. The available means were used for redundant 
employees who could find another job on their own, while employees who 
needed the support were left outside the experiment (Inspectie Werk en 
Inkomen, 2004). The temporary decree was no longer valid as of 1 July 2005. 
 
In response to the 2008 crisis, the Dutch government launched several measures 
to prevent unemployment. In November 2008, a special working time reduction 
scheme was introduced. This temporary scheme made it possible for employers 
with significant decrease in turnover, to apply for a permit which allowed for the 
decrease of working hours for their employees. The decreased amount of hours 
was compensated by the government through the use of unemployment benefit 
funds. Employers continued to pay the full salary to their employees. The 
employer received an Unemployment Benefit for the employee for whom 
working time reduction had been awarded and who had met the criteria for an 
unemployment benefit. Often the unemployment benefit was lower than the 
salary the employer had to pay to the employee. The temporary part-time 
unemployment benefit scheme could be seen as the temporary extension of a 
longstanding previous shorter working hours scheme which ended in March 
2009. The aim of this measure was to retain professional skilled employees for 
companies which were sufficiently economically viable to survive the crisis, 
despite the lack of orders and turnover. Employers could reduce the number of 
working hours by a maximum of 50% and during this period employees received 
an unemployment benefit for the hours that they were not working. The 
temporary part-time unemployment scheme came to an end on 1 July 2011.  
 
The short-time working and the part-time unemployment scheme can be 
considered as secondary prevention measures aimed at avoiding forced 
dismissals. This thesis focuses on curative measures geared towards direct job-
to-job transitions for employees under threat of unemployment. In June 2009, 
the temporary subsidy scheme retraining employees under threat of 
unemployment came into effect. The aim of this scheme is to stimulate job-to-
job transitions. Employers who hire an employee who is threatened by 
unemployment elsewhere can receive an education bonus of maximum EUR 
2,500 under the condition that the company contributes at least the same 
amount. The scheme will come to an end on January 1st, 2013 but, in line with 
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the EU2020 agenda, the Dutch government’s aim is to increase the labour 
participation, and in order to achieve this goal the Ministry of Employment and 
Social Affairs intends to introduce new facilities in a so-called ‘vitality package’. 
The implementation of the vitality saving scheme is planned for 2013. Later in 
this section the vitality package will be further addressed.  
 
In addition, the Dutch government established 33 temporary Mobility Centres 
throughout the Netherlands in 2008 and 2009. The aim of these centres is to 
prevent unemployment by helping employees faced with redundancy to find a 
new job as soon as possible either within the sector or outside the sector. Both 
public and private stakeholders (local authorities, employers and UWV 
WERKbedrijf) collaborate in these centres. The Mobility Coordination Centre 
(Coördinatie Centrum Mobiliteit) of UWV WERKbedrijf coordinates the Mobility 
Centres. This governmental initiative builds on previous experiences in the 
Automotive Industry. In 2006, the Dutch Public Employment Services, CWI, the 
predecessor of UWV WERKbedrijf, took the initiative to build a Mobility Centre 
Automotive (MCA), which aimed at supporting job-to-job transitions for more 
than 2,000 employees who had lost their jobs at the company of Nedcar or its 
supply companies. In the region of Limburg, in the south of the Netherlands, 
both public and private partners were willing to work together because there 
was a sense of urgency. The province of Limburg already had a platform where 
relevant parties met each other frequently. The platform could be considered as 
a network. The MCA was a successful instrument for crisis intervention in the 
labour market and made it possible to deviate from standard procedures and 
rules and is comparable to the Task Forces implemented in the UK, i.e. the MG 
Rover case. The aim of the MCA was achieved: 1,333 employees (85% of the 
inflow) found a new job in or outside the automotive sector (Andersen et al., 
2009).  
Currently, the 33 Mobility Centres are located at the so-called ‘Werkpleinen’. 
Municipalities and UWV WERKbedrijf collaborate in these ‘Werkpleinen’ to 
provide integrated services to employers and the unemployed. Currently, there 
are 100 Werkpleinen but, as a result of the announced cutbacks for 2012-2015, 
this number will probably be reduced to 30 Werkpleinen. Furthermore, as from 
the end of 2011 there will no longer be a re-integration budget available for 
Unemployment Insurance benefit recipients.134 Between 2012 and 2015 UWV 
WERKbedrijf is confronted with cutbacks in expenditure of EUR 450 million.135 

134  Letter to the staff of UWV Werkbedrijf in response to the announced cutbacks, 15 March 
2011 accessed from: <http://www.samenvoordeklant.nl/uploads/media/110315_brief 
_aan_medewerkers.pdf>, 17 October 2011.





This will certainly have an effect on the service provided to the unemployed and 
employers. Unemployment benefit recipients will receive e-coaching between 
the third and twelfth month of unemployment. Face to face contact will be 
limited to those unemployed who experience great difficulties in entering the 
labour market. 
 
In 2010, the Dutch government decided to stimulate employers and trade unions 
to take up their responsibility to support job-to-job transition for employees 
whose jobs are at risk, through a temporary financial subsidy for experiments, in 
which employers collaborate in regions and sectors. Large companies and 
collaborating employers could submit a proposal before 1 November 2010 for an 
experiment based on the Temporary Decree from job-to-job (Tijdelijk besluit van 
werk naar werk) which came into force in September 2010. Trade unions or works 
councils must be involved in the realization of the project proposals. In November 
2010, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment assessed the submitted 
proposals. Eventually, nine experiments were approved and the government 
granted a total subsidy of EURO 1,938 mln. A precondition for subsidizing the 
project is that employees involved will lose his or her job within the next four 
months. Furthermore, collaborating employers co-finance at least 50% of the 
project costs. A maximum subsidy is available of EUR 2,500 per employee with a 
maximum of EUR 500,000 per experiment.  
 
Table 7.8 presents the nine experiments which were approved by the Dutch 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. The nine experiments vary in 
content, target group, scope, sectors and actors involved. Some experiments 
focus on one sector and one region, while other experiments focus on one region 
but cover various sectors. There are also experiments which cover all sectors, but 
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Table 7.8: Nine experiments based on the Temporary Decree from job-to-job 
 Name project/ 
experiment 




job transitions  
Sectoral Fund for 
employment, 
training and 





In the collective agreement there 
is already a possibility to support 
job-to-job transitions, but after 2 
months the employee is handed 
over to the Public Employment 
Service UWV WERKbedrijf. This 
experiment extends the support 
by SSWT to 12 months. 
2 ‘Repositioning of 





enterprises in the 




This experiment is part of an 
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network. The experiment goes 
beyond the construction sector 
and stimulates job carving for 
redundant employees. Jobs are 
created for low skilled 
employees. 
3 ‘With knowledge 
a step ahead’ in 




NCW) for the 







This experiment focuses on 
redundant employees aged 40 or 
over. In this project vouchers 
worth EUR 2,500 can be granted 
to employers who have to lay off 
employees and to employers 
who want to hire a redundant 
employee aged 40 or over.  








City of Den 
Bosch (Mid-
South of the 
Netherlands)  
Development of a digital labour 
pool within an industrial zone 
where vacancies and redundant 
employees will be matched 
without interference from the 
Public Employment Service UWV 
WERKbedrijf. 
5 Outline how to 
approach ‘job-to-




the Medical care 
and welfare 
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redundant employees in the 
Medical care and welfare sector, 
mostly low skilled employees 
and employees aged 50 or over. 
Intensive support is provided so 
that behavioural change is 
achieved and that the employee 
will learn to direct his own career 
path. 
6 ‘Cooperating 
sectors at work’ in 
the graphical 
sector 
Sectoral Fund for 
training and 





This experiment focuses on 
intersectoral mobility. Collective 
agreements and funds can be 
used for trajectories and 




financing: both the leaving 
sector as the receiving sector will 
contribute to the education and 
transition. 




trade union and 




Combination of job-to-job 
support and a pilot in which the 
employer continues to pay the 
wage in case of redundancy. This 
is a financial incentive for 
employers to support job-to-job 
transitions for their redundant 
employees. In the first phase of 
the project it is the responsibility 
of employers and the employees 
to invest in job-to-job transitions. 
In the second phase this 
responsibility shifts to a regional 
cooperation 
8 From job-to-job, 
from income to 
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in the middle of 
the Netherlands 
Employers and redundant 
employees direct the first phase 
of unemployment. Agreements 
regarding job-to-job transition 
support will be implemented in 
social plans in which the focus 
will shift from passive financial 
support to active support for the 
redundant employee. 
9 ‘Real estate total 
from job-to-job 
transitions’ in the 














(South- East of 
Netherlands) 
Redundant employees are to be 
trained and educated in order to 
retain them for the branch of 
technique. Through a simulation 
environment employees can 
obtain and retain specific skills in 
times of recession. 
Source: Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 2011  
 
It is plain that the current government stimulates social partners to take up the 
responsibility for job-to-job transitions in the event of redundancies and for a 
job-to-job budget in collective agreements.136 In the national budget for 2012, 
the government proposes to introduce a so-called ‘vitality package’. This 

136 <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2011/09/30/ 
kamp-vitaliteitspakket.html>, accessed 6 October 2011. 
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It is plain that the current government stimulates social partners to take up the 
responsibility for job-to-job transitions in the event of redundancies and for a 
job-to-job budget in collective agreements.136 In the national budget for 2012, 
the government proposes to introduce a so-called ‘vitality package’. This 
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package comprises the introduction of a new bonus to stimulate employees 
aged 62 or over to continue their labour participation, a mobility bonus for 
employers to hire disabled and unemployed persons aged 50 or over, and the 
introduction of several career facilities. The latter refers to the fact that the 
Dutch government wants to introduce a vitality saving scheme, which makes it 
more attractive for employees to save for periods when income falls occur. The 
savings in the vitality scheme can then be used for re-education, demotion, 
starting a business or to bridge a period when the person has no income or a fall 
in income, e.g. during forced job-to-job transitions. The implementation of the 
vitality saving scheme is planned for 2013. In addition, the government intends 
to decrease the threshold for fiscal deduction of education expenditures. Finally, 
the Dutch government intends to compensate social partners for the extra effort 
involved in introducing a job-to-job budget and intersectoral education.137 
 
Market 
In 2002, the Dutch Act SUWI, short for Structure for Implementation of Work 
and Income, came into force. An important element of the SUWI operation was 
to increase efficiency in the system by introducing competition in the re-
integration market. The Public Employment Service, UWV WERKbedrijf, and 
municipalities outsource the re-integration activities to private companies. But 
employers also can buy these services. Currently, over 900 suppliers which 
provide one or more service at the re-integration market are included in the 
Quality Guide of Stichting Blik op Werk.138 However, not all suppliers are 
included in this guide. Van Gestel et al. suggest that the re-integration market 
has expanded from a limited number of suppliers (around 600) to a larger market 
with smaller suppliers (nearly 2,000) (Van Gestel et al., 2009). This is in line with a 
research conducted by Regioplan in which the researchers, based on UWV 
figures, suggest that approximately 1800 private companies conduct the 
Individual Re-integration Agreements (Individuele Re-integratieovereenkomst, 
IRO) (Mallee, Mevissen, Soethout, & Weening, 2006). One of the preconditions 
from the parliament to privatise the re-integration market was to have a 
transparent market for the organisations that outsource the return to work 
activities (municipalities and UWV) and the clients. Information about the 
performance of re-integration companies is necessary to let the market succeed. 
In the Netherlands, a re-integration quality mark has been developed, on the 
basis of self-regulation of the sector, which private service suppliers can obtain if 
they meet certain quality criteria. However, it appears that generally the 
performance of re-integration has not improved since the privatization (Van 

137 <http://www.rijksbegroting.nl/2012/voorbereiding/begroting,kst801043_8.html>,acces-
sed 19 September 2011.
138  <http://www.blikopwerk.nl/keu/Keurmerk>, accessed 2 November 2011.
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Gestel et al., 2009). 
 
In 2007, 45% of the companies used shared services centres for outplacement 
and 22% outsourced the outplacement activities (Borghouts-van de Pas et al., 
2009).  
Stemming from the crisis approach and the erection of Mobility Centres, the 
Public Employment Service UWV WERKbedrijf provides financial means to 
private suppliers aimed at the prevention of unemployment. Permanent and 
temporary employees who will lose their jobs within four months, and 
jobseekers with an unemployment benefit who have lost their jobs in the last 
three months are eligible for support with a maximum duration of three months. 
This support comprises trajectories focussed on early acquired competencies, 
skills training or education. Another precondition is that the employer has no 
money available for transition support, e.g. there is no social plan. From the 
mobility fund the average amount available to jobseekers is EUR 1,750. As of 
October 2011, this service will cease.  
 
Hierarchies 
About 25% of the Dutch companies had an insufficient amount of work in 2009. 
The proportion of companies with an insufficient amount of work and which 
retained personnel (labour hoarding) was 19% in 2010. However, retaining 
personnel does not mean that companies do not have to dismiss employees. In 
2009, about 10% of the companies retained personnel and had taken outflow 
measures at the same time (Van der Ende, Hazebroek, Wilkens, & Donker van 
Heel, 2010). 
 
Firms that are in poor circumstances and have to lay off more than twenty 
employees are obliged to give reasoned notice to trade unions and can take the 
initiative to draw up a restructuring plan, which describes, among other things, 
the support and facilities available to find another job for those who are declared 
redundant. The employer decides whether or not the trade unions and the works 
council are consulted when fleshing out the restructuring plan. It is not 
obligatory to consult trade unions and works councils, but a ‘social plan’ to which 
trade unions and works councils have contributed are more valuable than those 
which are only established by employers. As explained previously, collective 
agreements can oblige companies to draw up a social plan in the event of 
collective dismissals.  
Job-to-job trajectories can be outsourced to private suppliers, for example to 
outplacement agencies, temporary employment agencies or re-integration 
companies. From the early 1990s, some big Dutch companies laid the 
foundation for career centres or Mobility Centres. For instance, the Dutch 
Railway NS Mobility Centre was established in 1993, and is one of the first 
internal Mobility Centres. Other examples centres are internal Mobility Centres 
at TNT Post and the Rabobank (Evers et al., 2004). Only large firms with enough 
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financial scope are able to engage outplacement- and mobility arrangements, 
which is an attempt to provide employment security. 
 
Networks 
On the basis of the Gatekeeper Act which came into force in 2002, Dutch 
employers have to continue paying the salary of the employee during the first 
two years of sickness or (temporary) disability; the employer and employee are 
obliged to cooperate in the return to work process of the employee. Many Dutch 
employers were not entirely satisfied with the support offered by (private) 
professional service providers and the help from governmental public institutions. 
Therefore, in some Dutch regions employers joined forces and established so 
called ‘Gatekeepers Centres’. These centres “for and by” employers are based 
upon a mutual (financial) interest of the employers: finding new suitable jobs, for 
sick employees within a regional network of collaborating employers. In contrast 
to the 33 temporary Mobility Centres, the Gatekeepers Centres are private 
initiatives. The Dutch government appreciated these employer’s initiatives and 
provided financial support to establish new Gatekeepers centres. The 
Netherlands counted 26 Gatekeepers Centres (poortwachterscentra) in 
September 2009. As a response to the economic crisis and on the basis of their 
experiences with the re-integration of sick and disabled employees, the 
Gatekeepers Centres are currently also involved in job-to-job transitions because 
of mass redundancy. This coordination mechanism, in which self-regulating 
networks of firms collaborate, is especially interesting for small and medium 
sized companies which are not able to provide another job within their own 
company. The Gatekeepers’ role has extended from return to work processes for 
sick and disabled employees to job-to-job transitions in a more broad 
perspective. As mentioned, these networks exist in addition to the previously 
described 33 Mobility Centres which the government established. Actually, these 
Mobility Centres, in which several actors collaborate, can also be considered as 
networks. Furthermore, at the regional level branch service desks (Branche-
servicepunten) and employers’ service desks (Werkgeversservicepunten) have 
been set up. The branch service desks are established at the initiative of trade 
associations or sector organisations and are public-private partnerships between 
employers, UWV WERKbedrijf en municipalities. Other partners can be involved 
depending on the regional circumstances, e.g. the Chamber of Commerce, 
sectoral funds and centres of Expertise on Vocational Education and Training. 
The employers’ service desks are collaborations between municipalities, the 
Public Employment Service UWV WERKbedrijf and educational institutes. These 
network organisations function as information desks initiated from the public 
sector for employers to ease their search for qualified employees. Furthermore, 
they can provide information regarding subsidy schemes and they can support 





Responsibility for job-to-job transitions 
The Labour Foundation (Stichting van de Arbeid, STAR), the Council for Work 
and Income (Raad voor Werk en Inkomen, RWI), sectoral funds and various 
researchers state that the primary responsibility for job-to-job transitions lies 
with individual employers and employees, and employers’ associations and 
trade unions (Donker van Heel et al., 2008; Kok et al., 2008; Raad voor Werk en 
Inkomen, 2008; Stichting van de Arbeid, 2009). During the economic crisis, the 
government shouldered the responsibility for forced job-to-job transitions via 
the establishment of the Mobility Centres. However, as addressed earlier, the 
current government wants to stimulate employers and trade unions taking up 
their responsibility to support job-to-job transition for employees whose jobs are 
at risk, through a temporary financial subsidy for experiments in which 
employers collaborate in regions and sectors. Large companies more often 
agree that it is the employers’ responsibility to support their redundant 
employees to another job. In total three-quarters of the companies studied did 
(partly) agree with the statement that employers should support their redundant 
employees towards a new job within or outside the company. But only 15% of 
the companies examined have formulated policies regarding to job-to-job 
activities, though there are large difference between sectors (see table 7.6). It is 
particularly in the governmental and educational sector that job-to-job 
transition policies are drawn up. This is one of the results from the spring survey 
of the OSA demand panel (Borghouts-van de Pas et al., 2009). A recent study 
conducted by EIM among redundant employees who had been employed at a 
small or medium sized company in the previous two years revealed that 20% 
received job-to-job transition support via the employer and the other 80% did 
not receive any support (EIM, 2010).  
 
In December 2007, the Dutch Minister of Social Affairs and Employment 
commissioned the Committee on Labour Market Participation, also known as the 
Bakker Committee, to formulate proposals aimed at raising the labour market 
participation rate to 80% by 2016 (Advies Commissie Arbeidsparticipatie, 2008; 
Bovenberg & Wilthagen, 2009). Independent labour market experts from the 
public sector, the private sector and academia were members of this committee. 
In June 2008, the report of the Committee on Labour Market Participation was 
published and comprised a three-track approach. The first track was geared 
towards increasing the current labour market participation and included 
proposals to encourage employers to hire long-term benefit recipients on the 
basis of temporary wage costs subsidies. In turn, benefit recipients would have a 
participation obligation. Furthermore, the committee proposed to stimulate 
part-time workers to extend the number of working hours by tax incentives and 
to improve facilities for combining work and care. The second track was aimed 
at raising the pension age gradually to 67, so that employees would be kept in 
the labour market for longer. The third and most important track for this study, 
focused on more structural employability and employment security. The 
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focused on more structural employability and employment security. The 
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committee proposed to give employers, employees and municipalities at the 
decentralised level more responsibility for employability and employment 
security by introducing a Work Budget, transforming the unemployment 
insurance scheme to an employment insurance scheme, and by stating that the 
responsibility for those with a weak labour market position should be set down 
by one responsible actor. The proposed Work Budget was a personal budget and 
was not linked to a job, meaning that the employee could transfer the budget to 
another job. The Austrian severance pay system served as example for the 
proposed Work Budget. However, the Work Budget would aim to maintain the 
worker’s employability level and could be used to finance the actual costs of 
training or education. Furthermore, the proposed Work Budget could also 
provide additional income in the event of forced job-to-job transitions, part-time 
retirement, training, unpaid leave, a new job with lower earnings, and would also 
be available to flexible workers (Advies Commissie Arbeidsparticipatie, 2008; 
Bovenberg & Wilthagen, 2009). All actors should contribute to the Work Budget: 
employers, employees, social partners and the state. 
With the introduction of an employment insurance scheme employers would 
have a financial interest in preventing unemployment. The employment 
insurance comprises three phases which are shorter than the current maximum 
duration of the unemployment insurance. In the first phase the employer has to 
continue to pay 80 to 100% of the wage for a maximum duration of six months. 
In this phase the employer and employee are responsible for finding a new job 
quickly. In the second phase, the sector or industry has a financial responsibility 
and employees can enter a re-integration scheme provided by public or private 
suppliers. After the second phase the responsibility is shifted towards the 
municipalities. To this very day the Work Budget and employment insurance are 
not yet implemented in the Netherlands, because of dissensions between the 
actors involved. However, as part of the recently presented national budget 
2012, the government intends to launch a ‘vitality saving scheme’ as of 2013. 




The amount of costs for a social plan depends on the extent of the provisions 
negotiated between the employer and the trade union or works council. The 
employer bears the costs for outplacement, severance pay and other provisions 
concluded in the social plan. 
The sectoral funds have had up to now a limited role in supporting job-to-job 
transitions, and the way the funds are financed varies. In collective agreements 
employers and trade unions can negotiate about levy percentages. In some 
sectors the government contributes financially to the fund. For example, the 
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Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations contributes yearly an amount to 
the sector fund A&O in the form of a subsidy scheme.139  
Gatekeepers Centres received a start subsidy from the government, but today 
they should be able to support themselves via membership fees or through 
financial contributions for provided services. The 33 Mobility Centres are in 
principle temporary and public-financed. The nine experiments based on the 
Temporary Decree from job-to-job (Tijdelijk besluit van werk naar werk) are 
financed through public and private means. The government granted a total 
subsidy of EUR 1,938 mln. A precondition for the subsidy is that collaborating 
employers should also contribute financially, implying that they have to co-
finance at least 50% of the project costs. A maximum subsidy is available of EUR 
2,500 per employee with a maximum of EUR 500,000 per experiment.  
Until October 2011, the UWV WERKbedrijf mobility fund has provided the 
means for the unemployment prevention services outsourced to private 
suppliers, on average EUR 1,750 per jobseeker. A precondition is that the 
employer who has to lay off employees does not have enough financial means to 
support the redundant employee to a new job. The support can be offered to 
employees, including those with a fixed-term or temporary contract, who will 
become unemployed in the following four months or who have become 
unemployed in the last three months.  
As mentioned previously, the Dutch government recently proposed a ‘vitality 
scheme’ in the national budget 2012. The aim of this scheme is to make it 
attractive for employees to save for periods when income falls occur. The 
savings in the vitality scheme can then be used for re-education, demotion, 
starting a business or to bridge a period when the person has no income or a fall 
in income, e.g. during forced job-to-job transitions. 
 
7.2.6 Performance 
The unemployment rate in the Netherlands is one of the lowest in Europe. In the 
previous sections the Dutch job-to-job arrangements and the way job-to-job 
support is organised in the Netherlands were described. The main instrument in 
organizing job-to-job support is the social plan. However, there is no represent-
ative study available regarding the effectiveness of job-to-job arrangements 
established in Dutch social plans. Although the general view is that individual 
employers and employees are responsible for job-to-job transitions, the Dutch 
government has facilitated the social partners during the crisis. As a response to 
the crisis the Dutch government commissioned the establishment of temporary 
Mobility Centres. As explained in the previous section, the Public Employment 
Service UWV WERKbedrijf collaborated with municipalities, provinces, 

139 <http://www.aofondsrijk.nl/fileadmin/ao_data/Downloads/Over_A_O_fonds_Rijk/ 
Beleidsplannen/beleidsplan_2010.pdf>, accessed 2 November 2011.
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established in Dutch social plans. Although the general view is that individual 
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government has facilitated the social partners during the crisis. As a response to 
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employers, education and training centres and other private partners in these 
Mobility Centres. In 2009, the 33 Mobility Centres supported 13,000 redundant 
employees to another job without a spell of unemployment. Thus, these 
redundant employees made a direct job-to-job transition (UWV werkbedrijf, 
2010). In general, 51% of unemployment benefit recipients find another job 
within the first year (UWV, 2009).  
 
A recent study by UWV WERKbedrijf revealed that the unemployment duration 
was, on average, nine months for those jobseekers who found a job in 2010. 
UWV WERKbedrijf states that the chance of finding a job is highest in the initial 
phase of unemployment and compared the figures of these job finders with the 
registered jobseekers who had not yet found a job. The average nine months 
unemployment duration of the job finders contrasts sharply with the average 
duration of unemployment of jobseekers who still had not found a job. The 
average unemployment duration of these unemployed jobseekers was 30 
months. Compared with those who were still unemployed, the job finders were 
relatively young and had a higher educational status (UWV Werkbedrijf, 2011).  
 
The nine experiments based on the Temporary Decree Job-to-Job transitions 
(Tijdelijk besluit van werk naar werk) will be evaluated by an independent 
research institute by mid 2012.  
 
7.2.7 Success and failure factors 
De Kok et al. examined 20 case studies regarding job-to-job activities agreed in 
social plans. These case studies are not representative for the way social plans 
are manifested in the Netherlands, but they give a tentative insight into the 
success and failure factors. De Kok et al. start with a description of general 
preconditions for successful job-to-job transitions (Kok et al., 2008; RWI, 2010). 
The first one is that employers are willing to invest in job-to-job activities and 
employees should be motivated to participate in these activities. Employees 
should be convinced that it is an opportunity to participate in the activities, 
instead of seeing it as a threat. Trust and openness are key words. Secondly, 
trade unions or the works council should be involved throughout the whole 
process. Not only should they be involved in drawing up the social plan, but they 
should also play a role in the implementation, e.g. taking place in a board and 
supervising the implementation of the social plan. Thirdly, redundant employees 
should be given time to accept the new situation and to explore new 
opportunities by themselves.  
 
De Kok et al. continue with success factors regarding the content of social plans. 
They conclude that the higher the quality of the social plan, the better the 
implementation of job-to-job transition support. Furthermore, they argue that it 
is difficult to determine what kind of support should be included in the social 
plan, because situations differ. One measure can be a solution in one case, but 
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that does not necessarily mean that it is effective in another case. The social plan 
should be tailor-made and should take into account the number and the 
composition of redundant employees, the financial means of the company and 
the regional labour market situation. Employers and employees should agree 
about the distribution of the costs and about performance indicators.  
The following success factors relate to the implementation of social plans. In 
order to achieve a successful transition it is necessary that early information and 
advice is provided to the redundant employees regarding the social plan. The 
redundant employees should know what lies ahead, what can be arranged for 
them and what is expected from the redundant employees themselves. Another 
success factor is to give personal attention. This can be arranged by assigning a 
regular contact person who pays attention to the personal situation and supports 
the employee to find another job quickly. To make use of several specialized 
outplacement agencies can be valuable to provide tailor-made services to 
different target groups.  
 
De Kok et al. reveal, in their research, failure factors in addition to the above 
mentioned success factors (Kok et al., 2008). The first one is that it is difficult to 
predict future developments. Sometimes the number of redundant employees is 
fewer than was anticipated. Instruments and policy arrangements are unused, 
while expenses have been made. Another failure factor is that social plans are 
not connected with HRM-policies in the companies. Performance interviews are 
not consequently used. This implies that employers do not always have an 
overview of the skills and qualification of their employees. Employees are not 
stimulated to look around for another job. Thirdly, some employees, especially 
low skilled redundant employees, are not willing to make the transition to 
another employer as long as they can make the most of the better employment 
conditions of their current employers. These employees prefer to stay in the 
current job as long as possible instead of long-term (re) training trajectories 
which might lead to a little wage increase. The sense of urgency to find another 
job quickly disappears when offered trajectories which last more than one year 
(Kok et al., 2008).  
 
In a recent study conducted by EIM, several bottlenecks with regard to job-to-
job transitions from the perspective of SMEs are discussed (EIM, 2010). The 
study distinguishes failure factors at different levels: micro and macro. It appears 
that HRM or personnel management does not have priority in most SMEs. An 
SME employer only invests in education and training if he receives the benefits 
from it in the short term. According to the interviewees in the EIM study, SMEs 
have short-term planning. They look ahead for a only few months and, in the 
event of threatened redundancy, they come into action at the very last moment, 
which means that it is too late to arrange job-to-job activities. An employer who 
finally applies for a dismissal permit often has no financial means to support his 
redundant employees (EIM, 2010). At the macro level the study revealed that 
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the aim is to improve cohesion and collaboration with regard to job-to-job 
activities. However, in practice it appears that organisations compete with each 
other and that new organisations are established which operate separately from 
the existing infrastructure. Furthermore, the mismatch between national policy 
and regional needs is mentioned as a failure factor in the EIM study. 
 
Picchio and Van Ours concluded that company training has a positive effect on the 
employment security of employees. They argue that it is less likely that those 
employees, including older employees, who receive company training will become 
unemployed compared with those not receiving company training. Of those 
employees who did not receive company training 5.5% were unemployed one year 
later, whereas of those employees who received company training 1.9% were 
unemployed one year later. When Picchio and Van Ours controlled for personal 
features the difference appeared to be even larger (Picchio & Van Ours, 2011). 
 
7.3 Comparison of job-to-job transitions systems across countries 
 
Now that the different job-to-job transitions systems in different countries have 
been reviewed, the empirical findings derived from the four national cases 
(Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6) will be further analyzed and compared with the Dutch 
system in terms of type of support, eligibility, financing, responsibility, 
coordination, delivery, and income security. What are the main similarities and 
differences? Firstly, this section starts with a summarizing overview of the job-
to-job modalities in the countries studied. Subsequently, the similarities and 
differences between the Netherlands and the other countries examined will be 
further discussed in sections 7.3.1, 7.3.2, 7.3.3, and 7.3.4. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the main focus of this thesis is on the curative part, 
i.e. systems and measures geared towards direct job-to-job transitions in the 
event of redundancy (see phase three in table 7.9). However, during the 
interviews preventative unemployment measures were also mentioned, such as 
education, training, and the reduction of working hours. It should be emphasized 
that the preventative measures and curative measures are interdependent. For 
instance, investments in education and training in order to achieve more 
functional flexibility in the company will subsequently also contribute to more 
smooth transitions from job-to-job in the event of redundancy. Several phases in 
the prevention of unemployment can be distinguished: primary prevention, 
secondary prevention, and tertiary prevention (see table 7.9). The primary 
prevention phase refers to a healthy company, in which forced dismissals are not 
under discussion. In the secondary prevention phase, there is a threat of 
redundancy. A company in bad circumstances can take several preventative 
measures to avoid redundancy, e.g. measures to adjust the volume of 
manpower, to adjust labour costs, or measures to enhance the employability of 
the current staff. These measures can be targeted at the company itself (internal 
measures) or the company can focus on opportunities outside the company 
CHAPTER 7 
241
(external measures). When there is a lack of work, companies can try to balance 
holiday leave, overtime credits and abolish Sunday and overtime shifts, or they 
can cooperate with other companies via labour pools, secondment or 
outplacement trajectories. In times of crisis, governments can support 
companies to overcome economic difficulties by implementing short time work 
arrangements, e.g. the Kurzarbeit regulation in Austria and the special part-time 
unemployment scheme in the Netherlands. When forced dismissals are 
inevitable, individual companies (hierarchies) can file for redundancy and 
introduce curative job-to-job measures for the employees who have received 
their notice. In the event that the contract will be terminated by mutual consent, 
which is attractive for employers because in this way they avoid formal dismissal 
procedures, the company and individual employee can negotiate about active 
job-to-job support and financial compensation, in the Netherlands mostly 
attuned in an agreed social plan. Furthermore, curative measures can be 
initiated and coordinated by other actors such as trade unions and employers’ 
associations, the state or the Public Employment Service, private market 
suppliers or networks. The role of the various actors differs in the countries 
examined, which will be discussed in the next sections.  
Finally, tertiary prevention refers to the phase in which the employment contract 
is terminated. When the curative measures geared towards direct job-to-job 
transitions are not effective, the redundant employee will become unemployed. 
When certain access conditions are met, the unemployed can receive an unem-
ployment benefit. This is the phase in which actors, predominantly the state and 
the Public Employment Service, provide preventative measures and support 
geared to avoid long-term unemployment.  
The various job-to-job intervention modalities in the event of forced dismissals 
observed in the countries examined and discussed in the preceding chapters are 
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the aim is to improve cohesion and collaboration with regard to job-to-job 
activities. However, in practice it appears that organisations compete with each 
other and that new organisations are established which operate separately from 
the existing infrastructure. Furthermore, the mismatch between national policy 
and regional needs is mentioned as a failure factor in the EIM study. 
 
Picchio and Van Ours concluded that company training has a positive effect on the 
employment security of employees. They argue that it is less likely that those 
employees, including older employees, who receive company training will become 
unemployed compared with those not receiving company training. Of those 
employees who did not receive company training 5.5% were unemployed one year 
later, whereas of those employees who received company training 1.9% were 
unemployed one year later. When Picchio and Van Ours controlled for personal 
features the difference appeared to be even larger (Picchio & Van Ours, 2011). 
 
7.3 Comparison of job-to-job transitions systems across countries 
 
Now that the different job-to-job transitions systems in different countries have 
been reviewed, the empirical findings derived from the four national cases 
(Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6) will be further analyzed and compared with the Dutch 
system in terms of type of support, eligibility, financing, responsibility, 
coordination, delivery, and income security. What are the main similarities and 
differences? Firstly, this section starts with a summarizing overview of the job-
to-job modalities in the countries studied. Subsequently, the similarities and 
differences between the Netherlands and the other countries examined will be 
further discussed in sections 7.3.1, 7.3.2, 7.3.3, and 7.3.4. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the main focus of this thesis is on the curative part, 
i.e. systems and measures geared towards direct job-to-job transitions in the 
event of redundancy (see phase three in table 7.9). However, during the 
interviews preventative unemployment measures were also mentioned, such as 
education, training, and the reduction of working hours. It should be emphasized 
that the preventative measures and curative measures are interdependent. For 
instance, investments in education and training in order to achieve more 
functional flexibility in the company will subsequently also contribute to more 
smooth transitions from job-to-job in the event of redundancy. Several phases in 
the prevention of unemployment can be distinguished: primary prevention, 
secondary prevention, and tertiary prevention (see table 7.9). The primary 
prevention phase refers to a healthy company, in which forced dismissals are not 
under discussion. In the secondary prevention phase, there is a threat of 
redundancy. A company in bad circumstances can take several preventative 
measures to avoid redundancy, e.g. measures to adjust the volume of 
manpower, to adjust labour costs, or measures to enhance the employability of 
the current staff. These measures can be targeted at the company itself (internal 
measures) or the company can focus on opportunities outside the company 
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(external measures). When there is a lack of work, companies can try to balance 
holiday leave, overtime credits and abolish Sunday and overtime shifts, or they 
can cooperate with other companies via labour pools, secondment or 
outplacement trajectories. In times of crisis, governments can support 
companies to overcome economic difficulties by implementing short time work 
arrangements, e.g. the Kurzarbeit regulation in Austria and the special part-time 
unemployment scheme in the Netherlands. When forced dismissals are 
inevitable, individual companies (hierarchies) can file for redundancy and 
introduce curative job-to-job measures for the employees who have received 
their notice. In the event that the contract will be terminated by mutual consent, 
which is attractive for employers because in this way they avoid formal dismissal 
procedures, the company and individual employee can negotiate about active 
job-to-job support and financial compensation, in the Netherlands mostly 
attuned in an agreed social plan. Furthermore, curative measures can be 
initiated and coordinated by other actors such as trade unions and employers’ 
associations, the state or the Public Employment Service, private market 
suppliers or networks. The role of the various actors differs in the countries 
examined, which will be discussed in the next sections.  
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is terminated. When the curative measures geared towards direct job-to-job 
transitions are not effective, the redundant employee will become unemployed. 
When certain access conditions are met, the unemployed can receive an unem-
ployment benefit. This is the phase in which actors, predominantly the state and 
the Public Employment Service, provide preventative measures and support 
geared to avoid long-term unemployment.  
The various job-to-job intervention modalities in the event of forced dismissals 
observed in the countries examined and discussed in the preceding chapters are 
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Table 7.9: Job-to-job intervention modalities in the event of forced dismissals 
Primary 
Prevention 
PHASE 1: HEALTHY BUSINESS 
Secondary 
Prevention 
PHASE 2: THREAT OF REDUNDANCY 
INTERNAL MEASURES  
Adjustment manpower/labour volume  
     e.g. Reduction  duration employment, reduction 
of working hours (individual and collective), 
reduction overtime, halt on vacancies/opening  
Adjustment labour costs 
     e.g. Reduction of working hours (individual and 
collective), freeze or economize  conditions of 
employment, merge or split functions 
Enhancement employability staff 
     e.g. Employability:  education and training, (early 
acquired competencies), functional flexibility, 
labour pools within the company, update/ 
change working conditions in collective 
agreements and /or social plans 
EXTERNAL MEASURES  
Adjustment manpower/labour 
volume 
     e.g.: Labour pool with different 
companies, secondment, pre-
retirement 
Adjustment labour costs 
      e.g. secondment, outsourcing 
Enhancement employability staff  
     e.g. Employability beyond the 
company’s border,  Update / 
change working conditions 
in collective 
agreements and /or social plans, 
external  regional or sector 
labour pool   
PHASE 3:  UNDER NOTICE  
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7.3.1 The Swedish and Dutch job-to-job transition system compared 
Before the job-to-job systems or arrangements are compared between the 
Netherlands and Sweden, the labour market situation in both countries will be 
addressed. The unemployment rate in the Netherlands in 2009 was lower than in 
Sweden and was in fact one of the lowest in Europe (2.8%). On the other hand, 
Sweden had a lower long-term unemployment rate (12.8%) than the Netherlands 
(34.9%) and the EU27 (37.0%). This might mean that Swedish unemployed 
people find another job more quickly compared with the Dutch unemployed. 
However, if the lower percentage in long-term unemployment in Sweden is 
connected to the higher level of total Swedish unemployment and the higher 
percentage in long-term unemployment in the Netherlands is connected to the 
low Dutch total level of unemployment, the intensity of the problem is probably 
the same in both countries. Does the job-to-job support provided in Sweden 
differs from the support provided in the Netherlands? Based on the empirical 
findings it can be concluded that the job-to-job support provided is similar in 
Sweden and the Netherlands. In both countries active and financial support are 
available. The Swedish transition agreements and the Dutch social plans regulate 
which support is offered to redundant employees. However, the target group and 
the way the job-to-job transition ‘system’ is organised, differ between Sweden 
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7.3.1 The Swedish and Dutch job-to-job transition system compared 
Before the job-to-job systems or arrangements are compared between the 
Netherlands and Sweden, the labour market situation in both countries will be 
addressed. The unemployment rate in the Netherlands in 2009 was lower than in 
Sweden and was in fact one of the lowest in Europe (2.8%). On the other hand, 
Sweden had a lower long-term unemployment rate (12.8%) than the Netherlands 
(34.9%) and the EU27 (37.0%). This might mean that Swedish unemployed 
people find another job more quickly compared with the Dutch unemployed. 
However, if the lower percentage in long-term unemployment in Sweden is 
connected to the higher level of total Swedish unemployment and the higher 
percentage in long-term unemployment in the Netherlands is connected to the 
low Dutch total level of unemployment, the intensity of the problem is probably 
the same in both countries. Does the job-to-job support provided in Sweden 
differs from the support provided in the Netherlands? Based on the empirical 
findings it can be concluded that the job-to-job support provided is similar in 
Sweden and the Netherlands. In both countries active and financial support are 
available. The Swedish transition agreements and the Dutch social plans regulate 
which support is offered to redundant employees. However, the target group and 
the way the job-to-job transition ‘system’ is organised, differ between Sweden 
and the Netherlands. The differences will be addressed in this section. 
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Structural Swedish job-to-job system versus Dutch ad hoc activities and initiatives 
In the Netherlands there is a growing awareness of the need to invest in job-to-
job transitions. This became more urgent when the economic crisis hit the Dutch 
labour market and this topic was put at the top of the Dutch policy agenda. The 
solutions from the Dutch government, in the form of Mobility Centres, part-time 
unemployment schemes and experiments, are nothing more than temporary 
measures. Compared with Sweden there is no ‘systematic’ or structural 
approach in the Netherlands. A central feature of the Swedish system is the role 
given to strong adjustment agreements coordinated by employers’ associations 
and trade unions without government involvement. A relevant precondition is 
that there is trust among the trade unions and employers. Social partners should 
be willing to collaborate. The Swedish transition foundations work like insurance 
companies to which the companies pay a contribution every two months. In 
prosperous periods money is saved in the fund and once the tide turns the 
means are immediately available in order to support redundant employees 
quickly to another job. When layoffs are deemed necessary, the employer can 
claim money from the transition fund. The first collective adjustment agreement 
already dates from 1974; nowadays transition agreements are a structural and 
important feature of the Swedish labour market. In the Netherlands social plans 
are negotiated when it becomes clear that companies have to restructure which 
might lead to forced redundancies. Thus, the Swedish transition agreements 
make it possible to take action right away when the company is in poor 
circumstances, while in the Netherlands time elapses to implement social plans 
once a company is confronted with collective dismissals. 
Another feature of the Dutch case is that the government seeks solutions in 
times of crisis, but once the solution has been created, e.g. the job-to-job 
experiments, the economy has recovered and the need to take action is less 
urgent. It appears that some experiments currently find difficulty in finding 
redundant employees for the project. This failure factor of ad hoc policies and 
the difficulty in predicting future developments was also addressed in the study 
conducted by De Kok et al. in 2008.  
 
Limited role Dutch trade unions and employers’ associations  
The Dutch social partners have been traditionally highly involved in employment 
and labour market policies, but currently their roles with regard to job-to-job 
transitions is fairly weak, certainly in comparison with the Swedish system. In the 
early 1990s, the Dutch tripartite Public Employment Service was criticized and a 
committee led by Buurmeijer concluded that radical changes were needed 
regarding the organisation of the social security. Eventually, with the 
introduction of SUWI, the tripartite governance was abolished and the role of 
social partners was restricted (Van Gestel et al., 2009).  
 
SME employees covered? 
It appears that Dutch employees who work in large companies benefit the most 
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from job-to-job arrangements. Large Dutch companies can draw up a 
‘redundancy plan’, whereas small companies do not have the resources to buy 
outplacement services. Thus, Dutch employees working in small companies are 
less privileged with regard to job-to-job support than workers employed in big 
companies. The systematic approach of the Swedish collective agreements 
based on mutual trust has resulted in a peaceful labour market without strikes. 
Just as in Sweden the number of strikes and lockouts are rare in the Netherlands 
(see table 2.4 in Chapter 2). Furthermore, in Sweden many people can qualify for 
job-to-job support in the event of redundancy, including those employed as 
SMEs. Today, almost half of the Swedish workforce is covered by an adjustment 
agreement, and an estimated 80% of companies covered by an adjustment 
agreement in the private sector are small companies with fewer than 10 
employees. In December 2010, the trade unions and the employers’ association 
reached a transition agreement in the municipality sector which will come into 
force on 1 January 2012. This is one of the largest transition agreements in the 
Swedish labour market, covering around 1.1 million employees. Thus, as from 1 
January 2012 the majority of all permanent employees will be covered by a 
transition agreement. However, temporary employees are not covered by the 
transition agreements. A challenge for the Netherlands is to explore a more 
systematic approach in which more employees working in small companies or 
with typical contracts can also benefit from ‘systematic’ job-to-job arrange-
ments.  
 
Financing job-to-job support via periodic contribution to structural funds 
The Swedish transition foundation can be a source of inspiration in the Dutch 
quest for a more structural system to enhance job-to-job transitions for those 
whose jobs are at risk. The Dutch sector funds (sectorfondsen or so-called O&O 
fondsen) are private foundations managed by social partners. Currently, the 
Dutch sectoral funds do not have a systematic and structural role in providing 
transition support in the case of redundancy and intersectoral mobility is 
scarcely stimulated (Donker van Heel et al., 2008). Dutch policymakers and, in 
particular, the social partners could consider the use of the existing structure of 
the sectoral funds to collect and distribute money for transition support for 
people who are going to lose their jobs, and to enhance intersectoral mobility. 
The advantage for the employer is that there is money available to help 
redundant workers if their employer is in financial trouble. Moreover, the image 
of the company will be harmed to a lesser degree than if the employer does not 
provide any support to its redundant employees. In such a system, both trade 
unions and employers could be actively involved in using their experience and 
knowledge to match the right person with the right job. However, it remains to 
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Outsourcing re-integration activities for the unemployed to private suppliers in 
Sweden still in its infancy compared with the Netherlands 
Until 1993/1994 private employment services were forbidden in Sweden. The 
Swedish governmental agency, the Labour Market Board (AMS), had a monopoly 
on job matching activities. Nowadays the Public Employment Service AMS 
contracts private companies, for example, for coaching activities. The theory 
behind this is that a lot of private suppliers have contacts and relationships with 
employers which the Swedish PES does not have to such an extent. In Sweden the 
blue-collar transition foundation TSL contracts out the job coaching activities to 
private service providers. 
Markets, as a coordination mechanism, are gaining importance in Sweden, but 
compared with the Netherlands the outsourcing process to private suppliers is still 
in its infancy. The Netherlands has more experience with contracting out services 
to private parties. As mentioned previously, nearly 2,000 private suppliers act on 
the Dutch re-integration market. 
In the Netherlands, a re-integration quality mark has been developed, on the basis 
of self-regulation of the sector, which private service suppliers can obtain if they 
meet certain quality criteria. However, it appears that generally the performance 
of re-integration has not improved since the privatization (Van Gestel et al., 2009). 
Duration of Swedish unemployment benefit shorter and replacement rate lower, 
but active support provided in an earlier stage compared with the Netherlands 
The maximum duration of the Swedish unemployment benefit is one year at the 
most. In the Netherlands the maximum duration of the unemployment benefit 
can last up to three years and two months. The OECD total average unemploy-
ment replacement rate under the assumption of the earning level of 100% of the 
average wage is, during the initial phase of unemployment, lower in Sweden 
(60%) than in the Netherlands (79%). When the earning level is less, i.e. 67% of the 
average wage, the difference between the replacement ratios is negligible (SE: 
79% and NL: 81%). 
7.3.2 The British and Dutch job-to-job transition system compared 
Before the similarities and the differences between the British and Dutch job-to-
job systems are discussed, general labour market figures will first be presented. In 
2009, 77% of the Dutch labour force was employed, whereas in the UK this per-
centage was 69.9%. The unemployment rate in the Netherlands was 3.7% in 2009, 
and 7.6% in the UK. The percentages of long-term unemployment are compare-
able. In both countries a quarter of the unemployed were unemployed for twelve 
months or longer. These figures give us a general view of the labour market 
situation in both countries. The Netherlands seems to have had a better labour 
market position in 2009. However, the mobility rate in the Netherlands is lower 
than in the UK. The question is as to whether or not the better labour market 
performance in the Netherlands can be explained by more active job-to-job 
policies or arrangements. Therefore, the British and the Dutch job-to-job systems 
and arrangements will be compared. 
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The job-to-job support provided in the UK is similar to the Netherlands, but both 
countries are heedless of psychological support after redundancy 
The support that can be provided is similar in the two countries and comprises, 
among others, training and education, active job search support, advice and 
guidance. British researchers concluded, based on the MG Rover case, that it is 
important that people know and understand better what support is available. 
Information was in fact available to those being made redundant, but the 
employees losing their jobs, especially on the scale of the MG Rover closure, 
were in shock. They needed help to understand the information. The researchers 
argue that a more tailored approach to workers is needed, not only 
professionally, but also psychologically. While there was a speedy response to 
the crisis, the interviews with the ex-workers suggested that there is a need to be 
more sensitive to people who have never been unemployed and do not know 
how to make claims for benefit or search for jobs. There is also a need to help 
people feel that it is not their fault that they have become unemployed (Bailey et 
al., 2009; Bentley et al., 2009). In the Netherlands more attention can be paid to 
psychological support for redundant employees. 
 
Early support: the British Rapid Response Service versus the Dutch Mobility Centres 
The Jobcentre Plus Rapid Response Service (RRS) is an executive agency of the 
Department of Work and Pensions and tries to prevent customers from making 
a Job seekers’ allowance claim. The local Jobcentre Plus offices organises ‘fast 
tracks’ which means that support is offered to employees as soon as they receive 
their notice. The local Jobcentre is notified by the regional office which 
employers will dismiss twenty people or more in the short-term. The Rapid 
Response Service members contact these employers and ask what kind of 
support the employer needs. In the past, job-losses at small companies 
remained unnoticed, but since October 2009, Jobcentre Plus has collaborated 
with the Insolvency Trade Body R3 and the Insolvency Service to share 
information about possible job losses in struggling companies. Such an early 
warning system does not exist in the Netherlands. 
The temporary Dutch Mobility Centres which are initiatives of the Dutch 
government resemble the British Rapid Response Service, because they are 
publicly financed organisations. Furthermore, the departure point of both 
initiatives is that there is a partnership approach. Several similar actors 
collaborate together in the Dutch Mobility Centres and the British Rapid 
Response Service. In the Netherlands the primary responsibility lies with the 
company that has to lay off employees. The company determines which actors 
and instruments will be brought in to achieve the job-to-job transition and who 
should take the lead. The Mobility Centres offer advice to the employers and 
support redundant employees in their job search. The Mobility Centres 
implement, together with other partners, the agreed approach. The British 
members of the Rapid Response Team seem to be more pro-active in contacting 
companies who are about to lay off employees and this makes it possible to 
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Markets, as a coordination mechanism, are gaining importance in Sweden, but 
compared with the Netherlands the outsourcing process to private suppliers is still 
in its infancy. The Netherlands has more experience with contracting out services 
to private parties. As mentioned previously, nearly 2,000 private suppliers act on 
the Dutch re-integration market. 
In the Netherlands, a re-integration quality mark has been developed, on the basis 
of self-regulation of the sector, which private service suppliers can obtain if they 
meet certain quality criteria. However, it appears that generally the performance 
of re-integration has not improved since the privatization (Van Gestel et al., 2009). 
Duration of Swedish unemployment benefit shorter and replacement rate lower, 
but active support provided in an earlier stage compared with the Netherlands 
The maximum duration of the Swedish unemployment benefit is one year at the 
most. In the Netherlands the maximum duration of the unemployment benefit 
can last up to three years and two months. The OECD total average unemploy-
ment replacement rate under the assumption of the earning level of 100% of the 
average wage is, during the initial phase of unemployment, lower in Sweden 
(60%) than in the Netherlands (79%). When the earning level is less, i.e. 67% of the 
average wage, the difference between the replacement ratios is negligible (SE: 
79% and NL: 81%). 
7.3.2 The British and Dutch job-to-job transition system compared 
Before the similarities and the differences between the British and Dutch job-to-
job systems are discussed, general labour market figures will first be presented. In 
2009, 77% of the Dutch labour force was employed, whereas in the UK this per-
centage was 69.9%. The unemployment rate in the Netherlands was 3.7% in 2009, 
and 7.6% in the UK. The percentages of long-term unemployment are compare-
able. In both countries a quarter of the unemployed were unemployed for twelve 
months or longer. These figures give us a general view of the labour market 
situation in both countries. The Netherlands seems to have had a better labour 
market position in 2009. However, the mobility rate in the Netherlands is lower 
than in the UK. The question is as to whether or not the better labour market 
performance in the Netherlands can be explained by more active job-to-job 
policies or arrangements. Therefore, the British and the Dutch job-to-job systems 
and arrangements will be compared. 
CHAPTER 7 
247
The job-to-job support provided in the UK is similar to the Netherlands, but both 
countries are heedless of psychological support after redundancy 
The support that can be provided is similar in the two countries and comprises, 
among others, training and education, active job search support, advice and 
guidance. British researchers concluded, based on the MG Rover case, that it is 
important that people know and understand better what support is available. 
Information was in fact available to those being made redundant, but the 
employees losing their jobs, especially on the scale of the MG Rover closure, 
were in shock. They needed help to understand the information. The researchers 
argue that a more tailored approach to workers is needed, not only 
professionally, but also psychologically. While there was a speedy response to 
the crisis, the interviews with the ex-workers suggested that there is a need to be 
more sensitive to people who have never been unemployed and do not know 
how to make claims for benefit or search for jobs. There is also a need to help 
people feel that it is not their fault that they have become unemployed (Bailey et 
al., 2009; Bentley et al., 2009). In the Netherlands more attention can be paid to 
psychological support for redundant employees. 
 
Early support: the British Rapid Response Service versus the Dutch Mobility Centres 
The Jobcentre Plus Rapid Response Service (RRS) is an executive agency of the 
Department of Work and Pensions and tries to prevent customers from making 
a Job seekers’ allowance claim. The local Jobcentre Plus offices organises ‘fast 
tracks’ which means that support is offered to employees as soon as they receive 
their notice. The local Jobcentre is notified by the regional office which 
employers will dismiss twenty people or more in the short-term. The Rapid 
Response Service members contact these employers and ask what kind of 
support the employer needs. In the past, job-losses at small companies 
remained unnoticed, but since October 2009, Jobcentre Plus has collaborated 
with the Insolvency Trade Body R3 and the Insolvency Service to share 
information about possible job losses in struggling companies. Such an early 
warning system does not exist in the Netherlands. 
The temporary Dutch Mobility Centres which are initiatives of the Dutch 
government resemble the British Rapid Response Service, because they are 
publicly financed organisations. Furthermore, the departure point of both 
initiatives is that there is a partnership approach. Several similar actors 
collaborate together in the Dutch Mobility Centres and the British Rapid 
Response Service. In the Netherlands the primary responsibility lies with the 
company that has to lay off employees. The company determines which actors 
and instruments will be brought in to achieve the job-to-job transition and who 
should take the lead. The Mobility Centres offer advice to the employers and 
support redundant employees in their job search. The Mobility Centres 
implement, together with other partners, the agreed approach. The British 
members of the Rapid Response Team seem to be more pro-active in contacting 
companies who are about to lay off employees and this makes it possible to 
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provide support at a more early stage.  
 
Role of British employers’ associations and trade unions in job-to-job transitions is 
limited  
The government and individual companies play the most significant role in the 
British job-to-job transitions. Trade unions and employers’ associations do not 
play a role in providing active job-to-job support. The role of trade unions in a 
redundancy process is concentrated on negotiating the best deal for the 
redundant employees. Until recently, the role of Dutch trade unions and works 
councils was limited to establishing social plans in case of collective dismissals. In 
some cases, e.g. the TNT Post restructuring case, the employer negotiated at an 
early stage with trade unions about mitigating the consequences of the 
redundancy. As mentioned previously, TNT established an internal Mobility 
Centre. However, the Dutch government deems it necessary that trade unions, 
individual employers and employers’ associations take up more responsibility for 
job-to-job transitions and introduced the nine job-to-job experiments.  
 
Financing job-to-job support provided by the government results in programmes in 
the UK and an ad hoc approach in the Netherlands 
Both the British and the Dutch model with regard to job-to-job transitions in the 
event of redundancy are not organised in a structural way, such as the Swedish 
transition foundations. The UK works with programmes, e.g. the Rapid Response 
Service and the Response to Redundancy programme, which are both financed 
by the government. The Dutch government provides means to set up temporary 
Mobility Centres. Furthermore, in Dutch collective dismissal procedures, social 
plans are agreed between the employer and the works council or trade unions, 
once it is clear that a company has to lay off more than twenty employees. The 
negotiations start when redundancy is inevitable while, e.g. the transition 
agreements in Sweden have a more structural character and are in place before 
redundancy occurs.  
 
Private outplacement services are common in the UK and the Netherlands 
Both the Netherlands and the UK have an open and liberal policy towards 
private recruitment and outplacement agencies. Outplacement evolved in the 
UK and companies which have the financial means provide these services to 
their redundant, mostly high-skilled employees.  
 
Networks of companies that collaborate in the field of HRM are scarce in the UK  
In the Netherlands several company networks exist aimed at exchanging 
personnel, knowledge, ideas and experience in the field of HRM. This should 
lead to more quality, more efficiency and cost reducing measures. These kinds of 
company networks in a certain region are scarce in the UK. However, this does 
not mean that companies do not collaborate with other organisations in the 
event of redundancy. In the RRS and Local Employment Partnerships different 
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actors cooperate closely and each redundancy process will have a different 
constellation of actors involved depending on the local circumstances. 
 
Training and education is a shared responsibility and should fit the employers’ 
needs 
The Local Employment Partnerships established in the UK are a step forward in 
fitting training and education to the employers’ needs. However, there is room 
for improvement and the challenge for the British government is to build up 
good relationships with employers. The British government is in favour of shared 
responsibility and expects that employees and employers will co-invest in 
training courses and that they will take greater responsibility for ensuring that 
the employers’ and employees’ skills needs are met. This is also a challenge for 
the Netherlands. 
 
Less income security for redundant employees in the UK compared with the Dutch 
situation  
The maximum duration of the contribution based Jobseekers’ Allowance in the 
UK is much shorter than the Dutch unemployment insurance. Furthermore, the 
British unemployment replacement rate (54% in 2009 by an earning level of 
100% of the average wage) during the initial phase of unemployment is 
significantly lower than in the Netherlands (79% in 2009 by an earning level of 
100% of the average wage). The British contribution based Jobseekers’ 
Allowance is paid up to maximum of 182 days. After this period jobseekers can 
be eligible for an income-based Jobseekers’ Allowance which is means-tested, 
implying that the amount of savings does matter to be qualified for this benefit. 
Under certain conditions, the Dutch unemployment insurance can last up to 
three years and two months. The unemployment insurance is not means-tested. 
When the Dutch unemployment benefit runs out, the unemployed can be 
eligible for a social security benefit from the municipality, if certain conditions 
are met. Moreover, the level of the unemployment benefit is determined 
differently. In the UK the contribution based Jobseekers’ Allowance depends on 
the age of the redundant employee and is maximized at GBP 65.45 per week 
(EUR 73.75), while the Dutch unemployment benefit depends on the previously 
earned wage: 75% in the first two months of unemployment and 70% after that. 
The weekly minimum wage for a Dutch employee aged 23 and over is EUR 
331.20 as of 1 July 2011, which means that the unemployment benefit for eligible 
redundant employees in the UK is less compared with the Dutch income security 
provided during the initial phase of unemployment. 
 
7.3.3 The Austrian and Dutch job-to-job transition system compared 
 
Austrian labour foundations function as a bridge between two jobs 
The Austrian labour foundations (Arbeitsstiftung) vary in scale and organisation, 
but they are all aimed at serving as a bridge between two jobs. Strictly, the labour 
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provide support at a more early stage.  
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Mobility Centres. Furthermore, in Dutch collective dismissal procedures, social 
plans are agreed between the employer and the works council or trade unions, 
once it is clear that a company has to lay off more than twenty employees. The 
negotiations start when redundancy is inevitable while, e.g. the transition 
agreements in Sweden have a more structural character and are in place before 
redundancy occurs.  
 
Private outplacement services are common in the UK and the Netherlands 
Both the Netherlands and the UK have an open and liberal policy towards 
private recruitment and outplacement agencies. Outplacement evolved in the 
UK and companies which have the financial means provide these services to 
their redundant, mostly high-skilled employees.  
 
Networks of companies that collaborate in the field of HRM are scarce in the UK  
In the Netherlands several company networks exist aimed at exchanging 
personnel, knowledge, ideas and experience in the field of HRM. This should 
lead to more quality, more efficiency and cost reducing measures. These kinds of 
company networks in a certain region are scarce in the UK. However, this does 
not mean that companies do not collaborate with other organisations in the 
event of redundancy. In the RRS and Local Employment Partnerships different 
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actors cooperate closely and each redundancy process will have a different 
constellation of actors involved depending on the local circumstances. 
 
Training and education is a shared responsibility and should fit the employers’ 
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The Local Employment Partnerships established in the UK are a step forward in 
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good relationships with employers. The British government is in favour of shared 
responsibility and expects that employees and employers will co-invest in 
training courses and that they will take greater responsibility for ensuring that 
the employers’ and employees’ skills needs are met. This is also a challenge for 
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situation  
The maximum duration of the contribution based Jobseekers’ Allowance in the 
UK is much shorter than the Dutch unemployment insurance. Furthermore, the 
British unemployment replacement rate (54% in 2009 by an earning level of 
100% of the average wage) during the initial phase of unemployment is 
significantly lower than in the Netherlands (79% in 2009 by an earning level of 
100% of the average wage). The British contribution based Jobseekers’ 
Allowance is paid up to maximum of 182 days. After this period jobseekers can 
be eligible for an income-based Jobseekers’ Allowance which is means-tested, 
implying that the amount of savings does matter to be qualified for this benefit. 
Under certain conditions, the Dutch unemployment insurance can last up to 
three years and two months. The unemployment insurance is not means-tested. 
When the Dutch unemployment benefit runs out, the unemployed can be 
eligible for a social security benefit from the municipality, if certain conditions 
are met. Moreover, the level of the unemployment benefit is determined 
differently. In the UK the contribution based Jobseekers’ Allowance depends on 
the age of the redundant employee and is maximized at GBP 65.45 per week 
(EUR 73.75), while the Dutch unemployment benefit depends on the previously 
earned wage: 75% in the first two months of unemployment and 70% after that. 
The weekly minimum wage for a Dutch employee aged 23 and over is EUR 
331.20 as of 1 July 2011, which means that the unemployment benefit for eligible 
redundant employees in the UK is less compared with the Dutch income security 
provided during the initial phase of unemployment. 
 
7.3.3 The Austrian and Dutch job-to-job transition system compared 
 
Austrian labour foundations function as a bridge between two jobs 
The Austrian labour foundations (Arbeitsstiftung) vary in scale and organisation, 
but they are all aimed at serving as a bridge between two jobs. Strictly, the labour 
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foundations do not provide for direct job-to-job transitions. The participants in 
the labour foundations receive an unemployment benefit from the Public 
Employment Service AMS. Although the type of support provided via the labour 
foundations (professional orientation, education and training, active job search) is 
also offered in the Netherlands, the infrastructure of labour foundations does not 
exist in the Netherlands. An interesting feature of the Austrian labour 
foundations is that the former employers extend the responsibility for their 
redundant employees by providing a fee per participant and by, for example, 
providing tools, personnel or equipment free of charge that might be necessary 
for retraining the redundant workers. The maximum duration of participation in a 
labour foundation is four years which is quite long envisaged from the Dutch 
perspective. Some labour foundations can be regarded as structural, because 
they exist for many years. The first labour foundation dates from 1987 and is still 
in operation. Other labour foundations run for a specific period and other 
foundations have already disappeared. 
 
Austrian temporary workers can enter a labour foundation, while in the 
Netherlands the future job-to-job support will be nil for this category of employees  
The Austrian labour foundations are open for employees with a fixed-term 
contract which will not be renewed because of economic reasons. Thus, not only 
permanent employees are eligible for job-to-job support. The Dutch UWV 
WERKbedrijf provides the means to private agencies for unemployment 
preventative services including for temporary workers and employees with a 
contract of limited duration which will not be renewed within 4 months; however 
this service will stop as of October 2011. 
 
Financing labour foundations based on shared responsibility 
The way labour foundations are financed depends on the type of labour 
foundation. Labour foundations can be co-financed by companies, redundant 
employees (depositing a share of the severance pay) and colleagues (solidarity 
contribution), the Public Employment Service and local authorities. In the 
Netherlands, it is not common for employees to sacrifice a part of their 
severance pay, in exchange for job-to-job support, nor for colleagues to pay 
solidarity contributions. Austrian companies pay a fee per participant in the 
labour foundation. Providing outplacement services to redundant employee is 
less common compared with the Netherlands. This can be explained by the 
Austrian view that job-to-job transitions are a shared responsibility between the 
state and social partners, while in the Netherlands they are regarded more as the 
responsibility of individual employers and employees. 
 
Training networks (Qualifizierungsverbünde) as a preventative measure 
The Austrian training network is an association of at least three companies and 
at least 50% of the participating companies are SMEs. The joint aim is to provide 
training to their employees, based on the needs of the employers and 
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transferable to other companies. The AMS can grant subsidy for these networks. 
These kinds of training networks do not exist in the Netherlands. 
 
Role of Austrian social partners cannot be detached from the state 
The Austrian government, the Public Employment Service and, indirectly, also 
the social partners, play a main role in supporting redundant employees to 
another job. The social partners are represented in committees and boards at all 
levels of the Public Employment Service AMS, which is not the case in the 
Netherlands. During the 1990s, the Dutch Public Employment Service had a 
tripartite board (Sol, 2000), but even from its introduction the relationship 
between social partners and the government was tense. The tripartite structure 
was abolished when the SUWI law came into force in 2002. The social partners 
have a consultative role in this new structure via the Council for Work and 
Income (Van Gestel et al., 2009). However, the Council for Work and Income will 
cease as from 1 July 2012, because the government has decided to stop its 
contribution. 
 
Severance pay: national system based on the backpack principle versus a system 
based on the relationship between individual employers and employees  
The reform of the Austrian severance pay introduced a contribution based 
system of individual savings and replaced the direct payment of severance pay 
by the employer to the dismissed employee. When the dismissal is not at the 
initiative of the employee he or she can withdraw the severance pay or decide to 
move it to the fund of the new employer (backpack principle). However, 
employees who withdraw the money out of the fund can spend the money on 
whatever the workers want and this does not automatically mean that 
employability will be enhanced. The Netherlands does not have a transferable 
severance pay system. The severance pay system is still based on the traditional 
relationship between one employer and one employee, while Austria reformed 
this system to a broader national system through formation of funds. The 
Austrian new severance pay system served as example for the Work Budget 
proposed by the Committee on Labour Market Participation. 
 
The Austrian Unemployment Insurance provides less income security compared 
with the Dutch unemployment insurance 
The Austrian unemployment insurance scheme provides less income security 
compared with the Dutch scheme in terms of the level and the duration of the 
benefit. In 2009, the OECD overall average unemployment replacement rate 
during the initial phase of unemployment by an earning level of 100% of the 
average wage is 68% in Austria and 79% in the Netherlands. In Austria the 
maximum duration of the unemployment insurance benefit is 52 weeks in the 
event of 468 weeks of contributory employment within the preceding 15 years. 
In the Netherlands the maximum duration can last up to 38 months. The level of 
the Austrian benefit is equivalent to 55% of the previous net earnings, while in 
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foundations do not provide for direct job-to-job transitions. The participants in 
the labour foundations receive an unemployment benefit from the Public 
Employment Service AMS. Although the type of support provided via the labour 
foundations (professional orientation, education and training, active job search) is 
also offered in the Netherlands, the infrastructure of labour foundations does not 
exist in the Netherlands. An interesting feature of the Austrian labour 
foundations is that the former employers extend the responsibility for their 
redundant employees by providing a fee per participant and by, for example, 
providing tools, personnel or equipment free of charge that might be necessary 
for retraining the redundant workers. The maximum duration of participation in a 
labour foundation is four years which is quite long envisaged from the Dutch 
perspective. Some labour foundations can be regarded as structural, because 
they exist for many years. The first labour foundation dates from 1987 and is still 
in operation. Other labour foundations run for a specific period and other 
foundations have already disappeared. 
 
Austrian temporary workers can enter a labour foundation, while in the 
Netherlands the future job-to-job support will be nil for this category of employees  
The Austrian labour foundations are open for employees with a fixed-term 
contract which will not be renewed because of economic reasons. Thus, not only 
permanent employees are eligible for job-to-job support. The Dutch UWV 
WERKbedrijf provides the means to private agencies for unemployment 
preventative services including for temporary workers and employees with a 
contract of limited duration which will not be renewed within 4 months; however 
this service will stop as of October 2011. 
 
Financing labour foundations based on shared responsibility 
The way labour foundations are financed depends on the type of labour 
foundation. Labour foundations can be co-financed by companies, redundant 
employees (depositing a share of the severance pay) and colleagues (solidarity 
contribution), the Public Employment Service and local authorities. In the 
Netherlands, it is not common for employees to sacrifice a part of their 
severance pay, in exchange for job-to-job support, nor for colleagues to pay 
solidarity contributions. Austrian companies pay a fee per participant in the 
labour foundation. Providing outplacement services to redundant employee is 
less common compared with the Netherlands. This can be explained by the 
Austrian view that job-to-job transitions are a shared responsibility between the 
state and social partners, while in the Netherlands they are regarded more as the 
responsibility of individual employers and employees. 
 
Training networks (Qualifizierungsverbünde) as a preventative measure 
The Austrian training network is an association of at least three companies and 
at least 50% of the participating companies are SMEs. The joint aim is to provide 
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transferable to other companies. The AMS can grant subsidy for these networks. 
These kinds of training networks do not exist in the Netherlands. 
 
Role of Austrian social partners cannot be detached from the state 
The Austrian government, the Public Employment Service and, indirectly, also 
the social partners, play a main role in supporting redundant employees to 
another job. The social partners are represented in committees and boards at all 
levels of the Public Employment Service AMS, which is not the case in the 
Netherlands. During the 1990s, the Dutch Public Employment Service had a 
tripartite board (Sol, 2000), but even from its introduction the relationship 
between social partners and the government was tense. The tripartite structure 
was abolished when the SUWI law came into force in 2002. The social partners 
have a consultative role in this new structure via the Council for Work and 
Income (Van Gestel et al., 2009). However, the Council for Work and Income will 
cease as from 1 July 2012, because the government has decided to stop its 
contribution. 
 
Severance pay: national system based on the backpack principle versus a system 
based on the relationship between individual employers and employees  
The reform of the Austrian severance pay introduced a contribution based 
system of individual savings and replaced the direct payment of severance pay 
by the employer to the dismissed employee. When the dismissal is not at the 
initiative of the employee he or she can withdraw the severance pay or decide to 
move it to the fund of the new employer (backpack principle). However, 
employees who withdraw the money out of the fund can spend the money on 
whatever the workers want and this does not automatically mean that 
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severance pay system. The severance pay system is still based on the traditional 
relationship between one employer and one employee, while Austria reformed 
this system to a broader national system through formation of funds. The 
Austrian new severance pay system served as example for the Work Budget 
proposed by the Committee on Labour Market Participation. 
 
The Austrian Unemployment Insurance provides less income security compared 
with the Dutch unemployment insurance 
The Austrian unemployment insurance scheme provides less income security 
compared with the Dutch scheme in terms of the level and the duration of the 
benefit. In 2009, the OECD overall average unemployment replacement rate 
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In the Netherlands the maximum duration can last up to 38 months. The level of 
the Austrian benefit is equivalent to 55% of the previous net earnings, while in 
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the Netherlands the level is 75% of the previous earned wage in the first two 
months and 70% after that. However, if a redundant Austrian employee enters a 
labour foundation the unemployment benefit can be extended to almost four 
years. 
 
7.3.4 The Spanish and Dutch job-to-job transition system compared 
 
No active job-to-job transition support in Spain versus ad hoc approach in the 
Netherlands 
The interviews revealed that there is no job-to-job support system in Spain. 
Spain struggles against a dual labour market and a high unemployment rate. For 
many years, the Spanish labour market was strongly regulated and allowing 
temporary employment has generated important inequalities with a lot of 
protection for permanent employees and more precarious jobs for temporary 
employees. Social dialogue and trust are important preconditions for a structural 
job-to-job transition approach, and this is lacking in Spain. After the negotiations 
between trade unions and employers’ associations which reached a total 
deadlock in 2010, the Spanish government felt forced to intervene and 
announced several reforms to combat the severe labour market situation. In 
comparison with the Spanish situation, the Dutch labour market is rosier. The 
Dutch unemployment rate was the lowest in Europe in 2009. Nevertheless, the 
Dutch government introduced temporary Mobility Centres in response to the 
current crisis. Furthermore, UWV WERKbedrijf contributes financially to job-to-
job support for employees who lose their jobs within four months. However, 
these are temporary measures which come to an end in the near future. The 
Dutch government takes the view that social partners should be more 
responsible for job-to-job transition support and has introduced experiments to 
stimulate both employers and employees representatives to take the lead.  
 
Social plans obliged by Spanish law, while in the Netherlands there is no statutory 
obligation to draw up a social plan 
In the event of collective dismissal, Spanish employers have to request the 
competent Labour Authority for permission to terminate the contract. This 
procedure is required when the collective dismissal will take place within a 
period of 90 days and the dismissal is planned for 10 workers in a company with 
fewer than 100 employees, 10% of the number of workers in a company in which 
there are at least between 100 and 300 employees and 30 workers in a company 
which occupies 300 or more employees. Companies with 50 or more employees 
which start a redundancy process are obliged by Spanish law to draw up a social 
plan. In the Netherlands there is no statutory obligation to draw up a social plan, 
but collective agreements can make a social plan compulsory. In that event 
companies establish a social plan in close consultation with trade unions and/or 
the works council. Until now, the social plans agreed in Spain have paid little 
attention to job-to-job transition support. In general, Spanish trade unions strive 
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for the best financial compensation for the redundant employees and there is 
less attention for job-to-job activities. Although the Dutch social plans also 
emphasize financial arrangements, e.g. severance pay, the attention for active 
job-to-job support in negotiations is rising. However, it remains to be seen how 
active support agreed in social plans and in collective agreements will be 
implemented in daily practice. 
 
Spanish redundant employees are worse off in terms of active support compared 
with Dutch redundant employees 
In Spain redundant employees will become unemployed and they can register at 
the Public Employment Service for support. As explained previously, there is no 
practical support available for a direct job-to-job transition and Spanish 
employees will mostly go through a phase of unemployment after redundancy. 
In the Netherlands active job-to-job support is available, but it should be noted 
that support established in social plans usually focuses on redundant employees 
employed in large companies. Furthermore, the support is limited to those 
employees with a permanent contract. In small and medium sized companies 
only 26% of the redundant employees receive support, mostly in the form of a 
financial contribution instead of active job-to-job support. 
 
Limited role for private suppliers in Spain compared with the Netherlands 
Outplacement services are scarcely used in Spain, whilst it is quite common in 
the Netherlands, at least in large companies. The existence of profit making 
outplacement was forbidden in Spain until the reforms recently announced. As 
explained previously, there is no direct job-to-job support in Spain. Once a 
redundant employee is unemployed the Public Employment Service is the key 
actor in helping the unemployed to another job as quickly as possible. However, 
several interviewees mention that the active labour market policies can be 
improved in Spain. Owing to the current crisis the Public Employment Service is 
fully stretched in providing unemployment benefits and has fewer resources and 
capacity to provide active support. 
 
National Tripartite Training Foundation in Spain versus sectoral funds in the 
Netherlands 
With regard to the prevention of unemployment, the National Tripartite 
Training Foundation was mentioned in the Spanish interviews. Both Spanish 
employers and employees contribute financially to this fund. In the Netherlands 
there is no national training foundation, but sectoral funds have been establish-
ed which stimulate training and education. However, it appears that these funds 
scarcely invest in job-to-job support and in education and training which could 
lead to intersectoral mobility.  
 
The Spanish unemployment benefit versus the Dutch unemployment insurance 
The duration of the Spanish unemployment benefit depends on the work 
7
THE DUTCH JOB-TO-JOB APPROACH COMPARED WITH SE, UK, AT AND ES  
252
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No active job-to-job transition support in Spain versus ad hoc approach in the 
Netherlands 
The interviews revealed that there is no job-to-job support system in Spain. 
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many years, the Spanish labour market was strongly regulated and allowing 
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protection for permanent employees and more precarious jobs for temporary 
employees. Social dialogue and trust are important preconditions for a structural 
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between trade unions and employers’ associations which reached a total 
deadlock in 2010, the Spanish government felt forced to intervene and 
announced several reforms to combat the severe labour market situation. In 
comparison with the Spanish situation, the Dutch labour market is rosier. The 
Dutch unemployment rate was the lowest in Europe in 2009. Nevertheless, the 
Dutch government introduced temporary Mobility Centres in response to the 
current crisis. Furthermore, UWV WERKbedrijf contributes financially to job-to-
job support for employees who lose their jobs within four months. However, 
these are temporary measures which come to an end in the near future. The 
Dutch government takes the view that social partners should be more 
responsible for job-to-job transition support and has introduced experiments to 
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Social plans obliged by Spanish law, while in the Netherlands there is no statutory 
obligation to draw up a social plan 
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plan. In the Netherlands there is no statutory obligation to draw up a social plan, 
but collective agreements can make a social plan compulsory. In that event 
companies establish a social plan in close consultation with trade unions and/or 
the works council. Until now, the social plans agreed in Spain have paid little 
attention to job-to-job transition support. In general, Spanish trade unions strive 
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for the best financial compensation for the redundant employees and there is 
less attention for job-to-job activities. Although the Dutch social plans also 
emphasize financial arrangements, e.g. severance pay, the attention for active 
job-to-job support in negotiations is rising. However, it remains to be seen how 
active support agreed in social plans and in collective agreements will be 
implemented in daily practice. 
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that support established in social plans usually focuses on redundant employees 
employed in large companies. Furthermore, the support is limited to those 
employees with a permanent contract. In small and medium sized companies 
only 26% of the redundant employees receive support, mostly in the form of a 
financial contribution instead of active job-to-job support. 
 
Limited role for private suppliers in Spain compared with the Netherlands 
Outplacement services are scarcely used in Spain, whilst it is quite common in 
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outplacement was forbidden in Spain until the reforms recently announced. As 
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redundant employee is unemployed the Public Employment Service is the key 
actor in helping the unemployed to another job as quickly as possible. However, 
several interviewees mention that the active labour market policies can be 
improved in Spain. Owing to the current crisis the Public Employment Service is 
fully stretched in providing unemployment benefits and has fewer resources and 
capacity to provide active support. 
 
National Tripartite Training Foundation in Spain versus sectoral funds in the 
Netherlands 
With regard to the prevention of unemployment, the National Tripartite 
Training Foundation was mentioned in the Spanish interviews. Both Spanish 
employers and employees contribute financially to this fund. In the Netherlands 
there is no national training foundation, but sectoral funds have been establish-
ed which stimulate training and education. However, it appears that these funds 
scarcely invest in job-to-job support and in education and training which could 
lead to intersectoral mobility.  
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experience in the six years prior to the situation of becoming unemployed and 
the maximum duration is two years. After that a Spanish jobseeker can be 
eligible for a welfare benefit which can last for a maximum of 30 months. In the 
first 180 days the unemployment benefit equals 70% of the regulatory base and 
after that 60%. In the Netherlands, the maximum unemployment benefit is 38 
months. After that, Dutch redundant employees can be eligible for a means-
tested welfare benefit, which can last as long as the recipients fulfil the eligibility 
criteria. The level of the unemployment benefit is 75% of the previous earned 
wage in the first two months and after that 70%. The overall average OECD 
unemployment replacement rate during the initial phase of unemployment is, 
by an earning level of 100% of the average wage, 72% in Spain and 79% in the 
Netherlands. When the earning level is lowered to 67% of the average wage, the 
difference is negligible: 80% in Spain and 81% in the Netherlands. 
 
7.4 Concluding remarks 
 
In the previous chapters, job-to-job systems and arrangements in four European 
countries were examined and compared with the Dutch system. The 
institutional setting and background of the system, the actor orientations, 
capabilities and motivation, the coordination mechanisms and implemented 
job-to-job policies were described and analyzed. One of the research questions 
concerns what the Netherlands can learn from these foreign examples. Before 
this question can be answered, it is necessary to understand what kind of job-to-
job arrangements are in place in the Netherlands. Therefore, the Dutch job-to-
job approach was described in the first part of this chapter. An important 
conclusion from these findings is that there is no structural job-to-job transition 
system in the Netherlands. This does not mean that redundant employees do 
not receive any job-to-job support, but it concerns for the most part ad hoc 
activities, incidental support, temporary programmes or services, and 
experiments. Social partners can negotiate practical job-to-job support in 
collective agreements and social plans, but this support is targeted at redundant 
permanent workers employed in large companies. In response to the current 
crisis, the Dutch government set up temporary Mobility Centres and the Public 
Employment Service provided financial means for job-to-job support for those 
employees, including those with a temporary contract, whose employers did not 
have the resources with which to provide help. However, these temporary 
measures will end and the government stimulates social partners to take up the 
responsibility for job-to-job transition support. The government’s view that 
individual employers and employees are responsible for job-to-job transitions is 
shared by other Dutch organisations, e.g. the Labour Foundation (STAR) and the 
Council for Work and Income (RWI). The Dutch government stimulates 
employers and employees to take up the responsibility for a smooth job-to-job 
transition after redundancy, i.e. by the introduction of the vitality saving 
scheme, a compensation for social partners’ extra effort to introduce a job-to-
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job budget, by stimulating intersectoral education. However, it remains unclear 
if, and how, social partners will implement these measures and what the take up 
rate will be of the intended vitality saving scheme. Furthermore, it is noteworthy 
that the use of severance pay is not under consideration in this process. 
Although Dutch trade unions and employers’ associations play a role in the 
development and implementation of job-to-job policies, their role is still limited, 
certainly in comparison with the Swedish case. There are sectoral funds 
managed by social partners aimed at stimulating training and education, but 
these funds do not have a structural role in providing transition support in the 
case of redundancy.    
 
For Dutch companies with enough resources, it is quite common to outsource 
job-to-job support to private outplacement agencies. Furthermore, the Dutch 
re-integration service is completely privatised. Both UWV WERKbedrijf and 
municipalities contract out reintegration services to private companies. In other 
countries, e.g. Spain and Austria, the room for private employment agencies to 
act on the labour market was, until recently, very small owing to stringent law 
and regulations. It remains to be seen how the private market will develop in 
these countries in the near future.  
  
An interesting feature of the Dutch job-to-job model is the development of 
company networks. Employers are obliged by law to continue paying the wage 
of the employee during the first two years of sickness. As a response, companies 
joined forces and established so called ‘Gatekeepers’ centres. These networks 
‘for and by’ employers are based upon a mutual financial interest, and 
companies in the network help each other to find other jobs for their redundant 
and sick employees. These networks arose because employers were not satisfied 
with the way the Public Employment Service contributed to the re-integration of 
sick employees. However, owing to the lack of evaluations, is it difficult to assess 
whether or not these private networks of companies perform worse or better 
than the Mobility Centres or the job-to-job experiments initiated and partly 
financed by the government. With regard to the financing of the job-to-job 
support, the conclusion can be drawn that it is based on financial contribution by 
employers agreed in a social plan or by the government via temporary Mobility 
Centres, via temporary experiments or schemes. There is no structural funding.  
 
The Netherlands has well developed unemployment insurance. Once an 
employee loses his job the income security is guaranteed for a certain period of 
time. In comparison with the other countries studied, the Netherlands has the 
longest maximum duration of unemployment benefit. Dutch unemployed can 
receive an unemployment insurance benefit for a maximum of 38 months, if all 
the access criteria are met. However, according to figures of UWV, in practice 
40% of the employees who lose their jobs and apply for an unemployment 
benefit are entitled to an unemployment benefit which lasts for a maximum of 1 
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year. The Dutch total average OECD unemployment replacement rate was the 
highest among the examined countries in 2009.  
 
Furthermore, differences and similarities between the previously described four 
national cases and the Dutch job-to-job arrangements were discussed in this 
chapter. This comparison is necessary in order to infer possible lessons for the 
Netherlands. Table 7.10 provides a summarized overview of the employment 
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One of the central questions of this thesis is: What can, from a Dutch policy 
perspective, be learned from the job-to-job arrangements or systems in other 
European countries? In this chapter the lessons for the Netherlands will be 
inferred based on the analysis of the empirical findings derived from the national 
cases and the initial comparison with the Dutch approach. As pointed out in 
Chapter 1, policy learning and policy transfer are two elements of the concept of 
lesson drawing. It is outside the scope of this thesis to analyse if and how 
elements of specific national employment security systems can actually be 
transferred to the Netherlands. A comprehensive feasibility study would be 
necessary for this. Nevertheless, the potential lessons which I inferred from the 
countries studied were tested and validated in a meeting of experts organised at 
the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment on 28th April 2011. The 
results of this expert meeting provide an insight into possible transfer directions. 
In total 33 persons attended this meeting representing 14 different 
organisations. Among the participants were senior representatives of various 
ministries, trade unions, companies, the Public Employment Service, private 
agencies and policy advising organisations (see Appendix 2). The expert meeting 
started with a presentation in which I presented the findings of the country 
studies and the possible lessons which I have inferred from the empirical 
fieldwork. Using advanced technology, each organisation attended prioritized 
the presented lessons for the Netherlands. A network of several laptops was 
established. The laptops were linked and connected to a server. Each 
organisation present could share his view via a laptop and the results were 
presented on a large screen. This overview was the starting point for prioritizing 
these suggestions per system feature by the participants and was followed by an 
in-depth discussion. 
 
Section 8.2 addresses the lessons which I inferred from the empirical findings. 
The assessments of the inferred lessons by the main Dutch labour market actors 
are presented in section 8.3. Furthermore, during the expert meeting 
participants were asked to enter suggestions to stimulate and to improve job-to-
job transitions in the event of redundancy in the Netherlands. These suggestions 
were also discussed and prioritized in the meeting (see section 8.4). The debate 
was conducted by an independent panel chairman. This chapter concludes with 
an analysis of the results brought up in the brainstorm session and their 
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8.2 Dutch lessons inferred from the empirical evidence 
 
As mentioned previously, based on the analysis of the empirical data gathered in 
the country studies, I have inferred possible lessons for the Netherlands along 
the line of the employment security features: type of support, financing, 
eligibility and responsibility. More specifically, I focussed on elements observed 
in the countries examined, which could be linked or could be a possible solution 
for the weak points or omissions in the Dutch job-to-job approach. 
 
8.2.1 Lessons from Sweden 
The Swedish adjustment transition agreements are interesting for the 
Netherlands. The job-to-job transition goal is explicitly formulated in the 
transition agreements and support can, in some agreements, be provided even 
during the period of notice. Another possible lesson the Netherlands can draw 
from the Swedish transition agreements is the means of financing. Swedish 
employers pay a certain percentage of the wage bill which is not deducted from 
the wage to a mutual fund: the transition foundation. This makes it possible to 
save money in prosperous periods, while the money is available in times of 
economic downturn. 
 
Although this is a more structural system than in the Netherlands, it must be 
noted that not all employees are covered in the Swedish system. Only 
permanent employees in sectors where a transition agreement is concluded are 
eligible for job-to-job support. However, in December 2010, a transition 
agreement was reached in the public sector. As from January 2012, the majority 
of the Swedish workforce with a permanent contract will be covered by a 
transition agreement. The transition agreements could be relevant for the 
Netherlands when the Netherlands wish to build a more structural job-to-job 
system in which not only permanent employees, but also employees with 
temporary contracts and workers employed at small companies, are entitled for 
job-to-job support. A weak point of the Dutch job-to-job approach is that 
employees with a temporary contract and those employed at small companies 
hardly receive job-to-job support.  
 
Furthermore, the role of trade unions and employers’ associations in supporting 
redundant employees from job-to-job could be interesting for the Netherlands. 
Dutch trade unions and employers’ associations can play a more active role and 
negotiate about the concrete implementation and responsibility of job-to-job 
transitions aimed at all employees and all kinds of companies. As already 
pointed out in the previous chapter, the Dutch social partners could consider 
using the existing structure of the sector funds in order to organize structural 
job-to-job transitions. Table 8.1 lists the possible lessons the Netherlands can 




Table 8.1: Possible lessons for the Netherlands from the Swedish job-to-job 
transition experiences  
  Lessons for the 
Netherlands 




transitions for people 
whose jobs are at risk. This 
goal is formulated explicitly 
in the Swedish transition 
agreements and the 
transition foundation 
established by the social 
partners. 
The goal of enhancing job-
to-job transitions is 
formulated in some social 
plans, the nine 
experiments and in some 
collective agreements. 
However, the goal of job-
to-job policies and the way 
they will be implemented 
can be made more specific 
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Type of  
Support 
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agreements and the 
transition foundation 
established by the social 
partners. 
The goal of enhancing job-
to-job transitions is 
formulated in some social 
plans, the nine 
experiments and in some 
collective agreements. 
However, the goal of job-
to-job policies and the way 
they will be implemented 
can be made more specific 
in the Netherlands. 
Type of  
Support 
Start support in an early 
stage. Some foundations 
provide active support even 
during the period of notice.  
Job-to-job support can be 
provided after a social plan 
is established. The nine 
job-to-job experiments 
focus on redundant 
employees who will lose 
their job within four 
months. The question if 
and how these 
experiments will be 
embedded in the future 
job-to-job approach.  
Financing 
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sector funds to organize 
and support job-to-job 
transitions in a structural 
way. 
There is no structural way 
of financing job-to-job 
support. 
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Currently, Dutch 
employees employed at 
large companies with a 
permanent contract are 
more privileged 
concerning job-to-job 
compared to workers 
employed at SMEs or 










The Dutch social partners 
could take a more active 
role in this transition 
process and use the 
Swedish practice as a 
source of inspiration. 
Limited role of Dutch 
social partners in the job-
to-job process compared 
with the Swedish practice. 
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8.2.2 Lessons from the UK 
The job-to-job transition system in the UK is not a structural model, but comprises 
programmes which have been expanded by the government in response to the 
crisis. For example, the Rapid Response Service of the British Jobcentre Plus office 
attempts to prevent customers from making a Job Seekers’ Allowance claim and 
organizes ‘fast tracks’. The support has been made more flexible in the past 
years and support is offered to redundant employees as soon as they receive 
their notice. Early intervention is one of the key features of the RRS. Jobcentre 
Plus collaborates with several organisations to share information about possible 
job losses in struggling companies. This makes it easier to contact companies 
and to provide support at an earlier stage. This can be a lesson for the 
Netherlands as such early warning system does not exist in the Netherlands. 
 
Furthermore, the British MG Rover case shows that redundant employees need 
an approach tailored to their need; not only professional guidance, but also 
psychological support can be necessary. To become unemployed after being 
employed for years at the same company can come upon redundant employees 
with a shock. This is not only a challenge for the UK, but can also be a point of 




























Table 8.2 summarizes the lessons the Netherlands can learn from the job-to-job 
transition model in the UK. 
 
Table 8.2: Possible lessons for the Netherlands from the British job-to-job transition 
experiences  
  Lessons for the Netherlands Weak point or omission in the 
Netherlands 
Goal 
Need for policies to support 
transitions to ‘good quality’ 
jobs (lesson MG Rover case) 
There are Dutch examples in which 
job-to-job support pays attention to 
a quick transition into good quality 
jobs. This can be considered as a 
point of interest for the future. 
Type of 
Support 
Start support in an early stage 
(The Rapid Response Service) 
Provide help in understanding 
what help is available. 
Redundant employees need 
an approach tailored to their 
needs, not only professional 
but also psychological support 
(shock).  
Job-to-job support is provided after 
a social plan is established.  
The nine job-to-job experiments 
focus on redundant employees who 
will lose their job within four 
months. 
Financing -  
Eligibility 
Develop early interventions 
for those under notice or 
consultation of notice or have 
recently been made 
redundant. 
Develop a system in which 
temporary workers have the 
same rights as permanent 
workers. 
Currently, Dutch employees 
employed at large companies with a 
permanent contract are more 
privileged concerning job-to-job 
compared with workers employed 






Develop a system to share 
information about possible 
job losses in struggling 
companies. In the UK 
Jobcentre Plus, the insolvency 
trade body R3 and the 
Insolvency Service have 
joined forces and share 
information so that Jobcentre 
Plus can quickly help more 
companies. 
The Netherlands does not have such 
an early warning system.  
 
8.2.3 Lessons from Austria 
The Austrian labour foundations function as a bridge in between jobs. It is worth 
mentioning that both permanent and temporary workers can have access to the 
labour foundations. Another interesting feature of the Austrian labour 
foundation is that former employers contribute to the job-to-job transitions, not 
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Insolvency Service have 
joined forces and share 
information so that Jobcentre 
Plus can quickly help more 
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8.2.3 Lessons from Austria 
The Austrian labour foundations function as a bridge in between jobs. It is worth 
mentioning that both permanent and temporary workers can have access to the 
labour foundations. Another interesting feature of the Austrian labour 
foundation is that former employers contribute to the job-to-job transitions, not 
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only by a financial contribution to the labour foundation, but also by providing 
tools, personnel or equipment for retraining. In some labour foundations a 
solidarity contribution was introduced. This implies that employees who have 
not been made redundant contribute financially to transition support for their 
redundant colleagues. Furthermore, Austrian redundant employees can sacrifice 
a part of the severance pay in exchange for job-to-job support via a labour 
foundation. These contributions are not common in the Netherlands, but can be 
a source of inspiration for the Dutch job-to-job transition system. 
 
Another possible lesson that the Netherlands can learn from Austria is the 
introduction of a system which is based on the reform of the Austrian severance 
pay system. The Austrian severance pay can be transferred to another employer, 
while in the Netherlands the severance pay system is still based on the 
traditional relationship between one employer and one employee. Austria 
reformed this system to a broad national system through the formation of 
funds. In the Austrian severance pay system an employee who withdraws the 
money from the fund can spend the money on whatever the worker wants and 
this does not enhance the employability of the workers. Instead of copying this 
system, the Netherlands could consider a similar system and introduce an 
employability ‘backpack’.  
In addition, in Austria training networks exist in which employers share the costs 
of training. Their joint aim is to provide training to their employees which is 
based on the needs of the employers and is transferable to other companies 
Apparently, Austrian employers who collaborate in these kind of networks are 
not afraid to invest in the education of their employees who, in the future, might 





















Table 8.3: Possible lessons for the Netherlands from the Austrian job-to-job 
transition experiences  
  Lessons for the Netherlands Weak point or omission in 
the Netherlands 
Goal 
Financial support and a social 
plan are valuable, but the best 
help is active support into 
another job. 
In the Netherlands social 
plans and collective 
agreements are in place, but 
active job-to-job support is 
not always included. 
Type of 
support 
Establish a labour foundation or 
a pool which functions as a 
bridge “in between jobs”. 
Let former employers 
contribute by providing tools, 
personnel or equipment for 
retraining. 
Introduce an employability 
‘backpack’. 
Stimulate training networks of 
three or more companies of 
which at least 50% are small and 
medium sized companies. The 
aim is to provide training which 
is based on the needs of the 
employers and transferable to 
other companies.140 
Until now the Netherlands 
does not have a portable and 
individual work budget 
(which was proposed by the 
Dutch committee on labour 
market participation in 2008). 
 
Training networks like the 
Austrian 
Qualifizierungsverbünde do 







Introduce an employability 
‘backpack’ so that sudden costs 
of redundancies are covered, 
while the employer’s 
contribution to an individual 
savings fund can be spread over 
time (Abfertigung Neu). 
Introduce a system in which, 
from a joint responsibility 
perspective, the state, the 
former employer, the redundant 
employee and the employees 
who stay in the company 
(solidarity contribution) 
contribute financially to support 
the job-to-job transitions 
(labour foundation). 
Let companies share the costs 
for training via a training  
 
The Netherlands does not 
have a contribution based 
severance pay system of 
individual saving accounts. 
The Dutch severance pay 
system is based on the 
traditional relationship 
between one single and 
employer and the employee. 
 
A jointly financed job-to-job 
system (state, former 
employer, redundant 
employee and colleague 
employees) is not in place in 
the Netherlands. 
In the Netherlands it is not 
common for colleague 
employees who are not  
 

140 <http://www.qvb.at/index.html>, accessed 3 March 2011.
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between one single and 
employer and the employee. 
 
A jointly financed job-to-job 
system (state, former 
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
140 <http://www.qvb.at/index.html>, accessed 3 March 2011.
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network. Furthermore, let the 
Public Employment Service 
AMS and the European Social 
Fund (ESF) partly subsidize the 
training networks for the 
training costs and staff 
expenses.  
declared redundant to pay a 
solidarity contribution. 
Neither is it common for a 
redundant employee to 
invest the severance pay for 




Include, besides redundant 
employees with a permanent 
contract, also people with a 
fixed- term contract in the job-
to-job support system. In 
Austria it is possible for 
employees with a fixed-term 
contract, which will not be 
extended because of economic 
reasons, to enter a labour 
foundation. 
Currently, Dutch employees 
employed at large companies 
with a permanent contract 
are more privileged 
concerning job-to-job 
compared to workers 
employed at SME or those 





Make sure that social partners 
are strongly involved in the law 
and labour market policy 
making process. The state, in 
close cooperation with social 
partners, should take the lead in 
supporting job-to-job 
transitions. 
Role of social partners in the 
job-to-job transition process 
is limited compared with 
Austria and Sweden. 
 
8.2.4 Lessons from Spain 
As explained in section 1.3.3 past experiences are important for policy learning. 
Failures from the past and explanations for poor performances can also inspire 
countries not to transfer policies from other countries, or inspire countries to 
develop new policies and instruments. Spain is an interesting country to examine 
because of the currently severe labour market situation and the history of labour 
reforms as an attempt to make the labour market more flexible. Spain has been 
hit hard by the economic downturn. The unemployment rate has risen sharply in 
the last two years and youth unemployment is dramatically high, with almost 
42% in 2010. Spain struggles with high unemployment rates and the 
government was forced to intervene when negotiations between trade unions 
and employers’ associations reached a total deadlock. A lesson the Netherlands 
can draw from this experience is that trust and social dialogue are key factors in 
stimulating job-to-job transitions. The Spanish case also shows the effects of 
deregulation and flexibilisation of the labour market: a dual labour market with a 
lot of security for employees with a permanent contract and precarious jobs for 
those with a limited duration contract.  
 
In Spain there is no direct job-to-job transition support and the Netherlands can 
wonder if a job-to-job transition agreement is necessary at all. However, as 
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noted before, Spain struggles with high unemployment and, according to 
several interviewees, the active labour market policies can be improved. Some 
interviewees mentioned that Spain can learn from the Netherlands, because the 
Netherlands has the lowest unemployment rate in Europe. 
 
An interesting feature of the Spanish labour market is the Tripartite Training 
Foundation which supports employees and companies in vocational training. As 
explained previously, the Dutch sector funds do not tend to invest in education 
and training for jobs in other sectors, which implies that intersectoral mobility is 
hindered. The Netherlands can consider the introduction of a national training 
foundation or decide to open up the sector funds to other sectors in order to 
promote intersectoral mobility.  
 
Table 8.4: Possible lessons for the Netherlands from the Spanish job-to-job transition 
experiences 
  Lessons for the Netherlands Weak point or omission 
in the Netherlands 
Goal 
No direct job-to-job trans-ition 
support or policy. Employees 
whose jobs are at risk will become 
unemployed and can receive 
support from the Public 
Employment Service. 
A point of interest is the 
question whether a 
structural job-to-job 





Do not implement a job-to-job 
transition system, but invest in a 
national training foundation which 
supports employees and 
companies in vocational training. 
This can be seen as a preventative 
measure. 
The Netherlands does not 
have a national training 
foundation, but several 
sector funds which do not 
intend to invest in 
education and training for 
jobs in other sectors. 
 
Financing 
Both employers and employees 
contribute to the national 
Tripartite Training Foundation. 
Furthermore, ESF funds are 
available. 
In the Netherlands 
employers and employees 
contribute to sectoral 
funds, but not to a 
national training fund. 
Eligibility 
Employees, and since 2007 also the 
unemployed, are entitled to 












Organize good relationship be-
tween trade unions and employ-
ers’ associations. Trust and social 
dialogue are the key factors. The 
Public Employment Service has the 
leading role in supporting the 
unemployed to work. If necessary, 
private parties will be involved. 
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8.2.5 Lessons across the countries examined 
In the previous sections, I inferred possible lessons for the Netherlands based on 
the experiences in four foreign countries. The lessons were described for each 
country separately. Subsequently, I compared and analysed the lessons in order 
to identify differences and similarities across the countries examined and took 
the different system features (type of support, financing, eligibility, 
responsibility, coordination and delivery) into account. Based on this analysis I 
selected eleven lessons which were presented to the Dutch labour market 
experts during the expert meeting held at the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Employment on 28th April 2011. When selecting the possible lessons, I 
focussed on elements in the countries studied which could be a possible solution 
for the weak points or omissions in the Dutch job-to-job approach. Table 8.5 
displays the results of the analysis and summarizes the main possible lessons per 
system feature for the Netherlands. 
 
Table 8.5: Summarized overview of possible lessons for the Netherlands by system 
feature  
System feature Lesson for the Netherlands Deduced from*: 
1. Start early intervention (as from the moment of 
given notice) 
= UK, SE 
≠ ES, AT 
2. Provide active support and take care of 
psychological support (shock of losing your job) 




3. Take care of education and training with a short 





4. Develop a structural system for all type of 
employees (permanent jobs, fixed-term jobs) 
= SE-> structural, but not for 
employees with limited 
duration contracts 
= AT -> all types of 
employees 
≠ ES 
≠ UK -> not structural, but 
programmes 
5. Design a structural system for all employers 
(large companies and SMEs) 
= SE 
= AT 
6. Let employers pay a certain percentage over the 
wage bill in a job-to-job fund. In the event of 
redundancy this fund pays for the active support 
(including for transitions outside the sector). 
= SE 
= AT 
7. Provide for an employability ‘backpack’ 





8. Ask colleague employees who have not been 






9.Trade unions and employers’ associations should 
play a more active role by concrete agreements 
with regard to the implementation and 






10. Develop a system where information is shared 
with regard to future job losses in struggling 
companies, so that early action can take place. 
= UK 
11. Public organisations take the lead in job-to-job 
transitions, if necessary private actors will be 
involved. 
= UK 
* = derived from the country mentioned, ≠ means does not occur in the country mentioned 
 
8.3 Assessment inferred lessons by Dutch labour market actors 
 
As mentioned previously, the eleven lessons for the Netherlands which I inferred 
from the countries examined were presented in the expert meeting held at the 
Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment on 28th April 2011. 
Subsequently, the Dutch stakeholder organisations were asked to assess the 
lessons according to the following scale:  
1. Not interesting; do not transfer this lesson to the Netherlands; 
2. Interesting, but the Netherlands already pays enough attention to this (not a 
lesson); 
3. Interesting lesson, the Netherlands can use this element as a source of 
inspiration in the further development of job-to-job transition policy; 
4. Interesting lesson, the Netherlands should adopt this element, adapted to 
the Dutch context; 
5. Interesting lesson, the Netherlands should copy this element. 
 
Table 8.6 presents the results of the assessment of the lessons by the 14 
organisations present at the expert meeting. Almost all organisations shared the 
opinion that Dutch trade unions and employers’ associations could play a more 
active role in job-to-job transition support. Eleven of the fourteen organisations 
present shared the view that the Netherlands should adopt this lesson. 
Furthermore, the majority of the participants deemed early intervention for 
those employees threatened by unemployment as an important lesson. 
However, during the discussion several participants noticed that money should 
not be wasted on those who in fact do not need the support and could take care 
of themselves. Hence, a ‘break’ should be inserted, so that a clear distinction can 
be made between redundant employees who can find a job themselves and 
those who really need support. 
 
Furthermore, the idea of introducing an employability backpack, based on the 
new Austrian severance pay system, was regarded as appealing by almost all 
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to identify differences and similarities across the countries examined and took 
the different system features (type of support, financing, eligibility, 
responsibility, coordination and delivery) into account. Based on this analysis I 
selected eleven lessons which were presented to the Dutch labour market 
experts during the expert meeting held at the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Employment on 28th April 2011. When selecting the possible lessons, I 
focussed on elements in the countries studied which could be a possible solution 
for the weak points or omissions in the Dutch job-to-job approach. Table 8.5 
displays the results of the analysis and summarizes the main possible lessons per 
system feature for the Netherlands. 
 
Table 8.5: Summarized overview of possible lessons for the Netherlands by system 
feature  
System feature Lesson for the Netherlands Deduced from*: 
1. Start early intervention (as from the moment of 
given notice) 
= UK, SE 
≠ ES, AT 
2. Provide active support and take care of 
psychological support (shock of losing your job) 




3. Take care of education and training with a short 





4. Develop a structural system for all type of 
employees (permanent jobs, fixed-term jobs) 
= SE-> structural, but not for 
employees with limited 
duration contracts 
= AT -> all types of 
employees 
≠ ES 
≠ UK -> not structural, but 
programmes 
5. Design a structural system for all employers 
(large companies and SMEs) 
= SE 
= AT 
6. Let employers pay a certain percentage over the 
wage bill in a job-to-job fund. In the event of 
redundancy this fund pays for the active support 
(including for transitions outside the sector). 
= SE 
= AT 
7. Provide for an employability ‘backpack’ 





8. Ask colleague employees who have not been 






9.Trade unions and employers’ associations should 
play a more active role by concrete agreements 
with regard to the implementation and 






10. Develop a system where information is shared 
with regard to future job losses in struggling 
companies, so that early action can take place. 
= UK 
11. Public organisations take the lead in job-to-job 
transitions, if necessary private actors will be 
involved. 
= UK 
* = derived from the country mentioned, ≠ means does not occur in the country mentioned 
 
8.3 Assessment inferred lessons by Dutch labour market actors 
 
As mentioned previously, the eleven lessons for the Netherlands which I inferred 
from the countries examined were presented in the expert meeting held at the 
Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment on 28th April 2011. 
Subsequently, the Dutch stakeholder organisations were asked to assess the 
lessons according to the following scale:  
1. Not interesting; do not transfer this lesson to the Netherlands; 
2. Interesting, but the Netherlands already pays enough attention to this (not a 
lesson); 
3. Interesting lesson, the Netherlands can use this element as a source of 
inspiration in the further development of job-to-job transition policy; 
4. Interesting lesson, the Netherlands should adopt this element, adapted to 
the Dutch context; 
5. Interesting lesson, the Netherlands should copy this element. 
 
Table 8.6 presents the results of the assessment of the lessons by the 14 
organisations present at the expert meeting. Almost all organisations shared the 
opinion that Dutch trade unions and employers’ associations could play a more 
active role in job-to-job transition support. Eleven of the fourteen organisations 
present shared the view that the Netherlands should adopt this lesson. 
Furthermore, the majority of the participants deemed early intervention for 
those employees threatened by unemployment as an important lesson. 
However, during the discussion several participants noticed that money should 
not be wasted on those who in fact do not need the support and could take care 
of themselves. Hence, a ‘break’ should be inserted, so that a clear distinction can 
be made between redundant employees who can find a job themselves and 
those who really need support. 
 
Furthermore, the idea of introducing an employability backpack, based on the 
new Austrian severance pay system, was regarded as appealing by almost all 
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Table 8.6: Dutch lessons from foreign countries, assessment by Dutch actors 
 Lessons from foreign countries Average  Standard 
deviation 




1. Early intervention (as from the 
moment of given notice). 3.71 1.22 1 2 1 6 4 
2. Active support and psychological 
support.  
3.36 0.72 0 2 5 7 0 
3. Short duration education/training 
targeted on future employers’ 
needs. 
3.14 1.41 3 1 4 3 3 
4. Job-to-job system for all types of 
employees. 3.57 0.82 0 1 6 5 2 
5. Job-to-job system for all types of 
companies/employers. 3.07 1.1 2 1 6 4 1 
6. Employer contributes financially to 
a fund.  3.43 0.9 1 0 6 6 1 
7. Backpack severance pay/ 
employability backpack. 3.64 0.89 1 0 3 9 1 
8. Solidarity contribution by colleague 
employees for job-to-job support. 3 1.36 4 0 3 6 1 
9. More active role by trade unions 
and employers’ organisations 
regarding job-to-job support. 
3.86 1.12 1 1 1 7 4 
10.  Information system regarding 
possible job losses.  2 1.13 6 4 3 0 1 
11.Public actors take the lead in job-
to-job transition support, if 
necessary private actors will be 
involved. 
1.71 0.88 7 5 1 1 0 
 
At the expert meeting, the Dutch organisations present were less enthusiastic 
regarding an information system in which data is shared about job losses in 
struggling companies (lesson 10). On the one hand some organisations did not 
consider this lesson as interesting and on the other hand some organisations 
held the view that the Netherlands already pays enough attention to this 
element.  
Opinions were most divided on the lesson to introduce short duration education 
and training targeted on future employers’ needs (lesson 3). Particularly, trade 
unions did not deem this lesson interesting and they do not want to transfer this 
lesson from the foreign countries. Private market actors and the Dutch Public 
Employment Service had the opposite view and they do want to adopt this 
lesson to the Netherlands. The majority of the organisations present did not 
agree with the proposition that public actors should take the lead in job-to-job 
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transition support and that if necessary private actors would be involved.  
Opinions could and did differ among the participants with regard to whether or 
not the presented lesson is a real lesson for the Netherlands. Table 8.7 displays 
the results of the assessment by the Dutch actors regarding the eleven lessons 
which were inferred from the empirical findings.  
 
Table 8.7: Assessment foreign lessons for the Netherlands by Dutch actors, by 
organisation type  
  ‘Lessons’ from foreign countries 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Type 
organisation 
           
Trade unions 4.00 3.25 1.50 3.25 3.00 3.75 3.50 3.75 4.25 2.25 1.75 
Companies/ 
employers 




4.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 1.00 5.00 2.00 1.00 
Government/ 
policy/advice 
3.50 3.75 3.50 3.50 3.25 3.25 3.75 3.00 3.00 1.25 1.50 
Private market 
actors 
3.67 3.67 4.67 3.67 3.33 4.00 4.33 4.00 4.67 3.00 2.00 
 
The Public Employment Service holds the view that the Netherlands provides 
sufficient psychological support and active help to employees who are forced to 
change jobs (lesson 2). The opinion of the other actors is that this issue leaves 
room for improvement and that the Netherlands can draw inspiration from the 
foreign experiences. The scores regarding the lesson to provide short duration 
education and training which is targeted on future employers’ needs (lesson 3) 
varied among the participants. Trade unions are not in favour of this suggested 
lesson, while the Public Employment Service and private actors are all for it. 
Private actors also advocate a solidarity contribution paid by colleagues of the 
redundant employees in order to finance job-to-job support for those whose 
jobs are at risk (lesson 8). Employers and the Public Employment Service are 
opposed to this suggestion.  
In general, the Dutch stakeholders support the introduction of a job-to-job 
system in which all types of companies are included (lesson 5), although it can be 
observed from table 8.7 that companies envisage this as interesting, but also 
believe that Netherlands already pays enough attention to this element. The 
Public Employment Service gives the highest score for this lesson.  
Employers are not willing to pay a financial contribution to a fund for job-to-job 
transition, because they feel that in the Netherlands employers already pay 
enough for job-to-job support (lesson 6). In contrast, the other actors, 
8
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struggling companies (lesson 10). On the one hand some organisations did not 
consider this lesson as interesting and on the other hand some organisations 
held the view that the Netherlands already pays enough attention to this 
element.  
Opinions were most divided on the lesson to introduce short duration education 
and training targeted on future employers’ needs (lesson 3). Particularly, trade 
unions did not deem this lesson interesting and they do not want to transfer this 
lesson from the foreign countries. Private market actors and the Dutch Public 
Employment Service had the opposite view and they do want to adopt this 
lesson to the Netherlands. The majority of the organisations present did not 
agree with the proposition that public actors should take the lead in job-to-job 
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transition support and that if necessary private actors would be involved.  
Opinions could and did differ among the participants with regard to whether or 
not the presented lesson is a real lesson for the Netherlands. Table 8.7 displays 
the results of the assessment by the Dutch actors regarding the eleven lessons 
which were inferred from the empirical findings.  
 
Table 8.7: Assessment foreign lessons for the Netherlands by Dutch actors, by 
organisation type  
  ‘Lessons’ from foreign countries 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Type 
organisation 
           
Trade unions 4.00 3.25 1.50 3.25 3.00 3.75 3.50 3.75 4.25 2.25 1.75 
Companies/ 
employers 




4.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 1.00 5.00 2.00 1.00 
Government/ 
policy/advice 
3.50 3.75 3.50 3.50 3.25 3.25 3.75 3.00 3.00 1.25 1.50 
Private market 
actors 
3.67 3.67 4.67 3.67 3.33 4.00 4.33 4.00 4.67 3.00 2.00 
 
The Public Employment Service holds the view that the Netherlands provides 
sufficient psychological support and active help to employees who are forced to 
change jobs (lesson 2). The opinion of the other actors is that this issue leaves 
room for improvement and that the Netherlands can draw inspiration from the 
foreign experiences. The scores regarding the lesson to provide short duration 
education and training which is targeted on future employers’ needs (lesson 3) 
varied among the participants. Trade unions are not in favour of this suggested 
lesson, while the Public Employment Service and private actors are all for it. 
Private actors also advocate a solidarity contribution paid by colleagues of the 
redundant employees in order to finance job-to-job support for those whose 
jobs are at risk (lesson 8). Employers and the Public Employment Service are 
opposed to this suggestion.  
In general, the Dutch stakeholders support the introduction of a job-to-job 
system in which all types of companies are included (lesson 5), although it can be 
observed from table 8.7 that companies envisage this as interesting, but also 
believe that Netherlands already pays enough attention to this element. The 
Public Employment Service gives the highest score for this lesson.  
Employers are not willing to pay a financial contribution to a fund for job-to-job 
transition, because they feel that in the Netherlands employers already pay 
enough for job-to-job support (lesson 6). In contrast, the other actors, 
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particularly the private actors and the Public Employment Service, consider this 
as a very interesting lesson which should be adopted, adapted to the Dutch 
context. The introduction of an employability backpack is generally considered 
as an interesting lesson. The private market actors gave the highest score for 
this suggestion, while the employers consider this as interesting, but gave the 
lowest score for this element.  
There is no divergence of views regarding lesson 1 (early intervention), 4 (a 
structural job-to-job system for all employees) and 9 (a more active role by trade 
unions and employers’ organisations regarding job-to-job support). All 
participants consider that these are important lessons the Netherlands can learn 
from the foreign countries examined. Furthermore, all actors agreed that lesson 
11 should not be adopted, which implies that Dutch actors are not in favour of 
public actors taking the lead in job-to-job transition support and that, if 
necessary, private actors will be involved. This is in line with the scores of lesson 
9, which suggest that trade unions and employers should play a more active role 
in the Dutch job-to-job system. 
 
8.4 Proposals for the future Dutch job-to-job transition system 
 
In the second part of the expert meeting the question was asked as to what 
should be done in the Netherlands regarding the promotion of job-to-job 
transitions in the event of redundancy. The participants entered their ideas via 
the laptop. Meanwhile, the suggested proposals were classified and double 
entries were deleted. Subsequently, the participants were invited to assess all 
proposed ideas via a five point scale in which ‘1’ stands for ‘absolutely not a good 
idea; and ‘5’ stands for ‘a very good idea’. Table 8.8 displays four proposals 
submitted during the brainstorm session with the highest score given by the 
participants. Two of the four ideas proposed with the highest score are similar to 
the inferred lessons which the author discussed in a presentation prior to the 
brainstorm session. Apparently, the stakeholders were inspired by these inferred 
lessons and consider these lessons as promising for future job-to-job policy in 
the Netherlands. 
 
Table 8.8: Four entered proposals with the highest scores 
Proposals  Mean  Standard 
deviation  
Increase accessibility of job-to-job support, including workers 
who are not covered by a social plan or who do not work for a 
fixed employer 
4.71 0.45 
Enhance intersectoral mobility  4.71 0.59 
Early intervention and support for those who need it  4.57 0.62 
Possibility to do a work placement/apprenticeship at another 
company during the current employment contract 4.57 0.49 
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All participants agreed that future job-to-job support should be available for all 
employees and not only those who are covered by a social plan or who do not 
have a fixed employer. Furthermore, the organisations shared the view that 
intersectoral mobility should be promoted and improved. Early intervention and 
support should be offered on the understanding that the support is focused on 
those who really need it. Furthermore, the introduction of the possibility for 
redundant employees to do a work placement at another company during the 
current employment contract was assessed as an interesting idea.  
In the next sections the proposals and their scores for the different employment 
security system features will be described.  
 
8.4.1 Proposals with regard to type of support 
The fruitful brainstorm session yielded several interesting proposals with regard 
to the type of job-to-job support. The suggestions entered by the participants to 
improve the job-to-job support in the Netherlands and the corresponding scores 
are presented in table 8.9.  
 
Table 8.9: Proposals to promote job-to-job transitions with regard to type of 
support  
 Proposal Mean 
Promotion of intersectoral mobility 4.71 
Early intervention and support for those who really need it  4.57 
Possibility to do a work placement/apprenticeship at another company 
during the current employment contract 
4.57 
More attention for employability 4.50 
More use of portfolio, early acquired competencies, career check (diagnose) 4.36 
Facilitate job-to-job policy in the regions. This requires a close collaboration 
between regional actors and access to labour market information concerning 
shortages and surpluses of labour supply 
4.36 
Job-to-job support should be a permanent subject of conversations in 
collective agreements, not only in times of crises and in redundancy 
procedures 
4.29 
More possibilities for apprenticeships and exchange of personnel 4.21 
More support for SMEs - urge companies to be involved in supporting the 
redundant employee from job-to-job 
4.21 
Reduce hindrances for job-to-job support. Regulate preconditions e.g. 
regarding the break in pension contributions, unemployment entitlements, 
wage level 
4.07 
Stimulate short duration education and training, not only targeted at the own 
company/sector 
4.00 
Take care of good guidance and supervision by skilled coaches with 
knowledge of the labour market 
4.00 
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particularly the private actors and the Public Employment Service, consider this 
as a very interesting lesson which should be adopted, adapted to the Dutch 
context. The introduction of an employability backpack is generally considered 
as an interesting lesson. The private market actors gave the highest score for 
this suggestion, while the employers consider this as interesting, but gave the 
lowest score for this element.  
There is no divergence of views regarding lesson 1 (early intervention), 4 (a 
structural job-to-job system for all employees) and 9 (a more active role by trade 
unions and employers’ organisations regarding job-to-job support). All 
participants consider that these are important lessons the Netherlands can learn 
from the foreign countries examined. Furthermore, all actors agreed that lesson 
11 should not be adopted, which implies that Dutch actors are not in favour of 
public actors taking the lead in job-to-job transition support and that, if 
necessary, private actors will be involved. This is in line with the scores of lesson 
9, which suggest that trade unions and employers should play a more active role 
in the Dutch job-to-job system. 
 
8.4 Proposals for the future Dutch job-to-job transition system 
 
In the second part of the expert meeting the question was asked as to what 
should be done in the Netherlands regarding the promotion of job-to-job 
transitions in the event of redundancy. The participants entered their ideas via 
the laptop. Meanwhile, the suggested proposals were classified and double 
entries were deleted. Subsequently, the participants were invited to assess all 
proposed ideas via a five point scale in which ‘1’ stands for ‘absolutely not a good 
idea; and ‘5’ stands for ‘a very good idea’. Table 8.8 displays four proposals 
submitted during the brainstorm session with the highest score given by the 
participants. Two of the four ideas proposed with the highest score are similar to 
the inferred lessons which the author discussed in a presentation prior to the 
brainstorm session. Apparently, the stakeholders were inspired by these inferred 
lessons and consider these lessons as promising for future job-to-job policy in 
the Netherlands. 
 
Table 8.8: Four entered proposals with the highest scores 
Proposals  Mean  Standard 
deviation  
Increase accessibility of job-to-job support, including workers 
who are not covered by a social plan or who do not work for a 
fixed employer 
4.71 0.45 
Enhance intersectoral mobility  4.71 0.59 
Early intervention and support for those who need it  4.57 0.62 
Possibility to do a work placement/apprenticeship at another 
company during the current employment contract 4.57 0.49 
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All participants agreed that future job-to-job support should be available for all 
employees and not only those who are covered by a social plan or who do not 
have a fixed employer. Furthermore, the organisations shared the view that 
intersectoral mobility should be promoted and improved. Early intervention and 
support should be offered on the understanding that the support is focused on 
those who really need it. Furthermore, the introduction of the possibility for 
redundant employees to do a work placement at another company during the 
current employment contract was assessed as an interesting idea.  
In the next sections the proposals and their scores for the different employment 
security system features will be described.  
 
8.4.1 Proposals with regard to type of support 
The fruitful brainstorm session yielded several interesting proposals with regard 
to the type of job-to-job support. The suggestions entered by the participants to 
improve the job-to-job support in the Netherlands and the corresponding scores 
are presented in table 8.9.  
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support  
 Proposal Mean 
Promotion of intersectoral mobility 4.71 
Early intervention and support for those who really need it  4.57 
Possibility to do a work placement/apprenticeship at another company 
during the current employment contract 
4.57 
More attention for employability 4.50 
More use of portfolio, early acquired competencies, career check (diagnose) 4.36 
Facilitate job-to-job policy in the regions. This requires a close collaboration 
between regional actors and access to labour market information concerning 
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Job-to-job support should be a permanent subject of conversations in 
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 Proposal Mean 
Eliminate employers’ risks in taking on unemployed people at the margin of 
the labour market 
3.93 
Provide income security during education/training 3.93 
Career plans of employee geared with (potential) available jobs including 
education 
3.93 
Sufficient time between the notice and the actual dismissal date 3.86 
More attention to obtain work experience above education and training 
budgets 
3.86 
Provide financial services so that redundant employees realize the 
consequences of the dismissal 
3.86 
Utilize private learning/work places 3.79 
Companies, employers should be informed with regard to possible public and 
private job-to-job services/modules, so that they can choose and offer this 
services to their employees 
3.79 
Demand oriented: no general redundancy pools, but job-to-job support 
geared with (future) labour market demand 
3.79 
Short-term and long-term diagnoses of the company and sector situation 3.64 
Guidance should be demand oriented (geared to employers’ needs) 3.57 
Stimulate networking (during working hours) 3.57 
Make use of peer groups 3.50 
Give redundant employees a full explanation of the social plan  3.36 
Focus on the move as part of a career policy, so the emphasis is not on the grief 
of leaving the current job but on the possibilities provided by the next job.  
3.36 
Take care of psychological support 3.29 
Make use of digital possibilities, e.g. apply for jobs via internet 3.29 
Arrange that acquired severance rights are transferable to another employer 
in the event of voluntary mobility 
3.21 
Judge private and public actors on their results 3.14 
Introduce longer terms of notice 3.14 
Make a clear distinction in reorganization procedures between redundant 
employees and employees who dysfunction. Dysfunction is another route. 
3.07 
Via law and legislation: state more precisely what good employership entails 
with regard to employers’ and employees’ incentives for job-to-job 
transitions. 
2.93 
Unlink the severance pay from years +of service. 2.71 
Determine at the regional level that everybody who is able to work is also 





The participants of the expert meeting shared the opinion that intersectoral 
mobility is important and should not be hindered by the sector funds. 
Furthermore, the participants agreed that early intervention should take place, 
but only for those who really need support in order to quickly find another 
suitable job. The proposal to promote employability was also considered as 
important. Employability can be achieved by apprenticeships in order to obtain 
new work experience. Moreover, it is important to know what the skills of the 
redundant employees are. This can be achieved by using career checks, 
portfolios and looking at previously acquired competencies. The entered 
proposal to unlink severance pay from years of service did not fall on fertile 
ground, neither did the proposal to determine at regional level that everybody 
who is able to work is also obliged to work.   
 
8.4.2 Proposals with regard to target group 
In addition to the proposals regarding the type of job-to-job service that should 
be provided in the future, participants were asked to answer the question: who 
should be eligible for job-to-job transition support in the event of redundancy? 
Table 8.10 displays that the participants of the expert meeting shared the view 
that more employees should be entitled to job-to-job support and not only those 
who are currently covered by a social plan. The participants also agreed on the 
importance of the proposal to eliminate mobility hindrances, such as non-
transferable pension rights.  
 
Table 8.10: Proposals with regard to target group of job-to-job support 
Proposal Mean 
Increase accessibility of job-to-job support, including workers who are 
not covered by a social plan or who do not work for a fixed employer 
4.71 
Eliminate hindrances for specific target groups, such as non-transferable 
acquired pension rights  
4.00 
Introduce more projects a la Philips Employment Programme141 which is 
targeted at people at the margin of the labour market and aims to obtain 
work experience combined with education and training 
3.93 
Support directed at large and small companies 3.79 

141  The Philips Employment Programme was launched in the early 1980s and provided 
education and training for long-term unemployed people. The education and training 
trajectories were linked to employers’ needs in the regional labour market. It concerned 
dual work and training trajectories. During the 1990s, low-skilled workers employed at 
Philips received training and education during working hours and during this period they 
were replaced by long-term unemployed who could gain work experience. This is also 
known as ‘combi-trajectories’. Other job-to-job initiatives which arose from the Philips 
Employment Programme are “Nieuw Vakmanschap” and “Gecertificeerd Vakman-
schap”. For a detailed description see (Evers et al., 2004). 
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Furthermore, the participants agreed that early intervention should take place, 
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8.4.2 Proposals with regard to target group 
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be provided in the future, participants were asked to answer the question: who 
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who are currently covered by a social plan. The participants also agreed on the 
importance of the proposal to eliminate mobility hindrances, such as non-
transferable pension rights.  
 
Table 8.10: Proposals with regard to target group of job-to-job support 
Proposal Mean 
Increase accessibility of job-to-job support, including workers who are 
not covered by a social plan or who do not work for a fixed employer 
4.71 
Eliminate hindrances for specific target groups, such as non-transferable 
acquired pension rights  
4.00 
Introduce more projects a la Philips Employment Programme141 which is 
targeted at people at the margin of the labour market and aims to obtain 
work experience combined with education and training 
3.93 
Support directed at large and small companies 3.79 

141  The Philips Employment Programme was launched in the early 1980s and provided 
education and training for long-term unemployed people. The education and training 
trajectories were linked to employers’ needs in the regional labour market. It concerned 
dual work and training trajectories. During the 1990s, low-skilled workers employed at 
Philips received training and education during working hours and during this period they 
were replaced by long-term unemployed who could gain work experience. This is also 
known as ‘combi-trajectories’. Other job-to-job initiatives which arose from the Philips 
Employment Programme are “Nieuw Vakmanschap” and “Gecertificeerd Vakman-
schap”. For a detailed description see (Evers et al., 2004). 
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Proposal Mean 
Both full-time and part-time workers should be eligible 3.71 
Introduce projects for specific target groups (the elderly, the disabled)  3.71 
Support should focus on employees with insufficient skills and 
qualifications for the labour market 
3.43 
Support should be focussed on workers employed at small and medium 
sized companies 
3.29 
Everyone should be eligible for job-to-job support 3.21 
Employees threatened by dismissal owing to economic reasons 3.21 
International networks to support foreign employees 3.21 
Support for those whose limited duration contract terminates 3.14 
The employer has another responsibility for employees with many years 
of service than for those with a short limited duration contract  
3.07 
All employees should be covered by the job-to-job system. Financed by a 
levy on the wage bill, including those of seconded employees 
3.07 
Regional solutions instead of distinction between large and small 
companies  
3.07 
Only target groups who really need the job-to-job help should be 
supported (the elderly, the disabled and low skilled employees) 
3.00 
Take into account the needs and wishes of sectors and branches in a 
uniform way in order to promote intersectoral mobility 
3.00 
Target group is subject to the kind of arrangement: region? sector?, 
business park?, harbour? and the like 
2.93 
Redundant employees who have not been able to find another job within 
three months, not even with the support of private actors, should be 
eligible for (governmental) support  
2.57 
Employees threatened with dismissal because of dysfunction 2.36 
 
From table 8.10 the conclusion can be drawn that the majority of the Dutch 
organisations present at the expert meeting wish to extend the job-to-job 
support to a wider group of employees than the current employees covered by a 
social plan. As explained previously, these are mostly workers employed by large 
companies. Three out of four redundant Dutch workers employed at small 
companies have left the company without job-to-job support provided by the 
company. Yet, the general view is that employees who lose their jobs because of 
dysfunction, rather than reasons of financial decline, should not be eligible for 
job-to-job assistance. 
 
8.4.3 Proposals with regard to financing 
The participants of the expert meeting brainstormed the way of financing job-
to-job support. The results are presented in table 8.11. 
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Table 8.11: Proposals with regard to financing job-to-job support 
Proposal Mean 
Remove the financial partition between sector funds  4.43 
Regulate the financing over job-to-job support via collective agreements 
agreed between trade unions and employers’ associations 
4.36 
Companies not covered by a collective agreement should contribute via a 
levy  
4.21 
Spend individual development budgets on a wide range of possibilities 
(apprenticeship, education, membership network, etc)  
4.14 
Deposit budgets for education and training which have not been used into a 
fund to use for job-to-job support (e.g. retraining) 
3.86 
Companies with enough financial means should contribute to job-to-job 
support, preferably these companies would be the first to pay 
3.86 
Sources for financing job-to-job transitions: savings on unemployment 
benefit, funds negotiated in a social plan, investments in employability and 
prevention by employers and employees can lead to lower dismissal costs 
(trade off)  
3.86 
Structural financing such as the Swedish model is preferable to incidental 
financing 
3.86 
Financing via a certain percentage over the wage bill 3.79 
Public financing for employees at the margin of the labour market 3.79 
Introduce an employability backpack as a trade off for severance pay, so that 
entitlements can be transferred to the new employers in the event of 
voluntary mobility  
3.79 
Financing depends on immediate cause: partly financed by severance pay, 
partly financed by a certain percentage of the wage bill, if necessary 
contribution by the national or local government or the region   
3.71 
Both employer and employee should contribute via a deduction on the wage 
bill 
3.71 
Make use of the current sector funds for intersectoral mobility  3.64 
Build up outplacement entitlements during employment (e.g. ear-marked 
means in life course arrangements/ vitality arrangements)  
3.57 
Use the current financial arrangements in collective agreements or social 
plans for job-to-job transitions (severance pay, reduced pay)  
3.57 
In the event of redundancy social partners should not formulate the support 
as a possibility, but as a right. It is all about implementation 
3.57 
Link the financing to specific target groups (the elderly, low skilled 
employees, immigrants) 
3.43 
Prior to the dismissal employers should contribute to a ‘dismissal fund’ so that 
means and support are immediately available at the actual dismissal date 
3.29 
Reward collective use of severance pay by means of fiscal advantages or an 
increase through government funds  
3.29 
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Proposal Mean 
Introduce an individual vitality account via collective agreements with fiscal 
entitlements facilitated by the government  
3.21 
Solidarity contribution by colleague employees 2.93 
Rebuild the sector funds to a national fund 2.86 
Provide the opportunity to use the available means (unemployment benefit) 
from the ministry of Social Affairs and Employment in an early and creative 
way  
2.86 
Relate the severance pay also to the risk on (long-term) unemployment. 
Subsequently, the severance pay should be available for job-to-job 
transitions  
2.64 
Let the former employer pay a “dismissal tax” in case of forced dismissal to 
compensate external effects and settle this in a decreased severance pay  
2.64 
Finance job-to-job support via reduction of the unemployment contributions 
and other expenditures with regard to guidance to employment  
2.57 
Financing by social partners via law and legislation (e.g. based on risks) 2.50 
Introduce sector transition funds  2.29 
Set up a regional structure financed by a substantial reduction in the 
unemployment contribution and other expenditures on the unemployed for 
the guidance to employment  
2.07 
 
As table 8.11 shows, the organisations present have a preference for the removal 
of the financial partition between sector funds. The current barriers regarding 
the financing of training and education when an employee wants to make the 
transition to another sector should be settled. Simultaneously, trade unions and 
employers’ organisations should regulate the financing via social plans or 
collective agreements. Moreover, the majority of the participants agreed that a 
new levy should be introduced to finance job-to-job support for workers 
employed at companies not covered by a collective agreements or social plans. 
Furthermore, the participants advocated an individual employability budget 
which can be spend on activities to enhance job-to-job transitions, e.g. 
apprenticeships, training and education and investments in networking. The 
majority of the experts shared the view that companies with enough financial 
resources should preferably be the first to invest in job-to-job support for their 
redundant employees. Only one organisation did not like the sound of this 
proposal. Almost two-thirds of the organisations gave preference to structural 
financing, similar to the Swedish model, instead of incidental financing. Nine out 
of fourteen organisations scored a ‘4’ or ‘5’ on this proposal. 
 
8.4.4 Proposals with regard to coordination mechanism and responsibility 
The final topic discussed in the expert meeting was the way job-to-job support 
should be coordinated. The participants were asked to brainstorm the question: 
what in the Netherlands should take place with regard to coordination 
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mechanisms and the division of responsibility?  
 
Table 8.12: Proposals to promote job-to-job support with regard to division of 
responsibility  
Proposal Mean 
Specify special responsibility for vulnerable groups (partially disabled and the 
like)  
4.21 
Stipulations in employment contracts and collective agreements regarding 
responsibility and financing employability  
4.07 
Social partners should also be responsible for flexible workforces and workers 
employed at SMEs not covered by a social plan. Support provided by the 
government should be supplementary  
4.07 
Sectoral collective agreements should include agreements in the field of 
intersectoral job-to-job transitions in the region  
4.00 
More involvement of former employer to support redundant employees from 
job-to job. Make use of the employers’ network (region/sector), including 
certificates of competence and validation of work experience in order to 
reduce or prevent severance pay  
3.93 
Job-to-job support is primarily social partners’ responsibility. The public 
sector should intervene when there are ‘gaps’. E.g. the Public Employment 
Service can play an important role in providing support for redundant workers 
employed at SMEs 
3.86 
Consider declarations of binding force of transition agreements. This can be 
regulated in specific regional (labour market/transition) collective agreements 
3.86 
Organize in the region that small companies have access to job-to-job 
services established by large companies in that region 
3.86 
Organize that workers employed at SME have access to job-to-job support so 
that they do not automatically fall back on the public employment service  
3.57 
Education entitlements and obligations (e.g. statutory right to educational 
leave) for employees in order to be attractive for the current but also for 
future employers. If necessary, let employees share in the costs. Introduce 
arbitration boards if employers and employees cannot reach an agreement  
3.57 
Shift responsibility to regions. Employers, the Public Employment Service 
and municipalities should collaborate in order to support redundant 
employees from job-to-job 
3.50 
Guarantee the quality of job-to-job transition support and re-integration 
activities when these activities are conducted or financed by the government  
3.50 
The employee him/herself is responsible for employability  3.36 
Employers and employees are responsible (within the legal framework set by 
the government) for the establishment, implementation and financing in the 
first phase of job-to-job transitions. In the second phase the job-to-job 
support is implemented by regional private transfer centres. The government 
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like)  
4.21 
Stipulations in employment contracts and collective agreements regarding 
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employed at SMEs not covered by a social plan. Support provided by the 
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4.07 
Sectoral collective agreements should include agreements in the field of 
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employed at SMEs 
3.86 
Consider declarations of binding force of transition agreements. This can be 
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services established by large companies in that region 
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can be involved (tripartite) in the second phase 
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Proposal Mean 
Tripartite: agreements between social partners with support from the 
government. The government is responsible for employees not covered by a 
collective agreement  
3.29 
Private agencies are responsible for developing quality products 3.29 
Relax employment protection regulation 3.21 
Individual employers and employees (at company level) are responsible for 
outplacement and the like  
3.21 
Reduce the costs of sectoral mobility in terms of acquired (pension) 
entitlements  
3.21 
Public responsibility to determine the ‘distance to the labour market’  2.43 
Introduce quota for employers to hire specific target groups  2.43 
 
It can be inferred from table 8.12 that the majority of the Dutch participants 
agreed that trade unions, employers’ associations, companies and employees 
are primarily responsible for job-to-job transitions and the enhancement of 
employee’s employability. The role of the former employer should not be 
underestimated. If necessary the government can play a supplementary role. By 
means of collective agreements and individual employment contracts, social 
partners should negotiate specific responsibilities, division of tasks and financing 
of the support. Furthermore, participants shared the view that it should be 
clearer who should take the responsibility for the vulnerable groups (partially 
disabled and the like), but they do not believe in a mandatory employment 
quota which entails that employers are obliged to employ a certain percentage 
of the specific target group among their workforce. It appears that all actors 
have the opinion that attention should be paid to vulnerable redundant 
employees, but it remains unclear as to who should take the lead in helping 
those workers to another job. A challenge for the Dutch social partners and 
government is to clarify this issue and to take a particular joint stand, because if 
this is not declared openly, nobody feels truly responsible, with the result that no 
action will take place. 
 
8.4.5 Different actors, different opinions? 
In order to make new policies with regard to job-to-job support it is important 
that consensus is reached between the various actors. The Swedish and Spanish 
case, albeit very different, show that mutual trust and a common goal are 
important. However, opinions with regard to the promotion of job-to-job 
transition support can vary among the different actors. Therefore, the scores 
given to proposals were analysed by type of organisation. Table 8.13 displays the 





Table 8.13: Proposals with the highest scores with regard to the promotion of job-
to-job transitions by type of organisation  




Sufficient time between the notice and the actual dismissal date 5.00 
Enhance intersectoral mobility  4.75 
Introduce longer terms of notice 4.75 Trade unions 
Increase accessibility of job-to-job support, including for workers 
who are not covered by a social plan or who do not work for a fixed 
employer 
4.75 
More specific attention for employability 5.00 
Increase accessibility of job-to-job support, including support for 
workers who are not covered by a social plan or who do not work 
for a fixed employer 
5.00 
Make a clear distinction in reorganization procedures between 
redundant employees and employees who dysfunction. 
Dysfunction is another route 
5.00 
Provide financial services so that redundant employees realize the 
consequences of the dismissal 
5.00 
Reduce hindrances for job-to-job support. Regulate preconditions 
e.g. regarding the break in pension contributions, unemployment 
entitlements, wage level 
5.00 
Possibility of doing a work placement/apprenticeship at another 
company during the current employment contract 
5.00 
Support directed at large and small companies 5.00 
Introduce more projects a la Philips Employment Programme, 
which is targeted at people at the margin of the labour market and 






Regulate the financing over job-to-job support via collective 
agreements agreed between trade unions and employers’ 
associations 
5.00 
Early intervention and support for those who really need it  5.00 
More specific attention for employability 5.00 
Increase accessibility of job-to-job support, including for workers 














142  The number of proposals assessed with an average score ‘5’ differ per actor. The Public 
Employment Service has many proposals with the average score ‘5’. This can be 
explained by the fact that there is only one Public Employment Service, while the other 
actors are compound by different organisations.  

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142  The number of proposals assessed with an average score ‘5’ differ per actor. The Public 
Employment Service has many proposals with the average score ‘5’. This can be 
explained by the fact that there is only one Public Employment Service, while the other 
actors are compound by different organisations.  
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Companies, employers should be informed regarding possible 
public and private job-to-job services/modules, so that they can 
choose and offer these services to their employees 
5.00 
Stimulate short duration education and training, not only targeted 
at the own company/sector 
5.00 
Eliminate employers’ risks in taking on unemployed people at the 
margin of the labour market 
5.00 
Remove the financial partition between sector funds 5.00 
More attention to obtain work experience above education and 
training budgets 
5.00 
Facilitate job-to-job policy in the regions 5.00 
Reduce hindrances for job-to-job support. Regulate preconditions 
e.g. regarding the break in pension contributions, unemployment 
entitlements, wage level 
5.00 
Enhance intersectoral mobility  5.00 
Demand oriented: no general redundancy pools, but job-to-job 
support geared with (future) labour market demand 
5.00 
Arrange that acquired severance rights are transferable to another 
employer in the event of voluntary mobility 
5.00 
Take care to ensure good guidance and supervision by skilled 
coaches with knowledge of the labour market 
5.00 
Make use of digital possibilities, e.g. apply for jobs via the internet 5.00 
Target group: employees threatened by dismissal owing to 
economic reasons 
5.00 
Target group: full-time and part-time employees 5.00 
Target group: employees threatened with dismissal because of 
dysfunction  
5.00 
Target group: vulnerable groups: (the elderly, the disabled and low 
skilled employees)  
5.00 
Target group: employees from whom the limited duration contract 
terminates  
5.00 
Target group: low skilled employees 5.00 
Redundant employees who were not able to find another job 
within three months, not even with the support of private actors, 
should be eligible for (governmental) support 
5.00 
Introduce more projects a la Philips Employment Programme 
which is targeted at people at the margin of the labour market and 
aims to obtain work experience combined with education and 
training. 
5.00 
Reduce the costs of sectoral mobility in terms of acquired (pension) 
entitlements 
5.00 
Deposit budgets for education and training which have not been 
used into a fund to use for job-to-job support (e.g. retraining) 
5.00 
Regulate the financing over job-to-job support via collective 
agreements agreed between trade unions and employers’ 
associations 
5.00 


























































Prior to the dismissal employers should contribute to a ‘dismissal 
fund’ so that means and support is immediately available at the 
actual dismissal date 
5.00 
Relate the severance pay also to the risk on (long-term) 
unemployment. Subsequently, the severance pay should be 
available for job-to-job transitions 
5.00 
Make use of the current sector funds for intersectoral mobility 5.00 
Both employer and employee should contribute via a deduction in 
the wage bill 
5.00 
Structural financing like the Swedish model is preferable to 
incidental financing 
5.00 
In the event of redundancy social partners should not formulate 
the support as a possibility, but as a right. It is all about 
implementation 
5.00 
Job-to-job support is primarily social partners’ responsibility. The 
public sector should intervene when there are ‘gaps’. (E.g. the 
Public Employment Service can play an important role in providing 
support for redundant workers employed at SMEs) 
5.00 
Organize in the region that small companies have access to job-to-
job services established by large companies in that region 
5.00 
Sectoral collective agreements should include agreements in the 
field of intersectoral job-to-job transitions in the region 
5.00 
Shift responsibility to regions. Employers, the Public Employment 
Service and municipalities should collaborate in order to support 









Social partners should also be responsible for flexible workforces 
and workers employed at SMEs not covered by a social plan. 
Support provided by the government should be supplementary 
5.00 
More use of portfolio, early acquired competencies, career check 
(diagnose) 
4.75 
More support for SMEs urge companies to be involved in 
supporting the redundant employee from job-to-job 
4.75 
Early intervention and support for those who really need it  4.50 
Increase accessibility of job-to-job support, including for workers 
who are not covered by a social plan or who do not work for a fixed 
employer 
4.50 
Enhance intersectoral mobility  4.50 
Facilitate job-to-job policy in the regions. This requires a close 
collaboration between regional actors and access to labour market 






Possibility to of doing a work placement/apprenticeship at another 
company during the current employment contract 
4.50 
Early intervention and support for those who really need it  5.00 
Utilize private learning/work places 5.00 
Companies, employers should be informed regarding possible 
public and private job-to-job services/modules, so that they can 






Stimulate short duration education and training, not only targeted 
at the own company/sector 
5.00 
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More use of portfolio, early acquired competencies, career check 
(diagnose) 
4.75 
More support for SMEs urge companies to be involved in 
supporting the redundant employee from job-to-job 
4.75 
Early intervention and support for those who really need it  4.50 
Increase accessibility of job-to-job support, including for workers 
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More use of portfolio, early acquired competencies, career check 
(diagnose) 
5.00 
Eliminate employers’ risks in taking on unemployed people at the 
margin of the labour market 
5.00 
Remove the financial partition between sector funds 5.00 
Judge private and public actors on their results 5.00 
Guidance should be demand oriented (geared with employers’ 
needs) 
5.00 
Job-to-job support should be a permanent subject of conversations 
in collective agreements, not only in times of crises and in 
redundancy procedures 
5.00 
Enhance intersectoral mobility  5.00 
Facilitate job-to-job policy in the regions. This requires a close 
collaboration between regional actors and access to labour market 
information with regard to shortages and surpluses of labour 
supply 
5.00 
Demand oriented: no general redundancy pools, but job-to-job 
support geared to (future) labour market demand 
5.00 
Companies not covered by a collective agreement should 
contribute via a levy 
5.00 
Private agencies are responsible for developing quality products 5.00 
 
Based on table 8.13 the conclusion can be drawn that trade unions attach value 
to sufficient time between the notice and the actual dismissal date. This could be 
arranged by longer terms of notice. However, employers are not in favour of this 
proposal. They even gave the lowest score to this proposal (see table 8.14).  
 
Table 8.14: Proposals with the lowest scores with regard to the promotion of job-to-




Rebuild the sector funds to a national fund 1.25 
Unlink the severance pay from years of service 1.50 






Trade unions  
 
 
Relax employment protection regulation 1.50 
Introduce longer terms of notice 1.00 
Everyone should be eligible for job-to-job support 1.00 
Redundant employees who have not been able to find another 
job within three months, not even with the support of private 




Solidarity contribution by colleague employees 1.00 
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Short-term and long-term diagnoses of the company and 
sector situation 
1.00 
Determine at the regional level that everybody who is able to 
work is also obliged to work 
1.00 
Facilitate job-to-job policy in the regions. This requires a close 
collaboration between regional actors and access to labour 
market information regarding shortages and surpluses of 
labour supply 
1.00 
Introduce sector transition funds 1.00 
Public financing for employees at the margin of the labour 
market 
1.00 
Solidarity contribution by colleague employees 1.00 
Provide the opportunity to use the available means 
(unemployment benefit) from the ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment in an early and creative way 
1.00 
Introduce an individual vitality account via collective 
agreements with fiscal entitlements facilitated by the 
government 
1.00 
Tripartite agreements between social partners with support 
from the government. The government is responsible for 
employees not covered by a collective agreement  
1.00 


















Introduce quota for employers to hire specific target groups 1.00 
Employees threatened with dismissal because of dysfunction 1.75 




Introduce quota for employers to hire specific target groups 1.75 
Arrange for acquired severance rights to be transferable to 
another employer in the event of voluntary mobility 
1.33 
Let the former employer pay a “dismissal tax” in the case of 
forced dismissal to compensate external effects and settle this 
in a decreased severance pay 
1.33 
Relate the severance pay also to the risk on (long-term) 
unemployment. Subsequently, the severance pay should be 
available for job-to-job transitions 
1.67 
Private Actors   
Introduce quota for employers to hire specific target groups 1.67 
 
Trade unions are not in favour of proposals which are targeted on relaxing 
employment protection regulation and unlinking severance pay from years of 
service. The private actors do not want to relate severance pay to the risk on 
(long-term) unemployment and they do not support the proposal to use 
severance pay for job-to-job transitions. Companies and the Public Employment 
Service both gave the lowest score to the idea of introducing a solidarity 
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supply 
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Public financing for employees at the margin of the labour 
market 
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Solidarity contribution by colleague employees 1.00 
Provide the opportunity to use the available means 
(unemployment benefit) from the ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment in an early and creative way 
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Introduce an individual vitality account via collective 
agreements with fiscal entitlements facilitated by the 
government 
1.00 
Tripartite agreements between social partners with support 
from the government. The government is responsible for 
employees not covered by a collective agreement  
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Employees threatened with dismissal because of dysfunction 1.75 




Introduce quota for employers to hire specific target groups 1.75 
Arrange for acquired severance rights to be transferable to 
another employer in the event of voluntary mobility 
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Let the former employer pay a “dismissal tax” in the case of 
forced dismissal to compensate external effects and settle this 
in a decreased severance pay 
1.33 
Relate the severance pay also to the risk on (long-term) 
unemployment. Subsequently, the severance pay should be 
available for job-to-job transitions 
1.67 
Private Actors   
Introduce quota for employers to hire specific target groups 1.67 
 
Trade unions are not in favour of proposals which are targeted on relaxing 
employment protection regulation and unlinking severance pay from years of 
service. The private actors do not want to relate severance pay to the risk on 
(long-term) unemployment and they do not support the proposal to use 
severance pay for job-to-job transitions. Companies and the Public Employment 
Service both gave the lowest score to the idea of introducing a solidarity 
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contribution by colleague employees for job-to-job support. Furthermore, the 
Public Employment Service appears to be not in favour of an individual vitality 
account via collective agreements with fiscal entitlements facilitated by the 
government. However, as explained previously, the launch of a vitality scheme 
was recently published in the national budget for 2012 and its implementation is 
planned for 2013. 
 
8.5 Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter attempts to answer the following research question: what can the 
Netherlands learn with regard to job-to-job arrangements and systems for 
redundant employees in place in other countries? In my view the main lesson for 
the Netherlands is to design a structural approach to support redundant 
employees from job-to-job in the case of redundancy. Currently, the job-to-job 
activities and measures are on an ad hoc basis. They have an incidental, 
temporary or experimental character. Moreover, the role of social partners can 
be enhanced, certainly when the Dutch situation is compared with the Swedish 
case. The Swedish transition foundations can inspire the Dutch actors in 
developing a structural system for job-to-job transitions.  
 
The Swedish and the Spanish cases, albeit very different, prove that a good 
relationship between trade unions and employers’ associations, and between 
individual employers and employees, is a relevant precondition for success. The 
Swedish government does not force the trade unions and employers to 
negotiate about a transition agreement. In fact, trade unions and employers can 
determine the common goals with regard to job-to-job support without 
interference from the government. In Spain, the government had to interfere, 
because negotiations between trade unions and employers’ associations 
reached a total deadlock. In the UK, the role of trade unions and employers’ 
association with regard to job-to-job support is limited, but the government has 
set up programmes in order to provide early support in the event of dismissal via 
the Jobcentre Plus Rapid Response Service and the Response to Redundancy 
programme.  
 
The Swedish system supports transitions, and that in itself is a success factor. 
The majority of the Swedish employees are covered by a transition agreement, 
while in Spain there is no active support at all regarding job-to-job transitions in 
cases of redundancy and Spanish redundant employees will often become 
unemployed. In Austria, redundant employees, including those with a limited 
duration contract, can enter a labour foundation as soon as they receive an 
unemployment benefit. These countries examined give the Dutch stakeholders 
food for thought. Should all employees and all companies be included in a job-
to-job system? Currently, the job-to-job support in the Netherlands is limited to 
employees with a permanent contract employed in large companies. As 
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explained previously, the Public Employment Service UWV WERKbedrijf can 
provide financial means to private suppliers aimed at the prevention of 
unemployment of permanent and temporary employees, including temporary 
workers who will lose their jobs within four months, and jobseekers with an 
unemployment benefit who have lost their jobs in the last three months. The 
precondition for this subsidy is that the employer has no money available for 
transition support. However, this scheme ceases in October 2011. 
 
Relevant labour market organisations who participated in the expert meeting 
agree that the access to job-to-job support could be increased in the 
Netherlands and social partners could play a more active role in this process. 
There is no divergence of view among the Dutch labour market actors with 
regard to the possible lessons the Netherlands can draw from the countries 
examined: start early intervention for those who need it, introduce a structural 
system for all types of employees, including for workers who are not covered by 
a social plan or who do not work for a fixed employer. However, money should 
not be wasted on those employees who can quickly find a job on their own. The 
introduction of an employability backpack based on the Austrian experience, is 
generally considered as appealing by almost all stakeholders, whereas the 
introduction of an information system in which data is shared about job losses in 
struggling countries is not underpinned by the participants of the expert 
meeting. 
 
During the expert meeting the participants could propose ideas to enhance the 
Dutch job-to-job approach. It appears that all actors share the opinion that 
attention should be paid to vulnerable redundant employees, but it remains 
unclear as to who should take the lead in helping those workers to another job. A 
challenge for the Dutch social partners and government is to clarify this issue 
and to take a particular joint stand, because if this is not declared openly, 
nobody feels truly responsible, with the result that no action will take place. 
Another lesson that can be learned from the countries examined is that 
intersectoral mobility should be promoted if there are no jobs available in the 
current sector. This implies that barriers for intersectoral mobility should be 
cleared away, e.g. by removing the financial partition between the Dutch sector 
funds. During the expert meeting there was consensus among the Dutch actors 
that attention should be paid to the employability of employees, not only for 
redundant employees but during the entire career of employees. The possibility 
of doing a work placement or apprenticeship at another company during the 
current employment contract or while under notice is an idea introduced during 
the expert meeting which is supported by the Dutch labour market experts. 
Differences in the assessments of the proposed ideas were observed among the 
actors. Trade unions attach value to sufficient time between the notice and the 
actual dismissal date. This could be arranged by longer terms of notice, but 
employers are not in favour of this proposal. Trade unions are not in favour of 
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employees with a permanent contract employed in large companies. As 
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explained previously, the Public Employment Service UWV WERKbedrijf can 
provide financial means to private suppliers aimed at the prevention of 
unemployment of permanent and temporary employees, including temporary 
workers who will lose their jobs within four months, and jobseekers with an 
unemployment benefit who have lost their jobs in the last three months. The 
precondition for this subsidy is that the employer has no money available for 
transition support. However, this scheme ceases in October 2011. 
 
Relevant labour market organisations who participated in the expert meeting 
agree that the access to job-to-job support could be increased in the 
Netherlands and social partners could play a more active role in this process. 
There is no divergence of view among the Dutch labour market actors with 
regard to the possible lessons the Netherlands can draw from the countries 
examined: start early intervention for those who need it, introduce a structural 
system for all types of employees, including for workers who are not covered by 
a social plan or who do not work for a fixed employer. However, money should 
not be wasted on those employees who can quickly find a job on their own. The 
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generally considered as appealing by almost all stakeholders, whereas the 
introduction of an information system in which data is shared about job losses in 
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proposals which are targeted at relaxing employment protection regulation and 
unlinking severance pay from years of service. The private actors do not want to 
relate severance pay to the risk on (long-term) unemployment and they do not 
support the proposal to use severance pay for job-to-job transitions.  
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proposals which are targeted at relaxing employment protection regulation and 
unlinking severance pay from years of service. The private actors do not want to 
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In this study, employment security systems with a specific focus on forced job-
to-job transitions have been examined. The main research questions of this 
thesis are: 
 
What kind of systems or arrangements can be distinguished in European countries 
in order to enhance employment security for redundant employees? How can 
differences and similarities between those systems be explained? What lessons can 
possibly be learned from a Dutch policy perspective? 
 
Literature and policy documents have been scrutinized and four country studies 
have been conducted in order to answer the research questions. In each country 
various actors were interviewed. In Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6, the job-to-job systems 
in Sweden, United Kingdom, Austria and Spain were examined and discussed. 
The empirical findings were compared with the Dutch job-to-job arrangements 
in order to identify possible policy lessons for the Netherlands (Chapter 7). These 
lessons were inferred by the author and interactively discussed with various 
stakeholders in an expert meeting held at the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Employment in April 2011. The results of this meeting were described in 
Chapter 8. In this final chapter, the theoretical and empirical findings are 
brought together in order to answer the research questions.  
 
Based on the existing literature, the study set off from the observation that 
employment security is more than job security. Employment security is the 
possibility for unemployed or inactive persons to make the transitions from 
unemployment to employment and the possibility for workers to remain 
employed, not necessarily in the same job with the same employer. The present 
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9.2 Explaining differences and similarities in employment security 
systems 
 
In this study an analytical model has been developed in order to describe and 
explain employment security systems in different countries (see figure 9.1). The 
analytical model starts from the assumption that several factors influence the 
emergence of job-to-job policies and shape their further development and 
performance.  
Firstly, the institutional setting influences actor’s behaviour and the interaction 
between the actors involved in the employment security system. Institutional 
factors, e.g. employment protection legislation, unemployment insurance 
regulation, statutory regulation with regard to redundancy procedures, including 
obliged notice periods which apply within a country, are relevant explanatory 
factors for the emergence, shaping or the non-existence of active job-to-job 
policies within countries. 
 
Secondly, as well as the institutional setting, other factors influence the 
establishment of job-to-job arrangements. The actor-centered institutionalism 
theory makes clear that an analysis of policy development and policy change is 
worthless without taking into account the role of primary actors. Each actor has 
its own capabilities, orientations, perceptions and references. Since no single 
actor in an employment security system can determine the outcome unilaterally, 
the actor constellation is also important. The actor constellation and the modes 
of interaction, including the various coordination mechanisms, influence the 
establishment or the lack of job-to-job policies and arrangements. The actor 
constellation represents the set of actors that are involved in particular policy 
interactions, but is rather static, while the interactions of these actors can vary to 
a large extent. Based on the literature, several coordination mechanisms can be 
distinguished: associations, the state, including Public Employment Services, the 
individual company (hierarchy), networks, and the private market. 
 
In addition, the job-to-job transition policies and measures explored in the 
countries examined will be analyzed and explained along the following four 
crucial dimensions: the type of support, the financing, the eligibility, and the 
responsibility. The performance, which refers to the evaluation of the 
programmatic outcomes of policy choices and practices, is also included in the 
analytical model of employment security systems. The performance is the result 
of the combination of the previous addressed variables. Figure 9.1 portrays the 
analytical model for explaining employment security systems. 
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Figure 9.1: Analytical model for describing and explaining employment security 
systems
 
Derived and adapted from Scharpf (1997), Gilbert & Specht (1974), and Thomson et 
al. (1991)  
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including their modes of interaction (9.2.2), the policies (9.2.3), and the 
performance of the policies and arrangements (9.2.4). 
 
9.2.1 Institutional setting 
In this study Scharpf’s definition of the institutional setting was followed. This 
means that the institutional setting is limited to rules and legislation that 
structure the course of action that a set of actors may choose. The institutional 
setting can both stimulate and constrain the implementation of job-to-job 
policies.  
 
Employment protection legislation 
It can be hypothesized that, in countries with less strict employment protection 
legislation, employers are more likely to hire new employees. Thus less rigid 
employment protection legislation might stimulate job-to-job transitions in the 
event of inevitable job-losses owing to economic downturns. The findings of this 
study show that employment protection varies across the countries scrutinized. 
Employment protection is the least strict in the UK, which implies that it is 
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Employment protection is the least strict in the UK, which implies that it is 
relatively easy to fire British employees. The vacancy rate, which gives us an 
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indication for the number of job openings, is high in the UK compared with the 
other countries examined. Furthermore, the UK has the lowest percentage of 
employees with a fixed-term contract. This can also be explained by less 
stringent employment protection legislation. Moreover, the UK has, after 
Sweden, the second highest mobility rate. In 2008, 16.7% of the British people 
aged 16-64 with a permanent contract reported that they had changed jobs 
since the previous year, of which 14.0% reported that the transition was 
voluntary and 2.7% that they had been forced to find another job. Thus, the UK 
system is geared to making it easier to dismiss people and then having 
appropriate forms of public intervention for people, once they are unemployed, 
so that they can get back into another job. In Sweden, employment protection is 
stricter than in the UK, but the mobility rate is higher. Thus, the stricter Swedish 
employment protection legislation does not hold back Swedish employees from 
making the transition to another job. Apparently, the Swedes feel safe enough 
to take the risk of making a transition to another job owing to a good social 
safety net and active job-to-job support.  
 
Spain has the highest indicator of overall employment protection and the lowest 
mobility rate. The overall OECD EPL indicator was, in 2008, the highest among 
the countries studied. Inherited from Franco’s regime, the employment 
protection legislation in Spain is very strict and law regulates the minimum 
severance pay. Under the Franco regime the labour market was characterised by 
a very flexible wage-setting process, combined with a very rigid employment 
system, meaning that life-time jobs were guaranteed in exchange for 
compliance on wages and political acquiescence. In the 1980s, the deregulation 
process started, through allowing temporary employment and fixed-term 
contracts. Deregulation generated important inequalities with a lot of protection 
for permanent employees and more precarious jobs for temporary employees. 
During the last decades, Spain has tightened the restrictions on the use of fixed-
term contracts. In 1984, the ‘temporary contract for employment promotion’ 
was restricted to specific groups (employees aged over 45 and the long-term 
unemployed) in order to reduce the rate of temporary employment. However, it 
turned out that the restriction of this type of contract led to greater use of other 
types of temporary contracts. Therefore, the temporary employment contract 
for employment promotion was completely abolished in 1997 and a new contract, 
with the approval of lower dismissal costs (33 days per year of service with a 
maximum of 24 months), was introduced: the ‘permanent employment 
promotion contracts’ (contrato para el fomento de la contratación indefinida) 
which was applicable only to certain categories of workers (young unemployed, 
long-term unemployed and unemployed aged over 45).143 In later reforms of 

143 Royal Decree-Law 8/1997, Royal Decree-Law 9/1997
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2002 and 2006, the target group for the use of permanent employment 
promotion contracts was extended. With the 2006 reform, temporary workers 
aged 31-45 years could be eligible for a permanent employment promotion 
contract. This was a temporary measure which lasted until the end of 2007.  
Furthermore, with the 2006 reform tax deductions were introduced for 
employers who converted temporary contracts into permanent employment 
promotion contracts, and contracts lasting for two years in the same job within 
the same company during a period of 30 months were automatically converted 
to open-ended contracts (Bentolila et al., 2008). The 2006 reform did have an 
effect on the number of employees with a temporary contract. There has been a 
substantial reduction from 34.1% in 2006 to 25% in 2010. 
 
In Spain the statutory severance pay amounts to twenty days’ salary per year of 
service, with a maximum of one years’ salary. The severance pay in the event of 
unfair dismissal is equal to 45 days’ salary per year of service, up to a maximum 
of 3.5 years. With the enactment of Law 35/2010144 a set of urgent measures to 
reform the Spanish labour market was introduced. The severance compensation 
for contracts for the promotion of permanent employment for unfair 
redundancy has not changed, meaning that the statutory severance pay is 
reduced 33 days’ salary per year of service, with a maximum of two years instead 
of 45 days’ salary per year of service. One of the measures of the new reform is 
that the target group for this type of contract is again extended. Furthermore, 
with the new reform in 2010, the definition of the economic grounds for 
dismissals based on objective grounds was relaxed. According to several 
interviewees it is common practice that labour authorities do not authorize 
collective dismissals if the trade union and employer do not reach an agreement. 
Therefore, employers try to reach an agreement as early as possible in the 
redundancy process, to avoid the risk of strikes. In that event, the employer pays 
the negotiated severance pay, which is usually higher than the statutory 
minimum. Compared with the other countries studied, the number of strikes is 
considerably higher. The job vacancy rate is the lowest in Spain.  
 
EPL in Austria and Sweden is more strict than in the UK, but less strict than in 
Spain. It can be hypothesized that in countries with strict employment 
protection legislation the dismissal costs are high, which ultimately will result in 
the avoidance of dismissals. However, the unemployment figures showed that, 
owing to the 2008 economic downturn, the Spanish unemployment rate has 
more than doubled, which implies that, despite the strict EPL, Spanish 
companies have been forced to lay off employees or not to renew temporary 

144 Ley 35/2010, de medidas urgentes para la reforma del Mercado de trabajo, Boletín oficial 
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contracts. In fact, the Spanish history shows that liberalising the use of 
temporary contracts without relaxing the employment protection legislation for 
employees with a permanent contract, has resulted in a growing segmentation 
of the labour market: a temporary part becoming more precarious as it grew, 
while the permanent core was becoming more secure as it shrank. On the other 
hand, in the UK, a country with a less strict employment protection regime, the 
interviews revealed that in response to the crisis, British trade unions, employers 
and employees have devoted themselves to the avoidance of dismissals. This 
has resulted in preventative flexible measures such as wage constraints and the 
acceptance of temporary reduction in working hours. Nevertheless, not all 
British companies did succeed in refraining from forced dismissals and the 
government joined in the support of redundant employees via the (expansion of) 
national programmes, i.e. the RRS and R2R programme. 
 
Notice period 
Another feature of the institutional setting which might influence the behaviour 
of actors and eventually the job-to-job policies in a country is the notice period. 
The employer has to comply with the appropriate notice period when he intends 
to lay off employees. When employees are under notice, curative job-to-job 
measures can be applied. The longer the duration of the notice period, the 
longer the redundant employee has the time to find another suitable job under 
the current employment conditions.  
The employer continues to pay the wage during the notice period, which 
provides the redundant employee income security during their job search. 
Taking on another job too quickly, which does not entirely fit the employee’s 
skills and knowledge, may eventually lead to lower productivity. Thus, the notice 
period is relevant when examining job-to-job support and responsibility during 
the different phases in unemployment prevention. In Sweden, the statutory 
duration of the notice period for employers varies from one month for contracts 
which have lasted less than two years up to six months for contracts with a 
minimum duration of ten years, but in practice longer periods of notice are often 
agreed via collective agreements. In Austria, the notice periods differ for white-
collar workers and blue-collar workers. In the absence of an agreement, the 
blue-collar workers have a notice period of 14 days, while the notice period for 
white-collar workers is comparable with Swedish notice periods. Compared with 
Sweden and the white-collar workers in Austria, the UK has shorter statutory 
notice periods. In the UK, a written contract will usually specify the notice period. 
However, there are statutory minimums. The employee, who has been 
continuously employed for one month or more, has at least one week’s notice if 
the period of continuous employment is less than two years. If the duration of 
employment is two years or more, but less than twelve years, the notice period is 
one week for each year of continuous employment in this period. The notice 
period is not less than twelve weeks, if the period of continuous employment is 
twelve years or more.  
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With the labour reform in 2010, the statutory notice period in Spain has been 
reduced from 30 to 15 days, which makes Spain the country with the shortest 
statutory notice periods from the countries examined. This implies that a 
Spanish redundant employee has less time to find another job under the current 
employment conditions compared with peers in the other countries examined. 
 
Income security 
When the conditions for the termination of the employment contract have been 
met, and the notice period has expired, the employment contract is terminated. 
In this phase, redundant employees can possibly be eligible for unemployment 
insurance. It can be hypothesized that if the income level strongly declines when 
becoming unemployed, there is a great urgency to find another job as quickly as 
possible.  
 
To be eligible for unemployment insurance the unemployed should meet certain 
criteria. In Austria, the duration of the unemployment benefit depends on the 
time the person has been insured and his/her age. The maximum duration is 52 
weeks. However, the unemployment benefit extends to a maximum of four 
years in the event of participation in a labour foundation. The net overall average 
replacement rate during the initial phase of unemployment is 68% by an earning 
level of 100% of the average wage, and 70% by an earning level of 67% of the 
average wage.  
 
In Spain the duration of unemployment benefit depends on the work experience 
in the six years prior to the situation of becoming unemployed. The maximum 
duration of unemployment benefit is two years. The net replacement rates are 
high in Spain compared with the other countries studied: 72% by an earning level 
of 100% of the average wage and 80% by an earning level of 67% of the average 
wage. 
 
The UK has the lowest overall average net replacement rate among the 
countries examined (54% by an earning level of 100% of the average wage and 
67% by an earning level of 67% of the average wage), which implies that on 
average British employees experience a greater income loss during the initial 
phase of unemployment compared with the other countries studied. The 
contribution based Jobseekers’ Allowance is paid up to 182 days and is based on 
how much national insurance contribution a person has paid in the previous two 
years. It is thus important for British employees to find a new job quickly after 
redundancy, in order to cover daily living expenses, and this might explain the 
second highest mobility rate after Sweden.  
 
Sweden has a well-developed social security system. Most people who are 
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insurance. It can be hypothesized that if the income level strongly declines when 
becoming unemployed, there is a great urgency to find another job as quickly as 
possible.  
 
To be eligible for unemployment insurance the unemployed should meet certain 
criteria. In Austria, the duration of the unemployment benefit depends on the 
time the person has been insured and his/her age. The maximum duration is 52 
weeks. However, the unemployment benefit extends to a maximum of four 
years in the event of participation in a labour foundation. The net overall average 
replacement rate during the initial phase of unemployment is 68% by an earning 
level of 100% of the average wage, and 70% by an earning level of 67% of the 
average wage.  
 
In Spain the duration of unemployment benefit depends on the work experience 
in the six years prior to the situation of becoming unemployed. The maximum 
duration of unemployment benefit is two years. The net replacement rates are 
high in Spain compared with the other countries studied: 72% by an earning level 
of 100% of the average wage and 80% by an earning level of 67% of the average 
wage. 
 
The UK has the lowest overall average net replacement rate among the 
countries examined (54% by an earning level of 100% of the average wage and 
67% by an earning level of 67% of the average wage), which implies that on 
average British employees experience a greater income loss during the initial 
phase of unemployment compared with the other countries studied. The 
contribution based Jobseekers’ Allowance is paid up to 182 days and is based on 
how much national insurance contribution a person has paid in the previous two 
years. It is thus important for British employees to find a new job quickly after 
redundancy, in order to cover daily living expenses, and this might explain the 
second highest mobility rate after Sweden.  
 
Sweden has a well-developed social security system. Most people who are 
unemployed are eligible for unemployment benefit. Membership of an 
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unemployment insurance fund is voluntary but necessary to receive an income-
related benefit. Furthermore, the person must have worked for at least six 
calendar months during the last year with a minimum of 80 hours worked in each 
month, or have worked for at least 480 hours during a continuous six-month 
period, with a minimum of 50 hours each month. The basic unemployment 
benefit is paid out for a maximum period of 300 days. The overall net 
replacement rate is 60% by an earning level of 100% of the average wage and 
79% by an earning level of 67% of the average wage. People do not have to take 
the first job available, but can wait to a certain extent for a ‘suitable’ job. A well-
developed and comprehensive social security system is needed to prevent people 
from moving down the productivity ladder. The Swedish social security system 
has relatively high levels of benefits and a universal coverage. This makes it an 
expensive system, which can only be sustained if there is a consistent 
commitment to full employment. Therefore, job-to-job transitions are important 
and employers’ associations and trade unions are aware of the need to provide 
employment security instead of job security. In addition to the role employers’ 
associations and trade unions play in the employment security system, the 
Swedish government commissioned the PES to find unemployed people jobs as 
quickly as possible, but the problem is that fewer jobs are available owing to the 
current crisis.  
 
9.2.2 Actors including their orientation, capabilities and modes of inter-
action 
As explained previously, various actors can play a role in the employment 
security system. However, the extent to which an actor is supporting job-to-job 
transitions varies in the countries studied. Moreover, the way actors interact 
influences the emergence and shaping, or the non-existence of job-to-job 
policies and measures. In this section the role of associations, the state, including 
the Public Employment Services, hierarchies, networks and the market will be 
further explained. Attention will be paid to the actors’ orientations, capabilities 
and their modes of interaction. 
 
Associations 
The role of trade unions and employers’ associations in job-to-job transitions in 
the UK and Spain is limited, in comparison with Sweden and Austria. 
The Swedish unemployment prevention model is a complex interconnecting 
model that actually exists of four different pathways which are coordinated by 
different actors: the transition agreements coordinated by associations, in house 
solutions in companies, public interventions, and support provided through the 
market. As explained previously, the transition agreements negotiated between 
Swedish employers’ organisations and trade unions are the dominant mode of 
interaction in relation to direct job-to-job transitions for redundant employees. 
The first, and most important, reason for the introduction of the Swedish 
transition agreements is the strong role of social partners in regulating the 
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Swedish labour market. The first transition agreement dates from the early 
1970s. At that time, Sweden was hit by the oil crisis and employers and trade 
unions in the Trade and Industry sector believed that the PES could not help 
white-collar workers with job-matching in a satisfactory way. Therefore, the TRR 
transition foundation for white-collar workers was established. Collective 
agreements have a special status in Sweden, as they may replace certain 
legislation as binding law, which is common practice in Sweden. Social partners 
are willing to come to an agreement and moderate their demands to reach a 
consensus, because in the future they will meet again around the negotiating 
table. Strikes are rare in Sweden and the trade union density is high. The 
underlying principle is mutual trust.  
 
Another important explanation for the existence of the Swedish transition 
agreements is the Swedish actors’ orientation with regard to restructuring. 
Today, the Swedes, including the trade unions, realize that globalisation and 
restructuring are inevitable. They have a positive attitude towards new 
technologies and new jobs and, during the 1990s, a mental shift could be 
observed from job security to employment security. The Swedes rather protect 
people instead of jobs. The trade union for the blue-collar workers, the LO, was 
until then satisfied with the activities of the PES, but during the crisis of the early 
1990s it became clear that job losses were inevitable and job-to-job support was 
necessary. This was reason for the LO to negotiate a transition agreement for 
the blue-collar workers. Another reason was that the LO saw that the working 
method of the TRR transition foundation was much more effective than the PES 
interventions. 
 
As mentioned previously, the Austrian government and the social partners play 
a role in supporting job-to-job transitions although it can be argued that the 
labour foundations concern indirect job-to-job transitions. The role of social 
partners in this corporatist structure cannot be detached from the role of the 
state in this process. The first Austrian labour foundation was established in the 
Steel sector in 1987. The privatization and down-sizing of nationalized steel 
companies led to large scale redundancies. There was an atmosphere of fear, 
helplessness and lack of personal perspectives. Furthermore, it became clear 
that there would be no further legislation that would allow early retirement. The 
idea behind the first foundation was that money and a social plan are valuable, 
but the best help is active support into another job. Against this background, the 
works council and the manager of the steel company erected the first labour 
foundation: the VOEST-Alpine Stahlstiftung. The labour foundations evolved 
over time and are now a commonly used labour market instrument with a legal 
basis. The AMS is involved by authorizing the labour foundations and by 





contracts. In fact, the Spanish history shows that liberalising the use of 
t mporary con racts without relaxing the employment pr tection legislation for
employees wit  a perman nt contract, s resulted in a growing segmentation
of the labour market: a temporary part becoming more precarious as it grew,
while the permanent core was bec ming more secure as it shrank. On the other
ha d, in the UK, a country with a less strict employment protection regime, the
i tervi ws revealed that in response to the crisis, British trade unions, employers
nd employees have devoted themsel s to the avoidance f dismissals. This
has re ulted in prev ntative flexible measures such as wage constraints and the 
acc ptance of te porary reduct on in working hours. N vertheless, not all
British companies did succeed in refraining from forced dismissals and the
government joined in the support of redunda t mploye s via the (exp nsion of)
na io al programmes, i.e. the RRS and R2R programme. 
 
Notice period 
Another f a ur  of he institutional setting which might influence the behaviour
of actors and eventually the job-to-job polici s in a cou ry is the notice period.
The employer has to comply w th the appropriate otic  peri d when he intend
o lay off employees. When employees ar  under notice, curative job- -job
measures can be applied. The longer the duration of the notice period, the 
longer the redundant employee has the time to find another suitable job under 
the current employment conditi ns.  
The empl yer continues to pay the wage during the notice period, which 
provides the redundant employee income security during ir job search.
Taking on another job too quickly, which does ot ent rely fit the employee’s
skill  and knowledge, may eventually lead to low r productivity. Thus, the notice
period is relevant when examining job-to-j b support and r sponsibility during
the different phases in unemployment pr vention. In Sweden, th  stat tory
duration of the notic  period for employers varies fr m one month for contracts
which have lasted less han two years up o six months for c tracts with a
minimum duration of ten years, but in practice longer periods of notice are often 
agreed via collective agreements. In Austria, the notice periods differ for white-
collar workers and blue-collar workers. In the absence of an agreement, the 
blue-collar workers have a notice period of 14 days, while the notice per d for
white-collar workers is comparable with Swedish notice periods. Compared with 
Sweden and the white-collar work rs in Austria, the UK has shorter statu ory
notic periods. In the UK, a written contrac  will usually specify the notice p riod.
However, here are sta utory minimums. The employee, wh  has been
c ntinuously e loy d for one month or more, has at least ne week’s notice if
the p riod of continuous emp oym nt is less than two years. If he duration of
employment is two years or more, but less than twelve years, the notice period is
on  week for ach year of continuous employme t in this period. The notice
period is not less than twelve weeks, if the period of continuous employm nt is
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Although the Spanish trade unions have strong political power, they are not 
involved in active job-to-job transitions and they are at odds with employers’ 
associations. In 2010, this tense relationship between trade unions and 
employers’ associations resulted in a total deadlock in the negotiations on labour 
market issues and the Spanish government felt forced to intervene, proposing 
measures to reform the labour market in the summer of 2010. Hierarchical 
determination is here the observed mode of interaction. In recent years, Spain 
has been confronted with several labour market reforms and since the economic 
crisis which started in 2008, the unemployment rate has increased explosively. 
Spain is characterized by a dual labour market in which employees with a 
permanent contract are still well-protected compared with people with a 
temporary contract. For many years Spanish employers have striven for less 
rigid employment protection legislation for those with a permanent contract. 
The climate of trust between the social partners and employers’ associations is 
lacking. The lack of trust can be regarded as an explanatory variable as to why 
social partners have not collaborated in order to develop active job-to-job 
arrangements, despite the urgent labour market situation.  
There are a few examples of Spanish companies with a social plan that show that 
alternative support can be offered besides the financial compensation, but there 
is consensus among Spanish scholars that Spanish social plans have little impact 
on job-to-job transitions (Aragón Medina et al., 2010). Spanish companies with 
50 or more employees are obliged by law to draw up a social plan. However, the 
content of the average social plan is poor and is focussed on financial 
compensation rather than on active job-to-job support. In contrast to the 
Swedish practice, it seems that Spanish employees with a permanent contract 
are reluctant to make a transition to another job. It is part of the Spanish actors’ 
orientation to prefer job security rather than employment security. In general, 
employees’ representatives try to negotiate alternative measures to minimize 
the impact for the employees but, if dismissals are inevitable, the main concern 
of the employees is a high financial compensation. Furthermore, among the 
countries examined, Spain has the highest proportion of the workforce 
employed at micro and small enterprises, which are not obliged to draw up a 
social plan in the case of forced dismissals. Moreover, micro and small 
companies have no or less financial means to support redundant employees to 
another job. The majority (63.2%) of the Spanish workforce is employed in a 
company employing fewer than 50 persons. 
 
Traditionally, the system of industrial relations in the UK consists of voluntary 
relationships between social partners, with a minimal level of interference from 
the government. Although this relationship, without intervention of the state, is 
still the case in the non-legally binding nature of collective agreements, and 
trade unions and employers have little statutory involvement in public policy, 
legally established employment rights would now appear to be a permanent 
characteristic of the UK system. The collective agreements are not legally 
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binding, but the terms of collective agreements can be incorporated into 
individual contracts of employment that are then legally enforceable. An 
important feature of the UK is single-employer bargaining (Traxler, 1996). The 
position of trade unions was weakened during the 1980s and early 1990s. The 
trade union density fell from 51% in 1979 to 33% in 1995 which, according to 
Ebbinghaus and Visser, is the largest and longest decline in unionization in 
Europe of the last century (Ebbinghaus & Visser, 1999). Since the 1950s, multi-
employer bargaining has declined. This decline accelerated in the 1980s, as 
multi-employer agreements were replaced by single employer or, in some cases, 
plant-level contracts (Katz, 1993). This might explain the limited role of 
employers’ associations in supporting job-to-job transitions. 
 
The state: Government and Public Employment Service 
In general the liberal welfare regime is characterized by a central role for the 
market and a marginal role for the state, but owing to the economic downturns, 
the British government felt forced to intervene. As discussed previously, the role 
of social partners is limited in the UK. Only the state can correct labour market 
failures and the British government introduced the Rapid Response Service in 
the early 2000s and decided to expand the service in 2008. Until the introduction 
of the RRS, much of the intensive support provided by Jobcentre Plus was only 
available to people who had been unemployed for a long time. Today, the RRS 
provides for early intervention and early access to relevant support in order to 
find another job quickly. As explained previously, for British employees it is 
necessary to find another job as quickly as possible, owing to shorter notice 
periods and lower levels of income security after becoming unemployed 
compared with the other countries examined. Moreover, the economic 
downturn created a sense of urgency to invest in delivering skills, which are 
needed by recruiting employers, for those under notice. Therefore, the Skills 
Funding Agency launched the R2R programme. In the early 2000s, Task Forces 
were established to overcome difficulties in large companies or sectors, because 
actors experienced a sense of urgency. When time is at a premium actors are 
more willing to collaborate to find solutions and to mitigate the consequences.  
 
As explained previously, in the Austrian corporatist structure, the role of social 
partners cannot be detached from the role of the state. New legislation is 
developed through an intensive process of social dialogue at national level. In 
Austria, the Public Employment Service has to approve the establishment of a 
labour foundation and can be involved as a co-financer, i.e. providing benefits to 
the participants, and, if necessary, the AMS can under certain conditions co-
finance the infrastructure of the foundation. Furthermore, the Austrian Public 
Employment Service supports the (recently) unemployed in finding a new 
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Employment Service supports the (recently) unemployed in finding a new 





The Swedish government does not interfere in the transition agreements 
concluded between social partners, but this does not mean that it does not 
provide support to employees who run the risk of becoming unemployed. 
Employees who are not covered by a transition agreement and who will become 
unemployed can register at the Public Employment Service which mediates 
between jobseekers and employers. In Sweden there is a long tradition focussing 
on active labour market policies. 
 
In Spain, a clear division of responsibilities concerning active job-to-job support 
and coordination regard to job-to-job support is lacking. This might explain why 
there are no specific job-to-job policies or measures to support redundant 
employees in this Southern country. Also the government’s capabilities are 
limited. The financial situation, characterized by budget deficits and the fact that 
Spain is a country with almost three times as many inhabitants as the 
Netherlands, and five times as many as Sweden and Austria, explains why it is 
not easy to finance new policies geared towards direct job-to-job transitions. 
The size of the country and the enormous numbers of unemployed, combined 
with the fact that Spain has the fewest job openings among the countries 
examined, makes it currently difficult for the Spanish government to focus on 
direct job-to-job transitions after redundancies. All the resources, which refer to 
the actors’ capabilities and efforts, are targeted on helping the unemployed to 
find a job and not on supporting direct job-to-job transition. Thus, the Spanish 
government’s priority is on preventing long-term unemployment rather than 
supporting job-to-job transitions in the event of redundancies.  
 
Hierarchies 
Swedish companies with a transition agreement are eligible for support in job-
to-job transitions for employees to whom they have given notice. Employers 
with sufficient financial means can also decide to subcontract private 
outplacement companies. Good employership and creating goodwill in relation 
to the trade unions are motives for Swedish employers to facilitate job-to-job 
transitions for their employees. A good relationship with the trade unions, based 
on mutual trust, is necessary for the future collective bargaining process. In the 
UK, where single employer bargaining is more common than multi-employer 
bargaining, individual companies can negotiate outplacement services with their 
redundant employees. The British outplacement companies have evolved over 
recent years and companies with enough resources can outsource job-to-job 
interventions, mostly for highly-skilled senior employees, to private outplacement 
agencies.  
 
In Austria, companies can establish labour foundations in order to support 
redundant employees from job-to-job. The main reason why companies 
establish a labour foundation is that employers have certain obligations towards 
their redundant staff, which is agreed in a social plan. Furthermore, some large 
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companies envisage the labour foundation as a personnel pool. The former 
employees will be trained during their participation partly at the expense of the 
Public Employment Service. Another motive for Austrian employers to establish 
or contribute to a labour foundation is to side step the period of notice.  
 
In Spain, large companies are obliged by law to negotiate with trade unions 
about a social plan when they file for redundancy. As explained previously, the 
content of the average social plan is poor and focussed on financial compensation 
rather than on active job-to-job support. Spanish companies do not feel 
responsible for job-to-job transitions and, in general, employees’ representatives 
try to negotiate alternative measures to minimize the impact for the employees. 
However, Spanish employees still focus on financial compensation. The 
consequences of unemployment are collectivised and set aside for the state and 
the social security system. Moreover, the use of outplacement services by 
companies is not widespread in Spain, because private employment agencies 




Networks of individual companies which collaborate to support redundant 
employees from job-to-job are not noticeable in the countries studied. However, 
in Austria networks of firms exist which are focused on training, not specifically 
on job-to-job transitions. In these, so-called Qualifizierungsverbünde, companies 
share the costs of training and they outsource the training activities to private 
suppliers. The sectoral and regional labour foundations can also be considered as 
networks in which different actors collaborate. 
The British Rapid Response Service, the Local Employment Partnerships and the 
Task Forces can also be envisaged as networks. In these British partnerships a 
pluriformity of many different actors participates. The RRS network on a local 
level consists of more different organisations rather than solely employers.  
 
Market 
British companies, mostly large companies with enough financial means, 
outsource outplacement services to private suppliers, particularly for highly-
skilled workers employed in higher positions. The UK has an open and liberal 
policy towards private recruitment and outplacement agencies. This liberal 
attitude explains why private market actors are able to provide job-to-job 
support. In Austria some large companies support private outplacement services 
to their redundant employees, but this is not a widespread phenomenon. This 
can be explained by the fact that companies can establish a labour foundation or 
become a member of an existing labour foundation. Another possibility in 
Austria for downsizing companies is to contact non-profit temporary work 
agencies to re-employ their workers. Furthermore, the Austrian Public 
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twelve months of unemployment, the case management for the British 
unemployed lies with the Jobcentre Plus. After twelve months, the responsibility 
is handed over to the private sector.  
 
For a long time, in Sweden and Spain, private employment agencies were 
forbidden, or were not allowed to cooperate with the Public Employment 
Service. Nowadays, the Public Employment Service in Sweden contracts private 
companies, for example for coaching activities, but this outsourcing process to 
private suppliers is still in its infancy. Some transition foundations outsource job-
to-job support to private suppliers, while other foundations organize the support 
in house, e.g. with job coaches. The recent Spanish labour market reform of 
2010, includes the possibility for private profit employment agencies to 
cooperate with the Public Employment Service, which was prohibited before. It 
remains to be seen how this collaboration will evolve in the near future. 
 
9.2.3 Policies 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the main focus of this thesis is on the curative 
element, i.e. systems and measures geared towards direct job-to-job transitions 
in the event of redundancy (see phase three in figure 1.2 in Chapter 1). During 
the interviews preventative unemployment measures were also mentioned, 
such as education, training, and the reduction of working hours. It should be 
emphasized that the preventative measures and curative measures are 
interdependent. For instance, investments in education and training in order to 
achieve more functional flexibility in the company will subsequently also 
contribute to smoother transitions from job-to-job in the event of redundancy.  
 
Type of support 
One of the findings from the empirical research is that the active support 
provided to employees who have lost their jobs, is similar in the countries 
examined. The support offered includes e.g. professional orientation, job 
coaching, education and (re)-training, practical training, internships, and active 
job search support. However, the manner in which the support is organized, 
delivered, coordinated and financed differs. Furthermore, differences can be 
observed in the coverage and the eligibility of the job-to-job transitions support 
and the time at which the support is provided.  
 
In Spain there are no specific policies or measures to support redundant 
employees from job-to-job. Once a redundant employee is unemployed, the 
Spanish Public Employment Service is the key actor in helping the unemployed 
to find a new job. However, during the economic crisis the Public Employment 
Service is fully stretched in providing unemployment benefits and has fewer 
resources and less capacity to offer active job-to-job support. In general, the 
Spanish labour market policies are focussed on supporting the unemployed to 
work, which currently is a big challenge because the unemployment rate has 
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more than doubled since 2008. The national Tripartite Training Foundation can 
be considered as a preventative measure. This foundation facilitates training 
opportunities for employees to improve their skills and provides financial 
support to companies and their employees, including those with a fixed-term 
contract, who want to follow training courses and education.  
 
In all the countries scrutinized, severance pay is provided to redundant 
employees, although the duration and the level of the severance pay vary. The 
reform of the Austrian severance pay system is interesting to mention, because 
Spain wants to adopt this system. However, it remains unclear whether and how 
Spanish employers’ associations and trade unions will implement this system 
which is proposed by the Spanish government. The Austrian severance system 
was reformed in 2003. The debate about the severance reform had already 
started in the 1990s and several arguments for the reform can be distinguished: 
the low coverage of the previous system, the loss of entitlements when an 
employee voluntarily terminated the employment contract and, from the 
employers’ perspective, the high severance costs. The underlying goals of the 
new law were to enhance mobility, to address liquidity problems, to extend 
severance pay entitlements, and to extend the second pension pillar which was 
underdeveloped.  
 
The Swedish system focuses on early job-to-job transition support; especially in 
sectors where transition agreements are established. Some Swedish transition 
agreements offer support even before employees have been given notice. Early 
support is also an important feature of the British model, which is organized 
through the Rapid Response Service.  
 
Eligibility 
In Sweden and Austria small companies can participate in, respectively, the 
transition agreements and the labour foundations. With a newly reached 
agreement in the Swedish municipal sector, the majority of all Swedish 
employees with a permanent contract will be covered by a transition agreement 
as from 1 January 2012. Swedish employees with a temporary contract are not 
eligible for job-to-job transition. Furthermore, in the past job-losses at small 
companies in the UK remained unnoticed but, since October 2009, the Jobcentre 
Plus has collaborated with the Insolvency Trade Body R3 and the Insolvency 
Service to share information about possible job losses in struggling companies.  
 
Financing 
The first Swedish transition agreement dates from 1974 and the transition 
foundations are financed via a certain percentage of the wage bill. This implies 
that in prosperous periods money is saved in the fund and, once the tide turns, 
the means are immediately available in order to support the redundant 
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In Sweden and Austria small companies can participate in, respectively, the 
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Financing 
The first Swedish transition agreement dates from 1974 and the transition 
foundations are financed via a certain percentage of the wage bill. This implies 
that in prosperous periods money is saved in the fund and, once the tide turns, 
the means are immediately available in order to support the redundant 
employees quickly.  
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In the UK the government introduced programmes to provide early job-to-job 
support in the event of the market failing. The RRS and R2R programmes do not 
have a structural funding and are financed through the budgets of the national 
government and additional sources from the European Social Fund.  
 
The way the Austrian labour foundations are financed is discussed and negotiated 
between the actors involved and depends on the type of foundation. Given the 
corporatist structure, it is not surprising that social partners and the state are 
involved by the establishing and financing of the labour foundations. With the 
severance reform of 2003, the direct payment of severance pay from employer to 
employee, at the end of the employment contract, was abolished and replaced by 
a monthly employers’ contribution of employees’ gross wage in an employee 
provision fund. When an employment relationship is terminated the employees 
are entitled to the capital accumulated in their individual account. 
 
In Spain there are no active job-to-job measures. The national Tripartite Training 
Foundation can be considered to be a preventive measure. This foundation 
facilitates training opportunities for employees to improve their skills and 
provides financial support to companies and their employees, including those 
with a fixed-term contract, who want to follow training courses and education. 
Both Spanish employers and employees contribute financially to the national 
Tripartite Training Foundation.  
 
Responsibility and delivery 
In Sweden job-to-job arrangements are mainly organized and coordinated 
through transition agreements reached by trade unions and employers’ 
associations, but individual firms, the Public Employment Service and the private 
market also provide job-to-job support to redundant employees in order to find a 
new job quickly. Collective transition agreements have been reached without 
interference of the government. Thus, Swedish trade unions, employers’ 
associations and individual employers play an important role in guaranteeing new 
employment opportunities for workers whose jobs are at risk. This could be 
expected given the strong role of trade unions and employers’ associations in 
the Swedish labour market, which is explained by a high trade union density. 
Furthermore, the institutional setting leaves room for collective agreements to 
deviate from legislation. The transition foundations deliver the active job-to-job 
support, although the manner in which the active support is organised varies 
between the transition foundations. 
 
Whereas trade unions and employers’ association are important in the Swedish 
job-to job model, in the UK the state, the Public Employment Service, and 
individual, mostly large, companies play a dominant role in supporting 
redundant employees into a new job. The role of trade unions in the redundancy 
process is concentrated on trying to stop the redundancy happening in the first 
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place and, if forced dismissals are inevitable, most unions will campaign strongly 
for a voluntary severance package, which should be more than the statutory 
minimum, to be in place. Their role with regard to job-to-job transitions is 
limited and they try to press the government for intervention. During the 1980s 
and early 1990s the role of trade unions was weakened. Compared with Sweden, 
the trade union density in the UK is rather low, which might explain the limited 
role of trade unions in the job-to-job approach. The role of employers’ 
associations is also rather limited and can be explained by the lack of multi-
employer bargaining. However, individual firms, predominantly large firms with 
sufficient financial means, outsource job-to-job support to private organisations 
which offer outplacement services. These outplacement services have evolved 
over recent years, but tend to be offered to senior highly skilled workers who 
have to leave the company. Although traditionally state intervention is limited in 
this liberal country, the British government introduced several programmes to 
support redundant employees in finding another job. The most important 
reason for the introduction of these programmes has been to correct labour 
market failures. Jobcentre Plus is an executive agency, the Public Employment 
Service of the Department of Work and Pensions and responsible for a wide 
range of policies to support the transition from unemployment to employment, 
including the RRS. The Skills Funding Agency is an agency of the Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills and allocates funding for basic skills programmes 
to Jobcentre Plus customers, including redundant employees, and employers in 
the local economy. The Skills Funding Agency is responsible for the R2R 
programme, but outsources the activities to training suppliers. Generally, two 
training providers per region are contracted to provide the requested training. 
 
In Austria, job-to-job support is considered to be a shared responsibility between 
the state and social partners. The Austrian Public Employment Service AMS 
supports the recently unemployed to find a new job quickly. The role of social 
partners in the Austrian job-to-job model cannot be detached from the role of 
the state in this process. As explained previously, in this corporatist structure the 
social partners are strongly involved in the law and labour market policy making 
process and are represented in committees and boards at all levels of the Public 
Employment Service. Thus, it can be expected that the Austrian government 
and the social partners share the responsibility for coordinating and delivering 
support in order to find a job as soon as possible.  
 
A clear division of responsibilities concerning active job-to-job support and 
coordination with regard to job-to-job support is lacking in Spain. This might 
explain why there are no specific job-to-job policies or measures to support 
redundant employees in this Southern country. However, the financial situation, 
which is characterized by budget deficits and the fact that Spain is a country with 
almost three times as many inhabitants as the Netherlands and five times as 
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new policies geared towards direct job-to-job transitions. Apparently, the 
priority of the government lies with supporting the transitions from 




Performance refers to the evaluation of the programmatic outcomes of policy 
choices and practices. To be more specific, performance is the result of the 
combination of the institutional setting, actors’ orientations and capabilities, 
actors’ constellation and modes of interaction and the implemented policies, 
including the type of support, eligibility, financing and responsibility. As explained 
in Chapter 1, an in-depth evaluation by the author of the policies and measures 
taken by the government and other actors in the countries studied is not feasible 
within the framework and time span of this dissertation. Nevertheless, in this 
study the question is asked as to whether or not the observed job-to-job 
systems, arrangements or measures are successful in practice. To answer this 
question, available secondary data and additional literature provided by the 
interviewees were examined.  
 
In Sweden and the UK there are no overall comprehensive independent studies 
available on the effectiveness of the job-to-job system or arrangements 
examined. Explanations for the lack of these overall studies are the lack of time 
and financial resources to conduct the study.  
There are hardly any overall data available on the fate of redundant Swedish 
employees. The general impression is that around 80% of the dismissed employ-
ees find new jobs within a period of nine months. In Sweden a committee of 
inquiry was installed to organize the knowledge and experience concerning the 
transition agreements, but the evidence available regarding the performance of 
these agreements was insufficient to meet the requirements of scientific quality. 
In this study the results of two transition foundations, TSL and TRR, were scru-
tinized. The figures provided by the TSL foundation show that 70% of the TSL 
participants who left the foundation between September 2008 and September 
2009 found another job and 8% started a course of study. The figures provided 
by TRR show that 76% of the participants who left the TRR foundation in 2009 
found a new job, 8% started their own business and 7% started a course. 
However, it is very difficult to generalize these findings and to draw overall con-
clusions about the effectiveness of the Swedish transition foundations, because 
the conditions for support and the way the foundations are organized vary to a 
large extent. The assessment of the performance of the British governmental 
job-to-job programmes is also difficult. More than 5,000 employers accepted 
RRS support from Jobcentre Plus between November 2008 and September 
2010. However, Jobcentre Plus does not systematically record information on 
numbers of employees who are given advice or the job outcomes through the 
RRS. The reason for this is that it would be too expensive to gather this data.  
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The performance of the Austrian labour foundations was examined more closely 
in 2005, and revealed that 67% of the participants who left an outplacement 
foundation were (almost) fully employed in the labour market one year after 
they left the foundation. However, this study did not take into account the net 
effects of the labour foundations’ interventions. In 2008, in a study by Linz 
University, the researchers evaluated the effects of the interventions for the 
participation in the Elektra Bregenz labour foundation and compared the results 
with a control group. 75% of the participants in the Elektra Bregenz labour 
foundation were employed three months after the intervention, whereas 49% of 
the control group was again employed after three months. However, the Elektra 
Bregenz foundation is just one of many foundations in Austria. Like the Swedish 
transition agreements, the organisation of the labour foundations varies to a 
large extent which makes it difficult to draw conclusions about their overall 
performance.  
 
One interviewee explicitly mentioned that the previous Austrian labour 
foundations’ success rates are an important reason for current companies to 
establish a labour foundation. These success rates are not only important for the 
management of the companies and the redundant employees, but also for 
colleagues who are not declared redundant. In restructuring phases the possible 
participation of redundant colleagues in a labour foundation ease the conscience 
of employees who are not supernumerary. It creates ‘peace’ on the work floor.  
 
The lack of an employment security system in Spain also explains the lack of 
evaluation reports about the performance of job-to-job support.  
 
Summarized overview of the explanations concerning the status quo of 
employment security systems in the countries scrutinized 
In this section the similarities and differences in employment security systems 
have been explained. It can be concluded that in Sweden the negotiated 
transition agreements are an important mode of interaction in the Swedish job-
to-job system. In general, Swedish employers’ organisations and trade unions 
play an important role in regulating the labour market. The collective agree-
ments may even deviate from Swedish law and regulations. Given the strong 
role of Swedish employers’ and employees’ representatives in regulating the 
labour market, and the high trade union density, it is not surprising that they are 
also involved in shaping transition agreements. Such agreements do not exist in 
the other countries examined. One of the main explanatory variables for the 
establishment of the transitions agreements relates to the actors’ orientations. 
The Swedish view of both trade unions and employers’ associations is that 
people should be protected rather than jobs. The modes of interaction between 
trade unions and employers’ associations result in negotiated agreements in 
order to enhance job-to-job mobility in the event of redundancy. Social partners 
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they left the foundation. However, this study did not take into account the net 
effects of the labour foundations’ interventions. In 2008, in a study by Linz 
University, the researchers evaluated the effects of the interventions for the 
participation in the Elektra Bregenz labour foundation and compared the results 
with a control group. 75% of the participants in the Elektra Bregenz labour 
foundation were employed three months after the intervention, whereas 49% of 
the control group was again employed after three months. However, the Elektra 
Bregenz foundation is just one of many foundations in Austria. Like the Swedish 
transition agreements, the organisation of the labour foundations varies to a 
large extent which makes it difficult to draw conclusions about their overall 
performance.  
 
One interviewee explicitly mentioned that the previous Austrian labour 
foundations’ success rates are an important reason for current companies to 
establish a labour foundation. These success rates are not only important for the 
management of the companies and the redundant employees, but also for 
colleagues who are not declared redundant. In restructuring phases the possible 
participation of redundant colleagues in a labour foundation ease the conscience 
of employees who are not supernumerary. It creates ‘peace’ on the work floor.  
 
The lack of an employment security system in Spain also explains the lack of 
evaluation reports about the performance of job-to-job support.  
 
Summarized overview of the explanations concerning the status quo of 
employment security systems in the countries scrutinized 
In this section the similarities and differences in employment security systems 
have been explained. It can be concluded that in Sweden the negotiated 
transition agreements are an important mode of interaction in the Swedish job-
to-job system. In general, Swedish employers’ organisations and trade unions 
play an important role in regulating the labour market. The collective agree-
ments may even deviate from Swedish law and regulations. Given the strong 
role of Swedish employers’ and employees’ representatives in regulating the 
labour market, and the high trade union density, it is not surprising that they are 
also involved in shaping transition agreements. Such agreements do not exist in 
the other countries examined. One of the main explanatory variables for the 
establishment of the transitions agreements relates to the actors’ orientations. 
The Swedish view of both trade unions and employers’ associations is that 
people should be protected rather than jobs. The modes of interaction between 
trade unions and employers’ associations result in negotiated agreements in 
order to enhance job-to-job mobility in the event of redundancy. Social partners 
are willing to come to an agreement and moderate their demands to reach a 
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consensus, because in the future they will meet again around the negotiating 
table. If a collective agreement is in force, both the trade unions and the 
employers maintain industrial peace. If there is no collective agreement, the 
trade union has the freedom to take industrial action, but in Sweden industrial 
action is rare because the trade unions realize that globalisation and 
restructuring is an inevitable change.  
 
In contrast to the Swedish practice, British social partners play a limited role in 
the job-to-job process. The position of British trade unions weakened during the 
1980s and early 1990s, and currently the British trade unions density is low, 
certainly in comparison with Sweden. This implies that the capabilities of British 
trade union are lower compared with the Swedish trade unions. The limited role 
of employers’ associations in supporting job-to-job transitions can be explained 
by the decline of multi-employer bargaining. Today, an important feature of the 
UK is single-employer bargaining. In general the liberal welfare regime is 
characterized by a central role of the market and a marginal role of the state. 
However, owing to economic downturns and the fact that the there is no similar 
mode of interaction between trade unions and employers’ association regarding 
job-to-job transitions, the British government has introduced programmes to 
cope with labour market failures. 
 
The Austrian government, the Public Employment Service AMS, and indirectly 
also the social partners, play the main role in supporting people from job-to-job 
in the event of redundancy, which could be expected given the corporatist 
structure of this country. The role of social partners cannot be detached from the 
role of the state in this process. The social partners are represented in 
committees and boards at all levels of the AMS and are strongly involved in the 
law and labour market policy making process. The actors’ view in the Austrian 
labour foundation approach is that money and a social plan are valuable, but the 
best help is active support into another job. The first labour foundations were 
established by large companies as a result of the privatization and down-sizing 
of nationalized steel companies, which led to large scale redundancies in the 
1980s. At that time, there was an atmosphere of fear, helplessness and lack of 
personal perspective, and further legislation that would allow early retirement 
was not expected. The labour foundations evolved over time and are currently a 
commonly used labour market instrument in Austria. However, it can be argued 
that the labour foundations observed concern indirect job-to-job transitions.  
 
Spain is characterized by the absence of active job-to-job policies and support. 
The modes of interaction which could result in policies with regard to job-to-job 
is lacking between Spanish trade unions and employers’ associations. The 
relationship between trade unions and employers’ associations is tense and 
mutual trust is lacking, while a constructive dialogue is necessary to develop job- 
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to-job policies. Furthermore, the trade unions and employees’ orientation is still 
focussed on job security rather than on employment security. 
Owing to the severe economic labour market situation, the Spanish government 
felt forced to intervene and announced labour market reforms in the summer of 
2010. Thus, instead of negotiated agreements, the main modes of interaction in 
Spain can be best described as hierarchical determination. Subsequently, it is up 
to trade unions and employers’ associations to implement further the measures 
taken by the government. If the social partners do not pull in the same direction 
the question remains as to whether implementation occurs in an effective way. 
The Spanish government’s priority is to support the unemployed to find a job, 
instead of supporting direct job-to-job transitions. Preventing long-term 
unemployment is currently quite a challenge given the severe labour market 
situation in Spain. For many years, the Spanish labour market was strongly 
regulated, but deregulation through allowing temporary employment has 
generated important inequalities, with a lot of protection for permanent 
employees and more precarious jobs for temporary employees. For many years 
Spain has fought duality in the labour market.  
 
9.3 Policy learning in the realm of employment security systems 
 
One of the objectives of this study is to address possible lessons the Netherlands 
can learn from foreign job-to-job systems or arrangements. The Dutch 
perspective forms the basis for this study. The reason for this choice is that the 
present study is part of a large-scale research programme on employment 
security, which is financed by the Dutch organisation Stichting Instituut Gak. 
This research programme comprises seven separate studies on employment 
security. This study is one of these seven studies and aims to answer the 
question: What, from a Dutch policy perspective, can be learned from ‘employ-
ment security’ arrangements or systems in other European countries? This 
question is easily raised, but is difficult to answer. Countries can and do learn, 
but what is learned, to what effect, by whom and how, is difficult to establish. 
Based on a close study of the existing literature, the conclusion can be drawn 
that in the academic world there is no shortage of theorizing about the concepts 
of policy learning, lesson drawing and policy transfer. A pitfall is the casual inter-
changeability of the terms. This study looks at employment security systems in 
other European countries, seeking to learn lessons from a cross-national 
perspective. There is a clear distinction between policy learning and policy 
transfer. Lesson drawing can lead to policy change, but this is not always the 
case. Thus, policy learning and cross-national policy transfer has to be seen in the 
light of two separate processes. However, these concepts are immediately seen 
to be linked. Both are elements of the concept of lesson drawing. The analysis 
and conclusions drawn in this dissertation are limited to the policy learning 
aspect. Whether or not a lesson should and could be adapted or transferred (or 
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to-job policies. Furthermore, the trade unions and employees’ orientation is still 
focussed on job security rather than on employment security. 
Owing to the severe economic labour market situation, the Spanish government 
felt forced to intervene and announced labour market reforms in the summer of 
2010. Thus, instead of negotiated agreements, the main modes of interaction in 
Spain can be best described as hierarchical determination. Subsequently, it is up 
to trade unions and employers’ associations to implement further the measures 
taken by the government. If the social partners do not pull in the same direction 
the question remains as to whether implementation occurs in an effective way. 
The Spanish government’s priority is to support the unemployed to find a job, 
instead of supporting direct job-to-job transitions. Preventing long-term 
unemployment is currently quite a challenge given the severe labour market 
situation in Spain. For many years, the Spanish labour market was strongly 
regulated, but deregulation through allowing temporary employment has 
generated important inequalities, with a lot of protection for permanent 
employees and more precarious jobs for temporary employees. For many years 
Spain has fought duality in the labour market.  
 
9.3 Policy learning in the realm of employment security systems 
 
One of the objectives of this study is to address possible lessons the Netherlands 
can learn from foreign job-to-job systems or arrangements. The Dutch 
perspective forms the basis for this study. The reason for this choice is that the 
present study is part of a large-scale research programme on employment 
security, which is financed by the Dutch organisation Stichting Instituut Gak. 
This research programme comprises seven separate studies on employment 
security. This study is one of these seven studies and aims to answer the 
question: What, from a Dutch policy perspective, can be learned from ‘employ-
ment security’ arrangements or systems in other European countries? This 
question is easily raised, but is difficult to answer. Countries can and do learn, 
but what is learned, to what effect, by whom and how, is difficult to establish. 
Based on a close study of the existing literature, the conclusion can be drawn 
that in the academic world there is no shortage of theorizing about the concepts 
of policy learning, lesson drawing and policy transfer. A pitfall is the casual inter-
changeability of the terms. This study looks at employment security systems in 
other European countries, seeking to learn lessons from a cross-national 
perspective. There is a clear distinction between policy learning and policy 
transfer. Lesson drawing can lead to policy change, but this is not always the 
case. Thus, policy learning and cross-national policy transfer has to be seen in the 
light of two separate processes. However, these concepts are immediately seen 
to be linked. Both are elements of the concept of lesson drawing. The analysis 
and conclusions drawn in this dissertation are limited to the policy learning 
aspect. Whether or not a lesson should and could be adapted or transferred (or 
not) to the Netherlands is another fundamental question. Answering this 
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question requires a political position and feasibility studies which are outside the 
scope of this thesis. 
 
In the literature different levels of policy learning are addressed. For instance, 
Rose distinguishes seven ways of drawing a lesson: photocopying, copying, 
adaptation, hybrid, synthesis, disciplined inspiration and selective imitation 
(Rose, 2005). In my view Rose’s degrees of drawing a lesson also include a 
transfer aspect. The Danish researcher, Ilsøe, describes several dimensions of 
cross national policy transfer and, although she does not make a clear distinction 
between policy learning and policy transfer, the dimensions are relevant for the 
policy learning process. Ilsøe argues that policy transfer includes more than 
policy aspects, e.g. policy goals, administrative instruments or government 
structures (Ilsøe, 2010). 
 
In order to infer lessons for the Netherlands it is important to understand how 
the Dutch job-to-job approach is organized. Then possible omissions or weak 
points in the system could be identified which gives us input for possible lesson 
drawing. 
With regard to the organisation of job-to-job support, the conclusion can be 
drawn that compared with Sweden the Netherlands has no ‘systematic’ or 
structural approach. Thus, the Swedish adjustment agreements make it possible 
to take action immediately when the company is in poor circumstances, while, in 
the Netherlands time elapses to establish social plans once a company is 
confronted with collective dismissals. The role of trade unions in the Netherlands 
is less powerful compared with Sweden. This can be explained by the lower 
trade union density. 
 
In the Netherlands job-to-job support is provided on an ad hoc basis via social 
plans, experiments, or temporary measures introduced by the government. 
Social partners can agree collective agreements and social plans, but their role is 
not as strong as that of the Swedish trade unions and employers’ associations. 
Although the methods of organising job-to-job transitions can be agreed in 
social plans; this does not automatically mean that Dutch employees know what 
they can expect from their employers. Dutch SMEs neither have social plans, nor 
the financial means to set up a mobility centre or to provide active job-to-job 
support. In the Netherlands there is a greater chance of receiving job-to-job 
support while working in a large company rather than being employed at a small 
company. Thus, in the Netherlands it tends to be that employees working in 
large companies are more privileged with regard to job-to-job support. 
Generally, when a restructuring process takes place in large firms a social plan is 
established, which is not common in small companies.  
 
Moreover, in the Netherlands, networks of individual firms emerged as a 
response to the Gatekeeper Act which came into force in 2002. On the basis of 
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this law employers have to continue paying the salary of the employee during 
the first two years of sickness or (temporary) disability. Many employers were 
not entirely satisfied with the support offered by private professional service 
providers and the help from governmental public institutions. Therefore, in 
some regions employers joined forces and established the so-called 
Gatekeepers’ Centres. These networks for and by employers came into being in 
order to help each other in re-integrating sick employees. The established 
networks are currently also used for providing smooth job-to-job transitions in 
the event of redundancy as a response to the economic downturn. The 
establishment of these networks was not foreseen, but resulted from changes in 
the institutional setting. These Dutch networks of firms which help each other 
with HRM activities are unique and based upon a mutual (financial) interest. In 
the other countries scrutinized, similar networks in which companies collaborate 
to relocate redundant employees, were not observed. 
 
The Dutch government introduced several initiatives, e.g. the 33 temporary 
Mobility Centres, to support job-to-job transitions by virtue of the economic 
downturn which started in 2008. Both public and private stakeholders (local 
authorities, employers and UWV WERKbedrijf) collaborate in these centres. 
Furthermore, in 2010 the Dutch government allocated funding for nine job-to-job 
experiments in which they want to stimulate employers and employees to take 
up the responsibility for job-to-job transitions. Currently, an evaluation study is 
being conducted in the Netherlands regarding the nine job-to-job experiments 
and the results will be available in the summer of 2012. In 2009, the Dutch 
Mobility Centres supported 13,000 redundant employees to another job without 
a spell of unemployment. However, it is not easy to study and assess the net 
effects of the interventions. This requires an in-depth evaluation study with a 
control group.  
 
All in all, the Netherlands has a variety of coordination mechanisms which play a 
role in the job-to-job system, but there is no structural approach in which the 
support and the financing is geared to one another. The Dutch job-to-job 
support can be characterized as fragmented and ambivalent. Although the 
participants in the expert meeting agreed that job-to-job support should be 
provided to those who really need it, yet no Dutch actor takes the full 
responsibility for coordinating this support. The role of the Dutch government 
can be considered as ambivalent. On the one hand, owing to the crisis, the Dutch 
government invested in temporary Mobility Centres and in job-to-job 
experiments in order to stimulate social partners and other organisations to 
collaborate, while on the other hand the government announced major cutbacks 
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Gatekeepers’ Centres. These networks for and by employers came into being in 
order to help each other in re-integrating sick employees. The established 
networks are currently also used for providing smooth job-to-job transitions in 
the event of redundancy as a response to the economic downturn. The 
establishment of these networks was not foreseen, but resulted from changes in 
the institutional setting. These Dutch networks of firms which help each other 
with HRM activities are unique and based upon a mutual (financial) interest. In 
the other countries scrutinized, similar networks in which companies collaborate 
to relocate redundant employees, were not observed. 
 
The Dutch government introduced several initiatives, e.g. the 33 temporary 
Mobility Centres, to support job-to-job transitions by virtue of the economic 
downturn which started in 2008. Both public and private stakeholders (local 
authorities, employers and UWV WERKbedrijf) collaborate in these centres. 
Furthermore, in 2010 the Dutch government allocated funding for nine job-to-job 
experiments in which they want to stimulate employers and employees to take 
up the responsibility for job-to-job transitions. Currently, an evaluation study is 
being conducted in the Netherlands regarding the nine job-to-job experiments 
and the results will be available in the summer of 2012. In 2009, the Dutch 
Mobility Centres supported 13,000 redundant employees to another job without 
a spell of unemployment. However, it is not easy to study and assess the net 
effects of the interventions. This requires an in-depth evaluation study with a 
control group.  
 
All in all, the Netherlands has a variety of coordination mechanisms which play a 
role in the job-to-job system, but there is no structural approach in which the 
support and the financing is geared to one another. The Dutch job-to-job 
support can be characterized as fragmented and ambivalent. Although the 
participants in the expert meeting agreed that job-to-job support should be 
provided to those who really need it, yet no Dutch actor takes the full 
responsibility for coordinating this support. The role of the Dutch government 
can be considered as ambivalent. On the one hand, owing to the crisis, the Dutch 
government invested in temporary Mobility Centres and in job-to-job 
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CONCLUSIONS 
316
UWV WERKbedrijf is confronted with a cutback in the expenditure of EUR 450 
million.145 Certainly, this will have an effect on the services provided to redundant 
employees, the unemployed and employers. Unemployment benefit recipients 
will receive e-coaching between the third and twelfth month of unemployment. 
Face to face contact will be limited to those unemployed who have great 
difficulties in entering the labour market. The government considers collaborat-
ion with employers as important. Municipalities and UWV WERKbedrijf 
collaborate in so-called ‘Werkpleinen’ to provide integrated services to employers 
and the unemployed. Currently, there are 100 Werkpleinen, but the result of the 
cutbacks will be that UWV WERKbedrijf will be present at 30 Werkpleinen in the 
near future. At present the 33 Mobility Centres which were introduced by the 
government as a response to the crisis are also located at the Werkpleinen.  
The institutional setting might influence the behaviour of actors and eventually 
the emergence of job-to-job policies in a country. The employment protection 
legislation in the Netherlands is stricter than in the UK and less strict compared 
with Spain. The notice period which Dutch employers should take into account 
depends on the duration of the employment contract. The statutory notice 
period varies from one month for employment contracts which have lasted less 
than five years and four months for contracts which have lasted 15 years or 
longer. It is possible to deviate from the statutory notice period via stipulations 
in collective agreements, but the minimum duration of the notice period should 
at least be one month. Furthermore, the Netherlands has a well-developed 
unemployment insurance. The OECD replacement rate (RR) is an indicator 
which can be used to compare benefit levels between countries and measures 
the proportion of expected income from work which is replaced by 
unemployment and related welfare benefits. The overall average of the Dutch 
net replacement rate during the initial phase of unemployment is the highest 
among the countries examined. This means that income security is guaranteed 
for a certain period of time in the event of redundancy. Furthermore, the 
maximum duration of the Dutch extended unemployment benefit is 3 years and 
2 months, while in the other countries examined the maximum duration varies 
from 182 days up to 2 years. However, this does not mean that all redundant 
employees are eligible for the maximum duration of the unemployment 
insurance. Thus, compared with the other countries, the Netherlands has a good 
safety net during the initial phase of unemployment. 
 
Based on the data gathered in the countries examined, I inferred eleven possible 
lessons or inspiring elements for the Netherlands. The criteria for the selection of 
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these lessons are based on possible omissions or weak elements in the Dutch 
job-to-job system. The role of Dutch social partners in supporting job-to-job 
transitions is limited, certainly in comparison with the Swedish case.  
 
In Sweden and the UK early intervention is considered as one of the success 
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period of notice. The UK has developed a system in which information is shared 
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end of 2011, will result in the abolition of the re-integration budget for those who 
receive an unemployment insurance benefit. Furthermore, the service provided 
will be limited to e-coaching for those persons who are unemployed for three to 
twelve months. Thus, in the near future, it appears that the Dutch government 
will no longer invest in early intervention for the recently unemployed. 
 
Another weak point in the Netherlands is the manner in which job-to-job 
support is financed. There is no structural means of financing as there is in the 
Swedish case. Swedish employers pay a certain percentage of the wage bill to a 
mutual fund: the transition foundation. In the good years money is saved, which 
can be used in the event of redundancies. Furthermore, we observe differences 
in the target group for job-to-job support in the countries examined. As 
mentioned previously, in the Netherlands the common practice is that 
employees with a permanent contract employed in large firms are more 
privileged regarding the chance of receiving job-to-job support. In Austria, the 
severance pay system was reformed and a new contribution based system of 
portable individual saving accounts was introduced. In the Netherlands, the 
severance pay system is based on the traditional relationship between a single 
employer and the employee. Furthermore, in some Austrian labour foundations 
solidarity contributions exist which are paid by colleague employees who are not 
made redundant. This is not common in the Netherlands. 
 
In addition, a lesson the Netherlands can draw from the Spanish experience is 
that trust and social dialogue are key factors in stimulating job-to-job 
transitions. The Spanish case also demonstrates the effects of deregulation and 
flexibilisation of the labour market: a dual labour market with a lot of security for 
employees with a permanent contract and precarious jobs for those with a 
limited duration contract. Thus, the Netherlands and other countries can learn 
from the failures experienced in (re)-organizing the Spanish labour market. 
 
In order to assess and validate the lessons inferred, these lessons were presented 
to and discussed with an expert group. Representatives of trade unions, 
employers, private organisations, ministries and scholars participated in the 
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according to the following scale: 
1. Not interesting; do not transfer this lesson to the Netherlands; 
2. Interesting, but the Netherlands already pays enough attention to this (not a 
lesson); 
3. Interesting lesson, the Netherlands can use this element as a source of 
inspiration in the further development of job-to-job transition policy; 
4. Interesting lesson, the Netherlands should adopt this element, adapted to 
the Dutch context; 
5. Interesting lesson, the Netherlands should copy this element. 
 
The possible lessons inferred by the author and the assessment by the Dutch 
experts are summarized in table 9.1.  
 
Table 9.1: Summarized overview of possible lessons for the Netherlands inferred by 
the author from the examined countries and the assessment by the Dutch experts 
 Lessons from foreign countries Average  Standard 
deviation 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 Start early intervention (as from the moment of 
given notice) 3.71 1.22 1 2 1 6 4 
2 Provide active support and take care of 
psychological support (shock of losing your job) 
3.36 0.72 0 2 5 7 0 
3 Take care of short duration education/training 
targeted on future employers’ needs  3.14 1.41 3 1 4 3 3 
4 Develop a structural job-to-job system for all types 
of employees 3.57 0.82 0 1 6 5 2 
5 Develop a structural job-to-job system for all types 
of companies/employers  
3.07 1.1 2 1 6 4 1 
6 Let employer contribute financially to a fund via a 
certain percentage over the wage bill in a job-to-job 
fund  
3.43 0.9 1 0 6 6 1 
7 Provide for an employability backpack severance 
pay 
3.64 0.89 1 0 3 9 1 
8 Introduce a solidarity contribution by colleague 
employees for job-to-job support  3 1.36 4 0 3 6 1 
9 Take care of a more active role by trade unions and 
employers’ organisations regarding job-to-job 
support  
3.86 1.12 1 1 1 7 4 
10  Develop an information system regarding possible 
job losses  2 1.13 6 4 3 0 1 
11 Public actors take the lead in job-to job transition 
support, if necessary private actors will be involved 1.71 0.88 7 5 1 1 0 
 
In the second part of the expert meeting the Dutch experts were asked to 
propose ideas for enhancing job-to-job transitions in the event of redundancy. 
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Subsequently, the participants were asked to assess these proposals. From table 
9.1 and the discussion in the second part of the expert meeting, the conclusion 
can be drawn that there is no divergence of view among the Dutch labour 
market actors with regard to the lessons the Netherlands can draw from the 
countries studied: begin early intervention for those who need it, introduce a 
structural system for all types of employees, including for workers who are not 
covered by a social plan or who do not work for a fixed employer, and including 
those employed in small companies. In 2004, the IWI had already concluded that 
the former job-to-job experiment was not effective, because the available 
means were used for redundant employees who could find a job on their own, 
while employees who needed the support were left outside the experiment. At 
that time the experiment was abolished, instead of expanded to a wider target 
group.  
Apparently, the view to include workers employed in small companies or who 
are not covered by a social plan in the employment security system still holds 
true. Thus, the question remains as to which Dutch actor(s) will take up the 
responsibility for the job-to-job support for those who are yet not covered. In the 
future, social partners could take up this responsibility or there may be a role 
given for UWV WERKbedrijf. 
 
The possibility to do a work placement or apprenticeships at another company 
during the current employment contract, or while under notice, is an idea 
introduced during the expert meeting which is supported by the Dutch labour 
market experts. Furthermore, a more active role by social partners concerning 
job-to-job support is deemed necessary and intersectoral mobility should be 
promoted. Specifically, the Dutch sector funds could contribute more to active 
job-to-job support and the financial partition between the sector funds should 
be removed. The current barriers regarding the financing of training and 
education when an employee wants to make the transition to another sector, 
should be settled. 
 
It appears that all experts share the view that attention should be paid to 
vulnerable redundant employees, but it remains unclear as to who should take 
the lead in helping those employees to another job. A challenge for the Dutch 
social partners and the government is to clarify this issue, and to take a joint 
stand, because if this is not declared openly, nobody feels truly responsible and 
no action will take place. Finally, the Dutch trade unions would like to have 
sufficient time between the notice and the actual dismissal date. This could be 
arranged by longer terms of notice. However, the employers who participated in 
the expert-meeting were not in favour of this proposal. 
 
9.4 Limitations and implications 
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Subsequently, the participants were asked to assess these proposals. From table 
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structural system for all types of employees, including for workers who are not 
covered by a social plan or who do not work for a fixed employer, and including 
those employed in small companies. In 2004, the IWI had already concluded that 
the former job-to-job experiment was not effective, because the available 
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In conclusion, the limitations of this research and the policy and research 
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implications will be addressed in this final section. This study was set up, first and 
foremost, as an exploration of employment security systems with a specific 
focus on forced job-to-job transitions. This thesis attempts to describe and 
explain job-to-job systems in four European countries. Subsequently, these 
findings are compared with the Dutch job-to-job arrangements in order to 
explore possible lessons for the Netherlands.  
 
The effectiveness of the interventions and systems is important when 
comparing the various experiences of the different countries studied in order to 
draw lessons. However, this study shows that there are hardly any data available 
regarding the effectiveness of job-to-job support in the event of redundancy. 
Additional research is required in each of the countries examined. However, 
experience shows that it is difficult to conduct evaluation studies with regard to 
the performance of employment security systems which meet scientific 
standards. The Swedish case shows that is not easy to assess the net effects of 
job-to-job intervention, certainly not if the preconditions for support and the 
way the support is organized differ within a country. Moreover, information with 
regard to the performance of job-to-job interventions is not systematically 
gathered owing to the high expenses involved or time restrictions. However, the 
performance of job-to-job systems or interventions is relevant when answering 
the question as to whether it is sensible to transfer policy measures. The Dutch 
government decided to invite tenders for the evaluation of the Dutch nine job-
to-job experiments. The evaluation report is expected to be published in the 
summer of 2012. If experiments prove to be successful, the question would be 
how these experiences will be embedded in a more structural way. 
 
Besides these experiments, which have received a subsidy from the government, 
several company networks exist in the Netherlands aimed at the exchange of 
personnel, knowledge, ideas and experiences in the field of HRM. Arising from 
the Gatekeeper Act, companies joined forces to reduce the risk of continuing to 
pay the salary of the employee during the first two years of sickness. As 
explained previously, these networks are currently also used for job-to-job 
transitions in the event of redundancy. These private networks are established 
by and for employers and do not have public funding. However, the performance 
and sustainability of these networks remain unclear. Could it be that these 
private networks perform as well as the nine job-to-job experiments which 
received public funding or is their performance even better? And how 
sustainable are these networks? Further research is required to answer these 
questions.  
 
As mentioned previously, this study does not attempt to answer the question as 
to whether or not the observed systems, arrangements or policies in the foreign 
countries could or should be transferred to the Netherlands. This would require a 
political position, which is outside the scope of this thesis. Furthermore, 
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additional feasibility studies are required to answer the transfer question. Based 
on the knowledge acquired during the interviews the researcher inferred 
possible lessons for the Netherlands. These lessons were presented to 
representatives of important Dutch labour market actors at the expert meeting 
held on April 2011 at the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. 
Subsequently, the participants rated the presented lessons on a five point scale 
from ‘Not interesting, do not transfer this lesson to the Netherlands’ up to 
‘Interesting lesson, the Netherlands should copy this lesson’. This assessment 
gives us an insight into the social basis of the different Dutch labour market 
actors for transferring the lessons to the Netherlands, but does not tell us 
whether or not the transfer and implementation of the lesson is feasible in the 
Dutch context.  
One of the main findings of this study is that social partners should play a more 
active role with regard to job-to-job support. The Dutch government 
emphasizes the taking up of this lesson in the recently presented national 
budget for 2012.146 In line with the EU2020 agenda, the Dutch government’s aim 
is to increase the labour participation and in order to achieve this goal the 
Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs intends to introduce new facilities in a 
so-called ‘vitality package’. This package comprises the introduction of a new 
bonus to stimulate employees aged 62 or over to continue labour participation, a 
mobility bonus for employers to hire disabled and unemployed persons aged 50 
or over, and the introduction of several career facilities. Referring to the latter, 
the government intends to introduce a vitality saving scheme, which makes it 
more attractive for employees to save for periods when income falls occur. The 
savings in the vitality scheme can then be used for re-education, demotion, 
starting a business or bridging a period when the person has no income or a fall 
in income, e.g. during forced job-to-job transitions. Thus, the Dutch government 
implies that the employees themselves have a responsibility to save for the 
event of there being a fall in income during a certain period of time. The 
implementation of the vitality saving scheme is planned for 2013. However, it is 
not clear what the take-up rate by employees will be. In addition, the 
government intends to decrease the threshold for fiscal deduction of education 
expenditures. Finally, the Dutch government urges social partners to introduce a 
job-to-job budget in collective agreements147 and intends to compensate social 
partners for the extra effort needed to introduce such job-to-job budget and 
intersectoral education.148  However, currently it is unclear whether social 
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partners will introduce a job-to-job budget and how intersectoral education will 
be organized. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the use of severance pay is not 
under consideration in this process. In 2012, the government wants to come to 
an agreement with social partners regarding their responsibility in job-to-job 
transitions. It is hoped that the lessons inferred in this study from foreign 
experiences can serve as important sources of inspiration for the Dutch actors.  
 
Owing to the economic crisis, the Dutch government announced cutbacks in 
expenditure. The government’s view is that individuals themselves, together 
with the employers, are responsible for job-to-job transitions. In the build-up to 
the last elections several political parties suggested the shortening of the 
maximum duration of the unemployment benefit to one year instead of the 
current 38 months. In addition, the political parties suggested increasing the 
level of the unemployment benefit. In 2008, the Committee on Labour Market 
Participation, also known as the Bakker Committee, formulated proposals 
aimed at raising the labour market participation rate to 80% by 2016, including 
the introduction of a Work Budget and the transformation of the unemployment 
insurance scheme to an employment insurance scheme. The proposed Work 
Budget is a personal budget and is not linked to a job, meaning that the 
employee can transfer the budget to another job. The Austrian severance pay 
system served as an example for the proposed Work Budget. With the 
introduction of an employment insurance scheme employers will have a 
financial interest in preventing unemployment. The employment insurance 
comprises three phases which are shorter than the current maximum duration of 
the unemployment insurance. In the first phase the employer has to continue to 
pay 80 to 100% of the wage for a maximum duration of six months. In this phase 
the employer and employee are responsible for finding a new job quickly. In the 
second phase, the sector or industry has a financial responsibility and employees 
can enter a re-integration scheme provided by public or private suppliers. After 
the second phase the responsibility is shifted towards the municipalities. To this 
very day the Work Budget and employment insurance have not yet been 
implemented in the Netherlands, because of dissensions between the actors 
involved. However, in the recently presented national budget 2012, the 
government intends to launch a ‘vitality saving scheme’ as of 2013. This vitality 
scheme comprises elements of the previously proposed Work Budget. It remains 
unclear what consequences these proposals will have in the future. Compared 
with the other countries examined, the maximum duration of the Dutch 
unemployment benefit is long, but thorough research is necessary to determine 
the possible effects if the government intends to shorten this unemployment 
benefit duration. This might mean that redundant employees take up the first 
job available and do not wait for the right job which fits their competencies and 
skills. In the end this could harm productivity. When adjusting the maximum 
duration of the unemployment benefit it is also important to consider the notice 
period. In countries where the duration of the notice period for redundant 
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employees is longer e.g. in Sweden, the employees have more time in which to 
find another job while retaining their current income. Thus, in Sweden the 
maximum duration of the unemployment benefit is one year, but on the other 
hand notice periods, both the statutory and those negotiated in collective 
agreements, are longer than the notice periods in the Netherlands. Furthermore, 
Sweden has a more structural system in which job-to-job transitions are actively 
supported. Even the UK, where the duration and level of unemployment benefit 
is less generous, the government invests in early intervention and organizes 
‘fast-tracks’ for the recently unemployed. These elements should be taken into 
account when considering shortening the duration of the Dutch unemployment 
insurance. They should certainly be considered in the light of the announced 
cutbacks, which involve the withdrawal by UWV Werkbedrijf of early active 
support for the recently unemployed. 
 
Currently, the Netherlands has no structural job-to-job system. The job-to-job 
support comprises ad hoc activities, temporary measures, experiments and 
social plans. This study has revealed several possible lessons the Netherlands can 
learn in order to improve future job-to-job support, but the question remains as 
to whether a structural employment system is necessary for all types of 
employees. The findings in this study make clear that Dutch actors share the 
view that (public) support should be provided to redundant employees who 
really need it, i.e. for those who, without active job-to-job support, will run the 
risk of being long-term unemployed. If the state provides support too early, 
public money might be spent needlessly and that might take away the individual 
responsibility of employees and employers. However, it is not easy to assess the 
appropriate time and criteria for those who really need it. If employees are not 
able to find another job quickly, the chance of becoming long-term unemployed 
will increase. This study also revealed that if employers and employees invest 
financially in a ‘fund’ for job-to-job support, there is money available 
immediately for job-to-job support when the event of redundancy occurs. Such a 
system avoids liquidity problems for job-to-job support in the event of economic 
downturn, especially for small and medium sized companies. Countries can set 
up new funds for job-to-job support or seek alliance with funds that are already 
in place in the country (e.g. the Dutch sector funds).  
 
It is clear that in the future smooth transitions from job-to-job are necessary in a 
globalizing and profoundly changing economy. In order to tackle (long)-term 
unemployment, rapid responses are required from national governments, 
employers’ associations, trade unions, firms and individual employees. Job-to-
job support for redundant employees will remain important in the future. This is 
all the more important because it seems that restructuring is commonplace 
owing to the needs of globalisation and innovations. Restructuring no longer 
depends on cyclical problems. In some sectors restructuring processes take 
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find another job while retaining their current income. Thus, in Sweden the 
maximum duration of the unemployment benefit is one year, but on the other 
hand notice periods, both the statutory and those negotiated in collective 
agreements, are longer than the notice periods in the Netherlands. Furthermore, 
Sweden has a more structural system in which job-to-job transitions are actively 
supported. Even the UK, where the duration and level of unemployment benefit 
is less generous, the government invests in early intervention and organizes 
‘fast-tracks’ for the recently unemployed. These elements should be taken into 
account when considering shortening the duration of the Dutch unemployment 
insurance. They should certainly be considered in the light of the announced 
cutbacks, which involve the withdrawal by UWV Werkbedrijf of early active 
support for the recently unemployed. 
 
Currently, the Netherlands has no structural job-to-job system. The job-to-job 
support comprises ad hoc activities, temporary measures, experiments and 
social plans. This study has revealed several possible lessons the Netherlands can 
learn in order to improve future job-to-job support, but the question remains as 
to whether a structural employment system is necessary for all types of 
employees. The findings in this study make clear that Dutch actors share the 
view that (public) support should be provided to redundant employees who 
really need it, i.e. for those who, without active job-to-job support, will run the 
risk of being long-term unemployed. If the state provides support too early, 
public money might be spent needlessly and that might take away the individual 
responsibility of employees and employers. However, it is not easy to assess the 
appropriate time and criteria for those who really need it. If employees are not 
able to find another job quickly, the chance of becoming long-term unemployed 
will increase. This study also revealed that if employers and employees invest 
financially in a ‘fund’ for job-to-job support, there is money available 
immediately for job-to-job support when the event of redundancy occurs. Such a 
system avoids liquidity problems for job-to-job support in the event of economic 
downturn, especially for small and medium sized companies. Countries can set 
up new funds for job-to-job support or seek alliance with funds that are already 
in place in the country (e.g. the Dutch sector funds).  
 
It is clear that in the future smooth transitions from job-to-job are necessary in a 
globalizing and profoundly changing economy. In order to tackle (long)-term 
unemployment, rapid responses are required from national governments, 
employers’ associations, trade unions, firms and individual employees. Job-to-
job support for redundant employees will remain important in the future. This is 
all the more important because it seems that restructuring is commonplace 
owing to the needs of globalisation and innovations. Restructuring no longer 
depends on cyclical problems. In some sectors restructuring processes take 
place, while in other sectors there is an urgent demand for skilled employees. 
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Currently, Europe is on the eve of another recession, which might even be worse 
than the 2008 crisis. It is apparent that the functioning of the labour market is 
not perfect and European countries should realize that there is an urgent need to 
reflect on employment security systems in order to prevent long-term 
unemployment. By looking at experiences in other countries lessons can be 
learned, but it is not possible to take what may be successful in one country and 
simply transplant it into another. The often long-standing interlinkage between 
the different forms of coordination and regulation in any given country cannot 
easily be undone. There is not a ‘one size fits all’ employment security system. 
Path dependence explains the restrictions and limitations in learning and 
transferring elements from foreign countries, but what remains is the necessity 
for European countries to develop an employment security system which is 
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Participants expert meeting 28 April 2011 held at the Dutch ministry of Social 
Affairs and Employment in the Hague. 
Organisation Number of 
participants 
European Commission/DG Employment 1 
Philips (Firm) 2 
Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs 4 
Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations 2 
Trade union FNV Bondgenoten 1 
Trade union FNV Bouw 1 
Trade union FNV Centrale 1 
CNV National Federation of Christian Trade Unions  2 
Boaborea (Dutch association for re-integration companies, 
outplacement agencies and other private service suppliers) 
2 
ABU (The Federation of Private Employment Agencies ) 1 
CBS Statistics Netherlands 2 
RWI (Council for Work and Income) 1 
Gatekeepers centre Noord Holland Noord 1 
UWV WERKbedrijf/ Centre of Expertise 3 
Total number of participants 24 
  
Researchers/ audience  
Van Oss & Partners 1 
Amsterdam University 2 




Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
 
Aanleiding van deze studie 
 
Als gevolg van de globalisering en toenemende concurrentie zijn veel bedrijven 
genoodzaakt te reorganiseren. Niet alle werknemers passen in de nieuwe 
structuur van de organisatie. Daarnaast zorgt de economische crisis voor gedwon-
gen baanmobiliteit. De zekerheid van een baan voor het leven, bestaat niet meer. 
Soepele overgangen Van Werk Naar Werk (VWNW) zijn noodzakelijk wanneer 
mensen hun baan dreigen te verliezen. Dit vraagt om snelle interventies van 
overheden, bedrijven en werknemers zelf.  
 
Rond 2006 verscheen ‘Flexicurity’ op de Europese beleidsagenda. Dit concept is 
hevig bediscussieerd en bekritiseerd zowel in de beleids- als in de academische 
wereld. Flexicurity is een samentrekking van de Engelse woorden ‘Flexibility’ en 
‘Security’. Het doel van Flexicurity is om de flexibiliteit op de arbeidmarkt te ver-
groten en gelijktijdig werkzekerheid te bieden aan werknemers (Wilthagen, 
2004). Flexicurity werd onderdeel van de Lissabon Agenda en is onlangs weder-
om bevestigd als een sleutelconcept in de EU2020 agenda. Het verkennen, 
beschrijven en verklaren van werkzekerheidsystemen in vier Europese landen 
staat centraal in deze studie. Bovendien wordt in dit onderzoek een vergelijking 
gemaakt met de Nederlandse praktijk met het oog op het beleidsmatig kunnen 
leren van de buitenlandse ervaringen. 
 
De onderzoeksvragen van deze dissertatie luiden als volgt: 
 
Welke systemen of arrangementen kunnen in Europese landen worden onder-
scheiden die tot doel hebben de werkzekerheid voor werknemers die met ontslag 
worden bedreigd te verbeteren? Hoe kunnen verschillen en overeenkomsten tussen 
deze systemen worden verklaard? Wat kan Nederland vanuit beleidsperspectief 
mogelijk leren van deze buitenlandse ervaringen? 
 
Theorie, definities en analytisch model 
 
Werkzekerheid 
In de literatuur en beleidsdocumenten worden verschillende definities van werk-
zekerheid gebruikt (Wilthagen & Tros, 2004; European Foundation for the Impro-
vement of Living and Working Conditions, 2008; ILO definitie in Dasgupta, 2001; 
Europese Commissie, 2007 WRR 2007). Werkzekerheid is iets anders dan baan-
zekerheid en kan kortweg het beste worden omschreven als de zekerheid aan het 
werk te komen én te blijven. De gehanteerde definitie van werkzekerheid kan als 
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De mogelijkheid voor werklozen en inactieve personen om de transitie te maken van 
werkloosheid naar werk (re-integratie/activering) en de mogelijkheid voor werk-
nemers om aan het werk te blijven, niet noodzakelijkerwijs in dezelfde baan bij 
dezelfde werkgever (VWNW) (Borghouts, 2010).  
 
Vanuit onderzoeksoogpunt is het belangrijk te begrijpen dat de definitie van 
werkzekerheid twee doelgroepen onderscheidt: mensen die op de arbeidsmarkt 
participeren (insiders) en mensen die werkloos zijn (outsiders). Dit onderzoek 
richt zich op de eerste groep: werknemers die gedwongen zijn om van baan te 
veranderen. Er zijn verschillende fasen te onderscheiden als het gaat om werk-
loosheidspreventie (Evers et al., 2004). De eerste fase, de primaire preventie, 
betreft een gezonde bedrijfsvoering zodat de werkgever niet gedwongen is om 
mensen te laten afvloeien. In de fase van secundaire preventie is er sprake van 
een dreiging van boventalligheid; het zogenaamde ‘vijf-voor-twaalf’ scenario. De 
fase van secundaire preventie kan worden onderverdeeld in twee subfasen: 
dreiging van ontslag en de ontslagaanzegging. In het eerste geval kan de werk-
gever preventieve interne of externe maatregelen treffen om gedwongen ont-
slagen te voorkomen, zoals het aanpassen van arbeidkosten, arbeidstijden of het 
vergroten van de employability van het personeel. Wanneer ontslagen niet meer 
te voorkomen zijn en het ontslag wordt aangezegd, is de ondersteuning gericht 
op curatieve maatregelen met het doel om directe VWNW transitie te realiseren. 
Wanneer het arbeidscontract is beëindigd en werknemers werkloos zijn 
geworden, kan tertiaire preventie worden ingezet. In deze fase zijn maatregelen 
gericht op de preventie van langdurige werkloosheid. Dit onderzoek richt zich op 
curatieve maatregelen of arrangementen met het oog op directe VWNW 
transities voor mensen die boventallig zijn verklaard. 
 
Werkzekerheidsysteem en analytisch model 
In deze studie worden werkzekerheidsystemen verkend. In de systeemtheorie 
duidt een systeem op ‘een samengesteld geheel van componenten die elkaar 
beïnvloeden en die samen met de relaties tussen deze componenten een 
identificatie van een begrensde entiteit of proces vertegenwoordigen’ (Laszlo & 
Krippner, 1998). Een systeem is dus een verzameling van onderdelen of elemen-
ten die met elkaar in wisselwerking staan om als een geheel te kunnen 
functioneren. Gebaseerd op werk van Gilbert en Specht, Scharpf en Thompson et 
al. is in deze studie een analytisch kader uitgewerkt voor het beschrijven, het ana-
lyseren en verklaren van werkzekerheidsystemen (zie figuur 1). In werkzeker-
heidsystemen kunnen actoren die met elkaar interacteren een belangrijke rol 
spelen in de ontwikkeling van VWNW beleid en arrangementen. Daarom gaat 
deze studie verder dan enkel de beschrijving van het ontwikkelde VWNW beleid 
of arrangementen in verschillende Europese landen. Het onderzoek richt zich ook 
op de institutionele setting, de betrokken actoren met hun preferenties en 
capaciteiten, het ontwikkelde beleid en de prestaties daarvan. 
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Ontleend en aangepast aan eerder werk van Scharpf (1997), Gilbert & Specht 
(1974) en Thompson et. al (1991) 
 
Lessen leren, beleidsleren en beleidsovername 
De derde belangrijke vraag van deze studie is wat Nederland kan leren van de 
buitenlandse werkzekerheidsystemen met het oog op de verdere beleidsont-
wikkeling van werkzekerheid in Nederland. Landen kunnen van elkaar leren, dat 
doen ze ook, maar wat ze leren, tot op welke hoogte, wie er leert en hoe geleerd 
wordt, is moeilijk vast te stellen. Beleidsleren (policy learning) kan leiden tot het 
overnemen van beleid (policy transfer), maar dat is niet altijd noodzakelijk. De 
concepten van beleidsleren en beleidsovername worden vaak in één adem ge-
noemd of aan elkaar gelinkt. Op basis van de bestaande literatuur kan de con-
clusie worden getrokken dat er geen tekort is aan het analyseren van het concept 
van beleidsleren, het leren van lessen en beleidsovername. Beleidsleren en 
beleidsovername zijn twee elementen van het concept ‘lessen leren’. Deze studie 
beperkt zich tot het beleidsleren (policy learning) en gaat niet in op de vraag of de 
lessen ook door Nederland overgenomen (policy transfer) kunnen of moeten 
worden. Dit laatste vraagt om haalbaarheidstudies en het innemen van een 
politiek standpunt. Dit valt buiten het kader van deze dissertatie.  
  
Methode van onderzoek 
 
Niet alle EU lidstaten kunnen meegenomen worden in dit onderzoek. De reden 
voor een selectie van landen heeft te maken met de diepgaande kwalitatieve 
DUTCH SUMMARY 
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onderzoeksmethode van deze studie. Een viertal landen is geselecteerd op basis 
van het type welvaartsregime, de geografische spreiding en de historische 
classificatie van de sociale zekerheidssystemen. De geselecteerde landen zijn: 
Zweden, het Verenigd Koninkrijk, Oostenrijk en Spanje. Deze vier landen zijn 
bestudeerd en vervolgens vergeleken met Nederland. Verschillende databronnen 
zijn geraadpleegd om de onderzoeksvragen te kunnen beantwoorden. Het on-
derzoek is gestart met een literatuuronderzoek waarin tevens relevante beleids-
documenten zijn bestudeerd. In mei 2009 is er een eerste expertbijeenkomst 
georganiseerd op het Nederlandse Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegen-
heid. Deelnemers aan de bijeenkomst waren belangrijke Nederlandse stake-
holders. De doelstelling van deze bijeenkomst was informatie te delen over de 
eerste bevindingen van de desk research. Op basis van de bevindingen uit deze 
expertbijeenkomst is het interviewprotocol aangepast en zijn de bezoeken aan de 
vier landen voorbereid.  
Vervolgens zijn in 2009 en 2010 de geselecteerde landen bezocht. In elk land zijn 
diepgaande face-to-face interviews afgenomen met vertegenwoordigers van 
ministeries, arbeidsvoorzieningsorganisaties, werkgeversorganisaties, vakbon-
den, private marktpartijen, wetenschappers en andere relevante partijen. De 
interviews zijn in het Engels afgenomen, digitaal opgenomen en vervolgens 
letterlijk uitgeschreven en geanalyseerd met behulp van het kwalitatieve soft-
ware programma ATLAS.ti. Op verzoek van de Spaanse gesprekspartners is er tij-
dens de interviews een vertaler ingezet, zodat de geïnterviewden konden ant-
woorden in hun eigen taal.  
In april 2011 is er vervolgens een tweede expertbijeenkomst georganiseerd op het 
Nederlandse Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid. De bevindingen 
uit de landenbezoeken zijn door de onderzoeker gepresenteerd. De presentatie 
werd afgesloten met een opsomming van een aantal mogelijke lessen die 
Nederland zou kunnen leren van deze buitenlandse ervaringen. De deelnemers 
hebben deze lessen gewaardeerd aan de hand van een schaal die varieerde van 
“niet interessant/niet overnemen” tot “interessante les, moet Nederland één op 
één kopiëren”. Aansluitend leidde een onafhankelijke gespreksleider een 
'versnellingskamer' sessie waarbij met behulp van geavanceerde technologie 
werd gebrainstormd over de vraag wat er in Nederland zou moeten gebeuren als 
het gaat om 'Van Werk-Naar-Werk' beleid en activiteiten. De verschillende 
organisaties konden via deze weg naar voren brengen wat de reactie van hun 
organisatie is op de beleidsinitiatieven die zijn opgetekend in de betreffende 
buitenlanden. Daarnaast brachten de deelnemers zelf voorstellen in ter 






1.   Verschillen en overeenkomsten van werkzekerheidsystemen in de 
bestudeerde landen verklaard 
De hoofdstukken 3, 4, 5 en 6 geven antwoord op de eerste twee onderzoeks-
vragen. In deze hoofdstukken zijn de werkzekerheidsystemen in Zweden, het 
Verenigd Koninkrijk, Oostenrijk en Spanje onderzocht. Het eerder gepresenteerde 
analytisch model vormde het uitgangspunt voor de beschrijving en verklaring van 





De ontslagbescherming verschilt in de onderzochte landen. Het Verenigd 
Koninkrijk heeft de minst strikte ontslagregels, wat betekent dat het voor Britse 
werkgevers relatief gemakkelijk is om werknemers aan te ontslaan. De vacature-
graad geeft een indicatie van het aantal openstaande vacatures en is in het 
Verenigd Koninkrijk hoog ten opzichte van de andere onderzochte landen. Ver-
der kent het Verenigd Koninkrijk het laagste percentage werknemers met een 
tijdelijk contract. Dit kan mede worden verklaard door het soepele ontslagstelsel. 
In Zweden is de ontslagbescherming strikter dan in het Verenigd Koninkrijk, maar 
het mobiliteitspercentage is hoger. De strengere ontslagbescherming weerhoudt 
Zweedse werknemers dus niet om transities naar een andere baan te maken. 
Van de onderzochte landen heeft Spanje de meest strenge regels ten aanzien van 
ontslagbescherming. Dit strikte stelsel is een nalatenschap van dictator Franco 
waarin baanzekerheid voor het leven werd gegarandeerd in ruil voor volgzaam-
heid waar het gaat om het bepalen van de lonen en het instemmen met de poli-
tieke koers. Na Franco’s dood, eind jaren zeventig, startte het deregulerings-
proces. Dit hield in dat tijdelijke contracten werden toegestaan. Echter, er werd 
niets gedaan aan de hoge ontslagbescherming van mensen met een vast con-
tract. Dit leidde tot een tweedeling op de arbeidsmarkt die tot op de dag van van-
daag, ondanks verschillende hervormingen, nog steeds aanwezig is. De Spaanse 
arbeidsmarkt kenmerkt zich door een groep mensen met een tijdelijk contract 
met onzekere en zwakke arbeidsvoorwaarden en een groep werknemers met een 
vast contract die erg goed zijn beschermd. In Oostenrijk is de ontslagbescher-
ming strikter dan in het Verenigd Koninkrijk, maar minder strikt dan in Spanje. 
 
Opzegtermijnen 
Naast de ontslagbescherming is de opzegtermijn een belangrijk kenmerk van de 
institutionele omgeving die het gedrag van actoren en de ontwikkeling van 
VWNW beleid kan beïnvloeden. De werkgever kan gehouden zijn aan wettelijke 
opzegtermijnen wanneer hij van plan is om mensen te ontslaan. Wanneer het 
ontslag is aangezegd, kunnen curatieve VWNW maatregelen worden ingezet. 
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1.   Verschillen en overeenkomsten van werkzekerheidsystemen in de 
bestudeerde landen verklaard 
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Verenigd Koninkrijk, Oostenrijk en Spanje onderzocht. Het eerder gepresenteerde 
analytisch model vormde het uitgangspunt voor de beschrijving en verklaring van 





De ontslagbescherming verschilt in de onderzochte landen. Het Verenigd 
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het mobiliteitspercentage is hoger. De strengere ontslagbescherming weerhoudt 
Zweedse werknemers dus niet om transities naar een andere baan te maken. 
Van de onderzochte landen heeft Spanje de meest strenge regels ten aanzien van 
ontslagbescherming. Dit strikte stelsel is een nalatenschap van dictator Franco 
waarin baanzekerheid voor het leven werd gegarandeerd in ruil voor volgzaam-
heid waar het gaat om het bepalen van de lonen en het instemmen met de poli-
tieke koers. Na Franco’s dood, eind jaren zeventig, startte het deregulerings-
proces. Dit hield in dat tijdelijke contracten werden toegestaan. Echter, er werd 
niets gedaan aan de hoge ontslagbescherming van mensen met een vast con-
tract. Dit leidde tot een tweedeling op de arbeidsmarkt die tot op de dag van van-
daag, ondanks verschillende hervormingen, nog steeds aanwezig is. De Spaanse 
arbeidsmarkt kenmerkt zich door een groep mensen met een tijdelijk contract 
met onzekere en zwakke arbeidsvoorwaarden en een groep werknemers met een 
vast contract die erg goed zijn beschermd. In Oostenrijk is de ontslagbescher-
ming strikter dan in het Verenigd Koninkrijk, maar minder strikt dan in Spanje. 
 
Opzegtermijnen 
Naast de ontslagbescherming is de opzegtermijn een belangrijk kenmerk van de 
institutionele omgeving die het gedrag van actoren en de ontwikkeling van 
VWNW beleid kan beïnvloeden. De werkgever kan gehouden zijn aan wettelijke 
opzegtermijnen wanneer hij van plan is om mensen te ontslaan. Wanneer het 
ontslag is aangezegd, kunnen curatieve VWNW maatregelen worden ingezet. 
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Hoe langer de opzegtermijn, hoe meer tijd de boventallige medewerker heeft om 
een andere baan te zoeken onder de huidige arbeidscondities. De werkgever 
betaalt immers het loon door tijdens de opzegperiode. De wettelijke opzeg-
termijn is het kortst in Spanje, gevolgd door het Verenigd Koninkrijk. In Zweden 
zijn de wettelijke opzegtermijnen het langst. Daar komt nog bij dat in Zweden 
werkgeversorganisaties en vakbonden in collectieve overeenkomsten kunnen af-




Wanneer het arbeidscontract is beëindigd, kunnen boventallige medewerkers 
onder bepaalde voorwaarden in aanmerking komen voor een werkloos-
heidsuitkering. De hypothese is dat wanneer het verschil tussen het laatst ver-
diende salaris en de uitkering groot is, de werknemer genoodzaakt is om zo snel 
mogelijk een andere baan te vinden. Het risico bestaat dan dat mensen de eerste 
baan aannemen die ze kunnen vinden, terwijl deze baan niet noodzakelijkerwijs 
hoeft aan te sluiten bij de capaciteiten en vaardigheden van de betreffende per-
soon. Dit zou betekenen dat het potentieel van de werknemer niet ten volle 
wordt benut, wat uiteindelijk zou kunnen leiden tot een lagere arbeidsproduc-
tiviteit. De OECD heeft een indicator ontwikkeld, de vervangingsgraad (replace-
ment rate), die aangeeft wat het inkomen zal zijn op basis van de werkloosheids-
uitkering en andere gerelateerde uitkeringen in percentage van het laatste 
verdiende loon. In het Verenigd Koninkrijk is de vervangingsgraad het laagst van 
de onderzochte landen, terwijl die in Spanje het hoogst is. De vervangingsgraden 
van Zweden en Oostenrijk zitten daar tussenin. Werkzoekenden in Oostenrijk die 
een werkloosheidsuitkering aanvragen dienen in de afgelopen twee jaar ten 
minste voor 52 weken premies te hebben betaald. De duur van de werkloosheids-
uitkering hangt af van de leeftijd van de werkzoekende en het arbeidsverleden en 
is maximaal 52 weken. Echter wanneer men gaat deelnemen in een arbeids-
stichting kan de uitkering verlengd worden tot maximaal 4 jaar. 
In Zweden is de duur van de wettelijke werkloosheidsuitkering maximaal 300 da-
gen. De uitkering bestaat uit een basis uitkering en een inkomensgerelateerde 
uitkering. Om in Zweden in aanmerking te komen voor de inkomensgerelateerde 
uitkering moet de werknemer lid zijn van een werkloosheidsverzekeringsfonds in 
de sector waarin hij of zij werkzaam is.  
Wanneer een Britse werknemer zijn baan verliest kan hij/zij een Jobseekers’ Allow-
ance (JSA) aanvragen. Deze uitkering bestaat uit twee delen: een contributie 
gebaseerde uitkering en een inkomensgerelateerde uitkering. De eerste uitkering 
is gebaseerd op nationale premieafdrachten in de afgelopen 2 jaar, voor maximaal 
182 dagen. De inkomensgerelateerde uitkering is voor degenen die niet genoeg 
premies hebben betaald of voor wie de contributie gebaseerde uitkering inmiddels 
is beëindigd. Bij de inkomensgerelateerde uitkering wordt rekening gehouden met 
het huishoudinkomen en het vermogen. Spaanse werknemers die hun baan 
verliezen hebben recht op een werkloosheidsuitkering mits ze in de zes jaren 
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voorafgaand aan de werkloosheid ten minste over 360 dagen premies hebben 
afgedragen voor de sociale zekerheid. De duur van de uitkering hangt af van het 
aantal jaren dat de werknemer heeft gewerkt in de zes jaar voordat hij werkloos 
werd en sociale zekerheidspremies heeft afgedragen. De maximale duur van de 
uitkering is twee jaar. 
 
Actoren inclusief hun oriëntaties, capaciteiten en wijze van interactie 
 
In Zweden spelen vakbonden en werkgeversorganisaties een belangrijke rol in 
het VWNW systeem. Collectieve overeenkomsten zijn erg belangrijk in het regu-
leren en coördineren van de Zweedse arbeidsmarkt. Een belangrijk kenmerk van 
de Zweedse akkoorden is dat ze mogen afwijken van de Zweedse wet- en regel-
geving. Gezien de sterke rol van werkgeversorganisaties en vakbonden op de 
Zweedse arbeidsmarkt en de hoge organisatiegraad van vakbonden is het niet 
verrassend dat deze actoren ook betrokken zijn bij het ontwikkelen van VWNW 
beleid en arrangementen door middel van de zogenaamde transitie-akkoorden. 
Eén van de belangrijkste verklarende variabelen voor het ontstaan van deze 
akkoorden is de opvatting van de verschillende Zweedse actoren dat mensen in 
plaats van banen beschermd moeten worden. Zowel Zweedse vakbonden als 
werkgeversorganisaties zijn bereid om te onderhandelen en hun eisen aan te 
passen om consensus te bereiken in de veronderstelling dat ze ook in de 
toekomst elkaar zullen ontmoeten aan de onderhandelingstafel. De overheid 
bemoeit zich niet met de invulling van de transitie-akkoorden. Wanneer een 
akkoord is gesloten, houden beide partijen zich hier ook aan wat rust geeft op de 
Zweedse arbeidsmarkt. Het aantal stakingen is daarom erg laag in vergelijking 
met de andere onderzochte landen. 
 
In tegenstelling tot de Zweedse praktijk spelen Britse vakbonden en werkgevers-
organisaties een zeer beperkte rol in VWNW transities. In de jaren tachtig en 
negentig van de vorige eeuw verzwakte de positie van de vakbonden en in verge-
lijking met Zweden is de organisatiegraad van Britse vakbonden erg laag. Het 
vermogen en de capaciteiten om resultaten te boeken op het terrein van de 
arbeidsmarkt is in het Verenigd Koninkrijk dus gering in vergelijking met Zweden. 
De beperkte rol van Britse werkgeversorganisaties kan worden verklaard door 
een afname van ‘multi-employer’ onderhandelingen. Vandaag de dag vinden 
onderhandelingen met vakbonden plaats met één individuele werkgever (single-
employer bargaining). Als gevolg van het feit dat Britse sociale partners dus geen 
rol van betekenis spelen in het ontwikkelen van VWNW arrangementen en het 
Verenigd Koninkrijk in de afgelopen jaren ook geconfronteerd is met 
economische neergangen, is de Britse overheid gaan interveniëren om het falen 
van de arbeidsmarkt te corrigeren. De staat heeft verschillende programma’s 
(o.a. de Rapid Response Service (RRS) en de Response to Redundancy 
Programme (R2R)) ingevoerd met het doel mensen die boventallig zijn verklaard 
snel naar ander werk te begeleiden. 
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In Oostenrijk spelen de overheid, de arbeidsvoorzieningsorganisatie en indirect 
ook de sociale partners een belangrijke rol in het ondersteunen van VWNW 
transities. Dit is ook te verwachten gezien de corporatistische traditie van dit 
land. De sociale partners zijn vertegenwoordigd in besturen en commissies op 
verschillende niveaus van de publieke arbeidsvoorzieningsorganisatie. Bovendien 
zijn ze zeer betrokken bij het ontwikkelen van wetgeving en beleid. De arbeids-
stichting (Arbeitsstiftung) is op dit moment een veelgebruikt instrument om een 
periode van werkloosheid te overbruggen. De Oostenrijkse zienswijze van de 
betrokken actoren is dat geld en een sociaal plan waardevol zijn, maar dat boven-
tallige medewerkers het meest geholpen zijn met actieve ondersteuning naar een 
andere baan. Verder kent Oostenrijk trainingsnetwerken (Qualifizierungsver-
bünde). In deze netwerken delen werkgevers de kosten van opleidingen en 
trainingen. Een netwerk bestaat uit minimaal drie bedrijven waarvan ten minste 
50% bestaat uit MKB bedrijven. 
 
In Spanje is er geen VWNW systeem. De wijze van interactie zoals in Zweden 
tussen vakbonden en werkgeversorganisaties ontbreekt in Spanje. De relatie 
tussen de sociale partners kan worden getypeerd als gespannen en het 
onderlinge vertrouwen ontbreekt, terwijl een constructieve dialoog noodzakelijk 
is om VWNW beleid en arrangementen te kunnen ontwikkelen. Bovendien zijn de 
Spaanse actoren, met name de vakbonden en werknemers, vooral gefocust op 
baanzekerheid in plaats van werkzekerheid. Als gevolg van de economische crisis 
voelde de Spaanse overheid zich in 2010 genoodzaakt om arbeidsmarkt hervor-
mingen af te kondigen die vervolgens door de sociale partners geïmplementeerd 
dienen te worden. De vraag is echter of dit gaat gebeuren. De overheid heeft nu 
als prioriteit om de stijgende werkloosheid een halt toe te roepen en focust zich 
op de transitie van inactiviteit naar werk in plaats van VWNW. Echter de 
zorgwekkende financiële situatie met een groot begrotingstekort en het feit dat 
Spanje een groot land is met drie keer zoveel inwoners als Nederland en vijf keer 
zoveel inwoners als Zweden en Oostenrijk, verklaren waarom het voor Spanje 
niet gemakkelijk is om nieuw VWNW beleid te ontwikkelen. In landen met een 
grote arbeidspopulatie en weinig openstaande vacatures is het moeilijker om 
mensen van werk naar werk te helpen dan in landen met een kleinere arbeids-





Het type actieve ondersteuning dat geboden wordt aan boventallige mede-
werkers is vergelijkbaar in Zweden, het Verenigd Koninkrijk en Oostenrijk. Het 
gaat om professionele oriëntatie, job coaching, scholing en training, stages en 
actieve ondersteuning in het zoeken naar ander werk. Echter de manier waarop 
de ondersteuning is georganiseerd, uitgevoerd en gefinancierd, verschilt in de 
onderzochte landen. In Zweden en het Verenigd Koninkrijk richt men zich op 
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vroegtijdige VWNW interventies. In Zweden gebeurt dat via de transitiefondsen 
en in het Verenigd Koninkrijk door de Rapid Response Service en het Reponse to 
Redundancy Programme. De ondersteuning aangeboden via de Rapid Response 
Service is flexibel en aangepast aan de behoeften van de werkgever en de boven-
tallige werknemer. Het doel van het Response to Redundancy programme is het 
aanbieden van beroepsonderwijs gericht op het ontwikkelen van vaardigheden 
van de boventallige medewerker die aansluiten bij de behoeften van rekrute-
rende werkgevers. In Oostenrijk is de VWNW ondersteuning georganiseerd via de 
verschillende arbeidsstichtingen. 
In Spanje is er geen directe actieve VWNW ondersteuning. In het licht van preven-
tie van werkloosheid werd het Spaanse Tripartiete Fonds voor Beroepsopleidingen 
en Trainingen (La Fundación Tripartita para la Formación en el Empleo) genoemd 
in de interviews. Dit is een nationaal fonds dat wordt bestuurd door de overheid, 
vakbonden en werkgeversorganisaties. Het fonds biedt financiële ondersteuning 
aan bedrijven en werknemers die beroepsgerichte trainingen of opleidingen 
willen volgen. Het fonds is niet gericht op VWNW trajecten, maar de trainingen 
die worden aangeboden aan werknemers kunnen wel als preventie van werkloos-
heid worden beschouwd. 
 
In alle onderzochte landen wordt een ontslagvergoeding aangeboden aan boven-
tallige medewerkers. De duur en de hoogte van de ontslagvergoedingen variëren 
tussen de onderzochte landen. In 2003 is het Oostenrijkse ontslagsysteem 
hervormd. In het oude systeem (Abfertigung Alt) was het minder aantrekkelijk om 
van baan te wisselen wanneer men langer bij dezelfde werkgever in dienst was. 
De werknemer verloor de ontslagvergoeding wanneer hij vrijwillig van baan 
veranderde. De ontslagvergoeding moest door de werkgever wel uitgekeerd wor-
den, wanneer de werknemer met pensioen ging. In de nieuwe wet (Abfertigung 
Neu) is de ontslagvergoeding die wordt uitgekeerd aan het eind van de arbeids-
overeenkomst, vervangen door een maandelijkse bijdrage (1.53%) in een 
individueel fonds (Mitarbeitervorsorgekassen). Wanneer werkgevers in de laatste 
twee jaar bijdragen in het fonds hebben gestort en het ontslag niet op initiatief 
van de werknemer is, kan de ontslagvergoeding direct worden uitgekeerd. Wan-
neer niet aan deze twee criteria wordt voldaan, blijft het geld in het fonds en 
wordt het meegenomen naar de nieuwe werkgever (Rugzakprincipe). De opge-
bouwde rechten worden op zijn laatst uitgekeerd wanneer de werknemer met 
pensioen gaat. Het bedrag wordt uitgekeerd aan de werknemer en is vrij besteed-
baar. De hervormingen uit 2003 zouden de mobiliteit en flexibiliteit op de 
arbeidsmarkt moeten vergroten, maar verbetert de employability van de betrok-
ken werknemers niet. Doel van de nieuwe wet is het bevorderen van mobiliteit op 
de arbeidsmarkt, het aanpakken van liquiditeitsproblemen van bedrijven die de 
ontslagvergoeding niet kunnen betalen, het vergroten van de doelgroep en het 
uitbreiden van de tweede pijler aan pensioenrechten. Oostenrijk heeft dus het 
traditionele systeem van ontslagvergoedingen dat gebaseerd is op de traditio-
nele arbeidsmarktrelatie tussen één werknemer en één bedrijf, omgevormd tot 
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zijn ze zeer betrokken bij het ontwikkelen van wetgeving en beleid. De arbeids-
stichting (Arbeitsstiftung) is op dit moment een veelgebruikt instrument om een 
periode van werkloosheid te overbruggen. De Oostenrijkse zienswijze van de 
betrokken actoren is dat geld en een sociaal plan waardevol zijn, maar dat boven-
tallige medewerkers het meest geholpen zijn met actieve ondersteuning naar een 
andere baan. Verder kent Oostenrijk trainingsnetwerken (Qualifizierungsver-
bünde). In deze netwerken delen werkgevers de kosten van opleidingen en 
trainingen. Een netwerk bestaat uit minimaal drie bedrijven waarvan ten minste 
50% bestaat uit MKB bedrijven. 
 
In Spanje is er geen VWNW systeem. De wijze van interactie zoals in Zweden 
tussen vakbonden en werkgeversorganisaties ontbreekt in Spanje. De relatie 
tussen de sociale partners kan worden getypeerd als gespannen en het 
onderlinge vertrouwen ontbreekt, terwijl een constructieve dialoog noodzakelijk 
is om VWNW beleid en arrangementen te kunnen ontwikkelen. Bovendien zijn de 
Spaanse actoren, met name de vakbonden en werknemers, vooral gefocust op 
baanzekerheid in plaats van werkzekerheid. Als gevolg van de economische crisis 
voelde de Spaanse overheid zich in 2010 genoodzaakt om arbeidsmarkt hervor-
mingen af te kondigen die vervolgens door de sociale partners geïmplementeerd 
dienen te worden. De vraag is echter of dit gaat gebeuren. De overheid heeft nu 
als prioriteit om de stijgende werkloosheid een halt toe te roepen en focust zich 
op de transitie van inactiviteit naar werk in plaats van VWNW. Echter de 
zorgwekkende financiële situatie met een groot begrotingstekort en het feit dat 
Spanje een groot land is met drie keer zoveel inwoners als Nederland en vijf keer 
zoveel inwoners als Zweden en Oostenrijk, verklaren waarom het voor Spanje 
niet gemakkelijk is om nieuw VWNW beleid te ontwikkelen. In landen met een 
grote arbeidspopulatie en weinig openstaande vacatures is het moeilijker om 
mensen van werk naar werk te helpen dan in landen met een kleinere arbeids-





Het type actieve ondersteuning dat geboden wordt aan boventallige mede-
werkers is vergelijkbaar in Zweden, het Verenigd Koninkrijk en Oostenrijk. Het 
gaat om professionele oriëntatie, job coaching, scholing en training, stages en 
actieve ondersteuning in het zoeken naar ander werk. Echter de manier waarop 
de ondersteuning is georganiseerd, uitgevoerd en gefinancierd, verschilt in de 
onderzochte landen. In Zweden en het Verenigd Koninkrijk richt men zich op 
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vroegtijdige VWNW interventies. In Zweden gebeurt dat via de transitiefondsen 
en in het Verenigd Koninkrijk door de Rapid Response Service en het Reponse to 
Redundancy Programme. De ondersteuning aangeboden via de Rapid Response 
Service is flexibel en aangepast aan de behoeften van de werkgever en de boven-
tallige werknemer. Het doel van het Response to Redundancy programme is het 
aanbieden van beroepsonderwijs gericht op het ontwikkelen van vaardigheden 
van de boventallige medewerker die aansluiten bij de behoeften van rekrute-
rende werkgevers. In Oostenrijk is de VWNW ondersteuning georganiseerd via de 
verschillende arbeidsstichtingen. 
In Spanje is er geen directe actieve VWNW ondersteuning. In het licht van preven-
tie van werkloosheid werd het Spaanse Tripartiete Fonds voor Beroepsopleidingen 
en Trainingen (La Fundación Tripartita para la Formación en el Empleo) genoemd 
in de interviews. Dit is een nationaal fonds dat wordt bestuurd door de overheid, 
vakbonden en werkgeversorganisaties. Het fonds biedt financiële ondersteuning 
aan bedrijven en werknemers die beroepsgerichte trainingen of opleidingen 
willen volgen. Het fonds is niet gericht op VWNW trajecten, maar de trainingen 
die worden aangeboden aan werknemers kunnen wel als preventie van werkloos-
heid worden beschouwd. 
 
In alle onderzochte landen wordt een ontslagvergoeding aangeboden aan boven-
tallige medewerkers. De duur en de hoogte van de ontslagvergoedingen variëren 
tussen de onderzochte landen. In 2003 is het Oostenrijkse ontslagsysteem 
hervormd. In het oude systeem (Abfertigung Alt) was het minder aantrekkelijk om 
van baan te wisselen wanneer men langer bij dezelfde werkgever in dienst was. 
De werknemer verloor de ontslagvergoeding wanneer hij vrijwillig van baan 
veranderde. De ontslagvergoeding moest door de werkgever wel uitgekeerd wor-
den, wanneer de werknemer met pensioen ging. In de nieuwe wet (Abfertigung 
Neu) is de ontslagvergoeding die wordt uitgekeerd aan het eind van de arbeids-
overeenkomst, vervangen door een maandelijkse bijdrage (1.53%) in een 
individueel fonds (Mitarbeitervorsorgekassen). Wanneer werkgevers in de laatste 
twee jaar bijdragen in het fonds hebben gestort en het ontslag niet op initiatief 
van de werknemer is, kan de ontslagvergoeding direct worden uitgekeerd. Wan-
neer niet aan deze twee criteria wordt voldaan, blijft het geld in het fonds en 
wordt het meegenomen naar de nieuwe werkgever (Rugzakprincipe). De opge-
bouwde rechten worden op zijn laatst uitgekeerd wanneer de werknemer met 
pensioen gaat. Het bedrag wordt uitgekeerd aan de werknemer en is vrij besteed-
baar. De hervormingen uit 2003 zouden de mobiliteit en flexibiliteit op de 
arbeidsmarkt moeten vergroten, maar verbetert de employability van de betrok-
ken werknemers niet. Doel van de nieuwe wet is het bevorderen van mobiliteit op 
de arbeidsmarkt, het aanpakken van liquiditeitsproblemen van bedrijven die de 
ontslagvergoeding niet kunnen betalen, het vergroten van de doelgroep en het 
uitbreiden van de tweede pijler aan pensioenrechten. Oostenrijk heeft dus het 
traditionele systeem van ontslagvergoedingen dat gebaseerd is op de traditio-
nele arbeidsmarktrelatie tussen één werknemer en één bedrijf, omgevormd tot 
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een breder opgezet landelijk systeem van fondsvorming.  
 
Wie komt in aanmerking voor de ondersteuning? 
In Zweden en Oostenrijk kunnen zowel grote als kleine bedrijven participeren in 
respectievelijk de transitiefondsen en de arbeidsstichtingen. Vanaf 2012, zal met 
de invoering van een transitieovereenkomst in de Zweedse gemeentelijke sector, 
het merendeel van de Zweedse werknemers met een vast contract onder een 
transitieovereenkomst vallen en recht hebben op actieve VWNW ondersteuning. 
Zweedse werknemers met een tijdelijk contract komen niet in aanmerking voor 
ondersteuning via de transitiefondsen. De selectie criteria voor wie kan deelne-
men in een Oostenrijkse arbeidsstichting worden bepaald door het bedrijf, de 
ondernemingsraad of vakbond en de publieke arbeidsvoorziening. In het alge-
meen kunnen mensen die hun baan hebben verloren en die recht hebben op een 
werkloosheidsuitkering toetreden tot een dergelijke stichting. 
In het verleden werden gedwongen ontslagen bij Britse MKB bedrijven niet altijd 
opgemerkt door Jobcentre Plus, de Britse publieke arbeidsvoorzieningsorgani-
satie. Sinds de introductie van een ‘early warning’ systeem in oktober 2009 delen 
de Insolvency Trade Body R3, de Insolvency Service en Jobcentre Plus informatie 
met betrekking tot mogelijke baanverliezen in bedrijven die in moeilijke omstan-
digheden verkeren. Britse werknemers die met ontslag worden bedreigd of van 
wie inmiddels het ontslag is aangezegd, kunnen gebruik maken van de al 
genoemde Rapid Response Service en het Response to Redundancy Programme. 
 
Financiering 
Zweedse werkgevers betalen periodiek 0.3% over de totale loonsom aan een 
transitiefonds. Deze private fondsen worden bestuurd en beheerd door de vak-
bonden en werkgeversorganisaties. Op het eerste gezicht lijkt het of alleen 
werkgevers deze fondsen financieren. Echter, uit de interviews kwam naar voren 
dat werknemers indirect meebetalen. In ruil voor de financiële werkgeversbijdra-
ge aan het transitiefonds, is het gebruikelijk dat loonsverhogingen niet of in 
beperkte mate worden doorgevoerd in de collectieve overeenkomsten. Deze uit-
ruil maakt dus deel uit van het onderhandelingsproces tussen werkgeversorgani-
saties en vakbonden. 
 
De diensten van de Britse Rapid Response Service zijn voor de boventallige 
werknemers en bedrijven gratis. Jobcentre Plus ontvangt financiering van het 
Department of Work and Pensions op basis van strategische doelstellingen en 
management targets. Het budget voor de RRS is na de crisis van 2008 verhoogd 
en bedroeg in 2009/2010 GBP 12 miljoen (EUR 13.670.000 euro). Het Response to 
Redundancy programma is onderdeel van een pakket aan crisis maatregelen en de 
Skills Funding Agency heeft een budget van GBP 100 miljoen (EUR 113.920.000 
euro) om boventallige medewerkers te ondersteunen. De helft van dit budget 
wordt gefinancierd vanuit ESF middelen, de andere helft door het “Train to Gain” 




De financiering van een Oostenrijkse arbeidsstichting hangt af van het type 
stichting (onderneming, sectoraal, regionaal, insolventie) en van de onderhande-
lingen tussen het management van het bedrijf, werknemersvertegenwoordigers 
en eventueel met cofinancierders zoals de publieke arbeidsvoorzieningsorga-
nisatie AMS en lokale overheden. 
 
Een ander instrument om werkloosheid te voorkomen zijn de Oostenrijkse trai-
ningsnetwerken. Een dergelijk netwerk bestaat uit ten minste drie bedrijven 
waarvan de helft van de deelnemende bedrijven een MKB-bedrijf is. Doel is geza-
menlijke trainingen aan te bieden voor werknemers die aansluiten bij de behoef-
ten van de werkgevers. De idee is dat de werknemers de opgedane kennis en 
vaardigheden eventueel mee kunnen nemen naar een andere werkgever. De 
publieke arbeidsvoorziening betaalt mee aan de training en de personele kosten, 
mits de training wordt gegeven door een extern opleidingsinstituut. 
Het bedrijf dat mensen moet ontslaan, betaalt een bepaald bedrag aan de 
arbeidsstichting. In de Offene Arbeitsstiftung Wien geldt een gereduceerd tarief 
voor Weense deelnemers die afkomstig zijn van MKB-bedrijven of bedrijven die 
een zwakke financiële positie hebben. 
De financiering komt tot stand via verschillende bronnen. De bijdragen kunnen 
afkomstig zijn van: 
 de werkgevers die mensen boventallig hebben verklaard. Dit kunnen 
financiële bijdragen zijn, maar ook materiële bijdragen zoals het ter beschik-
king stellen van kantoorruimte of technische apparatuur voor opleidingen; 
 boventallige medewerkers (afstand ontslagvergoeding); 
 bijdragen van collega werknemers die niet boventallig zijn verklaard 
(solidariteits contributie); 
 publieke financiering (AMS, regionale, lokale overheid). 
 
Het Spaanse tripartiete fonds voor beroepsopleidingen (La Fundación Tripartita 
para la Formación en el Empleo) is een nationaal fonds dat financiële onder-
steuning biedt aan bedrijven en werknemers die beroepsgerichte trainingen of 
opleidingen willen volgen. Op het brutoloon wordt 0.70% ingehouden dat wordt 
gestort in een nationaal fonds voor trainingen. Van deze 0.70% neemt de werk-
gever 0.60% voor haar rekening, de resterende 0.10% betaalt de werknemer. In 
eerste instantie richtte het fonds zich enkel op opleidingen voor werknemers. 
Sinds een wetswijziging in 2007 behoren ook werklozen tot de doelgroep van het 
fonds. Van de totale middelen die het fonds in 2010 tot haar beschikking heeft 
(EUR 2.571.633.130), wordt 60% besteed aan opleidingen voor werknemers en 
40% aan werklozen. Het Europees Sociaal Fonds gaf in 2010 een subsidie van 
EUR 250.000.000 aan het fonds (Fundación Tripartita para la Formación en el 
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Zweedse werkgevers en vakbonden hebben een belangrijke rol in de VWNW acti-
viteiten en het afsluiten van transitie-akkoorden. De hulp die wordt aangeboden 
en de wijze waarop dit is georganiseerd, verschilt per fonds. Individuele bedrijven 
kunnen gebruik maken van de financiële ondersteuning vanuit de transitie-
fondsen, maar bij voldoende middelen kunnen zij ook zelf interne programma’s 
of speciale afdelingen opzetten met het doel boventallige werknemers aan ander 
werk te helpen (route 2). De derde route die gevolgd kan worden, is de publieke 
route. De publieke arbeidsvoorzieningsorganisatie kan werklozen ondersteuning 
bieden. Het gaat dan om een indirecte transitie: van werk naar werkloosheid en 
hopelijk weer snel terug naar werk. De publieke arbeidsvoorzieningsorganisatie 
besteedt activiteiten uit aan private marktpartijen. Deze vierde route, via private 
dienstverleners, staat in vergelijking met Nederland echter nog in de kinderschoe-
nen. Ook individuele bedrijven kunnen rechtstreeks gebruik maken van private 
diensten, bijvoorbeeld via outplacementbedrijven. 
 
In een reorganisatie concentreren Britse vakbonden zich op het onderhandelen 
van de ‘beste deal’ voor de werknemers. In de eerste plaats richten de onderhan-
delingen zich op het voorkomen van ontslagen en als dat onvermijdelijk is dan zal 
men strijden voor een ontslagvergoeding die hoger is dan het wettelijk minimum. 
De onderhandelingen gaan ook over het bevriezen van lonen in ruil voor baan-
zekerheid. Er vinden nauwelijks onderhandelingen plaats over het bieden van 
ondersteuning naar ander werk en de rol van werkgeversorganisaties is op dit 
terrein beperkt.  
De overheid vervult een rol in het VWNW traject via de reguliere werkzaamheden 
van de Jobcentres, maar ook via programma’s zoals de RRS en R2R. In de RRS zijn 
bij grote reorganisaties naast de publieke arbeids-voorzieningsorganisatie andere 
partners vertegenwoordigd, zoals de Skills Funding Agency, de Kamer van 
Koophandel, lokale overheden en de Regional Development Agencies. In het 
verleden zijn Task Forces opgericht om de gevolgen van een grootschalige 
reorganisatie op te vangen. Via een open offerte procedure wordt bepaald welke 
training- of opleidingsinstituten de opdracht krijgen om de opleidingen voor 
boventallige medewerkers te verzorgen, bijvoorbeeld in het kader van het 
Response to Redundancy Programme. Over het algemeen gaat het om één of 
twee trainingsorganisaties per regio. Noemenswaardig zijn verder de Local 
Employment Partnerships (LEP) die sinds 2007 bestaan. In eerste instantie zijn 
deze netwerken opgericht om mensen met een grote afstand tot de arbeids-
markt in contact te brengen met werkgevers. Jobcentre Plus biedt werkgevers 
die op zoek zijn naar nieuw personeel de mogelijkheid om door Jobcentre Plus de 
screening en selectie te laten verzorgen. Een aantal kandidaten wordt dan aan 
werkgevers voorgesteld, waaronder mensen met een grote afstand tot de 
arbeidsmarkt die anders niet uitgenodigd zouden worden voor een sollicitatie-
gesprek. In 2009 zijn deze LEPs uitgebreid en worden ook medewerkers die net 
hun baan hebben verloren voorgesteld aan werkgevers met vacatures. Indivi-
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duele bedrijven, vooral grote bedrijven met voldoende financiële middelen, 
kunnen outplacementtrajecten inkopen bij private marktpartijen. Dit doen Britse 
bedrijven ook, in het bijzonder voor het begeleiden van mensen op hogere 
posities. Volgens de respondenten in het Verenigd Koninkrijk vervullen vooral 
individuele werkgevers en de overheid de belangrijkste rol als het gaat om het 
ondersteunen van VWNW transities. 
 
De Oostenrijkse overheid en de publieke arbeidsvoorziening spelen een belang-
rijke rol in het snel weer aan het werk helpen van werkzoekenden. De arbeids-
voorzieningsorganisatie AMS is verdeeld in één federale, negen regionale en 99 
locale instanties. Kenmerkend is dat sociale partners op al deze niveaus 
vertegenwoordigd zijn in het bestuur van de publieke arbeidsvoorziening AMS. 
Dit is ook niet verrassend gezien de corporatistische structuur van dit land. De in-
vloed van sociale partners op het arbeidsmarktbeleid is geformaliseerd in bestu-
ren en commissies en gaat vaak verder dan alleen het consulteren. Voordat een 
wet naar het parlement gaat, zijn de details uitvoerig besproken met sociale 
partners. Het gezamenlijke standpunt wordt gewoonlijk als uitgangspunt geno-
men voor het overheidsbeleid. De AMS koopt diensten in bij marktpartijen. 
Meestal gaat het dan om diensten ten aanzien van het verbeteren van de kwalifi-
caties van werkzoekenden. De rol van private marktpartijen groeit, maar is ten 
opzichte van de rol van de overheid/AMS nog beperkt. De stichtingen kunnen 
afhankelijk van het type ‘stiftung’, een initiatief zijn van een individuele onderne-
ming, van meerdere bedrijven of van de overheid/AMS/lokale autoriteit. Bij de 
‘qualifizierungsverbünde’ is sprake van een netwerkbenadering, waarbij finan-
ciering gezocht wordt bij de overheid.  
 
In Spanje is er geen duidelijke verantwoordelijkheidsverdeling als het gaat om 
VWNW transities. Actieve VWNW ondersteuning ontbreekt. Mensen die boven-
tallig worden verklaard, worden in de regel werkloos en ontvangen een uitkering 
van de staat. Het gebrek aan vertrouwen tussen sociale partners en de afwezig-
heid van een duidelijke verantwoordelijkheidsverdeling verklaart mede waarom 





De institutionele omgeving, de betrokken actoren, inclusief hun preferenties en 
capaciteiten, de interactie tussen de actoren en het ontwikkelde beleid (type on-
dersteuning, financiering, wie heeft er recht op en de verantwoordelijkheidsver-
deling) bepalen de uiteindelijke prestaties van een werkzekerheidsysteem.  
Diepgaande evaluaties van het ontwikkelde VWNW beleid en arrangementen in 
de bestudeerde landen waren niet mogelijk in het tijdsbestek van deze disser-
tatie. Toch is de vraag naar de effectiviteit van de genomen beleidsmaatregelen 
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deze netwerken opgericht om mensen met een grote afstand tot de arbeids-
markt in contact te brengen met werkgevers. Jobcentre Plus biedt werkgevers 
die op zoek zijn naar nieuw personeel de mogelijkheid om door Jobcentre Plus de 
screening en selectie te laten verzorgen. Een aantal kandidaten wordt dan aan 
werkgevers voorgesteld, waaronder mensen met een grote afstand tot de 
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gesprek. In 2009 zijn deze LEPs uitgebreid en worden ook medewerkers die net 
hun baan hebben verloren voorgesteld aan werkgevers met vacatures. Indivi-
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duele bedrijven, vooral grote bedrijven met voldoende financiële middelen, 
kunnen outplacementtrajecten inkopen bij private marktpartijen. Dit doen Britse 
bedrijven ook, in het bijzonder voor het begeleiden van mensen op hogere 
posities. Volgens de respondenten in het Verenigd Koninkrijk vervullen vooral 
individuele werkgevers en de overheid de belangrijkste rol als het gaat om het 
ondersteunen van VWNW transities. 
 
De Oostenrijkse overheid en de publieke arbeidsvoorziening spelen een belang-
rijke rol in het snel weer aan het werk helpen van werkzoekenden. De arbeids-
voorzieningsorganisatie AMS is verdeeld in één federale, negen regionale en 99 
locale instanties. Kenmerkend is dat sociale partners op al deze niveaus 
vertegenwoordigd zijn in het bestuur van de publieke arbeidsvoorziening AMS. 
Dit is ook niet verrassend gezien de corporatistische structuur van dit land. De in-
vloed van sociale partners op het arbeidsmarktbeleid is geformaliseerd in bestu-
ren en commissies en gaat vaak verder dan alleen het consulteren. Voordat een 
wet naar het parlement gaat, zijn de details uitvoerig besproken met sociale 
partners. Het gezamenlijke standpunt wordt gewoonlijk als uitgangspunt geno-
men voor het overheidsbeleid. De AMS koopt diensten in bij marktpartijen. 
Meestal gaat het dan om diensten ten aanzien van het verbeteren van de kwalifi-
caties van werkzoekenden. De rol van private marktpartijen groeit, maar is ten 
opzichte van de rol van de overheid/AMS nog beperkt. De stichtingen kunnen 
afhankelijk van het type ‘stiftung’, een initiatief zijn van een individuele onderne-
ming, van meerdere bedrijven of van de overheid/AMS/lokale autoriteit. Bij de 
‘qualifizierungsverbünde’ is sprake van een netwerkbenadering, waarbij finan-
ciering gezocht wordt bij de overheid.  
 
In Spanje is er geen duidelijke verantwoordelijkheidsverdeling als het gaat om 
VWNW transities. Actieve VWNW ondersteuning ontbreekt. Mensen die boven-
tallig worden verklaard, worden in de regel werkloos en ontvangen een uitkering 
van de staat. Het gebrek aan vertrouwen tussen sociale partners en de afwezig-
heid van een duidelijke verantwoordelijkheidsverdeling verklaart mede waarom 





De institutionele omgeving, de betrokken actoren, inclusief hun preferenties en 
capaciteiten, de interactie tussen de actoren en het ontwikkelde beleid (type on-
dersteuning, financiering, wie heeft er recht op en de verantwoordelijkheidsver-
deling) bepalen de uiteindelijke prestaties van een werkzekerheidsysteem.  
Diepgaande evaluaties van het ontwikkelde VWNW beleid en arrangementen in 
de bestudeerde landen waren niet mogelijk in het tijdsbestek van deze disser-
tatie. Toch is de vraag naar de effectiviteit van de genomen beleidsmaatregelen 
belangrijk in het licht van beleidsleren en beleidsovername. Daarom is in deze 
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studie gebruik gemaakt van secundaire data om de vraag te kunnen beant-
woorden of de genomen beleidsmaatregelen in de onderzochte landen succesvol 
zijn. Aan de geïnterviewden is gevraagd of er onafhankelijke evaluaties beschik-
baar zijn. In Zweden en het Verenigd Koninkrijk zijn geen studies beschikbaar 
over de effectiviteit van de VWNW systemen of arrangementen. Van twee 
transitiefondsen zijn de resultaten beschikbaar gesteld aan de onderzoeker. 
Echter de opzet en werkwijze van de transitiefondsen verschillen dermate, dat 
deze resultaten niet gebruikt kunnen worden om generaliserende uitspraken te 
doen over de effectiviteit van de Zweedse transitie-akkoorden en fondsen.  
In het Verenigd Koninkrijk houdt Jobcentre Plus de resultaten niet systematisch 
bij van de Rapid Response Service. De reden daarvoor is dat het te duur is deze 
data te verzamelen. In Oostenrijk zijn wel studies aangetroffen. Een studie uit 
2005 laat zien dat 67% van de deelnemers die een arbeidsstichting verlaten een 
jaar daarna volledig aan het werk is. Echter, deze studie houdt geen rekening met 
de netto effecten van de interventies. In een studie van de Elektra Bregenz 
stichting is wel rekening gehouden met de netto effectiviteit. Hieruit blijkt dat 
75% van de deelnemers die participeerden in een stichting drie maanden na 
afloop van de interventie weer aan het werk was, terwijl dat bij de controlegroep 
(mensen die niet participeerden in de stichting) 49% was. Maar ook dit is een 
voorbeeld van één stichting en net als de Zweedse transitiefondsen verschillen de 
Oostenrijkse stichtingen qua opzet en uitvoering. Op basis van de beschikbare 
secundaire data kunnen dus geen generaliserende uitspraken worden gedaan 
over de effectiviteit van de Oostenrijkse stichtingen. 
 
2. Beleidsleren op het terrein van werkzekerheidsystemen 
 
Hoofdstuk 7 en 8 geven antwoord op de derde onderzoeksvraag. Wat kan 
Nederland beleidsmatig leren van de buitenlandse ervaringen als het gaat om de 
toekomstige ontwikkeling van werkzekerheid? 
 
VWNW in Nederland 
Om op basis van de buitenlandse ervaringen mogelijke beleidslessen voor 
Nederland te kunnen formuleren, is het eerst van belang dat we weten hoe het 
Nederlandse VWNW systeem is georganiseerd.  
 
Nederland heeft geen structureel werkzekerheidsysteem zoals in Zweden. De 
Zweedse transitie-akkoorden maken het mogelijk om via de transitiefondsen 
meteen actieve ondersteuning te bieden wanneer een bedrijf in moeilijkheden 
verkeert en gedwongen is om mensen te ontslaan, terwijl in Nederland meer tijd 
verstrijkt. Een sociaal plan kan worden opgesteld nadat bekend is dat een bedrijf 
geconfronteerd is met boventallige medewerkers. De rol van Nederlandse 
vakbonden bij VWNW transities is minder groot dan in Zweden. Dit kan worden 
verklaard door de lagere organisatiegraad van de Nederlandse vakbonden. In 
Nederland is er sprake van een gefragmenteerd aanbod van VWNW ondersteu-
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ning, dat niet op een structurele maar op een ad hoc basis is georganiseerd via 
sociale plannen, experimenten en tijdelijke maatregelen van de overheid. In 
Nederland is de kans op VWNW ondersteuning groter wanneer je werkt in een 
groot bedrijf dan wanneer je werkzaam bent in het MKB. Het MKB sluit in het 
algemeen geen sociale plannen en heeft vaak niet de financiële middelen om 
mensen van werk naar werk te begeleiden. De geboden ondersteuning in sociale 
plannen hebben vaak betrekking op mensen met een vast contract. Overigens is 
het zo dat waneer er wel een sociaal plan is afgesloten, dit niet automatisch 
betekent dat boventallige medewerkers weten waar ze aan toe zijn, omdat 
informatie over hoe het concrete VWNW aanbod eruit ziet, niet altijd expliciet is 
opgenomen in de sociale plannen. De verdere invulling wordt dan overgelaten 
aan de werkgever en de boventallige medewerker.  
 
Als gevolg van de introductie van de Wet Verbetering Poortwachter in 2002, zijn 
Nederlandse werkgevers verplicht om het loon door te betalen in de eerste twee 
jaren van ziekte of arbeidsongeschiktheid van de werknemers. Veel werkgevers 
waren niet helemaal tevreden met de ondersteuning die private marktpartijen en 
de publieke arbeidsvoorziening boden om de zieke mensen te re-integreren. 
Daarom sloegen werkgevers in een aantal regio’s de handen ineen en richten de 
zogenaamde Poortwachterscentra op. Deze netwerken voor en door werkgevers 
hebben het doel elkaar te helpen bij de re-integratie van ziek en arbeidson-
geschikt personeel. Naar aanleiding van de crisis zetten deze centra zich ook in 
om soepele overgangen van werk naar werk voor met ontslag bedreigde werkne-
mers te bevorderen. Het ontstaan van deze netwerken van bedrijven was niet 
voorzien, maar was het resultaat van veranderingen in de institutionele context. 
Dergelijke netwerken zijn uniek en bestaan niet in de andere onderzochte landen.  
 
Verder heeft de Nederlandse overheid, als gevolg van de economische crisis van 
2008, maatregelen getroffen om mensen snel van werk naar werk te helpen zoals 
de 33 mobiliteitscentra en de negen VWNW experimenten. De experimenten zijn 
in het leven geroepen om te stimuleren dat werkgevers en vakbonden hun 
verantwoordelijkheid gaan nemen als het gaat om VWNW ondersteuning voor 
met werkloosheid bedreigde werknemers en om te bezien wat wel en wat niet 
werkt. De negen goedgekeurde projecten ontvangen een subsidie van EUR 2,500 
per werknemer met een maximum van EUR 500,000 per experiment. De experi-
menten verschillen qua opzet, inhoud, doelgroep, betrokken actoren en dekking 
(regio/sector). Het is duidelijk dat de Nederlandse overheid sociale partners 
stimuleert om hun verantwoordelijkheid ten aanzien van VWNW op te pakken. 
De voorgestelde vitaliteitsregeling die in 2013 in zou moeten gaan is daar, naast 
de VWWN experimenten die nu lopen, een voorbeeld van. De vitaliteitsregeling 
zou het voor werknemers aantrekkelijk moeten maken om te sparen voor 
perioden wanneer het inkomen tijdelijk lager is, bijvoorbeeld in het geval van 
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Mogelijke lessen voor Nederland 
In deze studie is de Nederlandse VWNW aanpak vergeleken met die in de vier 
onderzochte landen. Op basis van de interviews en het aanvullende onderzoeks-
materiaal zijn aan de hand van mogelijke omissies en zwakke plekken in de 
Nederlandse VWNW aanpak, elf lessen gedefinieerd door de onderzoeker. In 
Zweden en het Verenigd Koninkrijk wordt vroegtijdig interventie als een belang-
rijke succesfactor beschouwd voor een snelle VWNW transitie. Een zwak punt in 
de Nederlandse aanpak is de wijze waarop VWNW ondersteuning wordt gefinan-
cierd. Er is geen structurele aanpak zoals in Zweden waar werkgevers een 
bepaald percentage van de loonsom storten in een fonds. In de goede jaren wordt 
er gespaard en in slechte tijden kan een beroep worden gedaan op middelen uit 
het transitiefonds voor de financiering van actieve VWNW ondersteuning. Een 
ander aandachtspunt voor Nederland is de doelgroep. In Nederland is de kans dat 
een boventallig werknemer VWNW ondersteuning krijgt groter wanneer hij een 
vast contract heeft en werkzaam is bij een groot bedrijf, dan wanneer een 
werknemer werkt bij een klein bedrijf of een tijdelijk contract heeft. In Zweden, 
het Verenigde Koninkrijk en Oostenrijk kunnen ook kleine bedrijven aansluiten bij 
de VWNW initiatieven. In Oostenrijk kunnen tevens mensen met een tijdelijk 
contract toetreden tot een arbeidsstichting. In deze stichtingen dragen de 
voormalige werkgevers financieel bij en kan zelfs een bijdrage gevraagd worden 
van de boventallige medewerker zelf of van collega werknemers die niet 
boventallig worden verklaard. Een andere interessant fenomeen dat Nederland 
niet kent, is het contributie gebaseerde systeem van overdraagbare ontslag-
vergoedingen zoals dat in Oostenrijk is ontstaan na de hervormingen in 2003.  
 
Deze mogelijke lessen die door de onderzoeker uit het onderzoeksmateriaal zijn 
afgeleid, zijn vervolgens getoetst en gevalideerd tijdens een expertmeeting die in 
april 2011 is georganiseerd op het Ministerie van SZW. De deelnemende 
organisaties hebben de elf mogelijke lessen gewaardeerd aan de hand van de 
volgende schaalindeling: 
1. Niet interessant/ niet overnemen; 
2. Interessant, maar doet Nederland al voldoende (geen les); 
3. Interessante les, Nederland kan dit element gebruiken als inspiratiebron bij 
het verder ontwikkelen van VWNW beleid; 
4. Interessante les, moet Nederland overnemen, aangepast aan Nederlandse 
situatie; 
5. Interessante les, moet Nederland één op één kopiëren. 
 
Bijna alle deelnemende organisaties zijn van mening dat een actievere rol van 
vakbonden en werkgeversorganisatie, zoals dat bijvoorbeeld in Zweden het geval 
is, gewenst is. Van de 14 deelnemende organisaties vinden 11 organisaties dat 
Nederland dit direct of aangepast aan de Nederlandse situatie, zou moeten 
overnemen. Het snel begeleiden van mensen die met werkloosheid worden 
bedreigd, ziet de meerderheid van de organisaties ook als belangrijke les. Tijdens 
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de discussie werd opgemerkt dat er geen geld verspild moet worden aan mensen 
die het eigenlijk niet nodig hebben en hun eigen zaken kunnen regelen. Daarom 
moet er een kleine ‘adempauze’ worden ingelast, om er voor te zorgen dat men-
sen die zelf in staat zijn snel een andere baan te vinden, worden gescheiden van 
de mensen die begeleiding nodig hebben. Verder vinden bijna alle deelnemende 
organisaties een employability rugzak, geïnspireerd op het nieuwe Oostenrijkse 
ontslagsysteem, een idee dat aanspreekt.  
De deelnemers zijn minder enthousiast over een informatiesysteem waarin 
informatie wordt gedeeld over mogelijke baanverliezen bij bedrijven die in zwaar 
weer verkeren, zodat vroegtijdig actie kan worden ondernomen. Deels omdat 
men het niet nodig vindt, anderzijds omdat organisaties van mening zijn dat 
Nederland al voldoende op dit terrein doet. De meningen zijn het sterkst verdeeld 
over de ‘les’ om in het kader van VWNW kortdurende opleidingen aan te bieden 
die gericht zijn op de behoeften van nieuwe werkgevers. Met name de vakbon-
den vinden dit niet interessant en willen dit niet overnemen als les uit het buiten-
land. Private marktpartijen en de publieke arbeidsvoorzieningsorganisatie vinden 
deze buitenlandse praktijk wel degelijk interessant en zouden het graag één op 
één willen overnemen in Nederland. 
De meerderheid is het niet eens met de stelling dat publieke partijen de hoofdrol 
zouden moeten spelen als het gaat om VWNW ondersteuning in geval van 
gedwongen ontslag en dat indien nodig activiteiten worden uitbesteed aan 
private marktpartijen. In de discussie werd naar voren gebracht dat sociale 
partners een belangrijke rol zouden moeten spelen als het gaat om VWNW 
transities. Daar waar nodig zou de overheid bij kunnen springen. Verder wordt 
opgemerkt dat een onderscheid gemaakt moet worden tussen MKB en het groot 
bedrijf. Een groot bedrijf is gemakkelijker in staat VWNW ondersteuning aan te 
bieden, terwijl MKB bedrijven daar meer moeite mee zullen hebben. 
 
In het tweede gedeelte van de expertbijeenkomst die gehouden is in april 2011 op 
het Nederlandse Ministerie van SZW is aan de Nederlandse experts de vraag 
voorgelegd wat er zou moeten gebeuren ten aanzien van de bevordering van 
VWNW transities in Nederland. De ideeën werden door de deelnemers per orga-
nisatie via de laptop ingevoerd. Ondertussen werden de ingevoerde voorstellen 
geclusterd en ontdubbeld. Vervolgens is aan de deelnemers gevraagd om de 
ingebrachte ideeën te waarderen aan de hand van een 5 puntschaal waarbij ‘1’ 
staat voor absoluut geen goed idee tot ‘5’ een heel goed idee.  
 
Alle deelnemers vinden het (heel) belangrijk dat VWNW ondersteuning 
beschikbaar moet zijn voor alle werknemers en niet alleen voor mensen die onder 
een sociaal plan vallen, of een vaste werkgever hebben. Hetzelfde geldt voor het 
bevorderen van intersectorale mobiliteit. Van de 14 organisaties geven tien orga-
nisaties de hoogste score en vier organisaties geven de score ‘4’ als het gaat om 
het vergroten van de toegankelijkheid. Als het gaat om het bevorderen van inter-
sectorale mobiliteit geven elf van de 14 organisaties de hoogste score. Inter-
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Mogelijke lessen voor Nederland 
In deze studie is de Nederlandse VWNW aanpak vergeleken met die in de vier 
onderzochte landen. Op basis van de interviews en het aanvullende onderzoeks-
materiaal zijn aan de hand van mogelijke omissies en zwakke plekken in de 
Nederlandse VWNW aanpak, elf lessen gedefinieerd door de onderzoeker. In 
Zweden en het Verenigd Koninkrijk wordt vroegtijdig interventie als een belang-
rijke succesfactor beschouwd voor een snelle VWNW transitie. Een zwak punt in 
de Nederlandse aanpak is de wijze waarop VWNW ondersteuning wordt gefinan-
cierd. Er is geen structurele aanpak zoals in Zweden waar werkgevers een 
bepaald percentage van de loonsom storten in een fonds. In de goede jaren wordt 
er gespaard en in slechte tijden kan een beroep worden gedaan op middelen uit 
het transitiefonds voor de financiering van actieve VWNW ondersteuning. Een 
ander aandachtspunt voor Nederland is de doelgroep. In Nederland is de kans dat 
een boventallig werknemer VWNW ondersteuning krijgt groter wanneer hij een 
vast contract heeft en werkzaam is bij een groot bedrijf, dan wanneer een 
werknemer werkt bij een klein bedrijf of een tijdelijk contract heeft. In Zweden, 
het Verenigde Koninkrijk en Oostenrijk kunnen ook kleine bedrijven aansluiten bij 
de VWNW initiatieven. In Oostenrijk kunnen tevens mensen met een tijdelijk 
contract toetreden tot een arbeidsstichting. In deze stichtingen dragen de 
voormalige werkgevers financieel bij en kan zelfs een bijdrage gevraagd worden 
van de boventallige medewerker zelf of van collega werknemers die niet 
boventallig worden verklaard. Een andere interessant fenomeen dat Nederland 
niet kent, is het contributie gebaseerde systeem van overdraagbare ontslag-
vergoedingen zoals dat in Oostenrijk is ontstaan na de hervormingen in 2003.  
 
Deze mogelijke lessen die door de onderzoeker uit het onderzoeksmateriaal zijn 
afgeleid, zijn vervolgens getoetst en gevalideerd tijdens een expertmeeting die in 
april 2011 is georganiseerd op het Ministerie van SZW. De deelnemende 
organisaties hebben de elf mogelijke lessen gewaardeerd aan de hand van de 
volgende schaalindeling: 
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2. Interessant, maar doet Nederland al voldoende (geen les); 
3. Interessante les, Nederland kan dit element gebruiken als inspiratiebron bij 
het verder ontwikkelen van VWNW beleid; 
4. Interessante les, moet Nederland overnemen, aangepast aan Nederlandse 
situatie; 
5. Interessante les, moet Nederland één op één kopiëren. 
 
Bijna alle deelnemende organisaties zijn van mening dat een actievere rol van 
vakbonden en werkgeversorganisatie, zoals dat bijvoorbeeld in Zweden het geval 
is, gewenst is. Van de 14 deelnemende organisaties vinden 11 organisaties dat 
Nederland dit direct of aangepast aan de Nederlandse situatie, zou moeten 
overnemen. Het snel begeleiden van mensen die met werkloosheid worden 
bedreigd, ziet de meerderheid van de organisaties ook als belangrijke les. Tijdens 
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de discussie werd opgemerkt dat er geen geld verspild moet worden aan mensen 
die het eigenlijk niet nodig hebben en hun eigen zaken kunnen regelen. Daarom 
moet er een kleine ‘adempauze’ worden ingelast, om er voor te zorgen dat men-
sen die zelf in staat zijn snel een andere baan te vinden, worden gescheiden van 
de mensen die begeleiding nodig hebben. Verder vinden bijna alle deelnemende 
organisaties een employability rugzak, geïnspireerd op het nieuwe Oostenrijkse 
ontslagsysteem, een idee dat aanspreekt.  
De deelnemers zijn minder enthousiast over een informatiesysteem waarin 
informatie wordt gedeeld over mogelijke baanverliezen bij bedrijven die in zwaar 
weer verkeren, zodat vroegtijdig actie kan worden ondernomen. Deels omdat 
men het niet nodig vindt, anderzijds omdat organisaties van mening zijn dat 
Nederland al voldoende op dit terrein doet. De meningen zijn het sterkst verdeeld 
over de ‘les’ om in het kader van VWNW kortdurende opleidingen aan te bieden 
die gericht zijn op de behoeften van nieuwe werkgevers. Met name de vakbon-
den vinden dit niet interessant en willen dit niet overnemen als les uit het buiten-
land. Private marktpartijen en de publieke arbeidsvoorzieningsorganisatie vinden 
deze buitenlandse praktijk wel degelijk interessant en zouden het graag één op 
één willen overnemen in Nederland. 
De meerderheid is het niet eens met de stelling dat publieke partijen de hoofdrol 
zouden moeten spelen als het gaat om VWNW ondersteuning in geval van 
gedwongen ontslag en dat indien nodig activiteiten worden uitbesteed aan 
private marktpartijen. In de discussie werd naar voren gebracht dat sociale 
partners een belangrijke rol zouden moeten spelen als het gaat om VWNW 
transities. Daar waar nodig zou de overheid bij kunnen springen. Verder wordt 
opgemerkt dat een onderscheid gemaakt moet worden tussen MKB en het groot 
bedrijf. Een groot bedrijf is gemakkelijker in staat VWNW ondersteuning aan te 
bieden, terwijl MKB bedrijven daar meer moeite mee zullen hebben. 
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VWNW transities in Nederland. De ideeën werden door de deelnemers per orga-
nisatie via de laptop ingevoerd. Ondertussen werden de ingevoerde voorstellen 
geclusterd en ontdubbeld. Vervolgens is aan de deelnemers gevraagd om de 
ingebrachte ideeën te waarderen aan de hand van een 5 puntschaal waarbij ‘1’ 
staat voor absoluut geen goed idee tot ‘5’ een heel goed idee.  
 
Alle deelnemers vinden het (heel) belangrijk dat VWNW ondersteuning 
beschikbaar moet zijn voor alle werknemers en niet alleen voor mensen die onder 
een sociaal plan vallen, of een vaste werkgever hebben. Hetzelfde geldt voor het 
bevorderen van intersectorale mobiliteit. Van de 14 organisaties geven tien orga-
nisaties de hoogste score en vier organisaties geven de score ‘4’ als het gaat om 
het vergroten van de toegankelijkheid. Als het gaat om het bevorderen van inter-
sectorale mobiliteit geven elf van de 14 organisaties de hoogste score. Inter-
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sectorale mobiliteit zou gestimuleerd moeten worden wanneer er geen banen 
beschikbaar zijn in de huidige sector. Dit houdt in dat obstakels weggenomen 
moeten worden die intersectorale mobiliteit in de weg staan, zoals het 
ontschotten van de sectorfondsen. Ook zijn partijen het eens dat vroegtijdig 
ondersteuning aangeboden moet worden, met dien verstande dat de 
ondersteuning zich richt op degene die het echt nodig heeft. Op de gedeelde 
derde plaats staat het voorstel om werknemers die hun baan dreigen te verliezen 
de mogelijkheid te bieden een stage te laten volgen bij een andere werkgever 
tijdens hun huidige dienstverband. 
De stakeholders zijn van mening dat aandacht besteed moet worden aan VWNW 
transities voor mensen met een kwetsbare positie op de arbeidsmarkt. Echter, 
het blijft onduidelijk wie dan de ‘lead’ zou moeten nemen om deze mensen te 
ondersteunen. Een uitdaging voor de sociale partners en de overheid is om daar 
duidelijkheid over te scheppen en hierover een gezamenlijk standpunt in te 
nemen. Wanneer dit niet concreet wordt ingevuld, zal niemand zich echt 
verantwoordelijk voelen om ook concreet actie te ondernemen.  
 
Beperkingen van het onderzoek en implicaties voor beleid 
 
De effectiviteit van de VWNW interventies is belangrijk wanneer landen met 
elkaar worden vergeleken om lessen van elkaar te kunnen leren. Deze studie laat 
zien dat er nauwelijks data beschikbaar zijn ten aanzien van de effectiviteit van 
VWNW ondersteuning in de onderzochte landen. In Nederland worden op dit 
moment de negen VWNW experimenten geëvalueerd en het rapport zal naar 
verwachting in 2012 worden gepubliceerd. Wanneer de experimenten succesvol 
blijken te zijn, is het de vraag hoe de werkwijze structureel wordt ingebed zonder 
subsidie van de overheid. Naast deze experimenten bestaan er private netwerken 
die spontaan zijn ontstaan na de introductie van de Wet Verbetering Poort-
wachter in 2002. Deze netwerken door en voor werkgevers, ontvangen geen 
publieke financiering. Presteren deze netwerken net zo goed als de experimenten 
die publiek geld ontvangen of presteren ze beter? En hoe duurzaam zijn deze 
private netwerken? Nader onderzoek is nodig om hierover uitspraken te kunnen 
doen. 
 
Dit onderzoek gaat niet in op vraag of de VWNW systemen en arrangementen 
die in het buitenland zijn aangetroffen, overgenomen kunnen worden door 
Nederland. Zoals gezegd is hier een haalbaarheidstudie voor nodig en een politie-
ke stellingname, hetgeen buiten het kader van dit onderzoek valt. Wel zijn moge-
lijke lessen afgeleid uit het onderzoeksmateriaal door de onderzoeker die 
vervolgens zijn gevalideerd door belangrijke Nederlandse stakeholders. Eén van 
die lessen is dat Nederlandse sociale partners een meer actieve rol zouden kun-
nen spelen in het VWNW proces. De Nederlandse overheid stimuleert sociale 
partners om hun verantwoordelijkheid te nemen en is van plan om een vitaliteits-
regeling in te voeren die het voor werknemers aantrekkelijker moet maken om te 
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sparen voor tijden wanneer het inkomensniveau tijdelijk terugvalt, bijvoorbeeld 
als gevolg van een gedwongen VWNW transitie. De implementatie van deze 
regeling staat gepland voor 2013, maar het is nog maar de vraag of werknemers 
daarvan gebruik gaan maken. Verder wil de overheid dat sociale partners een 
VWNW budget opnemen in CAO’s en daarbij ook aandacht besteden aan 
intersectorale opleidingen. De vraag is of sociale partners daadwerkelijk een 
VWNW budget gaan opnemen in de CAO’s. De overheid hoopt in 2012 een 
overeenkomst te sluiten met sociale partners over hun toekomstige rol in VWNW 
transities. 
 
De Nederlandse overheid heeft onder druk van de economische crisis bezui-
nigingen aangekondigd. In aanloop naar de laatste verkiezingen hebben ver-
schillende politieke partijen het voorstel gedaan om de werkloosheidsuitkering te 
verkorten van maximaal 38 maanden naar 12 maanden en eventueel de hoogte 
van de uitkering te verhogen. In 2008 heeft de Commissie Bakker voorgesteld om 
een werkbudget in te voeren en de werkloosheidsverzekering om te zetten in een 
werkverzekering. Tot op de dag van vandaag is er nog geen invulling aan deze 
voorstellen gegeven, als gevolg van meningsverschillen tussen de betrokken 
actoren. De vitaliteitsregeling die de Nederlandse overheid van plan is om in te 
voeren, bevat wel elementen van het eerder voorgestelde werkbudget. Het blijft 
echter onduidelijk wat de gevolgen zijn van deze voorstellen voor de toekomst. In 
vergelijking met de andere onderzochte landen is de maximale duur van de 
Nederlandse werkloosheidsuitkering langer, maar onderzoek is nodig om vast te 
stellen wat de mogelijke effecten zijn van het verkorten van de werkloosheids-
uitkering. Een effect zou kunnen zijn dat mensen de eerste baan aannemen die ze 
kunnen krijgen. Deze baan hoeft niet noodzakelijkerwijs aan te sluiten bij de 
vaardigheden en kennis die iemand bezit. Dit kan uiteindelijk de productiviteit 
negatief beïnvloeden. Ook is het belangrijk de opzegtermijnen in ogenschouw te 
nemen, wanneer men de duur van de uitkering wil verkorten. In Zweden is de 
duur van de werkloosheidsuitkering korter dan in Nederland, maar daar staat wel 
tegenover dat er langere opzegtermijnen zijn en dat meteen actieve ondersteu-
ning geboden kan worden om boventallige medewerkers van werk naar werk te 
helpen. In het licht van de aangekondigde bezuinigingen heeft het UWV WERK-
bedrijf in de nabije toekomst geen re-integratiebudget meer voor mensen die net 
werkloos zijn geworden. De ondersteuning die plaatsvindt, zal bestaan uit E-
coaching. Van vroegtijdige actieve ondersteuning lijkt dan geen sprake meer. 
 
Nederland kent geen structureel VWNW systeem. Dit betekent niet dat er geen 
VWNW ondersteuning aan boventallige medewerkers wordt aangeboden, maar 
het aanbod is gefragmenteerd en heeft een ad hoc karakter. Deze studie maakt 
duidelijk dat vroegtijdige interventie belangrijk is, maar de vraag rijst of een 
structureel systeem nodig is voor alle type medewerkers. De deelnemers aan de 
expertbijeenkomst zijn van mening dat ondersteuning geboden moet worden 
aan boventallig medewerkers die het echt nodig hebben. Wanneer de ondersteu-
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ning in een te vroeg stadium wordt ingezet kan dit de eigen verantwoordelijkheid 
van werknemers en werkgevers beïnvloeden met als resultaat dat er onnodig 
publieke financiering wordt ingezet. Het is echter niet gemakkelijk om het juiste 
tijdstip van interventie te bepalen. Vroegtijdige ondersteuning blijkt belangrijk te 
zijn bij het snel vinden van een andere baan. Bovendien is de kans op langdurige 
werkloosheid groter wanneer men na het ontslag niet snel een andere baan heeft 
gevonden. Hoewel alle Nederlandse stakeholders het eens zijn dat VWNW 
ondersteuning geboden moet worden aan degenen die het echt nodig hebben, 
neemt tot nu nog geen enkele Nederlandse actor de totale verantwoordelijkheid 
voor het coördineren van VWNW transities.  
 
Het is duidelijk dat in de toekomst soepele VWNW transities nodig zijn in een 
globaliserende en steeds veranderende economie en dit vergt acties van over-
heden, werkgeversorganisaties, vakbonden, werkgevers en werknemers zelf. 
VWNW ondersteuning zal ook in de toekomst belangrijk blijven. Temeer omdat 
herstructuringsprocessen altijd plaatsvinden als gevolg van de globalisering en 
innovatiebehoeften en niet alleen afhankelijk zijn van de conjuncturele ontwik-
keling. In sommige sectoren vinden reorganisaties plaats, terwijl in andere sec-
toren er een grote behoefte bestaat aan gekwalificeerd personeel. Europa staat 
aan de vooravond van een nieuwe economische crisis die misschien nog wel 
slechter uitpakt dan de crisis uit 2008. De arbeidmarkt blijkt en blijft imperfect en 
Europese landen moeten beseffen dat er een dringende behoefte bestaat aan het 
overdenken van een structureel werkzekerheidsysteem zodat langdurige werk-
loosheid wordt voorkomen. Door naar andere landen te kijken, kunnen landen 
leren, maar het is niet mogelijk om wat in het ene land succesvol blijkt te zijn, één 
op één over te nemen. De historische verbondenheid tussen verschillende vor-
men van coördinatie en regulering in een bepaald land kan niet worden gene-
geerd. Er is niet een ‘one size fits all’ werkzekerheidsysteem. Padafhankelijkheid 
verklaart de restricties in het leren en overnemen van interessante elementen uit 
buitenlandse systemen, maar wat blijft is de noodzaak voor Europese landen om 
een werkzekerheidsysteem te ontwikkelen dat aansluit bij de nationale context. 
 
